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Statebuilding is widely defined as a comprehensive and external exercise that 
aims to shape economic, security and administrative structures and 
institutions in a post-conflict society by promoting liberal internationalist 
norms. This thesis proposes that the narratives on statebuilding assign limited 
responsibility to international actors engaged in statebuilding, despite its 
comprehensive and intrusive nature: a mismatch dubbed as the 
¨responsibility gap¨.  It continues to propose that the limited attribution of 
responsibility to actors engaged in external statebuilding is possible through 
¨discursive safeguards¨ inherent in the framing of statebuilding. These 
propositions are tested in four stages: a) conducting a frame and discourse 
analysis on statebuilding in order to understand the way international 
responsibilities are framed, b) formulating an alternative framework to 
attribute responsibility by utilizing perspectives on moral responsibility, c) 
comparing these two frameworks to identify a responsibility gap in the way 
the statebuilding frame attributes responsibility to external actors, d) pointing 
out the discursive safeguards in international narratives that allow sustaining 
the responsibility gaps. As a last step, the propositions are tested through a 














AfP    Agenda for Peace 
CAR   Central African Republic  
CFSP   Common Foreign and Security Policy 
DFID   (UK) Department for International Development 
DPA   Dayton Peace Agreement 1995 
DRC    Democratic Republic of Congo 
EC   European Community 
ECHR   European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights 
ENP   European Neighborhood Policy 
ESDP   European Security and Defense Policy 
ESS   European Security Strategy 
EU   European Union 
EUPM  European Union Police Mission 
EUSR   European Union Special Representative 
FAC   EU Foreign Affairs Council 
FBiH   Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
G-77   Group of 77 (countries at the UN) 
ICCPR  UN Internatonal Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICG   International Crisis Group 
IFOR   Implementation Force 
ILC   International Law Commission 
MENA  Middle East and North Africa 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO   Non-governmental organization 
OHR   Office of the High Representative 
OSCE   Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development  
OECD – DAC OECD Development Assistance Committee 
PIC    Peace Implementation Council 
PRST   Presidential Statement 
RS   Republika Srpska (Serb Republic) 
SBC’s   EU Statebuilding Contracts 
SEA   Single European Act 
SFOR   Stabilization Force 
SSR   Security Sector Reform 
TMAF   Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework 
UN   United Nations 
UNDP  United Nations Development Program 
UN PBC  UN Peacebuilding Commission 
	 4	
UNSC   UN Security Council 
US   United States 
































TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 




1.  INTRODUCTION_______________________________________________ 14 
 
1.1  The Puzzle: The Responsibility Gap______________________________ 14 
1.1.1 Introducing the Puzzle ___________________________________ 14 
1.1.2 The evolution and implementation of statebuilding: A literature 
survey_______________________________________________________17 
1.1.3 The Gap: ¨International responsibility¨ in statebuilding _______ 25 
1.1.4 Sustaining the responsibility gap – Discursive safeguards _____ 33 
 
2.  The Way Forward _______________________________________________ 35 
1.2.1The hypothesis and the research question ___________________ 36 
1.2.2 Designing the research ___________________________________ 46 
1.2.3 Chapter breakdown ______________________________________50 
1.2.4 The boundaries of the research ____________________________ 53 
1.2.5 Novelty of the study _____________________________________ 53 




2. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AS AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK __58 
 
2.1.  Defining Responsibility _______________________________________ 59 
2.1.1 Legal responsibility vs. Moral responsibility ________________ 60 
2.1.2 Moral responsibility _____________________________________ 64 
2.1.3 Moral agency ___________________________________________ 66 
 
2.2.  Operationalizing Responsibility ________________________________ 72 
2.2.1 The moral responsibility framework _______________________ 74 
2.2.2 Operationalizing the responsibility framework: Intentions, impact 
and capacity_________________________________________________ 76 
2.2.3The way forward ________________________________________ 82 
 
2.3.  Attributing Responsibility _____________________________________ 83 
2.3.1 Responsibilities of the intervener towards local populations ___ 84 
	 6	
2.3.2 Responsibilities to protect or advance self-interests___________ 86 
2.3.3 Normative responsibilities and identity promotion ___________88 
2.3.4 Dilemmas in the moral responsibility framework ____________ 89 
 
2.4.  Summing Up __________________________________________________93 
 
3. THE FRAMING OF STATEBUILDING: MAIN CONCEPTS, 
PRACTICES AND SHIFTS _________________________________________ 98 
 
3.1  Frame Analysis as a Methodology________________________________ 98 
3.1.1 Setting the goals: Statebuilding, responsibility gaps and discursive 
safeguards___________________________________________________ 98 
3.1.2 Frame analysis __________________________________________ 99 
3.1.3 The way forward _______________________________________ 101 
 
3.2  The Frame of Statebuilding ____________________________________ 104 
3.2.1 Conceptualizing Statebuilding____________________________ 104 
3.2.2 Application of statebuilding: Addressing the ¨capacity gap¨ __114 
3.2.3 The development of statebuilding _________________________121 
 
3.3  Introducing the responsibility gap ______________________________ 123 
3.3.1 International responsibilities and the statebuilding frame ____ 124 
3.3.2 The moral responsibility framework and statebuilding _______127 
3.3.3 The responsibility gap ___________________________________133 
 
3.4  Introducing Discursive Safeguards _____________________________ 136 
3.4.1 Challenging the statebuilding frame: Competing discourses _ 137 
3.4.2 Examples of discursive safeguards ________________________139 
 
4. THE EU, STATEBUILDING AND RESPONSIBILITY ______________ 143 
 
4.1  Framing the EU as an External Statebuilding Actor _______________ 143 
4.1.1 The EU and the statebuilding frame _______________________144 
4.1.2 The EU as a unique actor ________________________________ 148 
 
4.2  The EU in Conflict Resolution: Policies, Tools and Capacities _____ 150 
4.2.1 The development of the EU as a foreign policy actor ________ 150 
4.2.2 The operationalization of EU foreign policy ________________ 155 
4.2.3 The EU and statebuilding guidelines ______________________ 158 
4.2.4 The EU and the statebuilding frame _______________________ 160 
 
4.3.  – The EU and Statebuilding: Responsibilities, Problems and Discursive 
Safeguards _______________________________________________________162 
	 7	
4.3.1 The EU in the moral responsibility framework______________ 163 
4.3.2 The responsibility gap  __________________________________ 171 
4.3.3 Discursive safeguards ___________________________________ 174 




5. STATEBUILDING IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ____________ 183 
 
5.1  The Evolution of Statebuilding in Bosnia ________________________ 185 
5.1.1 The War in Bosnia ______________________________________ 185 
5.1.2 The Dayton Peace Accords  ______________________________ 187 
5.1.3 The early post-Dayton years: Initial optimism ______________ 189 
5.1.4 Comprehensive and intrusive statebuilding ________________ 191 
5.1.5 Attempts to exit ________________________________________ 196 
 
5.2  The Statebuilding Framework in Bosnia _________________________ 203 
5.2.1 The security dimension  _________________________________ 205 
5.2.2 The institutional dimension ______________________________ 208 
5.2.3 Human rights and democracy ____________________________ 211 
5.2.4 Economy and development ______________________________ 213 
 
5.3  The EU and the Statebuilding Frame in Bosnia ___________________ 215 
 
6. FRAMING EUROPE’S RESPONSIBILITIES IN BOSNIA ___________ 218 
 
6.1  The EU and the Moral Responsibility Framework ________________ 218 
6.1.1 Establishing agency _____________________________________ 218 
6.1.2 Operationalizing moral responsibility of the EU in Bosnia  ___ 224 
6.1.3 The direction of the EU’s responsibilities  __________________ 232 
 
6.2  Responsibility Gaps and Discursive Safeguards __________________ 234 
6.2.1 Responsibility gaps in Bosnia  ____________________________ 234 
6.2.2 Responding to criticisms to the statebuilding frame: Discursive 
safeguards  _________________________________________________ 240 
6.2.3 Responsibility Gaps and Discursive Safeguards  ____________ 249 
 







One of the most enjoyable parts of life as an expat in a conflict or post-conflict 
country is the after work socializing. International aid workers, development 
experts, security sector specialists and political officers can often be found in 
the small number of ¨expat-friendly¨ places, discussing their experiences, 
roles and visions. And with the elevation of external statebuilding, also 
referred to as the external construction of functioning states as one of the most 
widely accepted models of conflict prevention and the application of this 
model in theatres as diverse as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Palestine, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the promises, implementation and failures of individual 
statebuilding projects appear often on the global agenda. I have been lucky 
enough to spend days and nights speaking with many intellectual, driven and 
compassionate people about the underlying reasons why violent conflicts 
occur and where the possible solutions lie. Although the names of these 
people cannot be included here for practical reasons, they inspired and 
catalyzed this study.  
 
As I engaged in formal and informal debates in various statebuilding 
contexts, it became clear that those engaged in the activity had questions 
about its nature, even though we were deeply engaged in its implementation. 
For example: Could sustainable peace and stability be imposed from the 
outside? What was the correct balance between international intervention and 
local ownership? What norms and values should intervention be based on? 
How and to what extent could the international community help? When was 
the right time to exit? Who was statebuilding really benefitting? In my head, 
all of these were related to one main question: Who was responsible for 
statebuilding, and what was the extent of this responsibility? These were the 
starting points of my research.  
 
From 2006 to 2008, I was posted to Sarajevo as a junior diplomat. Since then, a 
consensus seems to be forming, which holds that many years of external 
efforts and donor aid spent on reforming legal systems, security structures 
and public institutions and on promoting higher standards of human rights 
and democracy have not achieved sustainable peace and stability in Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, among other places. When one 
wonders who is responsible for this lack of progress, the answers vary. Some 
will say that regional instabilities, violent histories and/or the undemocratic 
local culture prevent sustainable statebuilding efforts.  Many will talk about 
the well-intentioned international efforts to reform the country in question, 
which have not been fully successful due to operational and technical failures 
in the reconstruction efforts, and will suggest ways these can be overcome 
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with certain adjustments in policy and practice. There will be those who 
define the post-conflict intervention as a neocolonial project, insensitive to 
actual local needs. Some will trace the origins of the conflict to previous 
external interventions and conclude that external intervention in any form 
does not work. In short, there seems to be no consensus regarding 
responsibility for statebuilding. I saw this too, in my subsequent diplomatic 
work in Israel, Palestine and Afghanistan. These shaped my aim of 
understanding how the discourse on responsibility is constructed and 
operationalized in post-conflict interventions.  
 
To continue with Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Union (EU) has 
openly declared its commitment on several occasions to Bosnia, initially as a 
secondary actor supporting US efforts, and later as a lead actor willing to 
assume collective responsibility in bringing sustainable peace, stability and 
prosperity to the country. It has constantly reaffirmed these intentions, for 
example at the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia when Luxembourg 
Foreign Minister Poos’s remarked that ¨the hour of Europe¨ had arrived, or 
when the United Nations Security Council declared in 2005 that Bosnia was 
moving from the ¨era of Dayton to the era of Brussels¨1. The previous EU 
Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, during a commemoration speech he 
delivered 10 years after the Srebrenica genocide, touched upon “the major 
responsibilities of the EU” in ensuring peace and stability and in enhancing 
democracy and prosperity in the European continent, emphasizing both 
European security and European values. A joint report written by former 
High Representative of the EU Solana and Rehn in 2006 regarding a possible 
transition from the international administration (OHR) to an EU-led presence, 
stated that “the revised EUSR mandate should continue to concentrate on political 
and security-related issues, including residual responsibilities of the Dayton/Paris 
Peace Agreement” 2.  
 
In addition to the commitments, the EU has also engaged in the 
comprehensive neo-liberal statebuilding project in Bosnia, impacting the lives 
and futures of many affected by the program. The international community 
was instrumental in the formulation of the Dayton Peace Agreement that 
ended the war in Bosnia. Dayton was not only a ceasefire document; it 
highlighted the future direction that Bosnia was supposed to take: For 
example, the constitution of the country is the Fourth Annex of this 
agreement. The international community steered Bosnia beyond Dayton as 																																																								
1 See Security Counctil Press Release on its 5506th Meeting (AM), “BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
READY TO ENTER ‘POST-DAYTON’ ERA JUST 10 YEARS”, available at 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8558.doc.htm. (Accessed on 19 February 2016).  
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina: Summary note on joint report by EUHR Solana and EU Commissioner Rehn 
on a Reinforced EU Presence, 17 October 2006: Brussels 
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well, through the vast executive powers given to the international High 
Representative in the country as well as the conditionality brought by the 
promise of EU enlargement. These imply that the external actors have an 
important share in the responsibility of the construction of the country.  
 
However, after 2006, Bosnia was failing to progress toward becoming a fully 
sustainable state on its way to EU accession. Indeed, the country’s political 
situation started to deteriorate. Bosnia had been championed as one of the 
triumphs of international statebuilding or peacebuilding efforts; but now, the 
Dayton Constitution was increasingly under attack by local parties. 
Fundamental divisions persisted, even deepened, on such issues such as 
territorial integrity, national identity and legitimacy of the state (ICG: 2012).  
 
As the situation continued to deteriorate in terms of the goals and ambitions 
of the statebuilding project, the tone of statements changed dramatically to 
suggest that it was high time to transfer responsibility back to the local 
population. Bosnians, the rhetoric went, should vote for moderate reform-
oriented parties3, find an agreement on how to reform the police, or to devise 
a more inclusive system of governance that would encompass all segments of 
the society (Leroux-Martin: 2013). 4 With these critiques, the international 
community seemed to be retaining for itself the power to set the vision and 
the benchmarks of progress for Bosnia; while declaring follow-up and 
implementation to be the responsibility of the Bosnians. Swedish Foreign 
Minister and former High Representative Carl Bildt put it bluntly in 2008 
when he said “if Bosnia is falling behind, the responsibility is not of the 
international community, is not of the EU, but the responsibility lies with the leaders 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”  
 
This dynamic was apparent to those of us working in Sarajevo. I clearly 
remember a European colleague working for the Organization of Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the mid 2000s – an institution that was 
responsible for intrusive democratization and electoral design in the country 
– stating that ¨the international community should feel no (additional) responsibility 
whatsoever to Bosnia, and on the contrary, Bosnia owed the international community 
for all the progress it achieved¨. A friend working for the EU attributed the lack 
of progress in Bosnia to the country’s unwillingness to join Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, and was flabbergasted why ¨the Bosnians would not want to join a 
community of 400 million diverse Europeans¨. The Bosnian own narratives were 
different. Whichever ethnic community was speaking out, it tended to place 
responsibility for the problems of Bosnia on the international intervention, 																																																								
3 Hawton, N. (2002), ¨Europe is increasingly present in Bosnia’s affairs¨, BBC  
4 Hopkins, V. (2012), ¨Bosnia risks state failure¨, ICG warns¨, at www.balkaninsight.com.  
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and later, the EU. The statebuilders had failed to reverse ethnic cleansing or to 
facilitate sufficient refugee returns, had unnecessarily intruded into the local 
dynamics of the country, or had favored one community over another.  
 
This dynamic is not confined to Bosnia. I have been confronted with similar 
confusion about what international responsibilities might entail in my 
postings in Israel/Palestine and Afghanistan. For instance, regarding the 
Middle East Peace Process, the EU committed itself many times to delivering 
humanitarian and emergency support, assisting the security sector reform, 
rule of law and institution-building efforts, as well as providing support to 
the sustained growth of the Palestinian economy all in support of the two 
state solution5. Yet, despite the political underpinnings of these acts, EU 
narratives defined its responsibilities mainly in technical terms. For instance, 
the former EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) Solana, during a joint press conference in Ramallah in August 2009, 
has strongly endorsed Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s comments 
that “establishing the Palestinian state and its institutions is solely a 
Palestinian responsibility” 6 . Once again, the international community’s 
intrusive involvement in Afghanistan, ranging from constitution-design to 
security sector reform and reshaping administrative structures did not match 
its narratives on responsibility. In 2012, a Tokyo Mutual Accountability 
Framework (TMAF) was accepted to draw the future support architecture for 
Afghanistan, which stated that ¨the international community’s ability to 
sustain support for Afghanistan depends on the Afghan government 
delivering on its commitments described in the Tokyo framework¨ - a 
conditional responsibility not matching the intrusive decisions made by 
external actors7.  
 
In short, external statebuilding, which has been in many ways so highly 
structuralized, formalized, well-thought and fine-tuned, seems to not have 
sufficiently formulated sufficiently clear-cut definitions on the origin and 
scope of the responsibilities of the local or external actors (Hameiri: 2009, 
Chandler: 2006, Paris: 2007). The goal of this research is to understand the 
persistence of the apparent mismatch between the comprehensive nature of 
statebuilding and the responsibilities that external actors are ready to assume.  																																																								
5 See, for example, the remarks of Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security and Rule of Law 
today, Monday 24 June 2008, Berlin; or the opening remarks by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European 
Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, at the Annapolis 
International Conference on the Middle East, 26 November 2007, Annapolis. 
6  Earthtimes Extra: Solana: Europe supports Palestinian Premier’s state vision, 
http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/283611,extra-solana-europe-supports-palestinian-premiers-
state-vision.html 







































1.1 The Puzzle: The responsibility gap  
 
1.1.1 Introducing the puzzle: 
 
As of this writing, four years after the outbreak of riots in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) in 2011, popularly referred to as the “Arab Spring,” 
global news headlines are reporting daily on new crises in Iraq, Syria, Libya, 
and Yemen. The coverage indicates how the MENA region has been shifting 
away from democracy, prosperity, security, stability and development. The 
agenda of the UN Security Council, the institution responsible for 
maintaining international peace and stability, is full, attempting to respond to 
outbreaks of violence not only in MENA, but in Ukraine, Central African 
Republic, Mali, South Sudan and Afghanistan. Even Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which was being hailed only a decade ago as the “success story” of 
international intervention, seems to be hostage to inflammatory rhetoric, 
ethnic and political divisions and heightened threats to stability. 
 
It is interesting to observe how UN veterans—people in management 
positions today who have been in the organization since the 1990s—are 
increasingly drawing parallels between the number of violent conflicts today 
and in the first years after the end of the Cold War.  Throughout the early 
1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the international community, the UN 
and the EU repeatedly failed to respond adequately to bloodbaths—in 
Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. These failures led to soul-
searching about what the international response to conflict should be, and 
statebuilding was one of the answers the international community came up 
with.  
 
Statebuilding has been widely defined as a comprehensive and external 
exercise that aims to shape economic, security and administrative structures 
and institutions in a post-conflict society by promoting liberal internationalist 
norms (Zartman: 1995, Mallaby: 2002, Chesterman: 2004, Paris: 2002, 
Fukuyama: 2004, Berger and Weber: 2006, Hehir and Robinson: 2007, Ghani 
and Lockhart: 2008, Lake: 2010, Newman: 2010, Chandler: 2006, Zaum: 2009, 
Chomsky: 2007, World Bank: 1997, RAND: 2007, OECD-DAC: 2008, OECD: 
2009, The Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction: 2003, Kirsti: 2006, 
DFID: 2010).  In January 2011, for example, a Presidential Statement (PRST) 
issued by the Security Council sustained this definition, drawing strong 
parallels between effective, stable and sustainable institutions in a given 
country and the prevention of renewed violence.  
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Statebuilding concepts have been implemented in many contexts since the 
mid 1990s—including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan; 
Palestine and Iraq. Its elements are often presented regarded as the best way 
to achieve sustainable international peace and stability, and to legitimize 
comprehensive external involvement in conflict and post-conflict countries. 
According to the RAND Corporation (2007), “Western governments 
increasingly accept that nation-building has become an inescapable 
responsibility.” Similarly, the European Security Strategy (2003) claims that 
“Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective 
policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments 
serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil 
government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to 
such multi-faceted situations.” 
 
Many interventions have produced positive results in the short run, by 
putting an end to violence, improving security, imposing the basic tenets of 
democracy and human rights and enabling immediate economic growth. But 
in the long run, addressing the root causes of conflicts and bringing a lasting 
end to conflict, in order to establish fully functional states, have been bigger 
challenges (Chesterman: 2004, Paris: 2002, Berger and Weber: 2006, Ghani and 
Lockhart: 2008). The number and intensity of the latest conflicts worldwide, 
including in theatres where comprehensive statebuilding projects have been 
implemented, such as Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan, increasingly raises 
question marks about whether externally funded and driven statebuilding 
projects can provide sustainable solutions to violent conflict. 
 
That the world’s nation states bear primary responsibility for preventing 
violent conflict and protecting civilians is well established in the international 
system. Yet, when external actors become involved in comprehensive 
activities in post-conflict countries such as “establishing effective institutions, 
(re)creating a social fabric and fostering healthy civil society,” this might 
indicate their heightened responsibility for conflict prevention and the 
protection of civilians—especially when these statebuilding activities fall 
short of delivering on their promise of lasting stability and peace (Call and 
Cook: 2003). In other words, engaging in statebuilding might imply important 
responsibilities for involved international actors. Based on these points, one 
goal of this thesis will be to investigate how the responsibilities of 
international actors are defined by international narratives on statebuilding, 
and whether these narratives accurately connect the concept of international 
responsibilities to the comprehensiveness of the task of statebuilding. 
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A cursory look at the way international responsibilities are framed in 
statebuilding indicates that neither the concept of “responsibility”, nor the 
principles outlined that would help interested parties to assess “responsible” 
behavior, are defined with clarity (Mayer: 2008b, Erskine: 2003). Although 
there have been many efforts to structuralize, enhance and fine-tune the 
application of statebuilding in various contexts, it appears that these efforts 
have not sufficiently extended to the discursive domain regarding 
responsibility. In other words, there seems to be a lack of clear-cut, well-
defined, standardized formulations of international responsibilities in 
statebuilding, where these responsibilities begin and when they should end.  
 
Such “non-definitions or inconsistencies (...) can lead to attributing duties or 
responsibilities to [some] institutions beyond their capabilities, while leaving 
more appropriate actors off the hook,” creating a risk that responsibilities 
could be defined selectively and changed arbitrarily, possibly based on the 
evolving capabilities and interests of external actors, as much as global 
realities and new threat perceptions (Erskine: 2003). This means that when a 
statebuilding project falters, blame can be shifted to factors such as regional 
politics, entrenched internal conflicts, or ancient hatreds, without necessarily 
conveying ways the international presence could have been responsible for 
insufficient progress toward the establishment of functioning, efficient and 
sustainable states. International debates about “what went wrong” tend to 
focus on operational and technical failures, rather than inherent problems 
related to the application of the statebuilding frame (RAND: 2007, OECD-
DAC: 2008). Thus, another of this thesis’s intentions will be to look into the 
“discourse of responsibility,” and assess whether, in the absence of clear 
definitions of external responsibilities, the international discourse is 
structured in a way that allows international actors to frame their 
responsibilities in a narrower manner than what they may actually be.  
 
Statebuilding has evolved constantly since the end of the Cold War. This 
evolution has been shaped by the changing global context, the interests, 
available resources and threat perceptions of the international community, as 
well as the need to factor in new experiences, best practices and setbacks 
along the way. In the era of the “War on Terror,” after the September 11 
terrorist attacks, the discourse around statebuilding evolved to emphasize the 
need to protect the interests of Western states and to preserve the world 
order, in contrast with the “humanitarian intervention” era of the 1990s, 
which focused on the value of external intervention to protect civilian 
populations (Mallaby: 2002, Holzgrefe and Keohane: 2003, Wheeler: 2003, 
Weiss: 2012, Scott: 2007, Schmidt: 2013). Given the challenges the international 
system is currently facing, it is not especially surprising that a new round of 
soul-searching is underway. The announcement in 2014, by UN Secretary-
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General Ban Ki-moon, that a High-Level Independent Panel would be 
convened in 2015 to review the entire UN peace-operations system was one 
major indication that this phase has began.  
 
Such processes provide an opportune moment for reflection on any gaps and 
inconsistencies in the way international responsibilities in statebuilding have 
been framed over the past two decades. The aim is to move toward better and 
more responsible practices. Looking into whether statebuilding involves more 
comprehensive responsibilities than are actually defined in common 
narratives and whether international actors tend to define their 
responsibilities in a narrow and limited way would be a good place to start. 
This is the purpose of my thesis.  
 
1.1.2 The evolution and implementation of statebuilding: A literature survey 
 
In order to claim that statebuilding is a comprehensive exercise that entails 
important responsibilities for external actors, the first step will be to conduct 
an initial survey of the literature covering the birth, evolution and 
implementation of statebuilding since the end of the Cold War. 
 
1.1.2.1 The Evolution of Statebuilding: A short summary 
 
In the years immediately after the end of the Cold War, a theory dubbed 
“democratic peace” gained traction. This theory claimed that peace between 
states could be best secured by liberal democracy, interdependence and 
(Western) civic identity (Sorensen: 2006). The immediate post-Cold War years 
were marked by a naive belief that democracy, peace and individual freedom 
would take root and flourish in parallel with economic liberalization with a 
little push from the “winners” of the Cold War. This faith was quickly 
shattered, as tragic conflicts erupted in succession in the former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, Somalia and elsewhere (Paris and Sisk: 2009, Gheciu and Welsh: 
2009). The human costs of these conflicts, as well as the threats they posed to 
international peace and security, exhibited the painfully weak response 
capability of the international system. Meanwhile, the complex needs of 
societies under transition became increasingly clear. 
 
In response, the concept of “peacebuilding” emerged, and with it came a 
revisiting of the limited mandates of peace operations of the Cold War era  
(Gheciu and Welsh: 2009, Paris: 1997, Lake: 2010, Newman: 2010, Paris and 
Sisk: 2009, Clarke and Herbst: 1996). Peacebuilding was not a genuinely new 
concept—it had been in use since the 1970s as a method of promoting 
sustainable peace by addressing the root causes of violent conflict (Call and 
Cousens: 2008). But it was only in the 1990s that it became widely used. All of 
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the major reviews of peace operations conducted by the UN after the Cold 
War emphasized peacebuilding, including the Agenda for Peace in 1992, the 
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in 2000 (the Brahimi 
Report)  and the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee in 2007. These studies 
describe peacebuilding as a comprehensive exercise that aims to go beyond 
stopping war, and that intends to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into 
conflict, via capacity-building and other activities designed to lay the 
foundations of sustainable peace and development.  This signaled a major 
break from the more limited peace missions of the Cold War era, which 
mostly involved establishing buffer zones and monitoring ceasefires. 
 
Peacebuilding also attracted new, non-UN actors to the work of conflict 
resolution (Paris: 1997). Among these was the EU, which was seeking to 
consolidate its identity and gain relevance as an actor on the global scene 
(Aybet, KM). In parallel with its increased use in conflict-prevention 
literature, “peacebuilding” was incorporated more and more into the mission 
mandates of international and regional organizations, development agencies 
and non-governmental organizations (Call and Cousens: 2008). 
 
Over the course of the 1990s, peacebuilding grew increasingly connected to 
theories of democratic peace and liberal internationalism (Paris: 1997). 
Peacebuilding helped connect democratic-peace theories to global realities 
and gave it an opportunity to realistically respond to conflict. In return, the 
democratic-peace thesis served to justify the choice of peacebuilding to 
promote free-market economies, human rights and democratic institutions 
based on individual rights as the prerequisite of sustainable peace and 
development (Baum: 2008).  
 
During the same period, two major adjustments occurred. The first was the 
elevation of institution building (or the building of state institutions) on the 
conflict-resolution agenda, as the key to stability (Fukuyama: 2004). The 
OSCE Istanbul Document of 1999, for instance, claims “We have put Europe’s 
old divisions behind us, but new risks and challenges have emerged. (…) We 
have experienced conflicts, which have often resulted from flagrant violations 
of OSCE norms and principles. (…) We are committed to strengthening our 
protection against these new risks and challenges; strong democratic 
institutions and the rule of law are the foundation for this protection.”  The 
second adjustment encompassed realizations, by international actors, that 
they could play a new and more active role in conflict resolution, and that 
they would need to upgrade their response capabilities if they wished to do 
so. The 2003 European Security Strategy recognizes that “a more capable 
Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realize our full 
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potential 8”.  Former US President Bill Clinton’s remarks sum up both of these 
elements of peacebuilding in his address to the 52nd UN General Assembly in 
1997: “[W]e must improve the UN’s capabilities after a conflict ends, to help 
peace become self-sustaining. The UN cannot build nations, but it can help 
nations to build themselves by fostering legitimate institutions of 
government, monitoring elections, and laying a strong foundation for 
economic reconstruction.”9  In short, it was increasingly accepted that the 
international (or at least the Western) community would need to make a 
stronger push for involvement if it wanted to promote and establish the 
liberal-democratic state worldwide, in its new conception as a prerequisite for 
peace10.   
 
The increased focus on institution-building and liberal institutionalism led to 
a rapprochement between statebuilding and peacebuilding; these concepts 
were often used interchangeably after the Cold War (Paris: 2002, RAND: 2007, 
Call and Cousens: 2008, OECD: 2010). However, of the two, peacebuilding is 
often regarded as the more general and comprehensive approach to ending 
and preventing violent conflict and to supporting sustainable peace. 
Statebuilding relates to the building of functional states as a response to state 
fragility that might lead to violent conflict. The term “statebuilding” is 
particularly important, as a particular and dominant form of peacebuilding. 
 
Statebuilding is defined as a normative liberal project—one that shapes the 
content of peace agreements and helps implementing them (Hameiri: 2002, 
Paris: 2002). It advocates exporting the ideas and norms of the democratic 
state from the core to the periphery of the globe, with a view to enhancing 
peace and security in the post-conflict reconstruction arena (Paris: 2002, 
Fukuyama: 1992, Paris: 1997, Berger and Weber: 2006). It advocates holistic 
and “whole of government” approaches, which holds that the social, 
economic and institutional needs of societies need to be addressed in order to 
achieve sustainable peace, with the participation of a multitude of 
(international) actors (Lake: 2010, Jahn: 2007, Newman: 2010). Statebuilding 
suggests that development, security and human rights norms are mutually 
reinforcing, thus putting additional emphasis on the normative aspects of 
liberal internationalism. In statebuilding, external actors often take the role of 
“educators” until full and just ownership can be established. Roland Paris 																																																								
8 See the full text of the 2003 European Security Strategy at  
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.  
9 Address by President Bill Clinton, September 22, 1997, Remarks to the 52nd Session of the United 
Nations General Assembly, http://www.state.gov/p/io/potusunga/207553.htm  
10 In its declared goal to promote the liberal-democratic worldview and preserving global (or Western) 
stability and peace, this normative framework has also led to criticisms defining statebuilding as 
neocolonial and imperialistic (De Guevara: 2010, Chomsky: 2007, O’Connell: 2010, Chandler: 2006). 
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(1997), for example, considers the permissibility of balancing the destabilizing 
effects of democracy and the free market by delaying elections, promoting 
equitable and growth-oriented adjustment policies and extending the 
duration of peacebuilding operations until the liberal peace is 
institutionalized (Paris: 1997). 
 
The introduction of statebuilding brought forward interesting questions and 
dilemmas regarding state sovereignty and local ownership. Despite the 
comprehensive, normative and intrusive nature of statebuilding, it 
emphasizes local ownership as its ultimate goal. Moreover, even during the 
statebuilding process, the overall responsibility to adapt to the liberal-
democratic framework and to internalize institutional reforms rests with local 
actors (OECD–DAC: 2008, Lotz: 2010). According to OECD–DAC (2008), 
“[S]tatebuilding is an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions 
and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations...successful state 
building will almost always be the product of domestic action, though it can 
be significantly enabled by well-targeted, responsive international 
assistance.” The words “endogenous” and “international assistance” appear 
in the same sentence; this apparent paradox implies a shift in the traditional 
conceptual bases of the international system, which was formerly 
characterized by state sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs and 
self-determination. However, this shift might be more a reflection of the way 
powerful states and international organizations (choose to) understand 
sovereignty and to act upon it, rather than a shift away from an international 
system based on state sovereignty (MrCormack: 2010). These dilemmas are 
among the core interests of this thesis, and will be analyzed in detail later on. 
 
It is worth briefly mentioning the concepts of “responsibility to protect” (R2P) 
and “humanitarian intervention” here; because of the way they connect to 
statebuilding narratives.  The UN officials Deng and Cohen first promoted the 
idea of “sovereignty as responsibility,” advocating the formation of a higher 
authority to which states would be accountable if they failed to carry out the 
responsibility of protecting their populations (Weiss: 2012, Deng et al.: 1996). 
A report prepared by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty in 2001 (ICISS: 2001), introduced the concept of the 
“responsibility to protect” (R2P), based on the idea that states had to maintain 
minimal standards with respect to their populations; if not, this duty would 
fall to the international community (Cunliffe: 2010). R2P also included 
capacity-building and temporary substitution for government in that 
country—as a measure before humanitarian intervention (Warner: 2003). As 
such, the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) doctrine expanded the possibility of 
intervention, and the scope of possible intervention, inside a sovereign state, 
by including options for military intervention beyond the traditional 
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requirement of securing UNSC approval. This is often described as a 
“normative shift” (Newman: 2009, Warner: 2003, Ignatieff: 2004; Chesterman, 
Ignatieff and Thakur: 2004). Under pressure from the G-77 countries, in 2005, 
the UN World Summit11 backtracked to the traditional prohibition on use of 
force without UNSC authorization except for self-defense and limited the 
international responsibility for collective action mainly to intervention in 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
However, the international community did “commit [itself], as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping States build capacity” (O’Connell: 2010).  This shift is 
important to note; while the scope of humanitarian military intervention 
narrowed significantly in the 2000s, the decree in a way legitimized 
international involvement in support of nation states, in the form of capacity 
building.  
 
The September 11 terrorist attacks and the so-called “War on Terror” that 
followed became a new turning point for statebuilding, bringing a new 
urgency to address security threats emanating from state fragility. First of all, 
the dynamic between nation states’ responsibilities and international 
(military) intervention changed. The paradigm shift was the legitimization of 
the emphasis on security, rather than humanitarian concerns, for intervention 
(Lake: 2010, Berger and Weber: 2006). Former US President George W. Bush 
put it bluntly in October 2001: “Every nation has a choice to make. In this 
conflict, there is no neutral ground. Any government sponsors the outlaws 
and killers of innocence; they have become outlaws and murderers 
themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril.” 12.   
   
The international community continued to play key role in the aftermath of 
the era’s military interventions. Bush remarked in September 2008 “we are 
working to ensure that our military progress is accompanied by the political 
and economic gains that are critical to the success of a free Afghanistan13”. 
Statebuilding was once again the proposed solution. But where the focus of 
interventions had previously been on improving state capacity and fostering 
development, these aims were now explicitly linked to security—a merger 
known as the “development—security nexus.” This concept continues to form 
an important part of the intellectual framework for statebuilding today (ESS: 
2003, Mallaby: 2002, Barnett: 2006, DFID: 2010). 
 
																																																								
11  The full text of the World Summit Outcome Document can be found at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-E.pdf.   
12 The speech was given directly after the start of the US and British military strikes on targets in 
Afghanistan. The full text is available at www.putlearningfirst.com 
13 The full text is available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/afghanistan.  
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The focus was on combating threats such as terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction and state failure, as is evident in the National Security Strategy of 
the USA14 and the European Security Strategy (2003). This shift affected 
statebuilding strategies as well. With the development—security nexus, 
poverty and underdevelopment were identified as threats to international 
peace and stability. This in a way “legitimized” intrusive and comprehensive 
statebuilding. The European Security Strategy (2003) claims, “In much of the 
developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to 
pressing security concerns.” This line of thinking connected statebuilding to 
the security interests of the Western/developed world. The Mission Statement 
of the US Department of State for 2004—2009, for example, identifies the 
department’s purpose as “creat(ing) a more secure, democratic and 
prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international 
community.”15 
 
These new trends also led to a shift in the priority of statebuilding from 
establishing democratic states to establishing strong states. Francis Fukuyama 
(2004) argued that the promotion of democratic norms continued to carry 
weight could be rated as less of a priority in fragile states because of the 
difficulties of enforcement. The RAND Corporation (2007) prioritized security 
issues over democratization, economic reforms and development, instead of 
concentrating on gradually reaching economic, social and political goals 
together. The unilateralism and preventive action championed by the US 
National Security Strategy (2002), and the increasing emphasis on the security 
needs and interests of democratic states” by some analysts (such as Mallaby: 
2002, Rotberg: 2004, Krasner; 2004, RAND: 2007) further challenged the 
legitimacy framework of earlier statebuilding projects (Newman: 2010, 
Chandler: 2006). 
 
As global realities change, statebuilding continues to evolve to address 
shifting threat perceptions and new definitions of (international) interest. The 
pullback of US forces from Iraq in 2011 and the announced departure of ISAF 
combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014 indicated a new era. The declining 
support among domestic constituencies in Western countries for military 
interventions, combined with the austerity measures put in places by many 
donor countries due to the global economic crisis and the sovereign debt crisis 
in the Eurozone highlighted a significant weakness of statebuilding efforts: 
successful exit strategies. The World Bank’s 2012 report on the Palestinian 
																																																								
14 The full text is available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf. (Accessed on 5 
February 2016). 
15 See the website of the US Department of State, available at 
www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm. (Accessed on 5 February 2016). 
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economy, for instance, warned that the decline in donor assistance would 
jeopardize gains made in building strong institutions16.   
 
In their narratives about conflict-torn states, at least, international actors 
continue to pronounce capacity building—in such sectors as security, 
governance and human rights—as a prerequisite to sustainable peace. 
Statebuilding may not be as pronounced in their syntax as it was in the past, 
yet the basics are still present: in addition to mentions of capacity building, 
security, democracy, development and human rights remain mutually 
reinforcing, and the notion that the international community must support 
conflict and post-conflict countries remains at the fore17. However, while the 
number of violent conflicts has increased and the number of contexts where 
statebuilding could be applied has broadened, there seems to be a lack of 
resources and will to engage in comprehensive statebuilding projects. For 
example, the “global strategy” outlined by US President Barack Obama in 
January 2012 announced a major shift in the strategic military objectives of the 
US, and also indicated changes in the US approach to international 
statebuilding. Obama said, for example, “As we look beyond the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan—and the end of long-term nation-building with large 
military footprints—we’ll be able to ensure our security with smaller 
conventional ground forces.”18 With this, he signalled a more threat-oriented 
and cost-effective approach to interventions.  
 
General suspicions based on the dubious track record of past post-conflict 
interventions reinforce this trend. Will these new realities lead to a 
reformulation of the theory and practice of statebuilding? What will happen 
to those states currently residing in gray areas, such as Afghanistan and 
Bosnia, where statebuilding programs have been started but are still far from 
achieving their declared goals of bringing lasting stability? And finally, what 
are the responsibilities of the international community in this dynamic? This 
thesis will seek answers to these questions.  
 
1.1.2.2 The Application of Statebuilding: Main elements 
 
Statebuilding connects the liberal-democratic-state ideal to lasting peace and 
security, and presents statebuilding as the way to achieve this ideal (Paris: 
2002, De Guevara: 2010, Fukuyama: 2004, Paris: 1997, Berger and Weber: 2006, 																																																								
16 See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2012/03/15/pa-fiscal-crisis-jeopardizes-
institution-building-progress (Accessed on 5 February 2016).  
17 Most UN Security Council debates on the various conflicts the world faces today, such as in Syria, 
Iraq, Libya, Mali, Central African Republic, Ukraine, Yemen, continue to emphasize the importance of 
elements of statebuilding.	
18 For full text of the speech, see http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/01/05/president-obama-outlines-
new-global-military-strategy. (Accessed on 5 February 2016).  
	 23	
Lake: 2010, Newman: 2010). Although it is widely understood that each 
conflict situation is unique and that statebuilding should be tailored to match 
specific social, historical, economic and regional circumstances based on the 
concept of local ownership, it is still possible to identity a format and a similar 
set of instruments that external statebuilders rely on in each context (RAND: 
2007, OECD-DAC: 2008). Indeed, there have been repeated attempts to 
develop guidelines defining universal best practices, for use in future post-
conflict interventions. In fact, several handbooks published by policy 
organizations, notably those of the RAND Corporation, DFID and OECD–
DAC, elevate statebuilding almost to the level of a technical process. 
 
Through the late 1990s and the 2000s, institutions such as the OECD–DAC,  
RAND, DFID, and UNDP conducted policy-based research on how to 
operationalize statebuilding and enhance the implementation of existing 
policies (PRIO: 2004). This has transformed peacebuilding into a structured 
approach that brings different forms of response, including security, 
humanitarian action, rule of law, human rights and development, under one 
framework (De Coning: 2010). Efforts to sequence statebuilding efforts based 
on priorities prevailed. Although there is no exact and unified position on 
how international post-conflict efforts should be structured and sequenced, 
the organizations mentioned above mostly suggest that statebuilding consists 
of the following activities, in sequence: 
 - Promotion of immediate security and stability,  - Humanitarian aid and assistance, building basic infrastructure, - Establishing a transitional administration to provide basic governance 
functions. - Economic stabilization,  - Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Rule of Law (RoL) - Governance Reform, - Human Rights and Democratization, - Economic Growth and Development 
 
In other words, following the provision of the basic humanitarian and 
security needs of populations, international efforts have almost always 
concentrated on building a state’s governance abilities, security sector, public 
administration, economy, development, human rights and democratic 
institutions. Despite the oft-mentioned uniqueness of every case, these 
activities have formed the basis of statebuilding activities in a number of 
contexts, from building the Bosnian state in the aftermath of the Yugoslav 
conflict, to establishing Palestinian institutions with a view to solving the 
Arab–Israeli conflict, to strengthening the Afghan state amid an ongoing war 
with militants who are often embedded in the territories of neighboring 
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countries. Through the application of these guidelines, statebuilding almost 
ceases to be a political choice of certain international actors; it is rather 
presented as a technical exercise in building the abilities of states, based on 
universal best practices (Bain : 2009). 
 
A more detailed analysis will be provided in later parts of this thesis, focused 
on the presentation and operationalization of statebuilding as a technical 
exercise. Here, a couple of initial propositions about the development and 
application of statebuilding will be made. These propositions, combined with 
other elements, will help to establish the research question: 
 
a) Statebuilding is a comprehensive exercise, which aims to bring 
forward long-term, durable and sustainable solutions for conflict and post-
conflict countries, by reshaping the political, security and economic 
foundations of societies.  
 
b) Statebuilding requires long-term and somewhat intrusive commitment 
from the international community. Quick-fix solutions will not bring 
sustainable solutions; a high level of commitment is required, with detailed 
institutional arrangements and resources dedicated to building a state 
(DeConing: 2010, RAND: 2007).  
 
c) Statebuilding is a normative exercise, based on the choice to promote a 
specific form of state administration as a universal best practice. This is 
despite attempts by some actors to present it as a technical exercise.  
 
d) The elevation of statebuilding as a universal best practice to achieve 
sustainable peace and stability legitimizes international civilian post-conflict 
involvement. It also leads to formulations about the future of a given country. 
From this angle, statebuilding is prescriptive.  
 
Combined, these elements lead to the first proposition of this research: The 
international community may have put itself in a position of substantial 
power and responsibility in the past few decades through engagement in 
statebuilding, which has been implemented in many contexts as a 
comprehensive, intrusive, prescriptive, normative exercise. In short, 
statebuilding implies comprehensive responsibilities for international actors, 
in line with its normative, intrusive and prescriptive nature. 
 
1.1.3  The Gap: “International Responsibility” in Statebuilding 
 
Despite progress toward ending violence, imposing basic law and order, 
promoting the norms of human rights and democracy and enabling 
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immediate economic growth, it is unclear whether statebuilding has been 
successful in reaching its ultimate goal of establishing viable and sustainable 
states based on functional and effective institutions and liberal democratic 
values (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan: 2005, RAND: 2007, OECD-DAC: 
2008). Many states where comprehensive statebuilding projects have been 
implemented, such as Afghanistan, Palestine and Bosnia, have in fact 
experienced backlashes in terms of political stability, if not in terms of their 
overall security situations. In fact, post-conflict interventions have often been 
criticized for creating aid dependency, as well as for relying on external actors 
for basic societal functions, for hampering local ownership, for fostering 
corruption and even for imposing a version of “colonialism” (Chandler: 2006, 
Smith: 2004, OECD-DAC: 2008, Samuels et al.: 2004, Narten: 2006). In the face 
of such critiques, it is unclear how much of a “route to sustainable peace and 
security” that statebuilding projects can provide in the conflicts under way in 
MENA and Africa today.  
 
In 1993, Samuel Huntington called upon the world to be wary of grand 
nation-building missions to shape the world in its own image and to focus 
instead on its own national interests (Huntington: 1993). After more than two 
decades of moving in the opposite direction, Western leaders, such as 
President Barack Obama, increasingly seem to be echoing Huntington 
today—especially as donor resources dwindle and “intervention fatigue” 
mounts.  
 
Yet, in the meantime, statebuilding continues to be implemented, sometimes 
in textbook form, in many conflict and post-conflict countries, as the best 
means of combating state fragility, and thereby achieving lasting peace and 
stability. In addition, even if some interventions are not dubbed 
“statebuilding,” per se, many elements of the statebuilding framework, 
ranging from good governance to security-sector reform and democratization, 
continue to be implemented in conflict and post-conflict countries. For 
instance, the EU has sought security-sector reform (SSR), good governance 
and democratization projects in such places as the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Ukraine, and the Central African Republic19. 
Finally, even though in some contexts, like Bosnia, Iraq and Kosovo, where 
the international community has moved away from large-scale statebuilding 																																																								
19  For a detailed description of the European Common Security and Defence Policy missions 
undertaking SSR activities, visit http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/index_en.htm. (Accessed on 5 February 2016).  For the EU’s good governance projects in 
DRC, see for example, The European Court of Auditors’ 2013 report on the issue at 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/lists/ecadocuments/sr13_09/sr13_09_en.pdf (Accessed on 5 February 2016). 
See the EU Commission’s press release, detailing the EU’s support to democratization in CAR, at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-10-517_en.htm?locale=en (Accessed on 5 February 2016).   
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missions it had undertaken, the projects have already had lasting impacts on 
subject countries, challenging traditional societal and political structures, 
shifting loyalties, and promoting “foreign” norms (Chandler: 2010).  
 
Finally, statebuilding does not only affect local populations who are suffering 
or emerging from conflict. It impacts on the economic and security interests of 
the intervening countries. It affects the international image of statebuilders, as 
engagement in statebuilding helps certain actors—such as the EU—to gain 
relevance on the international scene. 
 
All of these elements should ideally strengthen the proposition about the 
comprehensive responsibilities of international actors in statebuilding. Yet, if 
the first proposition of this thesis is that engaging in such normative, 
comprehensive, intrusive and prescriptive statebuilding projects implies wide 
responsibilities for the international community, the second proposition is 
that they do not. On the contrary, there is no clear‐cut, well-defined, 
standardized formulation of what responsibilities the international 
community has with respect to statebuilding. References to “responsibility” 
are not conceptually clear about what the term means and what principles 
should be applied when assessing responsible international behavior (Mayer: 
2008a, Erskine: 2003). When responsibility is defined, it is often done in a 
narrow and limited manner. 
 
1.1.3.1 The legal literature on the responsibilities of international actors in 
interventions is narrow, limited or still being debated: 
 
The subject of responsibilities of international actors in interventions is not 
ignored in international relations and law. Yet, our proposition is that none of 
these studies defines the responsibilities of international actors in 
statebuilding in a manner that is thorough and commensurate with their 
comprehensive involvement in other countries.  
 
The duties and responsibilities of external actors that militarily intervene in 
other countries have been well researched and theorized. The “just war 
theory” doctrine, for instance, establishes a moral justification for war by 
looking at two sets of rights: “the right to go to war (jus ad bellum)” and 
“right conduct in war (jus in bello)” (Osterdahl and Zadel: 2009, Doyle: 2010, 
Walzer: 2003). There have also been attempts to expand these concepts to 
cover post-conflict responsibilities (jus post bellum), based on the assumption 
that the return to peacetime carries with it moral duties for international 
actors (Doyle: 2010, Bass: 2004, Orend: 2002). However, this category of “just 
war” has not yet been formally recognized for post-conflict situations 
(Osterdahl and Zadel: 2009). Studies on jus post bellum mostly deal with 
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questions like where war ends and post-conflict situations begin; the extent of 
the “responsibility to rebuild” in the aftermath of military operations; and 
how a state can best be restored to its pre-war condition (Bass: 2004, 
Osterdahl and Zadel: 2009). As such, they don’t (yet) deal with the 
responsibilities implicit in statebuilding activities. In fact, jus post bellum tends 
to hold that international actors should get out of countries where military 
interventions have taken place as soon as possible (Bass: 2004).  
 
International laws do not currently provide a fully satisfactory answer, either. 
Articles 32 to 41 of the Hague Convention IV, which contains most of the 
available rules for post-conflict situations, are largely inapplicable to the 
demands of modern-day conflict (Osterdahl and Zadel: 2009). The 
International Law Commission (ILC) defines international responsibility 
solely from the perspective of wrongful or unlawful acts (Leck: 2009). The 
definition of responsibility as “the liability to answer,” is in legal terms 
equated with penalty (Lewis: 1948). In short, legal responsibility is more 
concerned with defining wrongful acts and assigning penalties to them. 
International law also tends to focus on the conduct of actors in specific 
situations, such as whether an international peacekeeping mission has 
committed a legally wrongful act. This definition is insufficient for explaining 
why external actors would or should assume responsibility for the building of 
another state—especially those actors that were not been involved in the 
military intervention in that country.  
 
One last area to explore is the connection between the responsibility to protect 
(R2P) and jus post bellum. R2P advocates that while sovereign states have the 
responsibility to protect their citizens, if states are unable or unwilling to do 
so, this duty might fall to the international community (ICISS: 2001). R2P 
debates do delve into the question of capacity building, insofar as boosting 
the capacities of states better allows them to protect their people. In this sense, 
R2P prescribes a technical, temporary assistance role for the international 
community, albeit one not matching the broadly normative and intrusive 
activities undertaken by statebuilders. R2P also limits the scope of 
responsibility to the protection of local populations and the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Not mentioned are the intervenors’ notions 
of responsibility to preserve the liberal internationalist world order or their 
own security and economic interests, or to boost their own capacities or 
images abroad (Evans: 2008, Weiss: 2012, Doyle: 2010). Finally, although the 
UN Secretary-General’s reports on R2P20 have featured the concept of the 
“responsibility to rebuild,” specifically in the areas of good governance, 																																																								
20 United Nations General Assembly, “Implementing the responsibility to protect,” Report of the 
Secretary-General (January 2009).  
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durable peace and sustainable development, the concept does not go beyond 
a mere recommendation (Osterdahl and Zadel: 2009, Koeman: 2007).  
 
1.1.3.2 International narratives on statebuilding define responsibilities of 
statebuilders in a narrow and limited way: 
 
The introduction of the concepts of “responsibility to protect” and 
humanitarian intervention has created a gray area for the international 
community to intervene in other states affairs. According to these concepts, a 
responsible state is one which is able to provide security and services to its 
citizens and does not pose a threat to international peace and security; when 
states are unable or unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities, their sovereignty 
can be problematized – allowing external actors to step in (ICISS: 2001, Ghani 
and Lockhart: 2008, Weiss: 2012). The remarks of previous EU High 
Representative Solana’s words summed up the situation: “Weak states are a 
nightmare for those living in them but also a problem for the rest of us. (…) 
Creating well-run states requires functioning politics. And this is something 
that foreigners cannot provide; only the locals can. We can help. But it is 
ultimately their responsibility. At the same time, their failures rebound on us. 
This is the core dilemma for diplomacy in our democratic age”21.  
 
While post-conflict statebuilding interventions allow the international 
community to act, their responsibilities are still formulated in narrow and 
limited ways. Two factors limiting international responsibilities in 
statebuilding are of particular interest to this thesis: the temporary support 
role prescribed to international actors and the framing of statebuilding as a 
technical exercise. 
 
With respect to the first factor, despite the debates that took place following 
the Cold War on whether globalization had made the nation state redundant 
and state sovereignty was withering away,  the sovereign equality of nation 
states remains one of the most basic tenets of the international system, as 
embedded in the United Nations Charter22. This is one of the main reasons 
why the international system stresses state sovereignty and local ownership 
when conducting interventions. UN Security Council Resolution 1366 (2001), 
for instance, claims that “the essential responsibility for conflict prevention 
rests with national Governments, and (...) the United Nations and the 
international community can play an important role in support of national 																																																								
21 Speech by Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for the CFSP, "Europe in the World", at 
Harvard University Kennedy School on 17 September 2009, http://eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_9007_en.htm (Accessed on 5 February 2016). 
22 See the open debates at the UN Security Council on post-conflict peacebuilding and security sector 
reform at www.un.org/en/sc.  
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efforts for conflict prevention and can assist in building national capacity in 
this field.” OECD–DAC (2008) supports this argument: “Statebuilding is an 
endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the 
state driven by state-society relations” and “successful state building will 
almost always be the product of domestic action, though it can be 
significantly enabled by well-targeted, responsive international assistance.”  
 
First of all; despite the debates following the Cold War on whether 
globalization has made the nation state redundant and state sovereignty was 
withering away, the sovereign equality of nation states remains one of the 
most basic tenets of the international system, as embedded in the United 
Nations Charter23. This is one of the main reasons why the international 
system stresses state sovereignty and local ownership in interventions. The 
UN Security Council Resolution 1366 (2001), for instance, claims that “the 
essential responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national 
Governments, and that the United Nations and the international community 
can play an important role in support of national efforts for conflict 
prevention and can assist in building national capacity in this field.” OECD-
DAC (2008) supports this argument: “Statebuilding is an endogenous process 
to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-
society relations¨ and ¨successful state building will almost always be the 
product of domestic action, though it can be significantly enabled by well-
targeted, responsive international assistance”. 
 
The R2P debates also ascribe a support function to international actors 
carrying out activities such as capacity building24. This defines the first aspect 
of the role narratively ascribed to the international community in 
statebuilding well: one of support and assistance, not one of leadership and 
decision-making, diminishing the responsibilities that could be attributed to 
external actors even where state sovereignty is problematized25 and local 
ownership is too weak to prevail. 
 																																																								
23 See the open debates at the UN Security Council on post-conflict peacebuilding and security sector 
reform at www.un.org/en/sc.   
24 According to the United Nations definition of R2P; ¨the State carries the primary responsibility for 
protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their 
incitement; (…) the international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this 
responsibility¨. http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml (Accessed on 5 
February 2016). These principles originated in a 2001 report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty and were endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in the 
2005 World Summit Outcome Document paragraphs 138, 139 and 140. See www.globalr2p.org for more 
details (Accessed on 5 February 2016). 	
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With respect to the second factor, the framing of statebuilding as a technical 
exercise, democratic peace and liberal internationalism—which form the 
theoretical core of the statebuilding debate—tend to elevate statebuilding to 
the level of a universal best practice, rather than a subjective policy choice. 
This thesis will argue that this definition leads to attributing to international 
actors solely the responsibility of assisting conflict-affected countries, as a 
narrow and limited definition of external responsibilities. This dynamic also 
leads to attribution of political responsibilities to national authorities, even 
where there is no real national authority to speak of. For instance, Catherine 
Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
said of the EU’s statebuilding endeavors in the Palestinian Authority, 
“Institution-building must facilitate the peace process and not replace it. We 
are working in partnership with the Palestinian Authority to build the 
institutions they will need to have when the State is established.”26 
 
1.1.3.3 While statebuilding constantly evolves, responsibilities remain static: 
 
As the literature survey demonstrates, statebuilding has evolved over the past 
two decades, due to changing global realities and threat perceptions, new 
ambitions, acquired capacities and past experiences (Paris and Sisk: 2009). 
Statebuilding is still an experiment that changes with different threat 
perceptions, new ways of thought and “lessons learned.” External actors 
change—sometimes they consist of mainly Western actors and allies; 
sometimes they include regional actors, civil-society institutions or other 
types of donors. Measures of success in statebuilding change, too, in ways 
that affect the nature of the international community’s involvement, and, 
eventually, its exit strategies. Discourse evolves and adapts, in order to bridge 
the gap between the changing realities on the ground and the neoliberal 
framework of statebuilding, creating new roles and responsibilities for 
international (and national) actors. 
 
However, while this evolution has been taking place in the discourse around 
statebuilding, it is unclear how much the responsibilities of the international 
community have been redefined in kind. In different phases of interventions, 
the role of the international community has been framed mainly as a 
temporary and technical capacity-building function in support of national 
actors, even where statebuilding has been intrusive27.  Another assumption 
that will be tested in the following chapters of this thesis is the notion that the 
																																																								
26 Full text available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-10-94_en.htm?locale=FR. 
(Accessed on 5 February 2016). 
27  The comprehensive and intrusive statebuilding function assumed by the Office of the High 
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1997 – 2005 is an example.  
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responsibility attributed to the international community in interventions has 
remained relatively static. 
 
These points contribute to strengthening the second proposition of this thesis. 
In past decades, state sovereignty was held to be at the core of the 
international system, whereas analysis on the moral dimension of world 
affairs was limited (Vogt: 2008). The international community has put itself in 
a position of substantial power and responsibility in recent decades by 
engaging in statebuilding activities. In addition, concepts such as “human 
security” and “humanitarian intervention” started entering the international 
agenda, while debates intensified in considering how to morally justify 
international intervention and post-conflict involvement, in light of the 
traditional notion of state sovereignty. The concept of responsibility has in 
fact become a fashionable catchphrase in the last decades, used by politicians, 
bureaucrats, journalists, businessmen and civic activists “in numerous 
contexts and with a great number of meanings in mind” (Vogt: 2006). As 
such, the term “responsibility” has found its way into UN declarations, 
political statements and academic articles, and has been used increasingly by 
the European Union in the past decade. 
 
The first proposition of this thesis was that statebuilding is a comprehensive 
and often intrusive activity, which implies deep responsibilities for the 
members of the international community engaged in the act. The 
aforementioned points suggest that responsibility has been understood, 
defined and constructed in a narrow and limited manner, which may not be 
commensurate with the wider responsibilities statebuilding entails. In 
considering external statebuilding efforts and the international 
responsibilities a gap can be identified between the ambitious task of shaping 
the future structures, mechanisms and structures of conflict-prone countries 
and the limited and incomplete way responsibilities can be attributed to them 
(Mallaby: 2002, Chesterman et al: 2004, Etzioni: 2004, Barnett and Zuercher 
2006). In other words, the temporary, technical facilitation and support role 
assigned to the international community in statebuilding, and the emphasis 
that the primary responsibility of protection, reconstruction and building of 
effective states lies with the nation states, seems to be in contrast with the 
comprehensive, prescriptive and intrusive nature of statebuilding identified 
earlier in this thesis (Chesterman: 2004, Carothers: 2007). In addition, the 
definition of external responsibilities does not take into account the changing 
roles external actors assume during different stages of statebuilding 
interventions, as well as the changing nature of statebuilding itself.  
 
This mismatch will be dubbed as the “responsibility gap” in this study. The 
concept will form one of the thesis’s building blocks—its second proposition 
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is that there is a mismatch between the comprehensive, intrusive, normative 
and prescriptive nature of external statebuilding and the limited and narrow 
way responsibilities are attributed to international actors.  
 
1.1.4  Sustaining the responsibility gap – Discursive safeguards: 
 
The final proposition relates to the structuring of the international narrative in 
a way that helps to sustain the responsibility gap defined above. It has 
already been suggested how the narratives prioritizing the responsibilities of 
local or national actors in the international system, or framing statebuilding as 
a technical exercise might indicate a mismatch with the comprehensive 
responsibilities statebuilding should entail for international actors. This part 
of the thesis will elaborate on this suggestion, before moving on to formulate 
a hypothesis and research question. 
 
At every step of statebuilding’s evolution, new problems and challenges have 
emerged. There have been mistakes and shortcomings in the way it has been 
applied; there have been questions about its success in sustainably solving 
conflicts (De Guevara: 2010, Chomsky: 2007, O’Connell: 2010, Chandler: 
2006). The shortcomings of statebuilding have great potential to affect local 
populations emerging from conflict, the prosperity and security of the citizens 
of donor countries and the credibility of the norms championed by liberal 
internationalism.  
 
The academic and policy worlds have constantly fine-tuned the practice of 
statebuilding, in an attempt to tailor it to rapidly changing global contexts. 
They have tried to address problems such as insufficient planning, lack of 
coordination by international actors and shortcomings in ensuring 
accountability (RAND: 2007, OECD-DAC: 2008). But there have been notably 
few studies aimed at responding to critiques questioning the appropriateness 
of applying liberal internationalism to the problems of conflict-prone 
countries. Paris and Sisk (2009), for example, claim that although issues such 
as coordination, coherence, local ownership, legitimacy, dependency, 
accountability and exit strategies are commonly discussed in the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission and elsewhere, debates surrounding the problems 
tend to be superficial, and underlying problems are rarely explored.  
 
The same dynamic can be seen in considering the responsibilities of 
international actors in statebuilding. There are no clear-cut, specific 
definitions or formulations of the responsibilities of external actors engaging 
in comprehensive statebuilding activities. According to Erskine (2003), such 
“non-definitions or inconsistencies... can lead to attributing duties or 
responsibilities to [some] institutions beyond their capabilities, while leaving 
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more appropriate actors off the hook.” This hazard applies to a range of 
issues, from addressing poverty to supplying justice, from solving conflicts to 
building states. And if the task of defining and attributing responsibilities is 
left to the agents themselves, there is a risk that these will be defined 
selectively, possibly based on calculations of short-term interest. Such 
definition could be to the detriment of the local populations involved, as well 
as to the populations of the European countries engaged in statebuilding, the 
international community as a whole, and to global norm-promotion and the 
entire statebuilding project.  
 
Those working in the field frequently say that—despite years of donor aid, 
despite international efforts to reform security sectors and legal systems, to 
build public institutions, to push for higher standards of human rights and to 
democracy and politically support the peace process—they see little progress 
toward genuine reconciliation, development and sustainable peace in conflict-
ridden places. Where failures have been evident, members of the international 
community have tended to shift blame toward regional instability, the 
intractability of the conflict, the “bizarre” mentality of the locals and “ancient 
hatreds.” They rarely elaborate with any sufficiency on how their own mostly 
well-intentioned presence and efforts bear some responsibility. In addition, 
most debates of “what went wrong” tend to focus on operational and 
technical failures related to inexperience, which are presumably possible to 
correct given certain adjustments to policy and application.  
 
The lack of a proper definition for the responsibilities of external actors in 
statebuilding can also be traced to vague, inconsistent and sometimes 
contradictory statements in official discourse. Equally evident, building on 
Erskine’s (2003) point on non-definitions and inconsistencies in attributing 
responsibility, is the selective assumption of responsibilities by the 
international community, which tend to be based on their present capabilities 
and interests, and the current state of affairs. For instance, the EU has openly 
and repeatedly declared its commitment to the international statebuilding 
project in Bosnia, initially as a secondary actor supportive of US efforts, and 
later as a lead actor. Yet, Swedish Foreign Minister and former EU High 
Representative Carl Bildt, for example, remarked in 2008, “If Bosnia is falling 
behind, the responsibility is not of the international community, is not of the 
EU, but the responsibility lies with the leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”  
 
One of the main concerns of this thesis is to explain how it is possible to 
assume important responsibilities both discursively and in practice, while 
avoiding accountability for them at the same time. The proposition here is 
that certain narratives, which will be dubbed “discursive safeguards,” have 
evolved to become defense mechanisms for international actors who wish to 
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avoid accepting responsibility for the shortcomings and failures of 
statebuilding projects. And so, the third proposition of this thesis holds that, 
while discourse has been an important method of gaining legitimacy for 
interventions and statebuilding projects, it has also been used as a tool to 
avoid, rather than assume, responsibility. This is not to suggest that 
international actors consciously gather together to formulate narrative 
responses that will help them avoid their responsibilities when engaging in 
statebuilding, only to argue that external actors contribute to the narrow and 
limited framing of the responsibilities they hold, and that they benefit from 
invoking such principles as state sovereignty and the primary responsibilities 
of nation states. Through discourse, external actors might be falling back on 
these principles, while benefitting from the limited way the international 
system allows them to define their roles.  
 
2. The Way Forward 
 
1.2.1 The hypothesis and the research question:  
 
This thesis started with a simple goal: understanding the international 
community’s discourse on responsibility and statebuilding. Three 
propositions have contributed to the construction of the research question:  
 
1. Statebuilding implies comprehensive responsibilities for international 
actors, in line with its normative, intrusive and prescriptive nature.  
2. There is a gap between the comprehensive actions of international 
actors in the political, economic, security and normative dynamics of 
post-conflict countries, and the narrow and limited moral, legal and 
discursive formulations of international responsibilities in conflict-
resolution and statebuilding.  
3. The core principles of the global system—such as state sovereignty and 
self-determination, as well as the changing nature of statebuilding—
create fertile narrative ground for international actors to define their 
responsibilities narrowly, (a practice referred to as discursive 
safeguarding).  	
The research question of this thesis, then, is twofold: Are there mismatches—
responsibility gaps—in the role accepted by the international community in 
statebuilding and the responsibilities attributed to that community? And: 
How does the discourse surrounding peacebuilding deal with these gaps?   
 
The accompanying hypothesis of this thesis is that:  
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1. Responsibilities are not attributed to international actors engaged in 
statebuilding in a way commensurate with their comprehensive 
engagement in post-conflict countries (responsibility gaps). 
2. International narratives about statebuilding include safeguards to 
ensure that responsibilities will continue to be attributed to external 
actors in a narrow and limited manner (discursive safeguards). 
 
A research question combining the concepts of statebuilding, responsibility 
and international discourse is of course a complex one. In order to answer the 
research question, first the phenomenon of external statebuilding will be 
thoroughly analyzed. Secondly, based on the proposition that international 
relations and conflict-resolution literature do not define international 
responsibilities in a way commensurate with the comprehensive set of 
responsibilities that statebuilding entails, the concept of responsibility will be 
analyzed to understand what kind of responsibilities might be attributed to 
international actors beyond the current narrow and limited definitions. The 
third goal is to investigate international discourse around responsibility, in 
order to understand how actors assume or avoid the duties assigned to them. 
This last goal will entail the pursuit of a method of inquiry into the nature and 
evolution of the international discourse on responsibility. Finally, the thesis 
will include a case study, in support of theoretical findings. 
 
1.2.2 Designing the research:  
 
1.2.2.1 Methodological preferences: 
 
To find the appropriate theoretical umbrella to the research questions at hand, 
two goals of this thesis must be underlined: a) understanding the way present 
day narratives frame statebuilding, as well as the related responsibilities of 
external actors and b) critically approaching this framing, by presenting an 
alternative framework to construct responsibility.  
 
Achieving these goals will necessitate a research design and theoretical 
perspectives that allows to connect three concepts; responsibility, 
statebuilding and discourse under a single framework, borrowing from 
different fields of study. The research question has already been broken down 
into three associated propositions, in order the practically address its 
complexity. In a similar fashion, a multitude of theoretical perspectives and 
methodologies will be utilized, when addressing different propositions under 
the research question.   
 
Statebuilding, as a subject, is mostly analyzed through the perspective of 
international relations, politics and government, and engenders discussions 
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on a broad range of concepts including the nature of sovereignty, the 
possibility of successful intervention, the connection between development, 
security and peace, and the challenges of sustainable peace. Statebuilding 
encompasses cross-sectoral actions such as institution-building, good 
governance, public administration, security sector reform, development, 
human rights, and to some extent, humanitarian aid, adding to the 
complexity of discussing it. Dealing with statebuilding necessitates the use of 
a theoretical framework that would allow discussing these diverse topics, 
insofar as they relate to the responsibilities of international actors in 
statebuilding and the discourse surrounding them. The purpose is 
understanding the general framework of statebuilding, the discourse 
surrounding it and the way this discourse constructs responsibilities, and to 
avoid technical and detailed conversations on, for example, the opportunities 
and challenges of security sector reform or best practices in good governance.  
 
Adding responsibility to the statebuilding discussion complicates the issue 
further. The field of international relations has not sufficiently elaborated on 
the issue of moral responsibilities and their attribution, or borrowed deeply 
from the field of moral philosophy in the limited number of studies that has 
(Erskine: 2003, Vogt: 2006). This study will also need to take this track, 
seeking for answers in the field of moral philosophy, since the international 
relations literature cannot be seen fully sufficient in connecting the 
responsibilities of international actors in statebuilding. Bridging the 
international relations, politics and philosophy fields might enable addressing 
thoroughly and adequately the issue of the responsibilities of international 
actors, as well as exhibiting the possibility of alternative constructions of 
responsibility for international actors beyond official narratives.  
 
The decision to seek answers to the research question in the discipline of 
politics and international relations, while benefitting from ideas and 
propositions of the field of moral philosophy, also necessitates relying on 
more than a singular methodological framework. The proposed way forward 
is using frame analysis as a methodology; to understand the way present 
narratives frame statebuilding and the related responsibilities of external 
actors. This methodology will be supplemented through surveying the moral 
responsibility literature, particularly studies on attribution of moral 
responsibilities, to discover alternative (and morally, more appropriate) ways 
to attribute responsibilities to international actors (Visoka and Doyle: 2014). 
The outcome of the frame analysis will be compared to the results of the 
literature survey on ‘attributability’, to point out a ‘responsibility gap between 
discursive and moral attributions of responsibility. Finally, discourse analysis 
will be utilized to identify ‘discursive safeguards’, as previously proposed.  
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1.2.2.2 Frame analysis: 
 
Frame analyses focus on how certain actors organize, interpret, and act on 
knowledge, and how this makes some actions possible while precluding 
others (Auteserre: 2012, Hansen: 2006, Loizides: 2015). Frames show how 
agents locate, perceive, identify and label events. They provide a singular 
interpretation and appropriate behavior for a certain context, such as 
peacebuilding and statebuilding in conflict-affected countries, while helping 
order normative content and define the boundaries of political discourse 
(Payne: 2001, Goffman: 1974, Klandermans: 1997). Frames are technically 
defined by Loizides (2015) as “conscious strategic efforts to shape shared 
understandings about a group, its environment, moral entitlements and range 
of possible actions.” They influence how international actors understand the 
world, construct certain phenomena and what they perceive to be appropriate 
actions (Loizides: 2015). They also help explain why actors with different 
identities and internal cultures adopt similar understandings of situation. In 
other words, using frame analysis is beneficial in understanding the lens 
through which the practical actions are undertaken, narratives are 
constructed and responsibilities are defined. 
 
With respect to the issue at hand – statebuilding - frame analysis will help 
understand why different actors, working in different contexts, tend to use 
similar narratives and endorse similar courses of actions when defining the 
responsibilities of the international community and their own roles within. It 
will help point out the similarities and differences among these actors. 
Framing will help account for the kinds of evolutionary thinking and 
technical adjustments to statebuilding that have taken place over time, due to 
new global realities, changing threat perceptions and lessons learned. It will 
assist in factoring in “time and change”, by encompassing the identities, 
interests and policies that continue to be established and reinforced, as well as 
the processes through which new information is  interpreted as confirmations 
of existing belief (Hansen: 2006).  In short, identifying the way responsibilities 
are framed in statebuilding narratives will constitute the backbone of the 
research methodology.  
 
Once this statebuilding frame has been identified, the second part of the 
research will concentrate on the possibility of defining these responsibilities 
through an alternative lens, different than the framing of the current 
narratives.  
 
This framing exercise, in a nutshell, will help thoroughly and systematically 
define the way statebuilding frames international responsibilities in official 
discourse. This exercise will also help test the proposition that the 
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statebuilding is a comprehensive and extensive exercise. In other words, it 
will enable analyzing the ideas, thoughts and actions that define the 
narratives and the possible discursive safeguards that allow international 
actors to avoid responsibility. 
 
1.2.2.3 Discourse analysis: 
 
Discourse analysis will be used as the main method to gather evidence and 
input, in order to identify the elements of the frame.  
 
Discourse gives away clues about the existence and evolution of a frame 
(Hansen: 2006). First of all, discourse consists of stable elements, which help 
identify the existence of frames. In terms of statebuilding, the initial literature 
survey already proposed that statebuilding has been presented as a key 
method to establish and preserve sustainable peace and security in conflict-
affected countries, while the international actors are attributed a temporary 
and limited responsibility in bringing this transformation further. Looking at 
discourse in a structured way can help test this proposition, by locating the 
elements of the frame.  
 
It has been previously indicated that the way the responsibilities of 
international actors have been framed in statebuilding has been mostly static, 
without reflecting the changing dynamics of conflicts, the interests and 
intentions of actors, and developing capabilities. Discourse anaylsis is also an 
important method to bring the element of change into the conversation. As 
statebuilding 28  evolves, the discourse surrounding it is also constantly 
reproduced and reconstructed.  For instance, debates on “humanitarian 
intervention” and the “responsibility to protect” legitimized interventions to 
promote the needs, interests and rights of people suffering under conflict.  
The “War on Terror” days, which gained strength after the September 11 
terrorist attacks, propagated external interference to preserve international (or 
Western) peace and security interests.  
 
Discourse analysis can be used to show how facts are dependent on particular 
discursive framings, and offers an empirical method for operationalizing 
them, by locating the intentions and choices of moral agents to attribute them 
responsibility (Laclau: 1993, Mouffe, Torfing: 1999, Torfing: 2005, Jorgensen 
and Phillips: 2002, Fairclough: 1995, Hansen: 2006). For instance, discourse 
analysis can help point out how those actors who promote specific norms and 																																																								
28 The theory and practice of statebuilding will be explored in detail in the following parts of this study. 
For further information on the debates on statebuilding mentioned in this part, see Paris (2002), Hameiri 
(2002), Ghani and Lockhart (2010), Ghani, Lockhart and Callahan (2005), and also RAND (2007), OECD/ 
DAC (2007). 
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practices might also be manipulating frames strategically to achieve their 
ends and boost their legitimacy (Payne: 2001, Hansen: 2006). Analyzing 
discourse could also indicate how agents avoid responsibility and legitimize 
this. From this angle, in addition to helping identify elements of the 
statebuilding frame, analyzing the narratives of international actors can also 
help approach the narrative construction and attribution of responsibility in a 
critical way.  
  
Two subsets of the methodology of discourse analysis will be particularly 
utilized in this study: discourse theory and critical discourse analysis 
(Hansen: 2006). Discourse theory	 aims to describe, understand and explain 
how and why particular discursive formations were constructed, stabilized 
and transformed. It presents discourse as constitutive, and describes stability 
and change as coming mainly from the narrative level, and allows for 
discourse to construct the stability in responsibility narratives. Narratives 
could be used to obscure change, and define, construct and reconstruct 
responsibilities in a static way, despite shifting dynamics, knowledge, 
perceptions and practices. (Jorgenson and Phillips: 2002, Torfing: 2005). This 
approach is useful when explaining stability in narratives and in practice. 
Furthermore, as discourse theory claims that knowledge is not fixed, but is 
produced and reproduced through discursive activity, it can help assert that 
the policy and practiceof statebuilding are not incontrovertible truths, and 
could be challenged (Laclau: 1993, Mouffe: 2006, Torfing: 1999, Torfing: 2005). 
This understanding is in line with the propositions on discursive safeguards, 
which ensure that responsibilities will continue to be attributed to external 
actors in a narrow and limited manner, in statebuilding.  
 
Critical discourse theory (CDA), another subset of discourse analysis, better 
explains how narratives are produced and reproduced when faced with 
changing dynamics and challenges.  (Fairclough: 1995, Jorgenson and Phillips: 
2002). Language users act both as discursive products and producers in the 
reproduction and transformation of narrative, and thereby in social and 
cultural change (Jorgenson and Phillips: 2002). Therefore, CDA allows to 
claim that, (a) the statebuilding frame is instrumental in the construction of 
the discourse on the responsibilities of international actors, and (b) discourse 
can help force and reinforce the existing responsibility framework of 
statebuilding – ‘discursive safeguarding’. Hansen’s (2006) work provides an 
excellent basis for the goals stated for this chapter, as she operationalizes 
framing and discourse analysis by combining these two subsets of discourse 
analysis, and applies them to conflict prevention and statebuilding.  
 
1.2.2.4 Literature surveys:  
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Discourse and frame analysis alone do not help address the remaining 
concept - responsibility. A significant part of pointing out a “responsibility 
gap” requires conceptually working on responsibility, in order to show that, 
(a) official narratives define international responsibilities in statebuilding in a 
limited and narrow manner, and (b) it is possible to use an alternative 
framework to assess international responsibilities.  
 
Finding different ways of attributing responsibility, beyond the narrow and 
limited depictions found in the statebuilding literature, requires investigating 
alternative ways through which responsibility might be defined and 
operationalized. Both disciplines of international relations and moral 
philosophy can be utilized towards this end. A number of mainly 
constructivist studies and philosophical texts dealing with the concept of 
responsibility will be used, with the aim of formulating answers about what 
responsibility means and entails, where it originates from, how 
responsibilities can be attributed to specific actors and who they are directed 
toward (Erskine: 2003, Erskine: 2007, Vogt: 2006, Szigeti: 2006, Frost: 2003, 
DeWinter: 2001, Frankfurt: 1969, 1971, French: 1979, Cooper: 1968, Lewis: 
1948, Held: 1970, Velasquez: 1983, Downie: 1969, Brown: 2006, Cohen and 
Levesque: 1990, Watson: 1987, Husak and Thomas: 2001, Barry: 2005). The 
focus will be on formulating an alternative framework for attributing moral 
responsibility beyond official narratives. After understanding in depth the 
possibility of ‘attribution of responsibility’ and the conditions for ‘moral 
agency’, the thesis will focus mainly on studies that consider the question of 
“collective moral responsibility’, and how it can be applied to the case of the 
European Union (Mayer: 2008b, Erskine: 2003, Erskine: 2007, Runciman: 2003, 
Harbour: 2003, Vogt: 2006, Szigeti: 2006, French: 1979, 1982, DeGeorge: 1981, 
Doyle: 2010, Walzer: 2003, Navari: 2003, Ojanen: 2003, Mayer: 2008, Tocci: 
2007, Manners: 2008, Smith: 2008, Whitman: 2009). In short, for this part, the 
method will be a literature survey on attribution and agency in moral 
responsibility, borrowing from parallel works in the fields of international 
relations and philosophy.  
 
1.2.2.5 Case study: 
 
The final component of my research is a case study designed to test the 
propositions and hypothesis of the thesis. Specifically, I will look at the 
European Union’s involvement in statebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Bosnia has been characterized as one of the most long-term, comprehensive, 
and extensive statebuilding projects of the past few decades, which makes it 
particularly interesting as a study of the moral responsibilities of international 
actors (Chandler: 2010). With international statebuilding efforts now 
stretching into their third decade, the Bosnian case is particularly helpful for 
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showing how change happens, how the relationships between different 
variables change and new variables are introduced, and how the world 
moves from one pattern to another (Lieberman: 2008, George and Bennett: 
2007). 
 
Broadly speaking, the choice to analyze the EU’s statebuilding efforts is based 
on these factors:  
a) The EU has been engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina in different 
roles and capacities since the beginning of the Balkan conflict in 
1992.  
b) The EU has been involved in the Balkans via both statebuilding 
efforts and through European enlargement processes.  
c) Many of the EU’s new civilian crisis-management tools and 
policies, such as the European Security and Defense Policy, and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, were tested in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
d) The double hatting of the High Representative and the EU Special 
Representative provides an interesting example for analyzing 
statebuilding and European enlargement together. 
 
George and Bennett (2005) underscore that, for research that employs 
multiple methods, like this one, process tracing is an apt methodology for 
conducting cross-method collaboration and integrating the different methods. 
By looking at several sets of information and data over many years, process 
tracing helps to identify changes in global dynamics and their effects on 
processes (Checkel: 2006). It will be particularly useful given the long time 
horizon in Bosnia, which will require factoring in two decades of changing 
global, regional, and local dynamics; evolving capacities; new threat 
perceptions; and new interests. 
 
For Checkel (2006), process tracing can also be used to challenge “law-like 
propositions” in international relations, such as the argument that 
“democracies do not fight democracies” or, for this thesis, “the international 
community’s responsibilities in statebuilding are technical, temporary, and 
limited role.” Process tracing is useful also for analyzing the perceptions, 
judgments, preferences, environment, and choices of actors, and meshes well 
with the frame analysis used in previous sections (Levy: 2008).  
 
As a first step, the case study aims to identify the casual mechanisms that 
explaining the stability of discourse regarding international responsibilities in 
changing global and national environments (Checkel: 2006, Levy: 2008, 
George and Bennett: 2005). The second step will be looking at the EU’s role in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from an “attributability” perspective, to see whether 
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this stable framing of international responsibilities is appropriate from the 
point of view of moral philosophy. As a third step, I will look at several 
discursive examples from the EU in order to analyse how the stability of 
responsibility discourse remains static amid evolving dynamics and 
processes. These three steps will help to test the hypothesis on responsibility 
gaps and discursive safeguards.  
 
Since the case study is, in essence, designed to test a hypothesis, the 
underlying implication is that the EU’s statebuilding efforts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are a representative example of a broader phenomenon: the 
consistent and stable framing of international responsibilities in a narrow, 
limited, and temporary fashion, despite the comprehensiveness, 
intrusiveness, and extensiveness of international involvement (Levy: 2008). 
Yet, the thesis also allows for deviations. The frame analysis in the third 
chapter focuses on the responsibilities of the international community in 
general, while the fourth chapter hopes to identify the frame that defines how 
the EU’s responsibilities are constructed—and in the process, to identify the 
EU’s position and unique role within the broader framing of statebuilding. 
Although when it comes to establishing moral responsibility, all contexts are 
unique and complex, the Bosnia case study should still broadly shed light on 
the roles and responsibilities of the EU in global statebuilding efforts (Erskine: 
2003, Szigeti: 2006).  
 
This overarching analytical framework will be a consistent lens through the 
sections of this thesis covering responsibility, statebuilding, discourse and the 
EU, and will lead to a unified argument that will help test its ultimate 
hypothesis. As the thesis proceeds, framing and discourse analysis will help 
define the interplay between the more stable framing of statebuilding, and the 
changing and evolving approaches and responsibilities as states adapt to 
changing interests, threat perceptions and capabilities. This line of inquiry 
and methodological framework will test the hypothesis regarding the use of 
discursive safeguards to cover the gap between the responsibilities entailed 
by statebuilding and the narrow ways they are attributed to international 
actors. It will show, in sum, how the international community adapts to 
changing situations by fine tuning the already existing frame of statebuilding 
and presenting this, via discourse, as responsible, rather than questioning the 
essence of statebuilding as dictated by neoliberal internationalism, even in 
situations where such self-questioning would be the more responsible thing 
to do. 
 




Several different theories will go into the investigation of my research 
question, as an overarching framework over the methodological preferences. 
Liberal international theories, on which many concepts and practices of 
statebuilding are based on, will be used to understand better the theoretical 
framework which statebuilding is based on. These theories help point out the 
relevant actors in statebuilding, their ambitions and interests and what their 
(social) structures comprise of (Finnemore and Sikkink: 2001). In other words, 
neoliberal internationalism will help shed light on the framework by which 
statebuilding is conceptualized, constructed and operationalized, as a factor 
supporting the dominant narratives of statebuilding and their 
conceptualization of responsibility (Paris: 2002, Fukuyama: 2004). 
 
Liberal internationalist studies are useful in understanding where 
statebuilding comes from and the dominant beliefs and theories its 
application is based on. They help explain statebuilding as it is applied today, 
as well as such attendant principles and terms as state sovereignty, 
democratic peace, free market economies, liberal internationalism, 
globalization, interventions and human rights. However, when the goal is to 
critically analyze notions of responsibility in statebuilding, approaches that 
focus on issues such as discourse, interests, identities, norms and 
responsibilities are more relevant. One example is the common implication in 
statebuilding narratives with liberal internationalist undertones that define 
statebuilding as a technical best practice aimed at establishing functional and 
peaceful states. This definition inhibits attempts to explain and analyze 
inconsistencies in the concept, as well as technical shortcomings and inherent 
contradictions. It fails to explain potential mismatches between narratives 
about international responsibilities and how those responsibilities play out in 
practice. As such, for the more essential critical elements of this thesis, which 
consists of taking a critical look at the current construction of responsibilities 
through narratives, different approaches will be needed. Also, because 
statebuilding is constantly being constructed and reconstructed in order both 
to account for problems that appear in practice and to adapt to the changing 
realities of the global world order, as explained in the previous part, more 
adaptable approaches are required. 
 
To that end, constructivist, and to a lesser extent, post-structuralist theories 
provide a useful framework for analyzing statebuilding. These theories do not 
make particular claims about the content of social structures or the nature of 
agents as the liberal internationalist narratives on statebuilding do. They do 
not produce specific predictions about political outcomes, namely what will 
work and what will not. They are more concerned with how social facts 
change and how those social facts influence international politics (Finnemore 
and Sikkink: 2001). Where notions of responsibility in statebuilding are 
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concerned, literature in the fields of international relations and the law cannot 
thoroughly connect the responsibilities of international actors in 
statebuilding. Both constructivism and post-structuralism deal with norms, 
ideas, knowledge, culture and ideas (Ruggie: 1998, Finnemore and Sikkink: 
2001). When analyzing the behavior of agents, they concentrate on the 
identities, values and the interests of actors (Hansen: 2006, Finnemore: 1996, 
Checkel: 1999). They see the world as constantly under construction, which 
makes it a valuable theory when attempting to account for change and 
compare static versus shifting constructions of facts through narratives 
(Hansen: 2006, Hoffman: 2009).  
 
From the perspective of agency, approaches that allow for actors to be defined 
as normative agents are particularly useful. Not only constructivist and post-
structuralist studies, but also theories of moral responsibility allow analyzing 
agency, including the possibility of the agency of international organizations 
and collectives (Finnemore: 1996). They examine the involvement of 
international organizations in the process of the social construction of actors’ 
perceptions of their interests. Therefore, moving away from liberal 
internationalist understandings and interpretations make it easier to examine, 
analyze and interpret the normative and discursive framework, as well as the 
operational aspects of statebuilding. 
 
To summarize, although this thesis will make use of neoliberal theories to 
define and analyze the framework of statebuilding and responsibility, its 
main approach will be critical to these understanding. This is not to define the 
study within the boundaries of post-structuralist or constructivist theory or 
moral philosophy, but rather to acknowledge the opportunities presented by 
these theories and approaches to establish an alternative framework that 
looks at responsibility narratives in a critical manner. This shall be the 
framework defining the methodological approaches explained above.  
 
1.2.2.7 Data collection: 
 
Previous sections of this thesis established that the research question would 
require multiple methodologies. The same is true of data-collection methods. 
 
For the frame analysis, the primary data-collection methods will be discourse 
analysis and literature surveys. As previously noted, the discourse analysis 
will mainly focus on official discourse from the statements and resolutions of 
the United Nations, the European Union, the and Peace Implementation 
Council. Focusing on the narratives of single actors across extended periods 
makes it easier to identify the static and changing elements in discourse. The 
data generated as a result of discource analysis will later be employed both to 
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identify the way international responsibilities are framed in connection to 
statebuilding, and to determine how these responsibilities would be framed 
from a moral-responsibility perspective. The convergences and divergences 
between the two different framings will help point out a “responsibility gap.” 
The discourse analysis will also be used to locate “discursive safeguards” that 
allow for stable narratives to be safeguarded amid evolving global, regional, 
and local dynamics. The secondary data obtained from official discourse will 
be largely adequate for fulfilling the goals of this research. 
 
Process tracing, too, will serve as a data-collection methodology (Collier: 
2011). Process tracing takes “good snapshots at a series of specific 
moments”—exactly what is needed to identify certain key time periods and to 
characterize key steps in the evolution of the EU’s statebuilding activities in 
Bosnia (Collier: 2011, Hansen: 2006). Process tracing allows for the evolving 
dynamics in each identified time period to be tested against the proposed 
stability of responsibility narratives, building a case for the proposed 
“responsibility gap.”  
 
George and Bennett (2005) argue that in process tracing, the researcher 
examines histories, archival documents, statements, and other sources, to see 
whether the casual processes that a theory hypothesizes are evident in the 
sequence. In order to ensure that all of the identified time periods receive 
sufficient and equal emphasis, the case study will draw on sources that have 
been consistently producing material on statebuilding in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina since 1995, such as UN Security Council statements and 
resolutions, EU Council Conclusions, and Bosnia and Herzegovina Peace 
Implementation Council’s statements. The historical data will prevent 
present-day perceptions and understandings from dominating the research. 
 
1.2.3 Chapter breakdown: 
 
Testing the first proposition of this research—that statebuilding implies 
comprehensive responsibilities for international actors—requires a strong 
understanding of the way statebuilding is constructed and operationalized. 
An initial literature survey has already helped demonstrate how liberal 
internationalist approaches have guided the emergence and evolution of 
statebuilding since the end of the Cold War, and showed the interplay 
between these approaches and official narratives to define the roles and 
responsibilities of international actors in statebuilding. Yet, further 
elaboration and analysis will be needed to highlight the comprehensive and 
often intrusive nature of statebuilding as a method of conflict resolution, to 
prove that this nature might requires attributing stronger responsibilities to 
international actors beyond narratives.  
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The second goal is discovering the possibility of attributing responsibility to 
international actors beyond the responsibility framework contained in official 
narratives. The solution will be sought through the disciplines of international 
relations and philosophy, which both have useful studies that focus on the 
attribution of moral responsibility.  These studies that deal with how moral 
agency can be established and the way responsibilities can be attributed will 
be used as a lens to look at the theory, narratives and practice of 
statebuilding, as well as statebuilding actors.  This is expected to allow 
reformulating and reconstructing responsibility in ways that go beyond the 
statebuilding frame. The expected outcome will be to exhibit a clear mismatch 
between the limited and narrow way official narratives ascribe 
responsibilities to external agents and the more comprehensive 
responsibilities that could be attributed to them through a moral 
responsibility perspective. This mismatch can already be dubbed as”a 
responsibility gap.” 
 
The final concept to be elaborated on is discourse. Building upon the 
proposition of Critical Discourse Theory on the way narratives are produced 
and reproduced, when faced with changing dynamics and challenges, the 
third proposition of this thesis suggests that official international narratives 
on statebuilding contribute to the narrow and limited framing of external 
responsibilities, by constantly producing and reproducing them when met 
with challenges (Fairclough: 1995, Jorgenson and Phillips: 2002) This constant 
reproduction of the frame, which effectively helps avoid the attribution of 
more comprehensive responsibilities to external agents, will be called 
‘discursive safeguards’. Building an argument on discursive safeguards will 
necessitate a deep investigation of the discourse surrounding statebuilding—
how it defines the main actors, what kinds of roles it attributes to them, how 
it frames statebuilding, as well as how statebuilding and its narratives have 
evolved.  
 
The research will be structured around the purpose of analyzing the interplay 
between these three concepts, discourse, responsibility and statebuilding. The 
first chapter has already analyzed some literature on statebuilding, 
responsibility and discourse, and has put forward the main propositions that 
the research wants to test. Those propositions, again, pointed to: (a) the 
comprehensive international responsibilities that statebuilding implies, (b) the 
gap between responsibilities as they are defined by official narratives and the 
comprehensive set of responsibilities cited above, and, (c) that international 
actors tend to contribute to this gap via discourse. The hypothesis has 
accordingly been defined as “the international community uses discursive 
safeguards to obscure the gap between the comprehensive and intrusive 
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nature of statebuilding and the narrow and limited definition of external 
responsibilities through narratives in international relations.” The following 
parts of the chapter set the goals of the research and proposed a theoretical, 
methodological and conceptual way of testing the propositions and the 
hypothesis.  
 
The second part of the thesis, which encompasses the second, third and fourth 
chapters, will operationalize the research question and build the argument 
responding to the research question. These chapters form the core of the 
thesis. The second chapter will probe the concept of responsibility, and that of 
the responsibility gap, and will point out what moral responsibilities 
statebuilding might actually entail. Legal and philosophical literature will 
also be applied here in order to help assess the framework in which the 
responsibilities of international actors in statebuilding are defined.  
 
The third and fourth chapters will each look at three points: (a) defining the 
frame of external statebuilding and its attendant responsibilities, (b) 
advancing the responsibility framework outlined in the second chapter by 
creating an alternative way to attribute international responsibilities in 
statebuilding, (c) testing the framework that explains how statebuilding is 
framed, “responsibility gaps” arise and discursive safeguards are used to 
avoid a comprehensive attribution of responsibility. The fourth chapter will 
look at these points from the perspective of the European Union, with the 
vision of portraying where the Union sits within the statebuilding frame. The 
methodology that will be employed in the third and the fourth chapters is a 
combination of framing and discourse analysis, as previously explained 
(Hansen: 2006, Auteserre: 2012, Loizides: 2015, Laclau: 1993, Fairclough: 
1995). The empirical method offered by Hansen (2006), which suggests that 
“[I]t is a key goal of discourse analysis to show how… facts are dependent 
upon a particular discursive framing of the issue in question”, will be 
particularly useful to operationalize these methods through the prism of 
conflict and interventions.  
 
The statebuilding frame will be approached from discursive and practical 
angles, in order to show how it is constructed and operationalized, combining 
a number of practical ways suggested to conduct frame analysis (Auteserre: 
2012, Loizides: 2015, Hansen: 2006, Payne: 2001). In the third chapter, the 
main concepts of statebuilding will be identified in order to set the discursive 
frame; the practical frame will be established through looking into how 
statebuilding has been operationalized. In the fourth chapter, the focus will be 
on how statebuilding is constructed by the EU. Discourse analysis will be 
used to support the frame analysis and to solidify the propositions with 
concrete narrative examples. Identifying dominant narratives, according to 
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Hansen (2006), is a core part of frame and discourse analysis. As such, the 
study will, first and foremost, attempt to identify the way dominant 
narratives frame statebuilding, and the responsibilities of international actors 
(Hansen: 2006). For the sake of simplicity, dominant narratives will be 
defined mainly through looking at official discourse: statements, resolutions, 
and speeches. This will serve two purposes. First of all, limiting the number of 
venues where discourse is produced (in our case to Security Council 
meetings, European Union debates and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Peace 
Implementation Council sessions) is a practical choice – these are all places 
where discourse on peacebuilding is consistently produced and reproduced. 
Secondly, the focus on official discourse to locate the frame will be useful to 
factor in the continuity and change in narratives. Selecting a certain type of 
discourse and a specific venue for analysis will provide the consistency, 
whereas the change in discourse by the same actors over time will help 
exhibit variations. These variations will be the basis to test the prepositions on 
discursive safeguards.  
 
Additionally, discourse analysis works with constructions of the Self and 
Other, to exhibit how identities are implemented and put into concrete 
practice, including by international institutions (Hansen: 2006). As such, it 
will be interesting to look how statebuilding discourse constructs its own Self 
(statebuilders) and Other (conflict or post-conflict countries). Looking into 
how the identities and interests of the Self (statebuilding actors and in 
particular, the EU) and the Other (post-conflict countries) are framed in 
discourse will make it easier to understand policy choices that lead to the 
construction of the statebuilding frame (Hansen: 2006, Auteserre: 2012). A 
more detailed description of how framing and discourse analysis will be 
conducted will be made in the third chapter, including the details on source 
selection.  
 
The fourth chapter aims to narrow the scope of the research by studying a 
single agent of responsibility - the European Union. Hansen (2006) suggests 
“it is a key goal of discourse analysis to show how (…) facts are dependent 
upon a particular discursive framing of the issue in question.” While the 
general assumption is that the EU subscribes to the neoliberal frame of 
statebuilding, it still needs to ascribe meaning to this frame and to construct 
objects within it based on norms, habit, rules and procedures within its own 
institutional space (Tversky and Kahmemann: 1981, Hansen: 2006, Auteserre: 
2012). As such, the first part of the fourth chapter intends to show how the EU 
constructs its foreign-policy identity and how it frames statebuilding and its 
related responsibilities via discourse. As Laclau (1993) explains, “[T]he way in 
which the speaker puts sentences together… [is] largely determined by the 
way in which institutions are structured, by what is sayable in some context.” 
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Building on this understanding, framing and discourse analysis will be used 
in the fourth chapter as well, in order to emphasize how and why the social 
and political conditions supporting the dominant narrative arose (Moses: 
2007).  
 
The first four chapters are the analytical parts of the thesis. The final two 
chapters will be the case study, which aims to show the practical application 
of the propositions put forward in the first chapters of the study—specifically, 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The same theoretical and methodological 
framework defined outlined above will be used here too. After defining, in 
the second and third chapters, the framework in which “responsibility gaps” 
and discursive safeguards” emerge, and investigating the European Union in 
the fourth chapter, the case study will further narrow the scope by looking at 
the intersection of the concepts of statebuilding, responsibility, discourse and 
the EU from the perspective of the statebuilding project in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The concluding chapter will also analyze the extent to which 
the research hypothesis has been accurate, discuss how the proposed 
framework might be expanded beyond Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU, 
and explore further potential areas of study. 
 
1.2.4 The boundaries of the research: 
 
Looking into the interplay between responsibility and discourse through the 
lens of statebuilding is an enormous task. In order to provide a glimpse into 
this vast subject in a manageable fashion, it is necessary to limit the 
boundaries of the research. This will be done in four ways: limiting the actor, 
limiting the time frame and limiting the examples. 
 
First, the leading actor: the European Union. While initially defining the 
frame of statebuilding, there will be no major distinction between external 
actors that have taken part in the implementation of the statebuilding project. 
The reason for this is an argument previously made - a variety of 
international actors, such as states, international organizations and NGO’s 
engaged in statebuilding efforts have applied similar frameworks based on 
democratic peace, free markets and good governance under the name of 
statebuilding. However, once the statebuilding frame is defined, the study 
will increasingly focus on the European Union as the international agent. 
 
The Union, as the main subject of the thesis was initially chosen due to its vast 
presence in efforts concerning in the past, present and future of Southeastern 
Europe, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular. However, the EU’s 
connection to statebuilding goes beyond the Balkans. The EU has emerged as 
an interesting and unique actor in conflict resolution and statebuilding efforts, 
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with its own conflict resolution background, its external policies based on a 
combination of hard and soft power, with its ambition to benefit from its 
trade, diplomacy and aid tools through a normative touch. The EU, in 
conflict/ post-conflict theatres such as Bosnia, Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan 
is currently an important actor, gaining relevance through being a major 
donor of development and financial assistance, operating European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions, appointing EU Special Representatives 
(EUSR) to gain a political voice and using conditionality through instruments 
such as enlargement or the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Moreover, 
the timing that the EU started to formulate its foreign policy identity more or 
less coincides with the rise of the concept of “statebuilding as peacebuilding” 
in conflict resolution efforts. Thus, the EU’s involvement in statebuilding goes 
beyond being a matter of interest or altruism, expanding into the area of 
identity formation. In addition, statebuilding, especially as a technical/ 
operational exercise, serves as a tool for the Union to undertake joint 
exercises, develop foreign policy tools and speak with a common voice. 
 
The European Security Strategy of 2003 states that “The best protection to our 
security is a world of well-governed, democratic states,” thus, the member 
states and the EU “have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to 
put failed states back on their feet.” In this sense, European engagement in 
statebuilding aims to respond to international and US demands to play its 
special part in protecting global order and security. These demands have also 
elevated the EU as a model for democracy and peace, with its active 
promotion of international law, democratic values and multilateralism. Thus, 
the contribution of the EU to statebuilding efforts also becomes an exercise 
through which the EU affirms and exerts its identity, both as a model and as a 
foreign policy actor. This point alone makes the EU a very interesting object of 
analysis. 
 
Another interesting point regarding the relevance of the European Union to 
this study is based on the discourse of the Union. It has been mentioned 
previously how, in the absence of a clear definition of the responsibilities of 
the international community, it becomes an easy way out for external actors 
to point their fingers elsewhere for the failures stemming from the inherent 
contradictions and inconsistencies of the theory and practice of statebuilding 
(Erskine: 2003). For the EU, who engages in statebuilding also to formulate its 
foreign policy identity and affirm the very principles it was found upon, 
failure of statebuilding efforts for reasons related to the very essence of the 
statebuilding project seems to hold serious repercussions. In relation to this 
study, discourse is not solely a tool used to avoid responsibility. It also 
reflects how an actor constructs itself and what kind of image it wants to 
project to the outside world. Experience from the ground suggests that there 
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is a gap between the way the EU presents its efforts in statebuilding and its 
self-perception as a foreign policy actor and the way the role and efforts of the 
EU are seen from others (Manners: 2008). Thus, using discourse to circumvent 
certain responsibilities instead of drawing a realistic picture of the situation 
on the ground could also harm the image of the Union and eventually become 
self-destructive. For these reasons, it becomes particularly interesting to select 
the EU and its formulation of discourse as the agent. 
 
Regarding the time frame, the study will mainly focus on the post-Cold War 
and only on interventions that can be defined as post-conflict peacebuilding 
or statebuilding. Thus, only the historical development of statebuilding since 
the 1990s and and the shaping of the EU as an aspiring global actor in this 
time period will be included. One reason for this is the desire to concentrate 
on the responsibilities after statebuilding projects have been launched. 
Responsibility is a difficult subject that goes deep into the areas of ethics and 
political philosophy, none of which is the intended area of focus of this study. 
The purpose is to avoid losing focus by entering extended debates on the 
origins of moral responsibility. Focusing on responsibilites acquired through 
engagement in liberal-internationalist statebuilding helps avoid complex 
issues such as historical responsibilities of the West, colonialism or any other 
philosophical debate that aims to go deep into the roots of duties and 
responsibilities of Western powers (Barry: 2005). Obviously, the other reason 
of identifying the post-Cold War period as the launching pad is the increasing 
dominance of neoliberal internationalism after this point in global politics. For 
all these reasons, even if there are interventions that could be defined as 
statebuilding before the Cold War, they are not the direct focus of this 
research.  
 
On the sources, a more complete list of texts to be studies will be detailed in 
the following chapters. However, as a general principle, the purpose is to 
concentrate on texts that can capture the elements of continuity as well as 
change in statebuilding as an evolving exercise. Statements made at relevant 
UN Security Council debates, European Council and EU Foreign Affairs 
Council conclusions (or their earlier versions) and Peace Implementation 
Council meetings will be prioritized for official discourse. The context-specific 
statements of high level EU or other officials on the ground will also be used. 
 
Finally, as explained at the beginning of this part, the first steps leading to this 
study were taken on the field, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Palestine and Afghanistan 
and were the results of practical debates concerning everyday issues related 
to external statebuilding. As such, the more theoretical formulations on 
responsibility and statebuilding will also be tested by case studies from the 
field, based on practical experience. In order to limit the thesis, the 
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concentration will be on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reason for this is both 
practical and personal. Bosnia is generally considered as the birthplace for 
intrusive statebuilding, where the theory and practice of the phenomenon 
were developed and structuralized. In this respect, the time frame chosen for 
the study more or less will being with the beginning of post-conflict 
reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and end in 2012, with a 
brief mention of the riots in February 2014. 
 
1.2.5 Novelty of the study: 
 
The issue of responsibility has been featured in different ways in philosophy, 
politics and international relations literature, under themes such as 
humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to protect, statebuilding, state 
responsibility and responsibilities of international organizations (Szigeti: 
2006, Frost: 2003, DeWinter: 2001, Frankfurt: 1969, 1971, French: 1979, Cooper: 
1968, Lewis: 1948, Held: 1970, Velasquez: 1983, Downie: 1969, Brown: 2006, 
Cohen and Levesque: 1990, Watson: 1987, Husak and Thomas: 2001, Barry: 
2005, Mayer: 2008, Erskine: 2003, Erskine: 2007, Runciman: 2003, Harbour: 
2003, Vogt: 2006, DeGeorge: 1981, Doyle: 2010, Walzer: 2003, Navari: 2003, 
Ojanen: 2003, Mayer: 2008, Tocci: 2008, Manners: 2008, Smith: 2008, Whitman: 
2009). There are studies on attributing responsibility to international 
organizations, as well as those that talk about responsibilities of international 
actors in statebuilding (Mayer: 2008, Erskine: 2007, Hansen: 2006, Chandler: 
2012). While these studies provide valuable insights on how responsibility 
can be attributed, they do not provide sufficient conceptual clarity and 
consistency on the issue of international responsibilities in statebuilding, 
especially in relation to longer-term structural issues such as aid dependency, 
problems associated with consociationalism or the evolving nature of 
statebuilding (Bose: 2002, Erskine: 2003, Erskine: 2007, Mayer: 2008, Vogt: 
2006). This leads to a “responsibility gap” when defining international 
responsibilities in statebuilding. 
 
Although there have been efforts to analyze the concept of responsibility in 
relation to international relations (Finnemore and Sikkink: 2001, Erskine: 
2003), there has also been no attempt to directly construct a framework that 
could be used to attribute responsibility to the relevant actors in a fair 
manner. In other words, the current international relations literature on 
responsibility does not provide a framework that defines the origins and 
scope of responsibility in external statebuilding that would address the 
“responsibility gap” defined above. The reason is that the statebuilding 
literature does not provide a thorough definition of “responsibility,” whereas 
the responsibility literature does not enter much the field of statebuilding. 
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This study proposes to contribute to the analysis on these issues, by figuring 
out whether it is possible to establish a framework to attribute responsibility 
to the international community in its statebuilding endeavors in post-conflict 
countries. The second purpose is to test the assumption put forward by, for 
example Erskine (2003), that this responsibility gap might become a fruitful 
ground for international actors to avoid their earlier assumed responsibilities. 
In addition, the concept of “discursive safeguards” is also a new 
phenomenon, which claims there is a framework that helps understand how 
international actors avoid responsibility in a structured manner. 
 
The introduction of the concept of the “responsibility gap” as well the 
analysis on how this gap reflects itself in statebuilding discourse is another 
one of the proposed novelties of this research. The concept of “discursive 
safeguards” is also new, suggesting that international discourse uses well-
established principles such as state sovereignty and the primary 
responsibility of nation states, as well as propositions such as the universality 
of (some) neoliberal basis of the state such as democracy and free market 
economies to avoid its responsibilities. The ambition to undertake a research 
that will deal with both the “responsibility gaps” and “discursive safeguards” 
simultaneously and in a structured manner will hopefully bring new insight 
on to the concepts of statebuilding, discourse and responsibility. 
 
Heathershaw (2008) states that statebuilding is overworked and under 
theorized. According to Paris and Sisk (2009), the amount of studies that go 
beyond guidelines for operationally improving current theories have been on 
the increase in the past years. To conclude this part, by identifying a gap 
between international responsibility and external statebuilding, by adding 
international discourse into the equation, by trying to formulate a definition 
of moral responsibility in line with the scope of this thesis, by attempting to 
show the deficiencies of statebuilding at a deeper level than fine-tuning, this 
research hopes to add to the increasing amount of studies which try to 
“theorize” statebuilding from a more critical perspective. 
 
1.2.6 Personal perspectives: Opportunities and constraints  
 
As I mentioned in a previous section, I began to consider a study of the 
responsibilities of international actors in statebuilding when I was working as 
a diplomat in Sarajevo. In my capacity there, I was actively following and 
contributing to policy through my country’s seat on the Peace 
Implementation Council (PIC). While working on my thesis, I also had the 
opportunity to serve in Israel and Palestine, Afghanistan, and New York, 
getting acquainted first-hand with different aspects of peacebuilding and 
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statebuilding. As such, most of the ideas and propositions in this study are 
based on personal experience. 
 
Writing a Ph.D thesis as a practitioner has been an interesting and rewarding, 
yet challenging experience. In terms of opportunities, while studying the 
evolution of the principles, theories, and practices of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding for my thesis, I was able to see up close the direct application of 
statebuilding on the ground. In my last months as a Ph.D. student, I also had 
the opportunity to work for the United Nations, supporting the 2015 Review 
of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, which let me acquaint myself with the 
most recent developments, trends, and ideas in the field. As such, many of the 
ideas in this thesis were tested against real-life experience with the pragmatic 
and practical aspects of peacebuilding. I also read academic literature through 
this pragmatic lens. Conversely, in my job I was able to view the more 
practical policy aspects of statebuilding from an academic angle.  
 
While I believe that my practical experiences have made my thesis stronger 
and in many ways unique, working simultaneously as a researcher and 
practitioner has also been challenging. The main difficulty was, not 
surprisingly, balancing my academic, professional, and personal roles and 
commitments. Although the academic and policy worlds overlap 
significantly, they are still distinct and separate. I was mostly happy with the 
practical insight that my work as a practitioner allowed me to bring into my 
studies, but I was also aware that, had I been solely an academic, I would 
have been able to concentrate more on strengthening the theoretical 
perspectives of my thesis, and to broaden and deepen its scope.  
 
A second challenge was ensuring that I would be able to distance myself from 
the confidential, classified information that I saw while working as a 
practitioner. Similarly, as a researcher, it was important to be able to be 
objective in my research, without being influenced by the perceptions and 
more practical concerns that my day-to-day work brought forth. Having 
frame analysis and process tracing—which allow the use of official 
statements, speeches, resolutions, and declarations as data—as the guiding 
methodologies of the thesis has mostly alleviated this challenge. Had I relied 
solely on primary data, detaching myself from my policy work would have 
been much more difficult, particularly since I had contact with many of the 
key people in the field.  
 
Finally, as a researcher, I had to challenge the core assumptions, principles, 
and practices that guided my work as a practitioner. Having to question 
frequently my own practice was sometimes a painful, yet very valuable 
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experience. My research experience allowed me to look at policy issues and 






















































































2. MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN STATEBUILDING:  
AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
This research started with the identification of inconsistencies in the way 
formal and informal discourse on statebuilding defined responsibility. 
Further elaboration on the concepts of responsibility and statebuilding led to 
the proposition on the “responsibility gap” - the apparent mismatch between 
the comprehensive and intrusive role played by international actors and the 
limited and narrow way their responsibilities are defined.   
 
“Responsibility” is a frequently used word by politicians, bureaucrats, 
journalists, businessmen and civic activists in numerous contexts and with a 
great number of (different) meanings in mind (Mayer: 2008). However, these 
references are often not backed up with conceptual clarity on what 
responsibility would mean (Vogt: 2006, Mayer: 2008, Erskne: 2007). Such 
“non-definitions or inconsistencies (...) can lead to attributing duties or 
responsibilities to [some] institutions beyond their capabilities, while leaving 
more appropriate actors off the hook” on a range of issues (Erskine: 2003). 
Statebuilding provides a good example to these situations, where despite the 
frequent use of the word ‘responsibility’, there is actually no clear principles 
to assess responsible international behavior.  Murithi (2009) claims that the 
absence of an assessment of the ethical dimensions of peacebuilding could be 
a contributory factor to the limited success that has been experienced in 
consolidating peace (Murithi: 2009). 
 
An initial literature survey undertaken in the first chapter has indicated three 
elements that define narratives on the responsibilities of international actors 
in statebuilding:  
 - The main responsibility of statebuilding and conflict resolution rests 
with local governments; the primary responsibility of nation-states is 
prioritized. - International actors assume a supporting and temporary role in their 
engagement with conflict-affected states; thus, the responsibilities 
attributed to international actors through narratives are narrow and 
limited, - While the principles and practices of statebuilding are constantly 
evolves, narratives continued to define international responsibilities in 
a relatively static manner. 
 
This chapter will attempt to challenge these parameters of responsibility, by 
asking the following questions:  
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 - When the international community talks about ¨responsibility¨, what 
kind of responsibility does this indicate? - What principles would apply to attribute moral responsibility to 
international actors in statebuilding? - What are the criteria for agency? Can international organizations be 
held responsible for their deeds? - Towards whom can responsibilities be directed? 
 
The answers to these questions necessitate alternative formulations of 
responsibility beyond official narratives. As underscored in the previous 
chapter, there are studies in the fields of international relations and 
philosophy that have in fact dealt with the topic of (moral) responsibility; yet, 
none of them have worked specifically on statebuilding. This part intends to 
conduct a literature survey on these studies, and utilize them to construct a 
framework for specifically attributing responsibility to international agents 
involved in statebuilding. Later, this survey will be used to establish how 
international actors can be held responsible for their involvement in 
statebuilding, and to whom its responsibilities are to.  
 
2.1 Defining Responsibility 
 
The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (ESS 
Report: 2008), which says “five years on from adoption of the European 
Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at 
any time in its history”, connects this responsibility to “rising up to 
challenges” arising from violent conflicts around the world. The EU 
Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict (Commission: 2001) is 
clearer, claiming that “the international community has a political and moral 
responsibility to act to avoid the human suffering and the destruction of 
resources caused by violent conflict”. The former EU High Representative 
Ashton, in a 2010 hearing to the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee, accepted that “the EU has primary responsibility for [its] 
neighbourhood”, alongside other global issues29.  
 
As these examples indicate, the “responsibility of international actors” (or the 
EU) in conflict resolution is a commonly used catchphrase. Yet, what this 
responsibility entails is often left unclear. The first purpose of this part is to 
shed more clarity on what can be meant by “responsibility”, by looking into 
debates on legal and moral responsibility.  																																																								
29  See Pantelic, Z. and Palokaj, A. (2010), ¨Ashton keeps low profile on Western Balkans¨, at 
http://euobserver.com/news/29247 (Accessed on 5 February 2016). 
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2.1.1 Legal Responsibility vs. Moral Responsibility: 
 
There have been efforts to define and construct international responsibility 
both from a legal and a moral point of view. The first chapter has already 
suggested that the international law framework has its limitations and is not 
able to fully respond to the requirements of this research. This part intends to 
solidify the argument that moral, rather than legal, responsibility should be 
used as a basis for this thesis.  
 
The International Law Commission (ILC), at its 63rd session in 2011, adopted 
draft articles on the responsibility of international organizations and 
submitted them to the General Assembly30. In line with previous arguments 
on legal responsibility, the ILC defines (international) responsibility (in post-
conflict interventions) mainly from the perspective of “wrongful or unlawful 
acts” and “international obligations” defined within the scope of international 
law. Article 11 of the text states that “an act of an international organization 
does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the 
organization is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act 
occurs”. Similarly, Lewis (1948) defines responsibility as “the liability to 
answer”, which, in legal terms, is equated with penalty. Legal responsibility, 
therefore, is more concerned with defining wrongful acts and assigning 
penalties to them. 
 
Going back to the starting point of this thesis, defining responsibility of 
international organizations strictly from the viewpoint of international law 
holds its limitations. First and foremost, this legal definition of international 
responsibilities is not what the international narratives have in mind, when 
they talk about their responsibilities to (support) ending violent conflict. For 
instance, when the EU claims that “they have greater responsibilities than any 
time in history”, as cited above, they are clearly not talking about a legal 
responsibility as formulated by the ILC.  
 
Secondly, the legal framework does not help build the argument on the 
“responsibility gap”. International law would not see a problem with 
narratives that focus on state sovereignty and the primary responsibility of 
nation states in interventions and confining the responsibilities of 
international actors to support. In fact, the jus post bellum doctrine prioritizes 
sovereignty and establishes the most important responsibility of international 
actors in interventions as exiting as soon as possible (Osterdahl and Zadel: 
2009, Orend: 2000, Bass: 2004). In line with the prioritization of the UN 																																																								
30 For the full text, see http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_11_2011.pdf. 
(Accessed on 5 February 2016). 
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Charter of state sovereignty, a core legal document defining the basic 
principles of the international system, the legal field does not go deep into 
defining the legal obligations of third parties engaged in statebuilding beyond 
this framework. In other words, engagement in conflict states in a 
comprehensive and intrusive manner is not within the radar of international 
law. Thus, it cannot explain the mismatch between the comprehensive nature 
of external statebuilding and the narrowly defined responsibilities of 
international actors. It keeps its focus on conducts of actors in specific 
situations, such as an international peacekeeping mission committing a 
legally wrongful act.  
 
Another document to turn to in this respect is the Hague Convention of 1907, 
on the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The 
Convention, in its 43rd Article states that “the authority of the legitimate power 
having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the 
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country31”.  The law presupposes that an occupying power will not restructure 
the operation and function of a state, but rather, will hold the status quo 
(Wouters and Chan: 2012). In other words, the law does not involve itself 
with external statebuilding under international law. This creates a tension 
between the law of occupation and the process of statebuilding (Wouters and 
Chan 2012, McGurk: 2005 – 2006).  
 
The examples of institution building authorized by the Security Council, such 
as for Kosovo under UNSCR 1244 (1999) or when the consent of the receiving 
state is sought might be exceptions of this phenomenon. However, even in 
documents such as 1244 (1999), the responsibilities of international actors 
during or after the institution-building process are not clarified. These 
resolutions only help legitimize statebuilding in certain contexts, but do not 
dwell upon the way statebuilding is conducted. Moreover, not every 
intervention is conducted strictly in abidance with international law. The 
Security Council, for example, did not provide the coalition forces with a legal 
mandate to use force against Iraq under Chapter VII, thus raising questions 
about the legality of the intervention in Iraq in 2003. Although elements of 
statebuilding in Iraq were authorized in the following Security Council 
resolution 1483 (2004), the legal basis as well as the scope of statebuilding and 
relevant international responsibilities remained unclear.   
 																																																								
31 For the full text, see 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=3741EAB8E36E9
274C12563CD00516894 (Accessed on 8 February 2016). 
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Of course, since the end of the Cold War, there have been shifts and changes 
regarding how the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference should 
be interpreted. The doctrine of “responsibility to protect” allows interventions 
on limited occasions32. The present position of international law regarding the 
question of state-building intervention does lean towards a kind of ‘soft’ 
sovereignty doctrine – one where sovereignty of State can, in some instances, 
be penetrated (Wouters and Chan: 2012). However, the scope and extent of 
this doctrine is far from clear. Activities such as institution building and 
democracy promotion also do not have a solid basis under international 
humanitarian law (McGurk: 2005-2006).  
 
Chandler (2006), talking about statebuilding, argues that “law and reality no 
longer coincide when considering the location of a sovereign power”¨. In short, 
international law does not cover many “grey areas” in interventions, 
particularly those related to international responsibilities in statebuilding. 
When international law does deal with responsibilities in post-conflict 
interventions, the responsibilities it defines does not match those mentioned 
in international narratives, some of which have been exemplified above. The 
legal field a) defines (external) responsibility in limited terms, and b) the relationship 
between statebuilding and international law seems to be relatively unclear; making a 
clear and concrete definition of responsibilities of international actors in 
statebuilding under international law difficult.  
 
Barry (2005) points out the limitations of law, stating that when dealing with 
ethical responsibility, importing standards of application from strictly legal 
contexts is not sufficient to define responsibility in its fullest sense, “as 
standards of ethical/ moral responsibility are much higher than those of legal 
responsibility”. Defining responsibility solely as a wrongful act would not 
make it possible to explain more complex phenomena; such as, for example, 
why a change of discourse of the international community emphasizing local 
ownership and responsibilities as a part of their exit strategy when their 
statebuilding project does not proceed as expected, could be viewed as an 
irresponsible act. There is no reference in the law which would make it 
possible to define evading responsibility in this sense as a wrongful act, 
despite the possible negative consequences to the local population, the image 
of the international community, global security and neo-liberal norm 
promotion. From this perspective, the law cannot give satisfactory answers to 
more general questions such as “Has the EU been responsible in its conduct 
related to statebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the entry into force 
of the Dayton Accords”.  																																																								
32 See the website of the United Nations on the Responsibility to Protect for further information, at 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml. (Accessed on 8 February 2016). 
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Studies on moral responsibility provide a stronger basis to move forward. 
First of all, when the European Union talk about responsibility, what they 
refer to can be understood as moral, not legal or any other form of 
responsibility. In fact, there are many specific references to moral 
responsibility. The EU document entitled “A Human Security Doctrine for 
Europe” states that “human beings have a right to live with dignity and security, 
and a concomitant obligation to help each other when that security is threatened.(…) 
There is nothing distinctively European about such moral norms. On the contrary, 
they are by their nature universal”.33 The EU Programme for the Prevention of 
Violent Conflicts (Commission: 2001) similarly argues that the EU “has a 
political and moral responsibility to act to avoid the human suffering and the 
destruction of resources caused by violent conflict”. Examples can be diversified.  
 
An initial look into studies on moral responsibility shows that the subject of 
moral responsibility has been elaborated on, both from the perspectives of the 
international relations and moral philosophy disciplines, even if these studies 
have not specifically concentrated on moral responsibilities in connection to 
peacebuilding and statebuilding (Szigeti: 2006, Frost, DeWinter: 2001, 
Frankfurt: 1969, 1971, French: 1979, Cooper: 1968, Lewis: 1948, Held: 1970, 
Velasquez: 1983, Downie: 1969, Brown: 2006, Cohen and Levesque: 1990, 
Watson: 1987, Husak and Thomas: 2001, Barry: 2005, Mayer: 2008, Erskine: 
2003, Erskine: 2007, Runciman: 2003, Harbour: 2003, Vogt: 2006, Szigeti: 2006, 
1982, DeGeorge: 1981, Doyle: 2010, Walzer: 2003, Navari: 2003, Ojanen: 2003, 
Mayer: 2008, Tocci: 2008, Manners: 2008, Smith: 2008).  
 
Moral responsibility is commonly defined as “the status of deserving praise, 
blame, reward or punishment” for an act of omission, in accordance with 
ones obligations (Klein: 2005). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
follows the same definition in different words; stating “when a person performs 
or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular 
kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms 
this reaction might take”. These definitions indicate that moral responsibility 
goes deeper than legal responsibility. Based on these elements, the following 
parts of this chapter will attempt to test whether a working definition of 
responsibility around the concept of moral responsibility can be utilized. 
 
2.1.2 Moral responsibility: 
 
																																																								
33 See ¨A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe’s 
Security Capabilities¨, at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/solana/040915CapBar.pdf (Accessed 
on 8 February 2016).  
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The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy identifies the elements of moral 
responsibility as:  
a) The concept of moral responsibility itself;  
b) The criteria for being a moral agent,  
c) The conditions under which the concept of moral responsibility is applied, 
d) Possible objects of responsibility ascriptions (e.g., actions, omissions, 
consequences, character traits, etc.)34. Throughout the rest of this chapter, 
moral responsibility will be defined and operationalized based on these 
elements.  
 
Before going on to exploring the subject of moral responsibility, it is worth 
repeating that this is a research on international relations rather than ethics or 
moral philosophy. Thus, inputs from the field of philosophy should not be 
understood as attempts to establish new understandings in this field, but 
rather to benefit from it to the limited extent that it is relevant for this thesis. 
In order not to dwell too much upon philosophical debates which could lead 
to losing focus, three simple approaches will be followed when analyzing 
moral responsibility: a) the use of more simple and general definitions from 
sources such as the Oxford Companion to Philosophy35 and the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, rather than reliance on heavy philosophical 
literature, b) looking into international relations literature as much as possible 
on responsibility and the use of ethics and philosophy to fill gaps, c) in the 
field of philosophy, looking at debates only directly related to the subject 
matter at hand.  
 
Looking into the first element, the concept of moral responsibility itself, the 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines moral responsibility as “the status 
of deserving praise, blame, reward or punishment” for an act of omission, in 
accordance with ones obligations, similar to the Stanford Encyclopedia on 
Philosophy. These definitions have two interlinked elements: a) defining the 
status of deserving praise, blame, reward or punishment, and b) defining 
ones obligations. This status can be prescribed through two different 
elements: prospective responsibility and retrospective responsibility (Erskine: 
2003, Vogt: 2006, Szigeti: 2006, French: 1979).  
 
Prospective responsibilities refer to “all the special responsibilities an agent may 
have in the short or long run in virtue of its given situation and in virtue of 
what or where it is” (Szigeti: 2006). Erskine (2003) defines prospective 
responsibility as the wish to assign and distribute moral burdens, often going 																																																								
34 See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/ 
(Accessed on 8 February 2016).  
35 See Honderich, T. (ed) (2005), ¨Oxford Companian to Philosophy¨, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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beyond the obligations of a legal system. Jurado (2006) also defines 
responsibility as “moral requirements imposed on the behavior of those who assume 
certain functions, roles and offices”. These responsibilities “often arise from the fact 
that the agent voluntarily shoulders or is involuntarily saddled with certain 
functions, roles and offices”, and can be used interchangably with the concept of 
special duties or obligations (Szigeti: 2006). As such, this definition of 
responsibility refers to duties and obligations moral agents are expected to 
fulfill in the present and in the future.  
 
Retrospective responsibilities relate to moral evaluations of institutions based on 
their past conducts. They are based on the assessment of certain 
circumstances where the agent can be blamed or praised (Erskine: 2003). 
Szigeti (2006) argues that “ascriptions of retrospective responsibility concern 
what the agent has done or failed to do”. Velasquez (1983) claims that 
responsibility means an action and its consequences are attributable to a 
certain agent. Cooper (1968) also leans on this definition of responsibility, 
defining it as “attitudes of blame, praise, indignation, remorse, reward and 
punishment”. On the other hand, Lewis (1948) makes a distinction between 
the legal and moral approaches to blame and shame; the basis of moral 
responsibility is the moral agent capable of acting rightly or wrongly, and 
cannot only be defined by being punishable.  
 
Approaching responsibilities from the angle of prospective and retrospective 
responsibilities fit the purposes of this research well. First of all, they don’t 
refer to abstract and undefined responsibilities, but rather connect 
responsibility to “being involved in a certain act”. The promise of action 
(prospective responsibilities) and past actions (retrospective responsibilities) 
are the basis of attribution of responsibility. Secondly, their use allows the 
addition of the element of time and change into the equation of responsibility. 
Instead of talking about a standard, universal responsibility that is not subject 
to any alteration, responsibilities change based on declared intent and 
undertaken action. Finally, they connect better to international discourse. 
Although common use of the word ¨moral responsibility¨ by international 
actors, the limited and narrow way they define their responsibilities under 
this term already differs from the initial description above. Thus, looking at 
moral responsibilities by including prospective and retrospective 
responsibilities can be a good way in identifying a responsibility gap.  
 
Based on these definitions, in a study on moral responsibilities of certain 
actors, establishing their prospective responsibilities should be one of the 
initial purposes. This includes defining moral duties and obligations 
voluntarily or involuntarily assumed by those claiming certain roles, duties 
and functions. For this research, this would be those duties and obligations 
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that can be attributed to the EU when it assumes an international actor 
position related to statebuilding and conflict resolution. Defining prospective 
responsibilities, often identified through signs of open or implicit intent such 
as narratives or conduct, is a first step in defining both the frame in which an 
actor operates, and also the way its identities, interests and self-image is 
formulated. At this point, it is sufficient to note that one essential element for 
defining moral responsibilities is prospective responsibility – those 
responsibilities assumed after a declaration of intent has been made (Szigeti: 
2006, Jurado: 2006).  
 
Another essential element is the retrospective responsibility of moral agents. 
The concept of retrospective responsibility points out that the study of moral 
responsibility takes past practices into regard in attribution as well. Previous 
actions, as well as current ones, might indicate responsibilities for agents 
based on the consequences of these actions. In other words, prospective 
responsibities occur after an action has been undertaken, based on attributed 
based the intended or unintended impact of that action. Prospective 
responsibilities are particularly interesting for the study of statebuilding, a 
constantly changing and evolving phenomenon tailored to adapt to global 
context, emerging capabilities and new interest or threat perceptions. Taking 
retrospective responsibilities in account will mean that responsibilities for 
past action will not be erased with each new context or situation.  
 
In defining moral responsibility, another way to factor in time and change is 
looking at constitutive theory. Constitutive theory suggests that judgements 
about what actors should ethically do are related to their roles deriving from 
specific practices at a certain point of time, in a specific geography (Frost: 
2003, DeWinter: 2001). From this angle, moral responsibilities are not static or 
universal, there is no singular set of moral rules, and responsibilities change 
and evolve based on context, culture and time. DeWinter (2001) accepts this 
viewpoint, stressing that “over time, shared understandings of what set of 
rights and responsibilities can be ascribed to them will change”. In other 
words, responsibility is a constructed and changing phenomenon. From a 
retrospective responsibility angle, though, defining new responsibilities due 
to changing contexts does not mean previous responsibilities are necessarily 
cancelled out.  
 
These points made through constitutive theory increase the eminence of using 
specific discursive examples, case studies and concentrating on evolving 
context for this research. This way, instead of defining broad moral codes for 
unspecified which moral responsibilities can be related to a certain actor (the 
European Union) at a specific time (after statebuilding projects have been 
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launched on the ground) related to a specific practice (statebuilding) in a 
specific geography (Bosnia and Herzegovina).  
 
To summarize;  
 - Aided by the concept of prospective responsibilities, one future goal of 
this research is to define the moral duties and obligations which have 
been voluntarily or involuntarily assumed by those assuming certain 
roles, duties and functions within a frame; 
 - Looking at retrospective responsibilities, together with constitutive 
theory, will help go beyond the formulations of responsibility within a 
specific frame, by factoring in the elements such as change, context, 
time and geography.  
 
2.1.3 Moral Agency: 
 
After defining moral responsibility, the next step is establishing the criteria for 
moral agency. International law establishes legal responsibility for collectives 
based on criteria such as possessing legal personality, rights, obligations and 
responsibilities under the framework of international law. However, 
identifying moral, as opposed to legal agents proves to be a more challenging 
endeavor.  
 
The main actor of moral responsibility is the moral agent (Lewis: 1948). Every 
agent has to meet certain conditions to be fit to be held responsible (Szigeti: 
2006). This section, based on a detailed analysis on academic texts dealing 
with agency in moral responsibility, identifies the following criteria an actor 
should fulfill to be classified as a moral agent:  
 - The capacity of deliberation and forming intentions: The first characteristic 
assigned to moral agents is the ability of deliberation. For 
responsibility to be assigned to an agent, it must be aware of the nature 
of the action it is performing (Held: 1970). According to Lewis (1948), 
moral value can be assigned to conduct which we understand and 
control. Erskine (2003) defines having the capacity of moral 
deliberation as the ability to understand courses of action, their 
consequences and outcomes. Agents capable of deliberation are 
considered to be able to form intentions, which indicate their plan and 
purpose of action – a necessary condition to attribute responsibility.  
 - Agent Control - The capacity of acting purposively according to formed 
intentions: Velasquez (1983) states that according to the traditional 
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notions of responsibility, an agent is liable for the actions which 
originate in its bodily acts (actus reus), in addition to its intentions 
(mens rea). He argues that an agent must have a unity of body and 
mind, which allows intentions to be carried out by the same agent. 
French (1979) mentions the requirement for the agent to capacity to 
carry out its intentions to establish responsibility. Erskine (2003) points 
out the ability to take action in response to moral guidelines as a 
requirement of moral agency. Thus, the ability to form intentions is not 
enough to be a moral agent; an essential part of moral agency is the 
capability to transform intentions into action.  
 - Alternative possibilities - the element of choice: One of the key debates on 
moral responsibility is the “alternative possibilities debate”, which 
claims that an agent must have had the possibility to choose from 
alternative courses of action to establish moral agency (Downie: 1969, 
Held: 1970). Brown (2006), quoting Frankfurt (1969), supports this 
argument, arguing that that choice is an important prerequisite of 
moral responsibility; and “an agent can be morally responsible for 
what it has done only if it could have done otherwise”.   
 - Independence and free will: The ability to act independently from other 
actors, based on free will is another essential element of agency 
(Watson: 2003). The decision-making capabilities of agents are 
strengthened by the ability to make free choices. Some philosophers 
such as Frankfurt (1969) place the element of free will even above 
alternative possibilities: even if alternative choices are not available, it 
is possible to hold an agent responsible as long as it acts on free will.  
 
In the case of the EU, the subject of analysis in this study, it is also needed to 
look into the discussions on collective responsibility in order to establish 
agency in addition to the debates on establishing moral agency put forward 
above. The notion that collectives, and more specifically international 
organizations, can be held responsible is relatively new in international 
relations. The International Law Commission’s (ILC) draft articles on the 
responsibility of international organizations shows that the legal field accepts 
this idea36. 
As new international actors become more pronounced in internatonal 
relations after the end of the Cold War, international organizations became a 
subject of analysis in addition to the nation state (Erskine: 2003). The moral 
dimension of world affairs also increasingly became a subject of study (Vogt: 
2006). This inspired academic and policy debates on how to morally justify 																																																								
36 For the full text, see http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_11_2011.pdf.  
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international intervention and post-conflict involvement against the 
traditional notion of state sovereignty.  
 
The increasing dominance of the idea that the international system consisted 
of actors other than states made philosophical debates on collective 
responsibility more relevant. A group of philosophers dubbed as 
“methodological individualists” claim that collectives cannot be held morally 
responsible, challenging their capability to fulfill the elements of agent 
responsibility mentioned above (Lewis: 1948, Downie: 1969, Cooper: 1968, 
Held: 1970). First of all, they identify the individual as the sole unit of ethical 
deliberation, reasoning and choice (Lewis: 1948, Downie: 1969), they suppose 
that all statements about the acts of collectives are in principle reducible to 
statements about actions of individual human beings (Cooper: 1968, Held: 
1970). Downie (1969) claims that collectives cannot make moral choices, and 
thus they cannot have moral responsibility: when a collective acts, actually 
someone acts on its behalf. Velasquez (1983) argues that an institution cannot 
possess agent control, claiming responsibility requires the unity of body and 
mind, an aspect that is not relevant for institutions.  
 
Proponents of the notion of collective responsibility challenge these views, 
stressing the following points: 
  - Collectives (institutions) have identities, continuity and organizational 
memories, which makes them different than the aggregate of individuals: 
Runciman (2003) states that corporations exist apart from the 
individuals who represent them through which they act. Harbour 
(2003) supports this point, suggesting that the individuals which act on 
behalf of an organization would not conduct the same acts if the 
organization did not exist, the continued nature of organizations 
depend on them having a separate identity which is more than the sum 
of the identity of their constituents. French (1979) bases moral 
responsibility of collectives on their ability to have continuity and 
organizational memories, thus representing more than the identities 
and interests of the individual members which construct it, stating that 
corporations subordinate individual ambition and decisions to the 
need of the corporation’s well being and survival. Harbour (2003) 
strengthens this point, referring to the shared values and 
organizational culture of institutions. 
 - Collectives with formal decision-making powers, internal unity and self-
command are more capable of moral deliberation and forming intentions: 
French (1979) argues that being able to form intentions, act purposively 
and commit deliberately to a specific form of action is one of the main 
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components of institutional responsibility. Indeed, based on the 
previous arguments related to moral agency, an institution should 
possess the relevant decision-making capabilities enabling to choose a 
course of action among different possibilites. From this point of view, 
groups with formal decision-making procedures, internal unity and 
self-command such as corporations and nation-states can be assigned 
responsibility easier. French (1979) define these types of entities as 
“conglomerate collectives”, Erskine (2003) classifies them as “formal 
organizations”.  One debate on the capabilities of institutions to form 
intentions is that, in order to construct majorities, collective decision-
making is based on compromise. Harbour (2003) claims that since 
purposive action is a requirement of collective responsibility, and 
compromise solutions allow action, compromise is what makes moral 
agency of complex organizations, which combine differing worldviews 
possible.  
 - Responsibility cannot be divided among the constituents of collectives with 
their own identity and complex decision-making structures. Harbour (2003) 
challenges the point made by individualists, on the possibility of 
assigning collectives responsibility by distributing it among its 
constituents. He argues that it is difficult to untangle individual 
responsibility, as “the complex flow of information, guidance and 
consequences give policy a very collective stamp”. Moreoever, a 
reduction of statements such as “Norway is richer than Sweden” to 
statements about individuals would be unacceptable (Held: 1970). 
DeGeorge (1981) argues that it is equally important to hold an 
institution responsible as the people working for/ representing it: “We 
not only need moral people. Even more importantly, we need moral 
structures and organizations”. Assigning responsibility to individuals 
that act on the behalf of the organization, or distributing responsibility 
is especially difficult in the context of states and international 
organizations (Erskine: 2003). This is why “we hold nations 
responsible, and do not ascribe the responsibility to a particular 
individual” (Cooper: 1968).  
 - Collectives have the capacity to act as moral agents: Erskine (2003) cites 
traditional international relations theories, which would claim that 
possessing capability of purposive action would not imply moral 
responsibility. These theories would suspect the capacities of 
international actors to act as moral agent, as they would be expected to 
act solely according to their interests. Frost (2003) challenges this view, 
arguing that there is nothing logically incoherent about placing the 
same group of actors within the frame of both social practices. An 
	 70	
agent that acts according to its interests could nevertheless be expected 
to assume moral responsibilities.  
 - The moral necessity to hold collectives responsible: Runciman (2003) 
mentions one last element relating to the necessity of holding 
collectives responsible: “We can hold states responsible, not because 
the law dictates so, nor because of some extra-legal phenomena, but 
because of the absence of anyone else being willing to take final 
responsibility for the actions performed in its name.” Sometimes, 
responsibility can be established in order to protect the interests of 
those, which might be harmed by the actions of an agent, even if the 
agent hasn’t done anything strictly contrary to its legal or moral 
responsibilities. Feinberg (1970) illustrates this point in his deliberation 
on prospective responsibility. He claims that, when collectives engage 
in activities with serious public risk, the law might impose 
responsibility to the agents for events even beyond their control. The 
rationale beyond this is that, if a collective knows it will be held 
responsible for wrongdoings even beyond its control in advance, it will 
take extra precaution when engaging in that act. In cases when public 
interest is concerned, and when the risk of serious harm is valid, 
prospective responsibility might be established to protect the general 
public, even if the agent hasn’t intentionally broken the law. Accepting 
that the parallel between the two cases is somewhat weak, it is still 
possible to argue we might talk about responsibility of an international 
organization if it is engaged in activities that carry risks for future and 
well being of the general public, it is easier to establish the 
responsibility of that actor.  
 
To summarize, the abovementioned criteria suggest that in order to be 
considered a responsible moral agent, a collective has to possess certain 
qualities, such as (a) a separate identity, continuity and organizational 
memories, (b) formal decision-making powers, internal unity and self-
command, (c) possess agent control and the capacity to act, (d) ability to act 
independently, based on free will. If an institution is engaged in activities that 
carry consequences for the well-being and future of a general public, or if it is 
the only logical actor to be held responsible for an act, it becomes easier to 
attribute responsibility to these collectives. 
 
The decision-making structure of the EU, its involvement in statebuilding, the 
evolution of its foreign policy and the way it frames statebuilding will be 
analyzed in detail in the fourth chapter, facilitating a conclusion that the EU 
can be considered a moral agent as well as what its responsibilities are. As 
seen above, especially in order to reflect on “retrospective responsibilities”, it 
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is necessary to connect an agent to a time, location and context. Thus, at this 
stage, it is not entirely possible to define the EU (or any international actor) as 
a morally responsible subject or attach responsibilities to it. 
 
However what could be concluded is that, it seems possible to identify the EU 
as the lead actor in a study that deals with moral responsibilities. The EU has 
its own separate identity, in addition to a legal personality, which does not 
change significantly with every new additional member or every change in 
leadership. EU decision-making is a complex process of deliberation; and 
once a decision is taken, it is difficult for its components to challenge it. Its 
freedom to act independently from other members and external influence can 
be addressed more in relative terms, as the attribution of moral agency is nıt 
an all-or nothing exercise and each of the criteria can be met in degrees: even 
if we cannot talk about a complete independence in terms of foreign policy as 
the member-states have not fully transferred their powers to EU in this realm, 
there is a growing trend in this direction. The EU is becoming more and more 
self-directive, also in the sense of having its own material resources. Thus, the 
previous part not only helps show how moral agency can be defined and 
established, but also enables selecting the EU as a subject of analysis.  
 
2.2 Operationalizing Responsibility 
 
After having formulated a definition of moral responsibility, as well as 
conditions to establishing moral agency, the third step is defining the 
conditions under which the concept of moral responsibility can be applied. 
 
Attribution of responsibility to a specific actor is a relatively easy task when a 
reference can be established to a legal/moral code, which clearly defines the 
prospective responsibilities of an agent. In this case, any agent that would 
(intentionally and willingly) break this code would be held retrospectively 
responsible. This is particularly easier when one is dealing with legal 
responsibility, which is established by treaties, agreements and customary 
law.  It is easy to establish the responsibility of an agent engaged in an act 
such as killing, which is clearly defined as a legally and morally wrongful act 
by almost all legal systems. Any breach of contract would be enough to 
establish responsibilities, and what was meant by these breaches would be 
clearly defined.  
 
Operationalizing the moral responsibility of external actors in statebuilding is 
not an easy or simple task. Moral responsibility does not make reference to 
clear and often written codes, which define wrongful acts and prospective 
responsibilities. Moral codes are more vague, more subjective and change 
easier, making it hard to define responsibility. The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
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Philosophy, for example, states “morality can be a body of standards or 
principles derived from a code of conduct from a particular philosophy, 
religion, culture etc. Or it can derive from a standard that a person believes 
should be universal”. As such, it is very difficult to make references to clearly 
defined legal and moral codes, when looking at the responsibilities of an 
international institution engaged in conflict resolution/ statebuilding. It is not 
possible to talk about wrongful acts intentionally undertaken contrary to a 
specific code. The fact that the subject matter in hand is international 
organizations makes the attribution of responsibility even harder. The 
international relations and legal fields include more extensive and clear 
definitions on what the responsibilities of state parties should be, yet 
international organizations are not thoroughly analyzed in this realm.  
 
In fact, the absence of a moral code or clear criteria to attribute responsibility 
to international actors in statebuilding might very well be the reason why the 
dominant framing of the responsibilities of international actors does not seem 
to match the comprehensive tasks they undertake in statebuilding. This part 
will attempt to construct a more structured way to attribute responsibility to 
international (collective) agents, as an alternative responsibility framework.  
 
However, the lack of such a code does not mean that attribution of moral 
responsibility is not possible or practical. Two points are particularly worth 
highlighting in this debate. The first is the argument that connects agency to 
“alternative possibilities”, or the element of choice. If statebuilding can be 
defined as a normative choice, rather than a universal best practice and the 
only course of action, the alternative possibilities debate would indicate the 
responsibility of the actor making this choice. This research indeed favors the 
definition of statebuilding as a normative choice.  
 
The second point relates to debates on the need to hold collectives responsible 
argue that in the absence of anyone else being willing or able to take final 
responsibility, especially if the interests of a wider public are concerned 
(Feinberg: 1970, Runciman: 2003). Statebuilding is concerned with situations 
where states do not have the capacity to fulfill their responsibilities to its 
populations or international peace and security, problematizing their 
sovereignty (Ghani and Lockhart: 2008, Chandler: 2006). These two points 
indicate that attributing responsibility to international actors in statebuilding 
is not only a possibility; it is a necessity, from the perspective of moral 
responsibility.  
 
2.2.1 The moral responsibility framework:  
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Building upon the propositions made in the previous parts of this chapter on 
prospective, retrospective and constitutive responsibilities, and the 
assumption that collectives such as international organizations (or the 
European Union) can be held morally responsible, this section intends to 
come up with a formulation that establishes a simple and practical framework 
through which moral responsibility can be attributed to international 
organizations. The starting point of reference will be Mayer and Vogt’s (2006) 
volume entitled A Responsible Europe: Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs. 
The said volume focuses on the attribution of responsibility to the EU 
regarding its foreign policy in order to formulate an ethical framework 
through which the responsibilities of the EU can be identified and analyzed. 
Towards this end, six principles are identified to facilitate the attribution of 
responsibility: 
 - Contribution principle: If an actor has caused and contributed to a 
situation of damage/ harm, it is morally responsible.  - Beneficiary principle: When an actor benefits from a situation where 
others suffer harm, it is morally responsible. - Community principle: Moral responsibility can be derived from the 
obligation arising from membership in a community to obey its rules. - Capacity principle: If there is a valid duty to do X, all actors capable 
should do X. - Legitimate Expectation principle: Actors must do X if others 
legitimately expect it to do X. (for example, when an institution has 
repeatedly stated an intent to do X) - Consent principle: X is obliged once it consents to do X. (Consent 
theory, in this regard, claims that (political) authority is legitimate if 
and only if it acts in accord with principles the subjects concur with). 
 
For the sake of functionality and efficiency, instead of looking into how all of 
these principles can fit into the framework of moral responsibilities of 
collectives, a number of them will be selected, keeping the following factors in 
mind: 
 
First of all, the legacy of colonialism is sometimes cited as a factor that 
necessitates the attribution of moral and historical responsibility to former 
colonial powers. Arguments on the economic wealth and military power of 
the Western world feeds into this debate, where the very existence of this 
wealth and power is seen as a reason to attribute moral responsibility towards 
the world’s poor, repressed and unfortunate (Barry: 2005, Montero: 2008). 
These sorts of attributions are not the immediate interest of this study. The 
purpose is concentrating on the more immediate and direct moral 
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responsibilities, which can be attributed to international actors based on 
involvement in statebuilding on a practice that is currently ongoing. 
 
Secondly, and related to the first point, the purpose of this research is to 
specifically focus on the responsibilities that arise after a third party actor 
subscribes to the notion of neoliberal statebuilding, consciously decides to 
take part in it and takes action towards this end. In other words, the 
responsibilities that can be attributed to an external actor after it chooses to 
initiate, facilitate or engage in the building of states are in the focus of this 
research. Thus, among the principles stated above, the most practical ones 
that connect responsibilities to the direct choices and actions made by the 
agents will be in focus. Taking a look at the principles defined above for the 
attribution of responsibility; the legitimate expectation, contribution and capacity 
principles will be prioritized.  
 
The legitimate expectation principle is useful when attempting to establish 
responsibility based on intentions and choices put forward in discourse. The 
legal definition of legitimate expectation applies the principle of fairness and 
reasonableness to a situation where a person has an interest in a public body 
or private parties retaining a long-standing practice or keeping a promise37. 
More simply, retaining a practice or keeping a promise is defined as a legally 
responsible behavior. Mayer and Vogt (2006) connect this to discourse. When 
an agent has repeatedly stated an intention to undertake an action, this 
establishes a legitimate expectation from the affected parties for the agent to 
undertake that task. Going back to moral philosophy, with regard to 
arguments on attributability, Watson (2003) highlights that the central 
concern is whether the agent’s action or attitude discloses evaluative 
judgments or commitments38.  This understanding connects well to the frame 
of statebuilding and discourse, as it indicates that discourse and frames can 
both be used to establish intent, which may lead to legitimate expectations 
from the side of the recipients to fulfill responsibilities arising from this 
(openly or tacitly) declared intent. In other words, established intentions are 
the first keyword in the attribution of responsibility for this research. 
 
The contribution principle is more self-explanatory, as it connects directly to 
actions undertaken and the impacts of these actions. It has been previously 																																																								
37 See http://definitions.uslegal.com/l/legitimate-expectation/ Accessed on 8 February 2016.  
38 The consent principle follows a seems to follow a similar logic from the perspective of this research: 
when an agent consents to an action, it is expected to undertake that action. On the other hand, a brief 
research into the origins of consent theory has indicated that it is mostly associated with political 
authority and the responsibilities of an individual (citizen) under the framework of a state (Locke: 1990, 
Rawls, Simmons). This framework, in this respect, is not fully in line with the ambitions of this research, 
and will not be utilized as a way forward.  
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noted how the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines moral 
responsibility connected to the performance of a morally significant action 
and the blame and praise associated with it. In this respect, the attribution of 
responsibility based on the impact of action will constitute the second keyword 
to attribute responsibility.   
 
Finally, from a ‘capacity principle’ perspective, the valid duties mentioned by 
the capacity principle are, in fact, not the focus of this research. However, the 
capacity principle can also be utilized in a different manner: “if an actor 
declares intention to undertake an action, it should have the capacity to 
undertake that action”. In fact, the principle is the same: all actors capable 
should undertake an action.  
 
In short, based on the principles of legitimate expectations, contribution and 
capacity compiled by Mayer and Vogt (2006), the conclusion is that concrete 
intentions, undertaken actions and their impacts and the capacity of the 
agents can be used while attributing responsibility. This approach is also in 
line with the findings of the previous parts, which points out ability to form 
intentions and make impact (which is used to establish prospective and 
retrospective responsibility), the existence of agent control and free will are 
the main pillars of moral agency. The next step is to look into these concepts 
in a more detailed way, to suggest a practical way forward to attribute 
responsibility. The framework that will be finally reached will used as the 
framework for the attribution of responsibility throughout the entire research.  
 
2.2.2. Operationalizing the responsibility framework: Intentions, impact 
and capacity: 
 
It has been previously mentioned that the field of moral philosophy would be 
utilized to devise an alternative framework to attribute responsibilities 
beyond the narrow and limited definitions in statebuilding. This part will 
constitute another step in that direction. Operationalizing the responsibility 
framework defined above, by setting out alternative ways to look into the 
discourse, actions and capacities of international actors involved in 
statebuilding, aims to highlight the limited nature of way responsibility is 
currently attributed to international actors, thus highlighting the 
responsibility gap.  
 
2.2.2.1 Attributing responsibility through exhibited intentions:  
 
As explained in the previous part on moral responsibility, if an agent 
possesses decision-making capabilities allowing it to form intentions, 
consents to a specific course of action among alternative possibilities using its 
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free will, and has the capability to carry out that action, moral responsibility 
of that agent can be established. Once agency is established, the legitimate 
expectations principle states that when an agent voices its intent to take action 
in a certain direction, it can be held responsible for that action. Watson (1987), 
also stressing on the importance of free will when forming intentions, argues 
that that “we are responsible of what we consent to, [if] (...) consent is not 
necessitated by causes internal or external to the agent”. Ronnegrad (2007) 
states that moral responsibility can be attributed to an agent for its intentional 
action: “Moral responsibility resides with those members who intentionally 
acted in pursuit of an event or ought to have intentionally prevented an 
event”. Attribution is possible through identifying intentions of an actor, 
through the promises it has made, the vision it points out, the theories and 
guidelines it stands on and the actions it undertakes. 
 
The intentions of an actor and its prospective responsibilities can also be 
connected (Szigeti: 2006, Erskine: 2003, Jurado: 2006). As mentioned 
previously, attribution of responsibility to a specific actor is a relatively easy 
task when a reference can be established to a legal/moral code, which clearly 
defines the prospective responsibilities of an agent. In this case, any agent that 
would (intentionally and willingly) break this code would be held 
retrospectively responsible. In the absence of such a code, the declaration of 
intent serves as a useful basis for the attribution of prospective 
responsibilities, considering that intentions come before action and thus 
establish “prospectivity”. In other words, intention is choice with 
commitment, which helps define prospective responsibilities (Cohen and 
Levesque: 1990). 
 
These arguments further strengthen the choice of discourse analysis and 
framing as the main methodology of this research. According to Husak and 
Thomas (2001), declared intentions showing consent can be understood from 
linguistical expressions. Moral agents form/ declare intentions also to enable 
themselves to publicly justify their behavior, their existence and their policies. 
DeWinter (2001) claims “by offering reasons to justify an action, one 
constitutes an action as legitimate or illegitimate. This serves in turn to 
redraw the boundaries of the actor itself, delineating the space it can 
legitimately occupy by defining what is acceptable action based on the type of 
actor it is deemed to be”. These intentions might be motivated by self-interest, 
but they nevertheless create legitimate expectations on the receiving side. In 
this sense, declared intentions to justify actions may turn into responsibilities. 
 
Husak and Thomas (2001) continue to state that expressions are not the only 
method of establishing intentions of consent; these intentions can be derived 
from the behavior of the agent as well. Koeman (2007) argues that intent can 
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be discerned from examining evidence: observing behavior, incentives and 
explicit avowals. When declared intentions are vague or multiple, (which is 
sometimes the case for the EU foreign policy) or when there is no specific 
declaration of responsibility; the activities undertaken, the vision set forward 
and the way that the problems and their solutions are framed can be used to 
establish responsibility. For instance, an agent does not have to state clearly 
that it plans to contribute to the security of a country, engaging in or 
contributing to security sector reform activities is enough to exhibit this 
intention. Thus, when an international agent assumes responsibility in 
conflict-resolution based on a normative and practical framework and takes 
action towards that end, responsibility can be established. Frames include 
prospective responsibilities within them, thus being part of such a frame can 
also result in the attribution of moral responsibility.  
 
To sum up, expressions of intentions or behavior indicating intentions can be 
used to determine what an actor has consented to, and – if the conditions are 
right - what it is morally responsible for. This does not mean that every word 
uttered would be sufficient to establish responsibility. Using framing and 
discourse analysis will be useful in this respect, to point out to the actual 
intentions of the international community in a more structured manner.  
 
2.2.2.2 Responsibility of impact: Actions, impacts, causation and intentionality: 
 
The contribution principle is connected to casualty or an agent causing or 
contributing to a situation of damage or harm. The principle suggests that 
moral responsibility can be established if actions have impact on those the 
agent is responsible to (Mayer and Vogt: 2006). Especially when there are no 
institutional mechanisms to distribute responsibility in a fair manner, the 
contribution principle that looks into actions and their (harmful) impact can 
be a valuable tool for attribution (Barry: 2005).  
 
There are some elements to clarify here, before moving on to the 
operationalization of the contribution principle. First of all, the contribution 
principle differs from the legitimate expectations principle, as it derives 
responsibility from specific actions. An action leading to impact is the first 
step of the contribution principle. In other words, establishing moral 
responsibility is to judge to what extents certain actors deserve blame or 
praise for their past actions and conduct (Erskine: 2003, Szigeti: 2006). In this 
way, it is closer to the concept of retrospective responsibilities, which look 




The second step is connecting the action undertaken by the agent in question 
to causation. In order to establish moral responsibility, one must look into 
whether the agent’s action is (viewed as) a necessary condition for the impact 
(harm) in question and whether the actor caused the impact (harm) (Shultz, 
Schleiter and Altman: 1981). An action that leads to a negative impact and 
causes harm can be permissible by legal and moral codes. Here, it is 
important to note that the harm is wrongful, not because it is necessarily 
wrongfully inflicted, but because it wrongs the victim and infringes its rights 
(McMahan: 2007). As such, in order to establish responsibility due to 
causation, it is not always necessary that the action in question is wrongful.  
 
The third step is establishing intention. The capacity to deliberate and form 
intentions has previously been marked as one of the most basic tenets of 
moral responsibility (Held: 1970, Lewis: 1948, Erskine: 2003). As such, for full 
attribution of moral responsibility, the act must be intended and controlled by 
the agent (Pizarro, Uhlmann and Bloom: 2003). However, there are debates on 
the need to attribute responsibility in some cases for unintentional acts 
beyond the agent’s control as well, such as in the absence of anyone else being 
willing or able to take final responsibility or when actions of the agents 
involve serious public risk (Feinberg: 1970). Szigeti (2006) suggests, “if an 
actor has caused and contributed to a situation of damage/ harm, it can be 
held responsible”. According to the ¨causal deviance¨ concept put forward by 
Pizarro, Uhlmann and Bloom (2003), when an action causes an unintended 
impact, “blame can be reduced or eliminated” but not necessarily abolished. 
Statebuilding can be established as one of those situations where unintended 
impact might lead to responsibility as well. In fact, attributing responsibility 
to external actors when they have led to the deterioration of a situation they 
are involved in, referring to issues such as world poverty, climate change and 
the protection of civilians during armed conflict, is a well-debated 
phenomenon (Barry: 2005, McMahon: 2007, Montero: 2008).  
 
These elements show the importance of going beyond intentions and looking 
into actions and (harmful) impacts when attributing responsibility. John 
Stuart Mill (1859), in his essay titled “A Few Words on Non-Intervention”, 
stated that a government achieved through intervention would not be 
authentic or self-determining, it won’t represent the will, deliberations and 
actions of local citizens. Evans (2009), focusing on the legitimacy of military 
intervention, argues that, no matter how justified the reasons and good the 
intentions for intervention, interveners do hold certain responsibilities by 
virtue of the harmful impact that they have inevitably caused. Navari (2003) 
points out that “international intervention may temporarily and to a certain 
extent relieve a state from its responsibilities, but it doesn’t deprive this state 
or its citizens from their rights”. Post-conflict statebuilding reshapes the 
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subjects and participants; their activities and interactions are expected to 
change form (Mitchell: 2009). Interventions change the direction of 
development in societies, making the international community a constant and 
resilient feature of domestic governance, whose removal might create 
existential problems to the constructed state (Carothers: 2002). These factors 
highlight the importance of looking into the impact of interventions when 
attributing responsibility. 
 
One example to the use of looking into impact is aid dependency. The 
undesired of many post-conflict interventions has been the increased aid 
dependency of conflict states to international donors (RAND: 2007, OECD-
DAC: 2008). Since this dependency is not based on a wrongful act and surely 
is not the intention of the international community, responsibility cannot be 
attributed through established intentions or promises made. However, 
keeping in regard the serious public risks of aid dependency as well as the 
absence of any other suitable actor to take responsibility, it is important to 
have the possibility to attribute at least part of the responsibility of negative 
impact on international actors. The contribution principle is most useful in 
these cases.  
 
In terms of operationalization, conducting a frame analysis will also be useful 
to analyze the impacts of actions of international actors. Framing intends to 
show the vision, guiding principles, discourse, operative framework and the 
problems associated with statebuilding. As mentioned above, utilizing the 
contribution principle will point out to the possibility of attributing 
responsibility to international actors beyond the intended impacts. This way, 
the responsibility gap can be further highlighted. 
 
2.2.2.3 The Capacity Principle:  
 
The primary interest of this research is to focus on responsibilities that arise 
after an agent willingly becomes part of a conflict resolution process and 
contributes towards that end. Looking into the intentions of international 
actors and the impact of their actions allows limiting the research as such; 
whereas the capacity principle will be operationalized as a secondary element 
to make a more thorough attribution of responsibilities. This will be done by 
converting the capacity principle “if there is a valid duty to do X, any actor 
capable should do X”, as previously explained. 
 
The main actor chosen for this research is the EU. Looking into the EU’s 
emergence as a foreign policy actor, a striking element is the incremental 
development of its foreign and security capabilities and its adjustment of its 
internal decision-making structures. The EU seems to be in a constant process 
	 80	
of redefining itself and boosting its capacities in crisis response. Thus, 
especially in the example of the EU, connecting capacity to responsibility 
seems to be an interesting way forward. 
 
First of all, increasing foreign and security capacities to respond better to 
conflict implies the intention to become more involved in crisis management, 
and possibly statebuilding. Intentions do not always have to be declared 
verbally; for instance, establishing European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) missions in the Middle East and the Balkans imply an intention to 
engage – an intention that can be used in the attribution of responsibility.  
 
Second, increased capacity means more room for involvement and 
subsequently a heightened impact. The contribution principle argues that 
moral responsibility could start as soon as intentions are translated into action 
and capabilities are deployed.  Indeed, Ojanen (2006) states “growing 
expectations have been widely recognized as an important factor pushing the 
EU into more activism in international relations. To a large extent, the EU has 
itself fed these expectations by its own indications”. In other words, looking 
into capacity-building efforts of an external actor – in particular the EU, may 
help better support the two principles explained above.  
 
However, there is a third way to look into responsibility. If one turns the 
capacity principle around; to say “an actor should not become involved in a 
certain act if it does not have the capacity to do so”, this establishes an 
additional basis for attribution. The EU’s involvement in conflict is again a 
very good example; the capacity principle would allow attribution of moral 
responsibility to the EU for its early involvement in violent conflicts in 
Yugoslavia without the necessary capacity to do so. From this perspective, 
every attempt to build capacity would signify a responsible act for the agent 
towards closing the responsibility gap, by matching its capacities to its 
responsibilities arising from intentions and impact.  
 
This research does not argue that having the capacity to solve a problem does 
not have to mean bearing responsibility for that problem. There are many 
problems, many conflicts around the globe, which the EU could help; on the 
other hand, it does not have the capacity to help all of them. This is why this 
research concerns itself with the theatres the actor intends to contribute and 
chooses to engage in. On the other hand, when making a choice to engage in a 
conflict in a particular way, an agent must make sure it does not overstretch it 
commitments and has the capacity to contribute in the way it intends to. 
Declaring intentions without a proper analysis of the capabilities of the agent 
may, in itself, constitute an irresponsible act.  
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2.2.3 The Way Forward:  
 
In the previous part, building on debates on moral philosophy and 
responsibility, the principles of legitimate expectations, contribution and 
capacity were identified to advance the framework of moral responsibilities of 
external actors in statebuilding. This part has suggested possible ways to 
operationalize these principles, with the goal of establishing a method to 
attribute moral responsibility to agents in statebuilding. 
 
It cannot be repeated enough that this is not a study of moral philosophy. Nor 
is the goal to provide an exhaustive list on every single responsibility that 
might arise for external actors engaged in statebuilding. The purpose is 
simply to conduct a more structured and thorough look into the concept of 
moral responsibility beyond vague narratives, in order to show that it is 
possible to expand the narrow and limited framework of responsibilities 
attributed to external agents in statebuilding. Keeping this goal in mind, the 
three principles can be translated into three concepts and methods, for 
operationalization: 
 - Expressions of intentions or behavior indicating intentions can be used 
to determine choice and consent, prerequisites for establishing moral 
responsibility for alternative possibilities. Discourse analysis and 
framing are useful to discover patterns of consent, by offering a way of 
looking into discourse or behavior in a structured manner.  
 - Impacts of action also create responsibilities for agents. As such, the 
(harmful) impacts of external action in statebuilding will be the second 
path through which responsibility is attributed. Towards this end, the 
frame analysis to be conducted will once again prove useful, to show 
the vision, the guiding principles, the discourse, the operative 
framework and the negative impacts of statebuilding.  
 - Finally, the choice to develop capacities contributes to establishing 
responsibility based on the alternative possibilities and contribution 
principles. Moreover, a mismatch between intentions and capabilities 
can also establish responsibility. Towards this end, the frame analysis 
will also concentrate on the development of capacities of agents.  
 
Operationalizing this framework will be instrumental in testing one of the 
main propositions of this research, that there is a responsibility gap between the 
narrow and limited definitions of external responsibilities in statebuilding, and the 
comprehensive and intrusive nature of statebuilding. This gap will be made 
apparent by establishing an alternative framework to attribute responsibilities 
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to international agents and identifying an additional (non-exhaustive) list of 
their moral responsibilities.  
 
2.3 Attributing Responsibility: 
 
In the previous parts, the possibility to establish the moral agency of the 
European Union, as an institution with a separate identity, continuity, formal 
decision-making powers, agent control and the capacity to act as a 
responsible collective agent has been established. Secondly, a framework to 
attribute responsibility to the international community (the EU) has been 
suggested, based on its intentions, impacts of its actions and capacity.  
 
The final task is to look into how responsibility can be attributed concretely – 
thus identifying the last element of the responsibility framework. Obviously, 
a concrete (and non-exhaustive) list of responsibilities can be identified only 
after the frame and narratives of statebuilding are analyzed in the following 
chapters. This part merely aims to limit the direction of responsibilities for the 
sake of simplicity, by pointing out “towards whom” external agents can be held 
responsible to. Navari (2003), thinking around similar lines argues that, “it is 
the obligations to entities that have moral standing that complete the notion of a 
moral obligation”.  
 
In the first chapter, it has been established how liberal internationalism, 
strengthened with the doctrines of humanitarian intervention and the 
responsibility to protect, frame the responsibilities of international actors in a 
narrow way towards local populations (Evans: 2008, Koeman: 2007, Doyle: 
2010). Despite the discursive focus on the protection of local populations to 
foster the legitimacy of interventions, the point that there are no purely 
altruistic interventions is also valid, implying that statebuilding agents might 
have many different additional responsibilities (Evans: 2008, Weiss: 2012). For 
instance, the responsibility towards the preservation of international peace and 
security is highlighted as a basic principle of international relations in the UN 
Charter and is a core tenet of humanitarian intervention (Weiss: 2012). 
Engagement in conflict resolution and statebuilding, as previously noted, is a 
promise to the taxpayers of donor countries to bring them better security and 
economic opportunities. Moreover, especially for the EU, taking part in 
statebuilding efforts is often seen as a pathway to global actorness and liberal 
norm promotion (Mayer and Vogt: 2006, Smith: 2008). Furthermore, potential 
responsibilities might also arise from the sustained costs of intervention to 
taxpayers, as well as negative impacts of intervention on locals. 
 
To further build on these points, a number of different directions of 
responsibility will be identified, to answer the question “responsibility to 
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whom”. Statebuilding discourse, which has been analyzed in the previous 
chapter, identifies reasons why third parties decide to intervene in conflicts 
and engage in post-conflict reconstruction, such as putting end to violent 
conflicts, stopping bloodshed and enhancing the lives of local populations, 
protecting and promoting security and economic interests and promoting 
certain values, norms and visions in the global sphere. The discourse and 
actions of the external actors in statebuilding seem to indicate that both its 
intentions and the consequences of its actions produce effects that create 
responsibilities to three different groups: 
 - Responsibilities to the local population - Responsibilities to protect/ advance self-interests  - Normative responsibilities/ Identity promotion 
 
Every intervention is unique, and a thorough frame and discourse analysis on 
statebuilding is possible only through looking at cases from the ground with 
specific examples based on specific actors. However, based on the previously 
established elements of moral responsibility, it is possible at this point to 
combine the argument on responsibility gaps with the direction of 
responsibilities.  
 
2.3.1 Responsibilities of the intervener towards local populations: 
 
The first chapter has indicated that declarations of responsibility towards 
local populations are a distinctive element of statebuilding narratives. The 
vision of building state capacity through comprehensive international post-
conflict interventions has necessitated a shift in the traditional principles of 
state-sovereignty and non-intervention, legitimized by narratives that 
prioritized the protection and interests of local populations as the purpose of 
intervention (Doyle: 2010, Weiss: 2012). The proponents of “just war theory” 
take these narratives even further, suggesting that just interventions must 
always keep the interests of local populations above others (Evans: 2008, 
Koeman: 2007, Doyle: 2010). The intentions and impact of external 
statebuilding will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter. At this point, it is 
enough to highlight the promise to build just, well-functioning, economically 
viable and self-sustaining states guided by democracy and human rights; as 
well as the comprehensive and often intrusive actions taken in this direction 
(RAND: 2007, OECD-DAC: 2008). 
 
The international community, through involvement in statebuilding, chooses 
to support a particular vision of peace based on a specific model of a 
functioning state. It (contributes to) building structures and institutions, 
provides aid and personnel towards this end, and presents its vision as a way 
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to enhance regional and global security as well as certain norms and values. 
Its actions lead to important change on the ground; sometimes causing 
negative impact. Based on the alternative choices and contribution principles 
explained previously, these promises (intentions) and impacts implies moral 
responsibilities to international actors, beyond the declared temporary, 
narrow and limited responsibilities in terms of time and scope (Navari: 2003, 
Carothers: 2002, Mitchell: 2009). The lack of attributing such responsibilities 
would lead to a responsibility gap towards local populations.   
 
In order to establish the existence of a responsibility gap, it will be necessary 
to conclude the exercise of identifying the frame of statebuilding, as well as 
the dominant narratives included within (Hansen: 2006). At this point, certain 
elements of moral responsibility towards local populations will be identified, 
and later compared with narratives on responsibility from the statebuilding 
frame. 
 - Protecting local populations from harm: The protection of local 
populations from harm is perhaps the most dominant way that 
international interventions are legitimized by discourse. As such, 
moral responsibility can be derived from the promise to local 
populations (intention), the impact of actions taken towards this end, 
and whether external actors had the capacity of protection when this 
promise was made.  
 - The promise of sustainable security: Statebuilding differs from 
humanitarian intervention in its promise to bring sustainable security 
and stability. The moral responsibility would necessitate looking at to 
what extent this intention has been prioritized and fulfilled, whether 
international capabilities have been built in a way to ensure that this 
promise is realistic, and whether there have been (unintended) impacts 
of external action on sustainable security. The adding of the word 
¨sustainability¨ to the equation could also imply moral responsibilities 
beyond the actual intervention on the ground. 
 - Economic development, democracy and human rights: Liberal international 
statebuilding, particularly strengthened with the development-security 
nexus, propagates and acts upon a vision that connects security to 
development, democratic institutions and human rights. (Ghani, 
Lockhart and Carnahan: 2005, ESS Report: 2008). External actors 
choose market economies, democratic institutions and human rights 
policies as the way forward for conflict countries, promising this vision 
will bring sustainable peace. From a moral responsibility perspective, 
external actors could be held responsible if their vision failed to live up 
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to its promises. As the statebuilding vision is translated into 
international action by the hands-on promotion of the neoliberal state 
in different directions, international actors might also bear 
comprehensive responsibilities for impact in economy, development 
and human rights. Finally, even if the international capacities at the 
beginning of the intervention were not sufficient to fulfill the 
comprehensive intentions, the building of capacities to close this gap 
would be a responsible act.  
 
2.3.2 Responsibilities to protect or advance self-interests 	
The narrative of humanitarian intervention and especially “just war theories” 
prioritize the protection of local populations in interventions, implying that 
other prioritizations could be immoral and illegitimate (Doyle: 2010, Weiss: 
2012). This is not the proposition of this research. Self-interest can be seen as a 
positive and benevolent factor that drives purposeful action (Murithi: 2009). If 
an agent has certain interests to fulfill in a certain area, the likelihood that it 
exits without its project being completed and its goals realized might become 
lower (Evans: 2009). Especially in the example of the EU, protecting and 
promoting the security and economic interests of its members could 
strengthen EU commitment to the regions it engages in and projects it funds. 
In fact, the moral responsibility framework defined above does not suggest in 
any way that keeping self-interests in mind while engaging in third countries 
would be morally irresponsible acts.  
 
Yet, again from the perspective of the moral responsibility framework, it 
could be suggested that declarations of self-interest by external actors 
(intentions) and the impact of statebuilding on these interests could be 
utilized to establish moral responsibility.  Statebuilding narratives of the 
international community and the EU clearly stresses on how interventions 
will positively affect their own citizens and international peace and security 
(ESS: 2003, ESS Report: 2008, US NSS: 2002, RAND: 2007). Navari (2003) 
argues that international organizations are “instruments of our own being”, as 
they are composed of states willing to sacrifice their particular wills for the 
sake of the general will and create an agency that acts on their behalf. 
Oakeshott (2003) mentions the rights of institutions to accomplish a particular 
end to fulfill their own interests. Even when self-interested factors are not 
clearly defined as an intention, agents “tend to act for self-interested reasons and 
sometimes unconsciously tend to interpret and apply their moral values in ways that 
won’t threaten their interests” (Sen: 1999).  
 
The following areas can be initially identified as being within the scope of the 
moral responsibility of external actors towards their own interests and self.  
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 - Security considerations: The narrative on security threats that failed/ 
fragile states present to the Western world is a component part of 
statebuilding debates, heightened especially after the September 11 
attacks. Statebuilding promises to provide sustainable answers to the 
(mostly assymetrical) threats negatively affecting the security interests 
of people belonging to countries that engage in statebuilding from 
other countries than the failed/ failing state; often identified as 
terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration and human smuggling, 
religious extremism, refugee flows and mass migration, weapons of 
mass destruction, piracy and regional conflicts (RAND: 2007, OECD-
DAC: 2008, ESS: 2003). The European Security Strategy (2003) 
exemplifies this connection well; stating, “With the new threats, the 
first line of defense will often be abroad; and (…) the best protection to 
our security is a world of well-governed, democratic states”. From a 
moral responsibility perspective, if external statebuilding is 
discursively legitimized with the promise of more security, the citizens 
of those countries could indeed legitimately expect more security. The 
possible negative (unintended) impact of engaging in statebuilding on 
their security could also establish moral responsibility. 
 - Economic interests: Statebuilding helps expand markets and may 
provide entry-points to previously virgin markets. In terms of those 
markets that the agent (the EU) already operates in, since state failure 
and conflicts reduce trade and put investments at risk, helping to build 
resilient states free of conflict aims to sustain economic activity in areas 
of conflict. In addition, keeping in mind the heavy burden of post-
conflict assistance and reconstruction, conflicts are costly; preventing 
state failure relieves taxpayers from extra burdens that might arise 
from conflict. Conflicts or rogue states might also threaten energy 
disruption or access to natural resources; necessiating the framing of 
energy supply guarantees (Ceccorulli: 2009). Moreover, threats to 
stability such as refugee flows are also linked to the rise in 
unemployment (in the EU). These are elements that can also be 
factored in when contemplating the responsibility gap; by looking into 
issues such as whether economic considerations have been included in 
narratives to legitimize statebuilding, what kind of promises do these 
narratives include, whether prolonged conflict has had its toll on the 
taxpayers and whether statebuilding had a negative or positive impact 
on economic interests.  
 
2.3.3 Normative responsibilities and identity promotion: 
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When defining normative interests, Wolfers’ (1962) distinction between 
possession goals (aimed at defending and increasing possessions) and milieu 
goals (aimed at changing the international environment the actor operates in) 
could be kept in mind. From this angle, engagement in conflict response does 
not stem solely from immediate security and economic interests. Actions are 
also reflections of common identity, values, norms; which, according to 
Navari (2003), persist even if the economic and security interests of the 
members change, or the capacities to fulfill mandates diminish.   
 
Statebuilding includes a strong normative element, especially when viewed 
as a choice of liberal internationalism. Murithi (2009) argues that the moral 
dimension of peacebuilding has been increasingly pronounced since the end 
of the Cold War, as it “took the dimension of a moral activity with moral 
presuppositions and implications”, which affect the strategies and efforts on 
the ground.  
 
The normative dimension of Western statebuilding efforts is sometimes 
criticized for actually advocating Western norms and interests, in the disguise 
of universal values (Chandler: 2000, Chandler: 2006, Chomsky: 2007). Brown 
(2006), for example, argues “there are good reasons to be worried about the 
idea of a coalition of liberal-democratic states engaging in a crusade to spread 
humanitarian values, claiming to be agents of a new moral consensus”. 
However, whether external actors (the EU) are promoting universal norms or 
European/ Western values is a subject of another study. From the perspective 
of this study, the normative element of statebuilding enables attribution of 
responsibility to international agents, based on their promise to propagate a 
certain (their own) world vision, their capacity to make this possible and the 
impact their engagement in statebuilding has on the promotion of the 
neoliberal state. The direction of this responsibility is also towards the Self – 
when the EU engages in statebuilding, this entails a responsibility towards its 
own norms, values and identity. 
 
Among a list of many possible normative aims, the following ones seem to be 
occurring often in international narratives as the milieu goals of statebuilding.  
 - Affirming its identity: Tocci (2007) states that an international actor can 
display different foreign policy goals ate the same time; the choices it 
makes to further certain goals more than others help define what kind 
of actor it actually is. The degree to which an international actor 
declares an intention to pursue certain norms and values, and the 
extent that it operationalizes this intention on the ground also serves as 
an affirmation of its own identity (Manners: 2008, Erskine: 2003). 
Mayer (2008b) argues that in addition to consenting to become a 
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normative actor, an agent must be able to follow and propagate its 
norms and values in its own behavior and apply them in the contexts it 
operates. As such, the intention of an agent (the EU) to engage in 
statebuilding to foster and affirm its own foreign policy identity, as 
well as the consistency in the way it promotes its norms and values on 
its image and identity of the EU can create moral responsibilities – 
towards the EU.  
 - Winning hearts and minds: Aggestam (2008) remarks that “the EU can be 
considered ethical as long as it doesn’t follow its interests at any cost to 
others, but tries to win their hearts and minds too”. This point can be 
made for the international community’s efforts in conflict resolution 
and statebuilding in general. One of the promises of statebuilding is 
that, adopting a moral/ normative touch and promoting “universal” 
values such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law are factors 
that will connect the local populations deeper with the statebuilding 
project. In a related way, the successful implementation of normative 
policies in the field, will impact the universal acceptance of these 
norms.  
 - Shaping the environment it operates: The comprehensive nature of 
statebuilding promoting a liberal internationalist framework of 
security, development and neoliberal values has been explained in the 
previous chapter. Human rights, democracy, good governance, the 
fight against crime, regional cooperation, conflict prevention, 
sustainable development and prosperity are all interrelated, the 
promotion of one complements the success of the other (Smith: 2008). 
From this angle, promoting the vision of the liberal internationalist 
state is a normative promise – a promise that this vision is the basis of 
international peace and security. This promise can also be utilized to 
establish responsibility.  
 
2.3.4 Dilemmas in the moral responsibility framework: 
 
The moral responsibility framework defined above is constructed with a 
practical purpose in mind; to look at international responsibilities from a 
different angle than the one somewhat vaguely constructed by the 
statebuilding discourse. Towards this end, some basic and relevant concepts 
of moral responsibility have been coupled with propositions regarding 




However, constructing even a simple framework has been an arduous task, 
bringing forward many questions on how just and appropriate it manages to 
attribute responsibility. It has been stated many times that the goal has not 
been to establish a completely inclusive and comprehensive framework that 
addresses every kind of moral responsibility question related to international 
actors in statebuilding, or draw up an exhaustive list of the responsibilities of 
international actors. Thus, many questions that come to mind here will have 
to be the subject of another debate.  The framework drawn above merely 
attempts to exhibit that a different kind of framing moral responsibility for 
external actors in statebuilding is possible beyond the temporary, limited and 
narrow definitions of the international relations literature. 
 
On the other hand, the following two dilemmas must be kept in this exercise; 
both to try to be as fair and balanced as possible in the attribution of 
responsibility and to keep in mind that this might not be completely possible.  
 
2.3.4.1 Conflicting Responsibilities: 
 
One of the most important advantages of using a moral responsibility 
framework to attribute responsibility to international actors in peacebuilding 
is the ability to define the direction of responsibilities. Although moral 
responsibility frameworks are very content-specific, and thus responsibilities 
can be defined based on specific contexts, time and actors, the literature 
survey conducted in the first chapter to analyze peacebuilding literature 
already allows defining three directions of responsibility: towards local 
populations (the Other), towards the security and economic interests of the 
intervenors (Self), and the normative values and image of intervening states 
(Self).   
 
One interesting question that could arise at this point of the research is, 
whether an agent could be held responsible in all these directions in an equal 
manner. The initial literature survey on peacebuilding and statebuilding 
suggests that through discourse, international actors prioritize two sets of 
responsibilities: the protection and well-being of local populations and the 
protection of international peace and security. The frame analysis in the next 
chapter will dig deeper into the intentions of agents in statebuilding, as well 
as the impact of their actions for attribution, enabling the discovery of other 
directions of responsibility. At this stage, however, one could make the 
assertion that the responsibilities that international actors choose to prioritize 
– such as self image, norm promotion, protection of civilians, prevention of 
conflict, protection of economic or security interests – would have the 
potential to help define the type of actors engaged in statebuilding, their 
identities, interests and intentions, as well as the type of intervention. This 
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would help distinguish between statebuilding projects that prioritize the 
protection of local populations and promotion of norms such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, or those that mostly prioritize the security interests of 
intervening countries, such as Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
The conundrum of clashing responsibilities explained from a moral 
responsibility perspective also helps pointing out divergences between 
different theoretical approaches in peacebuilding. From a liberal 
internationalist angle, which to this day continues to loosely define the 
framework of statebuilding and peacebuilding, it would be difficult to point 
out a clash between responsibilities, as the responsibilities of democratic 
actors to local communities, their own well-being and their norms and values 
would not run contrary to each other (Wenar and Milanovic: 2009,  
(Richmond: 2013).  However, a “clashing responsibilities” debate would also 
allow looking at statebuilding from a realist perspective, which would 
suggest that the immediate security interests of actors would undoubtedly 
take priority over others. Constructivist studies, on the other hand, could 
emphasize the importance of norm promotion in interventions, claiming that 
normative interests could topple immediate interests in certain scenarios, 
such as EU missions whose primary purpose is perhaps “flag-raising” 
(Pirozzi: 2011, Wolff and Whitman: 2011).  
 
In short, approaching the issue of attributing responsibilities to international 
actors in statebuilding through a moral responsibility angle carries potential 
for the purposes of this study. It helps challenge the predominantly liberal-
internationalist framework of statebuilding, by suggesting that international 
actors might have different priorities, interests and thus responsibilities in 
statebuilding in different contexts, beyond generic definitions of 
responsibility through narratives. Through this broader interpretation of 
responsibilities, it enables integrating the element of choice into the attribution 
of responsibilities. In other words, as moral responsibility argues for the 
attribution of responsibility through declared or undeclared intentions or 
intended or unintended impact of actions, the choice of international actors to 
prioritize certain directions of responsibilities over others in their 
interventions should be taken into regard.  For instance, field-level debates 
can extend criticism to international actors for backtracking on their moral 
values, disregarding the interests of local populations or not reaping enough 
economic or security benefits from the statebuilding project. The moral 
responsibility framework allows making sense out of these arguments.  
 
This conundrum of clashing responsibilities particularly makes sense when 
one is working on the EU. Vogt (2006) states that the powers and interests of 
the EU can be grouped into four categories: civilian/ economic, military/ 
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political, normative/ discursive, model/ structural. These different forms of 
power can and often do enforce each other, but can also clash. Normative 
goals can sometimes contradict practical interests, as in the case of the human 
rights dimensions of the EU’s trade relations with China (Mayer: 2006).  
Sometimes the EU, despite initially intending to be a neutral arbitrator in 
conflicts, may be forced to take sides, as was the situation in the Yugoslav 
wars (Bose: 2002).  
 
Has the EU managed to be more of an honest broker, or does it take sides in 
conflicts to further its own well-being and normative goals?  When its security 
interests have clashed with the universal norms it proposes to advocate, 
which direction has it taken? In designing and contributing to elements of 
statebuilding, has it focused more on the well-being of the local populations 
or not? And has it taken responsibility for times it has failed to one side? 
Analyzing when and under which circumstances international actors or the 
EU prioritize which responsibilities when a clash occurs is a question whose 
answer will be sought through the next chapters of this study, based on the 
opportunities provided by the moral responsibility framework.  
 
2.3.4.2 Responsibilities of other actors: 
 
Statebuilding is an exercise that often consists of many different actors. 
Conflict resolution and statebuilding usually involves responsibilities of a 
multitude of different actors, including the conflicting parties. This makes it 
difficult to define responsibilities of individual actors that contribute to 
different elements of statebuilding.  
 
When the subject of analysis is a particular actor within the statebuilding 
framework, such as the EU, the question of how to fairly distribute 
responsibility between different actors and attribute responsibility failry to 
the EU arises. Barry (2005) notes that it is not always easy to determine how 
much one agent contributes to the deprivation of another actor, and how 
much of the overall responsibility belongs to which agent. Jurado (2006) 
argues that “little has been done to assign duties among relevant international 
actors – be these governments, international institutions or NGO’s – in any 
systematic way”. Yet, the difficulty of knowing who the most appropriate 
actor is should not lead to a situation where the issue of responsibility is not 
tackled at all (Vogt: 2006).  
 
The general trend to hold local parties to conflicts responsible in terms of 
conflict resolution has been noted above. Despite the noteworthy expansion 
of the EU’s role, structures and capabilities in terms of peacekeeping and 
crisis management, security, defence and foreign policy are traditionally 
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known to be in the exclusive competence of EU member states and the 
transformation of the EU as a security and defence agent is incomplete 
(Ojanen: 2006). In terms of other actors, there is a general understanding in 
the Middle East and to a lesser degree in the Balkans that the US clearly leads 
in the field of global security, not least because of the lack of a fully developed 
strategic vision and coordination on the European side (Mayer: 2008a). The 
US is also a leading actor on the normative terrain of statebuilding (Mayer: 
2008a).  On the other hand, the UN is recognized as an organization that is 
responsible for peace and security, in addition to promoting global norms in 
the world (Ojanen: 2006). The EU uses military capabilities, operational 
planning and assets of NATO; non-EU states usually take part in ESDP 
missions. Regional partnerships and hostilities contribute to conflicts as well. 
This is an incomplete list, compiled to point out the difficulty of the problem 
of attribution/ distribution of responsibilities.  
 
It has been noted in the previous section that it is not possible for an agent to 
equally live up to each and every one of its responsibilities at all times. A 
similar approach can be followed in terms of distribution of responsibilities 
among different actors. When defining the responsibilities of the Union in a 
specific context, it is necessary to keep in mind that the EU is not an actor 
with the sole responsibility of conflict resolution. It is not the sole one which 
contributes to conflicts, mediates between conflicting parties and drives the 
process leading to solution. It is not the only one that formulates intentions 
and commitments, and acts accordingly on the ground. It is not the sole agent 
with capacities to solve global conflicts (Ojanan: 2006). Thus, without 
extending the research beyond its limits, it is nevertheless essential to note 
other actors who may also carry responsibilities in terms of statebuilding, and 
what these responsibilities may entail.  
 
2.4 Summing Up 
 
Pointing out the divergence between the rhetoric and self-image of the EU 
with its concrete actions and capabilities, Mayer (2008a) calls for a more 
mature and responsible narrative by and for the EU on its future global role. 
The solution he puts forward is that the EU should accept “its increasingly 
peripheral phase within a global order while explaining the substance and 
meaning of its ethical norms much better and following them in its own 
behavior”, and reduce expectations through a realistic assessment of 
capabilities (Mayer: 2008a). On the other hand, critics of liberal 
internationalist statebuilding, such as Noam Chomsky and David Chandler, 
debate the morality of intervention per se. Chandler (2006, 2010) agrees with 
the more neutral, humanitarian form of intervention followed by the 
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International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), while opposing the 
external social engineering of statebuilding efforts. 
 
This research would claim that neither point grasps the essence of the issue 
regarding responsibility. Although Mayer’s point (2008a) that there is need 
for a more mature and responsible narrative by and for the EU in terms of 
statebuilding is noteworthy, this does not mean that the EU should take a 
more peripheral role in global affairs or scale down its statebuilding efforts. 
First of all, the increased involvement of the EU in conflict resolution efforts 
around the globe, and its building of capacities in that direction is an 
indicator that the Union is not ready or willing to take the back seat in foreign 
policy. Moreover, despite repeated failures and new challenges, the elements 
of statebuilding – security sector reform, institution building, the promotion 
of good governance and human rights - still carry considerable weight in 
conflict response. The notion of viewing failed or rogue states as security 
threats and advocating institution building in the security, legal, 
administrative and financial sectors are still prevalent39.  
 
What might be needed is a rethinking on the way international 
responsibilities are framed. Matching the promises and actions of 
international actors to their responsibilities in a more accurate way might help 
foster the trust of local populations in statebuilding projects. It can tell both 
conflict countries and the taxpayers of statebuilders what to expect from 
civilian interventions. In addition, when the global debate on intervention 
seems stuck trying to find ways to surmount the backlash of the dominance of 
state sovereignty, rethinking responsibility might show that international 
actors can and should be legitimately involved in certain conflict countries. It 
can boost the image of the intervenors, by making interventions more 
credible.  
 
DeWinter (2001) refers to the sweatshop movement, which challenged old 
notions of corporate collective responsibility to “press its view that the 
corporation has duties towards a broad range of stakeholders. The collective 
is coming to be understood as a collective moral agent (...) bearing the larger 
responsibility of contributing to social justice within the communities which it 
produces” (DeWinter: 2001). Perhaps a similar sort of rethinking is needed in 
terms of states and international organizations, which take part in 
statebuilding. Barry (2003), commenting on efforts to reduce world poverty, 
argues that in the absence of formal mechanisms, new informal norms can be 
constructed to address deprivation, while the search of enhanced formal 																																																								
39 See, for example, Foreign Policy’s latest Fragile States Index at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/fragile-
states-2014. 
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mechanisms continues. Similarly, in the absence of clear-defined, formal 
methods to address the responsibilities of international actors engaged in 
statebuilding, trying to define the informal/ moral responsibilities of actors 
could lead to better practices. The framework to define moral responsibility, 
proposed by this chapter, has been the first step in this direction. By 
establishing an alternative framework through which responsibilities can be 
defined, combining the fields of international relations, law and philosophy, it 
has been made more clear that a wider range of responsibilities could be 
attributed to the international community for its engagement in building 
states. 
 
This framework rests on the following elements: 
 - The subject of international discourse on responsibility seems to be 
moral, rather than legal responsibility. Thus, the literature on moral 
responsibility can be used to define moral agency, operationalize and 
attribute responsibility and show its direction. 
 - Moral Agency: The capacity of deliberation and forming intentions, 
agent control, the element of choice and independence and free will are 
identified as elements to define moral agency. Building on arguments 
that defend the attribution of moral responsibility to collectives, the 
possession of the EU of a separate identity, continuity and 
organizational memories, formal decision-making powers, internal 
unity and self-command, agent control and the capacity to act, as well 
as the ability to act independently shows that the EU can be the subject of 
moral agency. 
 - Operationalization of responsibility: A broader formulation of the moral 
responsibilities of international actors in statebuilding can be possible, 
by looking into the intentions of agents, the impacts of their actions 
and their attempts to develop capacity. Discourse analysis, framing 
and literature surveys have been identified as useful methods to 
discover patterns that might establish such responsibility. 
 - Attribution of responsibility: Three directions have been suggested as a 
response to the question “to whom responsibilities are to”: 
Responsibilities to the local population, responsibilities to protect/ 
advance self-interests, normative responsibilities/ identity promotion. 
However, these responsibilities do not form an exhaustive list of moral 
responsibilities of external actors; a better list would have to factor in 
specific situations and actors.  
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Approaching moral responsibilities of external actors through this framework 
might help the attribution of responsibility beyond the more narrow, limited 
and temporary definitions of international relations literature, although a 
thorough analysis on the responsibilities of international agents will be 
possible only through looking at concrete cases.  
 
Thus, at this stage, two questions related to this research have been dealt 
with: a) Can moral responsibilities be attributed to international actors 
beyond the dominant narratives of statebuilding? b) How can this attribution 
be operationalized in a practical manner? The results can be explained more 
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- Does it have 
formal decision-
making powers, 
internal unity and 
self-command? 
- Does it have the 
capacity to act? 
- Can it act 
independently 
and based on free 
will? 
- What are the declared (and 
undeclared) intentions of 
external agents in 
statebuilding? Are these 
intentions formulated in a 
structured way, enough to 
establish responsibility? 
- What has been the impact 
of involvement in 
statebuilding? Have the 
possible negative impacts of 
involvement been 
mitigated? 
- Did the agents have 
sufficient capability to fulfill 
their intentions and 
promises at the outset? Have 
the agents developed their 
capacities to better fulfill 
their intentions and 
eradicate negative impacts 
of their involvement? 
- What have been the 
promises to local 
populations and the 
intentions regarding 
promoting interests and 
identity of 
statebuilders? Which of 
these three has been 
prioritized more? 
- What has been the 
impact of action on the 
three groups? Has there 
been negative impacts 
of statebuilding in 
either three directions?  
- Have international 
capacities been built in 
a way that would 







With help from the literature survey identifying specific elements of 
statebuilding in the first chapter, this framework has already proven useful to 
test the first proposition of this research; statebuilding might imply widespread 
responsibilities for international actors due to its comprehensive, intrusive and 
normative nature. The next step will be testing the proposition on the 
responsibility gap: Comparing the comprehensive moral responsibilities that 
can be derived from the framework above to the dominant framing of 
external responsibilities in statebuilding would point out whether the 
statebuilding attributes responsibilities to ¨statebuilders¨ in a narrow and 


































3.The Framing of Statebuilding: Main Concepts, 
Practices and Shifts 
 
3.1 Frame Analysis as a Methodology 
 
3.1.1 Setting the goals - Statebuilding, responsibility gaps and discursive 
safeguards: 
 
The main questions in this research are based on the relationship and 
interplay between three concepts: statebuilding, responsibility and discourse. 
The main propositions have been structured around these three concepts; 
arguing that a) statebuilding implies comprehensive responsibilities for 
involved international actors, b) the way the responsibilities of international 
actors is defined is not commensurate with these comprehensive 
responsibilities (responsibility gap), c) Discursive safeguards embedded in the 
frame helps sustain this “responsibility gap”; so that the practice of 
statebuilding as the “most successful method” to resolve conflicts can proceed 
without international actors having to bear the burden of its seemingly 
grander and deeper responsibilities. 
 
The previous chapter has dwelled upon the concept of moral responsibility, 
as a useful framework to identify a responsible agent, holding them 
responsible and determining the direction of responsibilities. This framework 
has indicated that statebuilding’s narratives, as touched upon in the first 
chapter, might too narrowly construct responsibilities of external agents.  
 
This chapter will elaborate more on statebuilding and its narratives, to define 
and understand the frame through which it is constructed, legitimized and 
operationalized, both from a theoretical and practical angle. Frame analysis 
will be the main methodology, to analyze the normative and practical framing 
of external responsibilities within statebuilding, as well as the changes it has 
undergone. This practice will serve towards testing the propositions 
mentioned above, particularly the goal of pointing out a responsibility gap.  
 
In short, this part will further exhibit that statebuilding includes 
comprehensive activities ranging from humanitarian relief to shaping the 
contents of and implementing peace agreements, establishing democratic 
institutions and promoting norms; which implies that the responsibilities of 
the relevant external actors should go beyond those defined in discourse and 
practice identified in the first chapter (Annan and Mousavizadeh: 2012, 
Hameiri: 2002, Paris: 2002). Second, identifying the way statebuilding and 
external responsibilities are framed and comparing it with moral 
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responsibility will help test the proposition on the responsibility gap between 
the comprehensive responsibilities of external agents and the way 
statebuilding attributes responsibility to them. Finally, the concept of 
“discursive safeguards that allow external agents to avoid their 
comprehensive responsibilities” will be introduced. Three different discursive 
safeguards, already identified in the first chapter will be developed: a) change 
(how statebuilding adjusts itself to changing realities, contexts, new ways of 
thinking), b) universality (how statebuilding is defined as a universal, 
technical exercise), c) local ownership (how statebuilding gains legitimacy 
through emphasizing local ownership as the end goal). Once more, a 
comparative study will be undertaken; aiming to compare the international 
discursive approach to these concepts to how the moral responsibility 
framework defined above would approach them. A thorough elaboration on 
discursive safeguards would require a concrete agent and context; thus this 
chapter will suffice with merely introducing the concept and leave further 
elaboration to the next chapters.  
 
3.1.2 Frame analysis: 
 
Before engaging into a deeper analysis on responsibility and statebuilding, it 
will be useful to elaborate once more on what frame analysis is and how it can 
be operationalized in line with the goals of this research.  
 
It has been mentioned previously that frame analysis emerges as a useful 
methodology to define how certain events or occurrences are located, 
perceived, identified and labeled (Goffman: 1986). Frames emphasize some 
elements of the picture, and doing so, they serve to filter perceptions about 
the world so that some aspects of the reality become more noticeable 
(Kuypers: 2009). Once in place, frames encourage journalists, scholars, 
practitioners to perceive, process and report all further information to support 
the basic evidence in the schema, while obscuring the contrary information 
that might be presented (Kuypers: 2009). Shaping the dominant frame which 
includes some “facts” while excluding others is a necessary first step in 
accomplishing the framers’ ends (Loizides: 2015). From this perspective, 
identifying a statebuilding frame will help better define how and why 
responsibility is defined in a narrow and limited manner. 
 
Secondly, the use of frames is not a passive exercise, and includes an element 
of appropriation, challenging, negotiating shared meanings. Framing is a 
conscious strategic effort that shapes shared understandings about a group, 
its environment, its moral entitlements and a range of possible actions 
(Kuypers: 2009, Loizides: 2015, Hansen: 2006). Loizides (2015) builds upon the 
definition of Goffman (1986) to define framing as interpreting, defining and 
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redefining state of affairs. Thus, framing is an occurrence that requires 
agency, as a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and 
suggesting what is at issue (Kuypers: 2009). In other words, framing is the 
result of the efforts of social agents, and requires agency, deliberation and 
manipulation in the construction of new realities (Loizides: 2014, Payne: 
2001). As such, the frame analysis will show that the framing of external 
responsibilities in statebuilding the way they are is a choice of external agents.  
 
Frames shape the view of actors on what constitutes a problem, which events 
should be noticed and prioritized, and which practices and policies will be 
authorized, enabled and justified; these actions, in turn, reproduce and 
reinforce the dominant meanings and practices (Auteserre: 2012). Frames 
define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements and suggest 
remedies (Kuypers: 2009). Identifying these components of frames in 
occurrences and/or narratives related to statebuilding emerges as a useful 
methodology, to help define the dominant and overarching frame that 
interprets, defines and proposes remedies to conflicts. Towards this end, the 
following components of a frame will be kept in mind, when looking at the 
development of statebuilding and the narratives and practices it includes. 
 - Frames define what constitutes a problem and diagnose causes. In this 
sense, frames include a diagnostic component, which defines a problem, 
its source, and the associated grievances and motives (Loizides: 2015, 
Kuypers: 2009). Social frameworks provide background information 
for events that incorporate the will, aim and controlling effect of the 
agent and allow the agent to locate, perceive, identify and label a 
number of concrete occurances (Goffman: 1986). In other words, the 
type of framework we employ provides a way of describing the event 
to which it is applied (Kuypers: 2009, Goffman: 1986). 
 - Frames include a normative aspect; a moral judgement about the need to 
react and the role of the agent (Kuypers: 2009). Participants must 
believe that there is an opportunity to bring about social change; they 
must also see themselves, as ¨much needed agents of their own history¨ 
(Gamson and Meyer: 1996, Loizides: 2014). In fact, Kuypers (2009) 
claims that most of the spoken moments are spent in providing 
evidence for the fairness and unfairness of the current situation and 
other grounds for sympathy, approval and understanding.  
 - The diagnostic element of frames, combined with moral judgements 
about the situation allows them to propose remedies to the occurrence 
(Kuypers: 2009). Loizides (2015) defines this as the prognostic 
component of frames, which includes identification of the appropriate 
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opportunities and strategies for solving the problem and the 
legitimization of certain courses of action. Dombos et al (2009) 
similarly introduce the concept of ¨issue frames¨, which provide 
reasoning in which issue specific prognostic elements respond to issue 
specific diagnostic elements. In other words, frames first define the 
empirical phenomena, fact and occurrences as an issue; then label the 
phenomenon as a problem that the (political) system should deal with 
(Gerhards: 1995).  
 - Although frames reflect and define public perceptions, they restrict 
some elements of the facts from public attention; through defining 
what is relevant and what is not (Goffman: 1986, Loizides: 2015, 
Auteserre: 2009). In this way, framing directly affects the kind of 
responses given on the ground.  
 - Agency is an important element of frames, as the practice of framing is 
not a passive exercise but conscious strategic efforts. They are not 
always a reflection of objective conditions but include an element of 
manipulation. They are crafted towards an end, an interest. As such, 
frames can be embedded in the definition of the identities and the 
interests of the agents (Loizides: 2015). Thus, one element of defining 
frames lies in defining the Self/the agent, the way it establishes its 
interests and identity and the way this reflects on the construction of 
the frame.  
 - When one defines the Self (the object), it is also necessary to look into 
the way the Other (the subject) is defined. Frames, in fact, are crafted to 
draw distinctions between the Self and the Other (Loizides: 2015).  
 - Finally, once the negotiation on the aspects of the occurrence is 
finalized and a frame is formed, the tendency is to continue on 
mechanically as though the matter had always been settled (Kuypers: 
2009).  
 
3.1.3 The way forward: 
 	
As mentioned previously in this chapter, the first goal here is to look into how 
statebuilding is currently framed and how it could be alternatively framed 
(from the perspective of moral responsibility). In other words, the goal is; a) 
to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available for 
making sense out of occurrences; and b) to analyze the vulnerabilities to 
which these frames are subject to (Goffman: 1986, Loizides: 2015). A 
comparative analysis as such, with the view to looking into alternative 
	 101	
frameworks that oppose the dominant narratives, is a method proposed to be 
useful in the identification of frames (Hansen: 2006, Auteserre: 2012).  In other 
words, while looking at how the official/mainstream/dominant discourse and 
narratives frames statebuilding, there is also the need to look into alternative 
discourses that contests and challenges statebuilding from different angles 
(Auteserre: 2012). This is one of the goals of this part.  
 
Here, it is essential to mention the relationship between framing and 
discourse (Fairclough and Wodak: 1997, Hansen: 2006, Howarth: 2000). 
Frames constantly appear in narratives. Thus, looking for recurring 
keywords, concepts, symbols and images is a useful method in the 
identification of frames (Kuypers: 2009, Goffman: 1986, Hansen: 2006). 
Hansen (2006) claims that approaching discourse analysis through different 
intertextual models (of official, media and marginal discourse) provides a 
structured view for different locations, actors and genres of the debate. Since 
the aim is to discover recurring themes in dominant discourse over a certain 
time period, it might be a wise idea to select (official) discourses that provide 
a certain element of continuity and stability. Towards this end, throughout 
the next chapters, UN Security Council meeting records that include full texts 
of statements made since the end of the Cold War, European Council 
Conclusions, statements made by the highest level EU and US officials will be 
utilized, together with supporting sources such as academic journals and 
media articles.  
 
On the other hand, identifying discourse that contests and challenges the 
mainstream/ official discourse will both help define and understand the frame 
better and also help compare the definition of external responsibility made by 
the dominant frame of statebuilding and the alternative conceptualizations of 
the moral responsibility framework. For this study, these alternative 
discourses will be utilized to further strengthen the idea of the “responsibility 
gap”. In addition, the mutually reinforcing nature of discourse and practice is 
a recurring theme in frame analysis (Hansen: 2008). In other words, practice 
also helps define frames. In this context, both the development of 
statebuilding since the end of the Cold War and the way it is generally 
operationalized will also be in focus.  
 
To summarize, statebuilding will be analyzed in this chapter from three 
different perspectives, with a view to conducting a frame analysis: 
 
a) Relooking into the elements provided in the first chapter, relating to 
the development of external statebuilding; 
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b) Selecting three basic concepts of international relations which 
neoliberal statebuilding literature is centered on – sovereignty, 
(humanitarian) intervention and capacity–building, and the way 
neoliberal statebuilding relates to these concepts in its narratives 
(Fukuyama: 2004, Chesterman: 2004, Paris: 2002, Zaum: 2009, OECD-
DAC: 2008, RAND: 2007, Wheeler: 2003, Chandler: 2010, Ghani and 
Lockhart: 2008, Weiss: 2014, Ignatieff: 2004; Chesterman, Ignatieff and 
Thakur: 2004, Ghani, Lockhart and Callahan: 2005, Paris: 2002, 
Sorensen: 2006), 
 
c) Looking into the application of statebuilding across different contexts 
and situations in order to identify a practical pattern in its 
implementation.  
 
All three perspectives aim to respond to the questions below; to identify the 
components of the frames: 
 - Diagnostic components: How the empirical phenomena, facts and 
occurrences are defined and how causes are diagnosed, - Normative components: How the role of agents is morally defined, 
how the situation is normatively framed, - Prognostic components: Which opportunities and strategies are 
identified for solving the problem and how certain courses of action 
are legitimized, - Agency: How the identities and the interests of actors (the Self) are 
structured, how the Other is defined vis-a vis the Self. 
 
These questions will not only help to define the frame of neoliberal 
statebuilding, but together with the questions defined previously to establish 
moral responsibilities, constitute two parts of a comparative analysis that 
aims to exhibit the responsibility gap between the statebuilding frame and the 
moral responsibility framework.  
 
As mentioned previously, the last step in this chapter is to introduce the 
concept of discursive safeguards. Discursive safeguards aim to reinforce the 
elements of the frame when met with opposition from alternative discourses 
(Hansen: 2008). From this perspective, it is now safe to define discursive 
safeguards as methods to reinforce the dominant discourse against the 
challenges and criticisms faced. The concept will be deliberated in more detail 





3.2 The Frame of Statebuilding 
 
After having identified the basic elements of frame analysis to move forward, 
it will now be possible to identify the diagnostic, prognostic, normative 
components of the statebuilding frame, as well as the way agency is 
constructed. Statebuilding will be approached from three angles to 
successfully locate the frame: a) main concepts that define statebuilding, b) 
the way statebuilding is implemented, c) the development of statebuilding 
over time. 
 
3.2.1 Conceptualizing Statebuilding 
 
The traditional normative framework of international relations stands upon 
the principles of self-determination of peoples, sovereign equality, and non-
interference (by the UN) in the domestic affairs of member states40. Although 
these principles are still at the core of the global system today, the 
international community has assumed ambitious and substantial roles in 
third countries especially in the past two decades, by shaping the future 
structures, mechanisms and structures of conflict-prone countries (Mallaby: 
2002, Chesterman et al: 2004, Etzioni: 2004, Barnett and Zuercher 2006).  
 
The idea of the “responsibility gap”, in many ways, points out to the 
confusion of having an international system that state sovereignty has been 
deeply challenged in the past decades; yet the basis of the system still 
emphasizes sovereignty and non-interference. The temporary, narrow, 
technical facilitation/support functions attributed to the international 
community in interventions, and the emphasis on the primary responsibility 
of the nation state in protection, reconstruction and building effective states is 
a formulation of a system that prioritizes sovereignty. The comprehensive, 
prescriptive and intrusive nature of statebuilding does not (Chesterman: 2004, 
Carothers: 2007). In other words, in a way, the parameters of the frame of 
statebuilding are different than the frame of external responsibilities in 
statebuilding.   
 
This part aims to understand how these two different frames coexist together; 
allowing a comprehensive and intrusive role for external actors while 
managing to define their responsibilities in a limited way, in line with the 
basic principles of international relations. In other words, the purpose is to 
understand the narrative that morally justifies international intervention and 
post-conflict involvement against the traditional notion of state sovereignty, 
without directly challenging it – and how this narrative reflects on the 																																																								
40 See Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
	 104	
responsibilities of external agents. This will be done through analyzing three 
interrelated concepts, and their relationship with statebuilding: 
“sovereignty”, “responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention” and 
“capacity building”.  
 
3.2.1.1 Redefining Sovereignty: 
 
Statebuilding is an evolving concept, whose meaning, purpose, goals and 
methods are constantly being redefined and revisited. For the sake of 
simplicity, statebuilding can be defined as the efforts of external actors to 
construct stable, capable and sustainable states as a response to conflict and 
state fragility, to protect human populations and global security (Fukuyama: 
2004, Chesterman: 2004, Paris: 2002, Zaum: 2009, OECD-DAC: 2008, RAND: 
2007). This understanding that external actors can step in to construct other 
states has been described as a normative shift in the post-Cold-War years, in 
contrast with the norms of state sovereignty, non-interference (by the UN) 
and the prohibition of the use of force, which have for long been defined as 
the essential component for the maintenance of international peace and 
security and a defense of weak states against the strong (Newman: 2009, 
Warner: 2003).  
 
Despite the agreement that sovereignty could not be seen as a carte blanche to 
carry out massive abuses; in its first 45 years, the UN Charter prioritized state 
sovereignty over human rights or protection (Wheeler: 2003, Weiss: 2012). 
Besides Article 51 of the UN Charter legitimizing self-defense, the only way 
intervention is deemed “legal” is when a situation is classified as a threat to 
international peace and security by a Security Council resolution under 
Article 41 (non-military measures) or Article 42 (military intervention).  
 
The UN Charter is obviously still valid. Yet, there has been an evolution in the 
way the notions of sovereignty, self-governance and legitimate political 
institutions are perceived (Zaum: 2009). Since the end of the Cold War, the 
Security Council has been more active in the realm of intervention, entering 
areas that had previously belonged to the domestic jurisdiction of states 
(Wheeler: 2003).  
 
One dimension of this transformation has been the broadening of the scope of 
the threats to international peace and security. The traditional interpretation 
of Article 42 has shifted to include humanitarian disasters, grave human 
rights abuses and (later) terrorism as a threat to international peace and 
security. One recent example is the Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) on 
Mali, which identifies terrorism, attacks against civilians and abuses of 
international humanitarian and human rights law as threats (to international 
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peace and security) and calls upon the international community for 
assistance. The Council’s resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya, mentions protection 
of civilians, international humanitarian law and human rights before 
announcing a series of international measures to be undertaken to address 
these concerns.  
 
Another element of transformation is the introduction of the argument on 
“too much sovereignty”, leading to discussions on balancing the right to 
sovereignty with intervention (Collier: 2010). Ghani and Lockhart (2008) claim 
international system should not allow each state with the authority to act with 
unaccountable power and give governments a carte blanche as to what 
happens within their territories. The Report on the Implementation of the 
European Security Strategy (ESS Report: 2008) is a practical example; 
stressing that while the respect for the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of states aren’t negotiable, “sovereign governments must take 
responsibility for the consequences of their actions”. What should happen to 
sovereign governments that do not or cannot fulfill these responsibilities is less 
obvious, but the implication is that the solution lies within the domain 
traditionally preserved for sovereignty. After all, what is not negotiable, 
according to the ESS (2008), is respect for sovereignty, rather than sovereignty 
itself. Chandler (2010) claims these new interpretations transform sovereignty 
into the “institutional mechanism through which the dangers of autonomy 
can be ameliorated”. These shifts indicate a transformation from “sovereignty 
as a right” to “sovereignty as a responsibility” (for performing. certain 
functions in the economic, social and political domains) (Ghani and Lockhart: 
2008). The UN website on the prevention of genocide, for example, states that 
“sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it 
is a charge of responsibility that holds States accountable for the welfare of 
their people”41.  
 
The introduction of the concept of “capacity” in international relations has 
also helped transform sovereignty debates. While the previous two elements 
(broadening the scope of threats to international peace and security and 
introducing “sovereignty as responsibility”) are more closely connected to 
external military intervention, the shifts in the way “state capacity” was 
perceived connected the sovereignty debate to statebuilding. By identifying a 
“sovereignty gap” between the “de facto capabilities” of states and the “de 
jure sovereignty” ascribed to them as a right, a direct link between state 
sovereignty and capacity was drawn (Chandler: 2010, Ghani and Lockhart: 
2008). These debates problematized the sovereignty of states that were 																																																								
41 See http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml for full text. (Accessed on 8 
February 2016).  
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incapable of protecting their populations or countering threats to international 
peace and security. This shift helped legitimize civilian interventions in the 
format of capacity building.  
 
The shift regarding perceptions on sovereignty relates more to the way 
powerful states and international organizations (choose to) understand 
sovereignty and act upon it – bringing forward a change in discourse and 
policy (McCormack: 2010). Looking at debates on several different issues at 
the UN today on security, development, human rights and budgetary issues, 
it can be seen that the problematization of sovereignty is not necessarily 
accepted by the general UN membership. One indicator is the debate at the 
Financial and Budgetary Committee of the UN General Assembly every year, 
on the resources of the UN Office on the Prevention of Genocide. For the last 
couple of years, the delegation of Cuba has been proposing to cut the 
resources of the said Office, opposing the way it interprets the responsibility 
to protect and problematizes sovereignty42. These examples can be multiplied. 
Yet, these objections usually pertain to the issue of external military 
intervention; involvement in third states in the form of capacity building is 
less challenged (McCormack: 2010). The capacity debate will be analyzed in 
further detail below.  
 
3.2.1.2 The Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention: 
 
Although they do not directly relate to the area of statebuilding, debates on 
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect (R2P) give useful 
insights to understand the connection between statebuilding, sovereignty and 
responsibility, particularly since their framing of external responsibilities 
have inspired statebuilding discourse to a great extent.  
 
Both humanitarian intervention and R2P connect to debates on sovereignty. 
The 1992 ¨UN Agenda for Peace¨ claimed “the time of absolute and exclusive 
sovereignty (…) has passed; its theory was never matched with reality”. The 
tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica are generally accepted as a turning point 
for the humanitarian intervention debate (Annan and Mousavizadeh: 2012; 
Weiss: 2012). The failure to intervene in these tragedies, costing hundreds of 
thousands of lives, launched a debate on the most appropriate forms of 
response by the international community. Former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan (Annan and Mousavizadeh: 2012), for example, states “the need to go 
beyond the traditional UN concept of non-intervention, to set a new standard 
to hold states responsible for the treatment and protection of people within 																																																								
42 For further details, see  http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/gaab4096.doc.htm.   
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their own borders”. UN officials Deng and Cohen first promoted the idea of 
“sovereignty as responsibility”, mentioning the accountability of states if they 
failed in their protection duties.43 The NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 
carried these debates to a practical level (Aybet: 1999). 
 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS: 
2001) introduced the concept of R2P in 2001, proposing that states had to 
maintain minimal standards with respect to their populations; if not, this duty 
would fall on the international community (Cunliffe: 2010). R2P doctrine 
expanded the possibility and scope of intervention against a sovereign state 
by including alternative options of intervention than UN Security Council 
(UNSC) approval. The world leaders only partially adopted R2P at the UN 
World Summit of 2005, limiting its scope to the major atrocities of genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Many countries, 
perceiving R2P as a form of intervention that might be directed at them, 
pushed for raising the bar of intervention (Weiss: 2012). For instance, the 
former Zimbabwe President Mugabe, argued at the Summit that concepts 
such as R2P required careful scrutiny to test the underlying motivations.44 
The Summit backtracked to prohibition on use of force without UNSC 
authorization except for self-defense, but held on to the point that “the 
unauthorized use of force in pursuance of humanitarian goals is legitimate” 
(O’Connell: 2010). These divisions are ongoing today; possibly even 
strengthened.   
 
Another observation relates to responsibilities, or to whom the responsibilities 
are directed. The R2P doctrine focuses on the responsibility of the state to 
protect its citizens; when the state is either unwilling or unable to fulfill that 
responsibility, a residual responsibility also lies with the broader community 
of states (ISISS: 2001). Thus, the main focus of humanitarian intervention, by 
definition, is “protecting human populations from harm” (Ignatieff: 2004; 
Chesterman: 2004, Ignatieff and Thakur: 2004). Former US President Clinton, 
in a 1999 speech argued, “if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries 
to kill them en masse (…), and it’s within our power to stop it, we will stop 
it”.45 The EU High Representative Ashton, on Syria, argued that “the future of 
Syria belonged to the Syrian people” and the EU had to help the people of 
Syria in every way it could.  
 
The primary focus of R2P is protection separated from response to threats to 
international peace and security (ICISS: 2001). However, after the September 																																																								
43 For further details, see http://www.e-ir.info/2013/01/07/evolution-of-the-responsibility-to-protect/.  
44 Full text available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/coverage/statements/zimbabwe/zw.pdf.  
45 Full text availabşe at http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/Europe-9906/html/Speeches/990622d.html.  
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11 attacks, responding to the protection needs of local populations and 
combatting terrorist threats have increasingly been connected, at least in 
narrative. For instance, French President Hollande, on Mali, has said 
“terrorists should know that France will always be there when it’s a question, 
not of its fundamental interests, but of the rights of the Malian population to 
live freely and in democracy”. The Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) 
states that “the commission of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations 
of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed 
conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and 
reaffirms, in this regard, its readiness to consider such situations and, where 
necessary, to adopt appropriate steps”. This trend correspond with the 
increased rhetoric on global threats coming from “failed” states and terror 
threats to legitimize interventions; both by the more preventative and 
unilateral US approach and the more multilateral approach of the EU (Weiss: 
2012, Evans: 2008, Bellamy: 2009, Mallaby: 2002). This trend is still ongoing; 
the US airstrikes in Syria launched in September 2014 supported by a number 
of Western and Gulf states, claimed legitimacy both due to their purpose of 
protection of the local (Kurdish) populations in Syria and countering regional 
terrorist threats, in the wake of the rise of the extremist terrorist organization 
ISIL in Syria and Iraq.  
 
In order to preclude the discussion from deviating from the domain of 
statebuilding, two elements will be highlighted. First, humanitarian 
intervention and R2P emphasize the protection of civilians as their motive for 
intervention. The implication is military intervention, rather than the civilian 
crisis response domain which statebuilding belongs to. Second, humanitarian 
intervention that goes beyond the responsibility of responding to gross 
human rights violations (genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes) does not enjoy international consensus – in fact, the example of 
Syria indicates that it is not always easy to forge an international consensus 
even when mass atrocities are ongoing.  
 
How do these arguments relate to statebuilding and responsibility? The 
answer can be found in two of the main propositions of R2P: a) the primary 
responsibility of nation states in protection and b) the responsibilities of 
external actors to (re)build state capacity. Gareth Evans, former Australian 
Foreign Minister and President of the International Crisis Group, claims that 
building state capacity and ensuring rule of law in the aftermath of large-scale 
violations is essential 46 . Although the initial implication of R2P and 																																																								
46 46  See the text of Gareth Evans’ 2007 speech at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-
type/speeches/2007/evans-the-limits-of-state-sovereignty-the-responsibility-to-protect-in-the-21st-
century.aspx. (Accessed on 8 February 2016).  
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humanitarian intervention is military, the inclusion of these two concepts 
serves to diminish the controversies surrounding them and also to shift the 
attention to civilian crisis management efforts through capacity building. 
Focusing on capacity building helps alleviate the fears regarding challenges to 
state sovereignty, as capacity building is presented as a method of preventive 
(rather than protective) action and a step prior to intervention, and as it 
implies state consent. Capacity building is presented almost as a benign form 
of external intervention that does not challenge state sovereignty and is 
theoretically based on the consent of the receiving state. It is further 
legitimized through the stress on the provision of sustainable protection for 
civilians through the prevention of conflict. Finally, the capacity-building 
aspect of R2P and humanitarian intervention emphasizes the primary 
responsibility of the nation state, where the responsibilities of external actors 
are considered to be temporary and limited to supporting the state. For 
instance, the website of the UN Office of the Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide talks about the responsibility of the international 
community to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility47. In 
short, interventions in the form of capacity building are considered more 
benign that military interventions, while assigning significantly less 
responsibility to the international community as well.  
 
3.2.1.3 Problematization of capacity and the statebuilding frame: 
 
This final part will work further on capacity building; to answer the question 
how intrusive and extended interventions called statebuilding, which expand 
into the post-conflict arena through reconstruction, capacity-building and 
democratization and are sometimes conducted without state consent, can be 
legitimized and sustained. The elements of frame analysis identified 
previously, namely the diagnosis, prognosis and agency components of the 
statebuilding frame, will be utilized towards this end (Hansen: 2006, Loizides: 
2015). In other words, looking at the way statebuilding identifies problems 
and their solutions as well as the way it constructs the Self and the Other will 
hopefully provide valuable insights towards understanding how the role of 
the external actor in statebuilding is legitimized while its responsibilities are 
decreased.  
 
In terms of agency, the R2P doctrine formulates the “Other” as a state that is 
unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibilities derived from being a 
sovereign state. The diagnosis is the identification of such a state, as well as the 
threat it poses to the protection of civilians and international peace and 																																																								
47 See the website of the UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention on Genocide at 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml. (Accessed on 8 February 2016).  
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security. The Self is the international community, which has a temporary 
responsibility to step in under defined circumstances pertaining to the 
protection of civilians or countering threats to international peace and 
security. The prognosis comes either in the form of military intervention or 
capacity building.  
 
Statebuilding narrows these elements down. First of all, it draws the Other as 
states incapable of fulfilling its responsibilities. The Other is a fragile or failed 
state, lacking the resilience and capacity to protect its own population or 
prevent regional spillovers from its own conflicts. It is additionally devoid of 
the essential capacities to protect human rights or handle electoral democracy. 
It is politically unstable, disconnected from its citizens, cannot participate in 
the global economy (Ghani and Lockhart: 2008). This breeds low standards of 
living, extreme poverty, corruption, networks of criminality, violence, ethnic 
divisions, drugs, destruction of cultural heritage, refugee flows and terrorism, 
and requires preventive action (ESS: 2003). The liberal internationalist element 
of statebuilding constructs the Other as a state that is not capable, but also one 
lacking of the so-called universal values and structures that define a modern, 
successful, functioning state at peace with itself.  
 
This affects the definition of the Self as well. The Self, even if it is dubbed so, is 
not the international community, but external actors that advocate neoliberal 
frameworks as a sustainable solution to conflicts. The Self has a temporary 
responsibility to step in without problematizing the sovereignty of a state and 
with its consent (ICISS: 2001). 
 
The way the Other is defined constitutes the diagnosis of the problem - the 
capacity gap that threatens populations under conflict and international peace 
and security (Ghani and Lockhart: 2008, Fukuyama: 2004). To give examples, 
the US National Security Strategy of 2010 argues that failing states breed conflict 
and endanger regional and global security.48 OECD – DAC (2008) makes a clearer 
connection between failed states and R2P; stating that “Recent years have 
seen increasing concern among policy-makers about weak, fragile and failing 
states. This concern has been driven by three primary factors: the recognition 
that the state has an important role in development, new attention to human 
security coupled with changing definitions on domestic responsibilities of 
states to protect their populations, and third, a post 9/11 concern about weak 
states as vectors of transmission for terrorism, organized crime and other 
threats”.  																																																								
48  Full text available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. (Accessed on 
8 February 2016).   
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As the problem is defined in a more comprehensive manner than grave 
humanitarian challenges or immediate threats to international peace and 
security, the prognosis is also more comprehensive. Compared to the more 
positive results reported in ending violence, imposing basic law and order 
and promoting immediate economic growth, establishing sustainable, 
efficient states has been the greater challenge (Ghani and Lockhart: 2008, 
RAND: 2007, OECD/DAC: 2008). Statebuilding is presented to deal with this 
problem, by addressing the root causes of conflict and add sustainability to 
military interventions (King and Murray: 2002). Statebuilding proposes 
building structures that will prevent recurrence of conflict (Lotz: 2010). It 
stretches the prerequisite of sovereignty beyond the ability/ willingness to 
protect, its main target becoming finding formulas to combat state failure/ 
fragility.  
 
The Agenda for Peace, already in 1992, argued “identifying and supporting 
structures that would tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to 
prevent a relapse into conflict”, including “rebuilding the institutions and 
infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife”, through practices such 
as building effective state institutions, (re)creating a social fabric and fostering 
healthy civil society (Call and Cook: 2003). The US Security Strategy of 2010 
states that “in countries like Iraq or Afghanistan, building the capacity 
necessary for security, economic growth and good governance is the only 
path to long term peace and security”49.   Similarly, the European Security 
Strategy (ESS: 2003) puts forward that “we must step up our work with 
countries most at risk by strengthening their capacity to cope”. All these 
actions were traditionally considered within the realm of state sovereignty. 
The solution it suggests is, in essence, building capacities in different 
directions – development, security, good governance, human rights. In this 
way, statebuilding is constructed as a more comprehensive exercise, compared 
to humanitarian intervention or other exercises that challenge the traditional 
framework of sovereignty. The lack of capacity creates a gap – one that the 
international community can legitimately fill (Ghani and Lockhart: 2008, 
Chandler: 2010). The reason is that statebuilding perceives sovereignty as the 
administrative task of managing the administrative and technical 
responsibilities of a state (Chandler: 2010). Hence, despite its comprehensive 
nature, statebuilding is framed as a technical exercise. 
 
R2P emphasizes the sovereignty of states and implies their consent in external 
capacity-building exercises (ICISS: 2001). Statebuilding connects the 
problematization of capacity to the problematization of sovereignty 																																																								
49 Ibıd. 
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(Chandler: 2010). Consequently, statebuilding is carried out in countries 
where sovereignty has been problematized. The former EU High 
Representative Ashton and former US Secretary of State Clinton stated “it is 
very important to look into the future of Afghanistan, that we are building 
together”, during a joint press conference in January 2010.50 Building the 
future of a country together, in a country whose sovereignty is problematized, 
implies a major task for external parties, one much beyond temporarily 
stepping in to support capacity building efforts. It implies favoring the 
international will over the local, or at least equating them to each other. From 
this perspective, statebuilding is also an intrusive exercise, despite the 
temporary support responsibility attributed to external actors.  
 
Finally, statebuilding allows for the introduction of (the tenets of) the 
neoliberal state in conflict countries, based on the theory that peace between 
states can secured by liberal democracies, interdependency and Western civic 
identity (Paris: 2002, Sorenson: 2006). Both the US National Security Strategy 
(2010) and the European Security Strategy (2003) emphasize the importance of 
the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in conflict 
countries. Thus, statebuilding exports the idea and the norms of the liberal 
democratic state from the core to the periphery of the international system, 
with the expectation of enhancing peace and security (Paris: 2002, Fukuyama: 
2004, Paris: 1997, Berger: 2006). As such, statebuilding has a strong normative 
touch, propagating a certain worldview and state system over others, despite 
a more technical framing.  
 
As such, despite many similarities, statebuilding constructs its diagnoses and 
prognoses as well as agency different both from the traditional framework of 
international relations and humanitarian intervention and R2P. The Other 
does not only lack the will or the capacity to deal with protection challenges 
or threats to peace and stability. It also lacks the tenets of a neoliberal state 
based on democratic institutions. The Self, in return, is the democratic state, 
possessing a free market economy, functioning institutions, the rule of law 
and respect for individual rights. The problem is defined as the lack of state 
capacity as well as a lack of liberal democratic institutions. The solution goes 
beyond building state capacity to better counter protection and/or security 
challenges into the more comprehensive, intrusive and normative exercise of 
statebuilding. The end goal is not merely the sustainable prevention of 
conflict; it is the emergence of a liberal democratic state.  
 
																																																								
50 Full text available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135530.htm. 
(Accessed on 8 February 2016).  
	 113	
Yet, while redefining the Self and the Other through the prism of “state 
capacity” while problematizing sovereignty allow the roles and 
responsibilities of the nation state and external actors to be reinterpreted with 
a more dominant role for the statebuilder, external responsibility is still 
defined through the humanitarian intervention/ responsibility. Although the 
underlying dynamics of R2P and the basic premises of statebuilding are 
different, they define state responsibility and the responsibility of 
international actors in the same way – a temporary and limited support 
function.  
 
3.2.2 The Application of Statebuilding: Addressing the ¨capacity¨ gap: 
 
The emphasis on capacity-building as a solution to state failure or fragility led 
to efforts to establish comprehensive frameworks guiding international 
involvement to mould “failed states” into modern entities (De Guevara: 2010). 
Policy organizations such as OECD-DAC, DFID and UNDP concentrated on 
formulating general guidelines to “build capable states”, which propose a 
collective approach bringing “liberal internationalist” buzzwords such as 
security, humanitarian action, rule of law, human rights and development 
under one framework (De Coning: 2010, Brahimi: 1999). Despite the 
acceptance that it is essential to tailor statebuilding to specific social, 
historical, economic and regional circumstances, similar frameworks have 
been used to address different problems; from Bosnia to Palestine and 
Afghanistan. This approach is exemplified by Ghani and Lockhart (2008), 
who emphasize the importance of developing a framework that can clearly 
and broadly describe core state functions and claim that this framework has 
“relevance to many countries struggling with crafting a pathway forward and 
finding the right balance between state, market and civil society”. 
 
The RAND Foundation (2007) argues that the costs and relevant actors should 
be determined, risk and conflict factors, required resources, anticipated 
resistance, scale of commitment and institutional arrangements must be 
thoroughly calculated and weighed. Despite the implication of the R2P 
doctrine that the responsibilities of the international community are 
temporary, discourse on technocratic statebuilding stresses on extended 
commitments. As the underlying idea is that no actor has the capacity or 
legitimacy to undertake a wholescale intervention on its own, coordination 
among and between major powers, major financial donors and neighboring 
states (Dobbins: 2006) is deemed as necessary. These frameworks are based on 
sequencing of international efforts; most policy reports suggest similar 
guidelines, as explained in the first chapter. 
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For simplicity, statebuilding efforts relying on technical guidelines based on 
neoliberal parameters will be defined as “technocratic statebuilding”. 
Although the application of statebuilding changes from context to context, 
statebuilding frameworks will be analyzed under four categories for better 
clarity: a) security, b) aid and development, c) good governance and 
institution-building d) human rights and democratization.  
 
This exercise will serve three purposes. First and foremost, seeing how 
statebuilding is implemented will be useful to define the statebuilding frame 
more thoroughly. Secondly, despite its normative touch explained above, this 
part will highlight attempts to frame statebuilding as a technical exercise. The 
third purpose is for future use. With reference to the moral responsibility 
framework explained in the second chapter, looking into the implementation 
of statebuilding provides an opportunity to understand better its impact on 
the ground; which will be put to use later when analyzing statebuilding from 
the perspective of the moral responsibility framework.  
 
3.2.2.1 The Security Dimension: 
 
Security sector reform (SSR) is defined as the task of transforming institutions 
and organizations that deal with security threats to the state and citizens, with 
the objectives of protection of the state (and individuals) from state and non-
state threats (Brzoska: 2006, USIP: 2008). It is a holistic concept that aims to 
create a secure environment for the consolidation of peace and stability, 
poverty reduction, good governance and democratization. Statebuilding 
guidelines argue that security is the prerequisite of development and 
democratization; thus SSR is the most essential and primary part of 
statebuilding. For instance, an OECD-DAC (2007) Report titled “Security 
Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice” states that “SSR 
serves to enhance the capacity of states to meet a range of security needs 
consistent with liberal democratic norms”. The European Union adopted an 
SSR strategy in 2006. OECD-DAC published its own guidelines on SSR; titled 
“OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice”. The UN 
views SSR as part of its preventative approach; the Security Council adopted 
a decision on this issue in 2007.  
 
According to these decisions and guidelines, SSR starts with the 
demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, to 
immediately improve the security situation on the ground. DDR is followed 
by the reform of the army, intelligence and the police, which should be 
subject to civilian oversight. SSR extends to oversight bodies such as the 
judicial sector and law enforcement institutions, in order to prevent non-state 
dispute resolution mechanisms, solve conflicts in an impartial manner and 
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preserve the credibility of the state (RAND: 2007). Finally, civilian oversight 
mechanisms are essential to ensure that the security sector is conducive to 
democratic politics. 
 
SSR emphasizes securing efficiency and effectiveness while responding to the 
democratic needs of societies, by preserving the balance between human 
rights and security. However, after 9/11, the operative part of security reform, 
involving combatting crime, terrorism, organized crime and other key threats 
that flourish in weak states and threaten international peace and security 
were more pronounced (Debiel et al: 2006). As a result, rule of law efforts 
usually lag behind the other parts of SSR, leading to accountability, credibility 
and legitimacy deficit. 
 
SSR involves challenges to statebuilders: the difficulty to deal with 
corruption, politicization and insufficient resources of local security forces, 
the inconsistency and unevenness in implementation due to the wide range of 
activities SSR involves, the expertise and personnel deficit (OECD-DAC: 2008, 
RAND: 2007).  The gravity of these challenges are used by external actors to 
legitimize shaping, managing and controlling SSR, in contrast with the 
framing of statebuilding as a technical exercise of supporting local institutions 
that should be shaped by the will of the people (Chandler: 2010).  
 
Moreover, there is lack of consensus on fundamental definitions, content and 
even terminology of SSR. The focus changes from securing the democratic 
rights of people to eliminating threats to “neoliberal peace”. These factors 
usually lead to an accountability, credibility and legitimacy deficit. 
International actors not being subject to scrutiny through accountability and 
electability further exacerbates this problem. 
 
3.2.2.2 The Aid, Assistance and Development Dimension: 
 
Emergency humanitarian aid deals with providing immediate relief in 
extreme circumstances, by minimizing displacement, dealing with drought, 
famine and disease, putting emergency infrastructure in place. Such duties 
are usually undertaken by actors which specialize in emergency relief; such as 
ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO and military agents. Humanitarian aid does 
not completely fit into the statebuilding framework (De Coning: 2010). The 
responsibilities of humanitarian actors usually start before interventions take 
place and statebuilding efforts begin, and are defined and legitimized 
through international humanitarian law. Humanitarian aid has a shorter-term 




Development assistance, aiming the resumption of economic activity is a 
longer–term process, a capacity-building activity part of the statebuilding 
guidelines. The focus of liberal internationalist statebuilding is the 
resumption of normal economic activity and fostering free markets, placing 
development in the normative framework of external statebuilding. 
Development activities include financing the government budget to cover the 
gap between tax revenues and expenditures, providing post-conflict 
assistance, creating regulatory tax mechanisms conducive to growth, 
undertaking measures to control inflation and attracting investment, 
stabilizing the currency, operating utilities and state owned enterprises, and 
sometimes running the Central Bank. In the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict, the usual practice is to conduct an initial needs assessment and 
organize a donor’s conference to jump-start basic economic activity (OECD-
DAC: 2008). The introduction of “aid conditionality”, as an instrument to 
promote liberal-democratic norms like human rights and democracy, has 
fostered the normative nature of development.  
 
The impact of development projects on post-conflict societies is unclear. 
Sustained aid flows undermine the development of state structures, hamper 
macro-economic competitiveness and institutional maturation, reinforce 
corrupt structures and the executive over the already weak legislature, and 
create dependency (Moss and de Walle: 2006). As a result, permanent 
intervention is needed to control the market economy. An aid-based economy 
leads to the executive bodies focusing on the priorities of donors rather than 
taxpayers. All run contrary to concepts of self-sufficiency, democracy and 
local ownership (Moore: 2004, Rubin: 2006).  
 
Making the transition from humanitarian relief to longer-term development is 
defined as a key statebuilding objective by policy reports such as RAND 
(2007) and OECD-DAC (2008). However, the problems cited above, in 
addition to the recurrence of conflict sometimes lead to a fallback on the more 
neutral framework of humanitarian relief. This may lead to increased 
disillusionment in statebuilding. 
 
3.2.2.3 The Institutional Dimension: 
 
Statebuilding suggests that sustainable peace is possible by establishing 
effective, accountable and legitimate systems of authority (Samuels: 2005, 
Rubin: 2006). Yet, institutional reform advocates top-bottom approaches, 
especially at the earlier stages of statebuilding, claiming that existing local 
capabilities are often delegitimized/ criminalized and reformed central state 
capacities must be generated with external help (OECD-DAC: 2007, RAND: 
2004). External actors guide, manage and sometimes conduct public services, 
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ranging from education to health. Some scholars argue that this 
comprehensive role foreseen for international actors erodes the capacity and 
legitimacy of the state, contrary to the proposition of institution-building to 
strengthen local capacity (De Guevara: 2010).  
 
Different auditing, reporting and monitoring requirements from donors 
create additional burdens on weak governments. In addition, external actors 
usually focus on strengthening the central government structures instead of 
local governance as an easier choice, especially when secessionism and 
conflict prevails in the periphery. On some occasions, central government 
authorities are dominated by or close to a party in conflict; making the 
international community inevitably a side to the conflict (Murithi: 2009).  
 
There are varying definitions and understandings on what a strong and 
functional state actually is. Despite the focus on democratic governance, 
institution building is conducted as a response to state fragility, which 
prioritizes strong and functional states over democratic ones (Fukuyama: 
2004). This focus on strong states leads to prioritization of the executive 
branch, instead of establishing appropriate checks and balances, which again 
raises question marks on democratic governance (De Coning: 2010).  
 
3.2.2.4 The Normative Dimension: 
 
Statebuilding has a normative component, borrowing from liberal 
internationalism (Paris: 2002, Goldsmith: 2008). Democracy and human rights 
perspectives are deemed necessary to redirect the competition for wealth and 
power to peaceful means through building representative institutions, civil 
society, independent media and political parties, organizing elections, 
advocating minority rights, bringing aid conditionality and even designing 
constitutions (OECD: 2007, RAND:2008).   
 
However there isn’t consensus on what these concepts mean and how they 
should be operationalized (Diamond: 2002). Suspicions already dominate 
debates on norm-promotion and its connection to (humanitarian) intervention 
and sovereignty at the UN, as previously explained. The promotion of 
democracy and human rights is often seen as a neoliberal Western practice 
rather than a universal practice. The selective application of trade and aid 
conditionality contributes to these sentiments (Tocci: 2008).  As a result, while 
the goals of statebuilding include promotion of democratic norms, the failure, 
misconception or mismanagement of the normative agenda of statebuilding 
risks the erosion of these norms on the global scene (R3). Such erosion will 
inevitably make it difficult to institutionalize these values and norms in a 
post-conflict country. In these cases, the contribution of statebuilders to 
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democracy, which discursively rely on the theoretical framework of 
“democratic peace” for legitimacy, is questionable.  
 
The strong focus on institution-building also delayed democratization in post-
conflict countries, based on the claims that rapid democratization can lead to 
more conflict, semi-democratic rule might threaten peace more than 
authoritarian rule and the promotion of liberal democratic norms can be 
downgraded in fragile states because of the difficulties of enforcement 
(Fukuyama: 2004, Carothers: 2007, Goldsmith: 2008). Especially with the 
“securitization” of the statebuilding debate, democratization and human 
rights have been pushed to the bottom of the list of priorities of statebuilding 
in the recent years (Paris: 2002). These practices seem to be contrary to the 
very argument of liberal democracy that democracy breeds stability (Lotz: 
2010).  
 
Secondly, the democratic peace theory, which has strongly influenced 
statebuilding theories and practices, tends to equate legitimacy with Western 
(LO) style democracy. Sabaratnam (2009) challenges this idea: “By relating 
legitimacy to adherence to a particular political model and the execution of 
particular functions, the statebuilding discourse (…) finds it difficult to deal 
with popular acceptances of systems that do not conform, or appear to 
conform, to these standards.(…) If we take the need for interpretation of 
beliefs seriously when understanding legitimacy, political discourses and 
beliefs of the state and society should become much more important as an 
object of analysis for studying legitimization, more so than constitutional 
arrangements, political processes, Freedom House rankings and other such 
external assessments”.  
 
Thirdly, and based on this point, statebuilders might fall in the trap of taking 
sides in a conflict by supporting the party which seems to advocate Western 
style liberal democracy more than the others; when actually, it could be 
argued that an order based on liberal democratic values must necessarily 
have room from non-Western elements. This kind of dynamic challenges the 
argument that statebuilding is a technical exercise.  
 
3.2.2.5 The framing of technocratic statebuilding: 
 
Looking into the way technocratic statebuilding is constructed and 
implemented allows us to make three relevant points regarding the 
statebuilding frame.  
 
The first point relates to the nature of statebuilding. Statebuilding is a 
comprehensive exercise that extends into the humanitarian, development, 
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security, governance and normative sectors. The problematization of the 
capacity gap allows external actors’ intrusive involvement into these fields 
under the guise of fostering state capacity. The difficulties of conflict states in 
addressing the difficult challenges they face are also used to legitimize 
intrusive involvement. Finally, statebuilding is a normative exercise, which 
prioritizes one political and administrative system over others. This can also 
lead to the favoring of certain actors that seem closer to liberal internationalist 
values over others as well. In short, looking at technocratic guidelines implies 
the comprehensive, intrusive and normative nature of statebuilding.  
 
A second conclusion relates to the efforts of policy organizations to define 
statebuilding as a technical, temporary and neutral exercise based on universal 
guidelines and best practices. The role of external actors is presented as 
capacity building, and the end goal of interventions as full sovereignty and 
local ownership. The holistic nature of statebuilding indicates the importance 
of balancing security, governance, development and human rights 
considerations and efforts.   
 
Statebuilding guidelines accept that technical errors, miscalculations and 
mistakes have been made (RAND: 2007, OECD-DAC: 2008). In fact, these 
guidelines have often been developed as a response to overcome these 
“technical” problems. As a remedy, they suggest adjustments within the 
practice of statebuilding without touching its essence much, such as 
improving coordination among international actors, making statebuilding 
more responsive to local needs or respecting local customs and practices. 
However, these technical solutions do not go deep enough to analyze and 
address the unintended negative impact caused by international action.  
 
Third, policy guidelines seem to fall short in addressing criticisms directed at 
the essence of statebuilding, some of which are captured above. What is the 
end goal of SSR; achieving local ownership or combatting threats to 
international peace and security? Who is responsible for countering the 
negative impacts of aid dependency? Is liberal democracy the best way 
forward for every society? If there is a choice, should security or local will and 
ownership be prioritized? These are more difficult questions, which challenge 
the dominant framing of statebuilding as the best model of conflict resolution.   
 
One of these more inherent dilemmas of statebuilding relates to local 
ownership. While prioritizing local ownership in discourse, statebuilding 
problematizes sovereignty. In this context, international actors often assume 
extensive responsibilities and intrude in shaping the future structures of a 
country, based on a liberal internationalist vision they dub as universal. This 
practice might end up damaging the credibility and sovereignty of a state, 
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contrary to the original purpose of statebuilding. The intrusive way 
statebuilding is conducted also runs contrary to its framing as a capacity 
building exercise. Another dilemma can be cited as the strong normative 
dimension of statebuilding, while constructing it as a purely technical exercise 
– made possible by defining liberal internationalist values as universal norms. 
In addition, the definitions, priorities and focus of statebuilding efforts are 
often subject to change and reinterpretation, based on international 
developments, new threat perceptions, and improved capacities of 
international actors. Yet, the attempt to present statebuilding as a universal 
and technical exercise disallows factoring in the element of change and the 
fundamental effect it might have on statebuilding practices. Finally, despite 
the presentation of statebuilding as a holistic concept that stresses preserving 
the balance between security, human rights and development, this balance is 
sometimes broken with the prioritization of security efforts in line with the 
security interests of external actors. In this way, the practice of statebuilding 
contradicts its principles and theories, sometimes creating a credibility gap 
regarding the actual goals and purposes of statebuilding.  
 
3.2.3 The Development of Statebuilding: 
 	
The final step in locating the statebuilding frame is to examine the 
development of statebuilding.  
 
To start with the way facts and occurrences are defined and problematized; 
we have seen in the first chapter that statebuilding tends to approach the 
world from the perspective of liberal internationalism and ¨democratic peace¨, 
suggesting that peace between states as well as the protection of civilians can 
be secured by the mutually reinforcing concepts of liberal democracy, 
interdependence, free market economy, democratic institutions and Western 
civic identity (Sorenson: 2006, Baum: 2008, Paris: 1997). The emphasis on state 
fragility and the lack of institutions increased over time, especially after 9/11 
(Hameiri: 2007a). Reasons for conflict are diagnosed in two ways. The first 
one relates to the will of states: liberal democratic states do not seek war. The 
second one was about capacity – the lack of components of liberal 
democracies, especially institutional capacity, is the problem and the cause of 
conflict. In short, liberal democratic states have the capacity for conflict 
prevention.  
 
The second step is looking into which opportunities and strategies are 
identified for solving the problem and how certain courses of action are 
legitimized. After the initial naïve prognosis that democracy would easily 
take root globally with the fall of the Soviet Union failed, capable, 
autonomous and legitimate government institutions became increasingly seen 
	 121	
as the key to stability. As such, establishing institutions able to peacefully 
resolve (internal) disputes became increasingly emphasized as the key to 
sustainability (RAND: 2007, OECD-DAC: 2008). Through the “development-
security nexus” and the introduction of holistic and ¨whole of government¨ 
approaches, statebuilding is also presented as a comprehensive exercise that 
must go into various sectors of state formation for viability and efficiency 
(Lake: 2010, Jahn: 2007, Newman: 2010). The “development-security nexus” 
also led to a shift in the priority of statebuilding from establishing democratic 
states to strong states. Despite the growing concerns over the sustainability of 
resources, the availability of civilian personnel and an increasing fatigue to 
become involved in conflict countries, capacity development and 
comprehensive institution building is still perceived as a recipe for 
sustainable conflict resolution. 
 
In order to determine the legitimization of certain courses of action in the 
statebuilding frame, one can turn to the way responsibility is defined. As 
humanitarian intervention and R2P gained prevalence, external involvement 
including capacity building was legitimized based on development and 
humanitarian considerations (Cunliffe: 2010). The focus on capacity and 
institution building prevailed after September 11; however, the element 
bringing legitimacy to intervention evolved into security considerations 
(Lake: 2010, Berger and Weber: 2006, Mallaby: 2002, Barnett: 2006, RAND: 
2007). Both the humanitarian intervention discourse and the later securitized 
frame of interventions emphasized the liberal democratic state. They 
celebrated institutional capacity building as an appropriate and legitimate 
course of action to boost the response capacities of states that could not fulfill 
their responsibilities due to capacity gaps in development, security and 
democratic institutions (Warner: 2003). With the development – security 
nexus, poverty and underdevelopment were also identified as threats to 
international peace and stability, further “legitimizing” intrusive and 
comprehensive statebuilding. 
   
The development of statebuilding also offers valuable insights as to how 
agency is constructed and how the Other is defined vis-a vis the Self. Despite 
attempts to present statebuilding as a universal exercise and the neoliberal 
state as a universal best practice, as previously defined, since the end of the 
Cold War, the international arena has seen an increase in the number of non-
UN actors in civilian crisis management, most of them being Western states, 
NGO’s and organizations. Although the Self has been discursively defined as 
the ¨international community¨, a Western neoliberal framework is implied in 
the definition of the Self partly due to the underlying idea that peace can be 
best secured by liberal democracies and Western civic identity. The Other is 
constructed as a state that does not have the capacity to fulfill its 
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responsibilities to protect its people or counter threats to international peace 
and security. As the Self is defined within a Western neoliberal framework, 
the implied definition of the Other becomes a state which is not found upon 
liberal democratic principles and/or does not possess a democratic 
institutional framework. In fact, this formulation problematizes identity as 
well as capacity.  
 
In terms of the normative aspects of the statebuilding frame, especially before 
9/11, intervention has been legitimized through a protection angle: the moral 
duty of the “international community” to protect civilians and prevent 
humanitarian disasters. Combatting threats to international peace and 
security came into focus later. In addition to moral duties, the offered solutions 
and adopted methods also have a normative touch, as statebuilding became 
about exporting the idea and the norms of the Western state from the core to 
the periphery of the international system (Paris: 2002, Fukuyama: 2004a, 
Paris: 1997, Berger: 2006). In fact, for a long while after the fall of the Berlin 
wall, Western norms were pronounced as the standard of modern civilization 
(Sorensen: 2006). Full local ownership and sovereignty was also conditioned 
to liberal democracy – to societies enjoying the elements of a liberal 
democratic state with strong institutions and enforcement capacity (OECD-
DAC: 2008). In other words, democratic peace and neoliberal internationalism 
have helped statebuilding justify the choices made or in the making.   
 
3.3 Introducing the Responsibility Gap  
 
The previous part of this chapter has attempted to identify different elements 
of the statebuilding frame; with a particular focus on the way responsibilities 
in statebuilding have been constructed through discourse. Looking into this 
frame has provided valuable inputs towards answering the propositions 
related to the “responsibility gap”; namely that the way the responsibilities of 
international actors are defined is not commensurate with these 
comprehensive responsibilities. This part aims to solidify this point beyond a 
mere suggestion; to show clearly that there is a gap between the way present 
day statebuilding frames responsibility and the way it would be framed by 
the moral responsibility framework. 
 
This part will take an initial step towards defining the concepts of 
responsibility gap and discursive safeguards. This will be done by comparing 
elements of the statebuilding frame above, to those of the moral responsibility 
framework explained in the previous chapter. The potential mismatch 
between these two discourses will point out to a responsibility gap. 
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A full identification of the responsibility gap will not be possible at this stage. 
This is mostly because the moral responsibility framework requires the 
identification of responsible agents, specific contexts and places.  It works on 
establishing agency, before moving on to defining the Self and the Other, by 
looking at whether the agent possesses qualities such as a separate identity, 
continuity and organizational memories and formal decision making powers. 
It requires looking at the concrete impact of actions. It analyzes how the 
capacity-building efforts of international actors affect their responsibilities. 
These will be done in the next chapters, first through the identification of the 
EU as the agent, and later by looking at its involvement in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This part, as mentioned, will merely identify elements of a 
responsibility gap.  
 
3.3.1 International responsibilities and the statebuilding frame: 	
In this chapter, the way statebuilding is constructed, legitimized and 
operationalized since the end of the Cold War has been analyzed, from 
conceptual, theoretical and practical angles, using elements of frame analysis. 
These elements have allowed a thorough definition of the statebuilding frame 
and the way it constructs responsibility.  
 
The first element regarding the frame is that statebuilding is a comprehensive, 
normative and intrusive exercise based on a vision that peace between states and 
the protection against mass atrocities can be secured by liberal democracies, 
free market economies, democratic institutions and Western civic identity 
(RAND: 2007, OECD-DAC: 2007, Sorenson: 2006, Paris: 1997). Especially with 
the ¨development-security nexus¨, it claims that the areas of development, 
security, human rights and democracy are mutually reinforcing and thus 
proposes solutions in all these areas. It problematizes state capacity and 
connects it to sovereignty and responsibility; thus legitimizing civilian 
interventions in the form of institutional capacity building in a multitude of 
sectors. These theoretical elements are translated in practice, through the 
attempts to construct a universal best practice of statebuilding based on 
security, humanitarian, development, and institutional and normative 
components. In this way, statebuilding allows external actors to make choices 
for states and implement them, based on a normative angle presented as a 
universal best practice.  
 
The second point relates to the way responsibilities are constructed by 
international actors. At the beginning of this chapter, four elements were 
identified to determine a frame: diagnostic, prognostic, normative 
components and agency.  
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The diagnostic components of a frame concern the way empirical phenomena, 
facts and occurrences are defined and how causes are diagnosed. External 
statebuilding benefits from the theories of democratic peace and liberal 
internationalism when constructing its theory and world vision. It utilizes the 
principle that liberal democratic states do not seek conflict and have the 
capacity to prevent conflict. Statebuilding borrows from the capacity side of 
this argument. The diagnosis problematizes the capacity gap and suggests 
that the capacity gap can be best overcome by well-functioning liberal 
democracies, where the principles of development, security, democracy, 
human rights and good governance are mutually reinforcing. Capacity is 
connected to state sovereignty and state responsibility, by suggesting that 
building state capacities (rather than military intervention) by external actors 
can foster sovereignty and thus state responsibility.  
 
The prognostic components of a frame aim to identify which opportunities and 
strategies are identified for solving the problem and how certain courses of 
action are legitimized. As the liberal democratic state based on functioning 
institutions is seen as the ultimate key to peace and protection, the strategies 
in principle rest on establishing such a state. It stretches the prerequisite of 
sovereignty beyond the ability/ willingness to protect; the target becoming 
finding best practices to combat state failure/ fragility. The solution it suggests 
is, in essence, building capacities in different directions – development, 
security, good governance, human rights.	Statebuilding perceives sovereignty 
as the administrative task of managing the administrative and technical 
responsibilities of a state (Chandler: 2010). Hence, despite its comprehensive 
nature, statebuilding is framed as a technical exercise. Today, capacity 
development and (democratic) institution building is still seen as a recipe for 
sustainability for conflict countries. The capacity-building focus also allows 
presenting statebuilding as a ¨benign¨ form of external intervention 
theoretically based on state consent. This conceptualization allows attribution 
of temporary and limited responsibilities for the international community 
until a capable state has been built. As such, a space is created for the 
international community to legitimately be involved in the construction of 
ever aspect of society and governance, ranging from the security sector to 
democracy promotion and economic development. Yet, the end goal of 
interventions is reaching full sovereignty and local ownership for conflict-
affected countries. 
 
In terms of agency, even when the Self is framed as the “international 
community”, the identity, interests and values of Western or donor countries 
seem to be prioritized in this definition. The Self has a temporary 
responsibility to step in without problematizing the sovereignty of a state and 
with its consent (ICISS: 2001). The humanitarian intervention discourse 
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assigns two characteristics to the Other: the lack of will and the lack of 
capacity to fulfill its responsibilities. Statebuilding problematizes the lack of 
resilience and capacity, and connects these to the lack of liberal democratic 
institutions (Richmond: 2013).	It is politically unstable, disconnected from its 
citizens, cannot participate in the global economy, which breeds low 
standards of living, extreme poverty, corruption, networks of criminality, 
violence, ethnic divisions, drugs, destruction of cultural heritage, refugee 
flows and terrorism, and requires preventive action (Ghani and Lockhart: 
2008). The ultimate goal is building the Other in the form of the Self – a liberal 
democratic state with functional and capable institutions. In the meantime, 
fostering its capacities to prevent it from becoming a threat to masses of 
civilians and international peace and security is prioritized.  
 
Finally, the offered solution and adopted methods also have a strong 
normative touch. The framing of statebuilding as an exercise of turning the 
incapable Other into the image of the liberal democratic Self is in itself a 
normative exercise, aiming to export the idea and the norms of the Western 
state from the core to the periphery of the international system (Paris: 2002, 
Berger: 2006). This exercise also reflects on the identity of the Self – as the 
statebuilding project is also a test case for the liberal democratic state based 
on functioning institutions as a universal best practice.  The moral duty of the 
Self is constructed accordingly - boosting the capacities of the Other in order 
to protect civilians and prevent conflict is presented as a moral responsibility 
for the liberal democratic actors who possess the know-how and correct 
vision on how to bring about peace.  
 
These elements can be summarized in the chart below: 
 
THE FRAME: STATEBUILDING AND RESPONSIBILITY 
 Diagnostic Arguments: - Responsible states do not seek conflict and are capable of conflict prevention. - Well-functioning, liberal democratic states are not a threat to their 
populations or international peace and security. 
Building state capacities can foster state sovereignty and responsibility. 
Prognostic Arguments: - Changing strategies:  
Phase 1: The belief that liberal democracy would take root easily. 
Phase 2: Comprehensive and long-term civilian interventions. 
Phase 3: Increased focus on security, functionality and capacity. 
Phase 4: Scaling down  - Sustainable solutions require comprehensive responses; that take into regard 
the connectedness of development, democracy, security, good governance 
and human rights. 
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- Addressing the lack of state capacity, through the construction of functional 
democratic institutions, will foster liberal democracy and address the 
problem of the lack of will to respond. 
Legitimization of Statebuilding: - Statebuilding is a benign form of intervention that implies state consent. And 
does not directly challenge state sovereignty. - When conflict affected states suffer from a lack of capacity, the international 
community can step in to boost state capacity, until effective prevention and 
response capabilities have been built.   - A lack of capacity means lack of sovereignty; statebuilding aims to foster 
sovereignty and local ownership through capacity building. - Under capacity has been fully built, the international community might have 
to temporarily assume more direct responsibilities. These responsibilities are 
technical, aimed at promoting “universal best practices”.  - Sustainable solutions require comprehensive approaches, which connect 
democracy to security, governance and development.  
Normative Arguments: - Liberal democratic norms are 
presented as universal norms. - Democratic and functional 
institutions are the guarantee to 
peace and stability.  - Turning the incapable Other to 
the peaceful Self is the way to 
combat conflict.  - It is a moral responsibility of 
liberal democratic countries to 
prevent conflict and protect 
civilians through engaging in 
statebuilding. 
Agency:  - The Self is framed as the 
international community, or the 
community of states that adopt 
universal best practices of 
governance. Yet, in practice, the 
Self has a predominantly Western 
and neoliberal touch.  - The Other is a state with a lack of 
will or capacity to fulfill its 
sovereign responsibilities. It 
implies a) an undemocratic state, 
b) an incapable state.  
 	
3.3.2 The Moral Responsibility Framework and Statebuilding: 
 	
Compared to the more static and simple way the statebuilding frame 
attributes responsibilities to international actors, the moral responsibility 
framework asks different questions on agency, the operationalization of 
responsibility and where the responsibilities are directed. As such, it presents 
a different perspective on statebuilding and responsibility, as an alternative to 
the dominant discourse.  
 
3.3.2.1 Moral responsibility and agency: 
 
Although moral responsibility can be best attributed through the 
identification of a specific agent, it is still possible to reach conclusions 
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regarding the different approaches of statebuilding and moral responsibility 
to agency.  
 
First, the statebuilding frame attributes responsibility to an entity dubbed as 
the “international community”. This is not possible from a moral 
responsibility point of view. The international community has no 
organizational structure, separate identity, single goal, decision-making 
powers and self-command.  
 
Second, the liberal internationalist approach of statebuilding suggests that 
agency is connected to a narrower group of actors than the “international 
community”. The dominant narrative of statebuilding has been challenged on 
numerous occasions by arguments implying that interventions have served 
Western security interests above all, with insufficient consideration given to 
practical implications of failed statehood or to local needs (De Guevera: 2010, 
Chandler: 2006, Chomsky: 2007, Cunliffe: 2009, King and Murray: 2002, 
Debiel, Klingebiel, Mehler, Schneckener: 2006). The preference of external 
actors to support or cooperate with actors closer to its world vision, working 
mentality and interests, or the choice to prioritize the construction of central 
state institutions in conflict resolution above other possible activities implies 
that statebuilding is a political exercise; conducted by actors with an identity 
and specific interests (Murithi: 2009, Hameiri: 2008). Yet, from a moral 
responsibility perspective, it is also difficult to attribute agency to a group 
called “Western actors” or “donor countries”. The problem remains the same.  
 
The difficulty of attributing responsibility to the international community 
already raises question marks about arguments such as “the responsibility of 
the international community to assist conflict states51”. Moreover, the liberal 
internationalist element to agency challenges the claim that statebuilding is a 
technical exercise based on universal best practices. These will be some 
elements of the responsibility gap.  
 
3.3.2.2 Operationalizing moral responsibility: Intentions, impact and capabilities: 
 
The framing of responsibilities in statebuilding has been identified through 
looking at diagnostic, prognostic and normative components emphasized in 
discourse. Establishing a moral responsibility framework requires a more 
structured approach. It necessitates looking at the declared (and undeclared) 
intentions of external actors in statebuilding, the impact of external 
																																																								
51 See , for example, the UN Special Adviser’s Office on the Prevention of  Genocide, at 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml. (Accessed on 9 February 2016)  
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involvement in statebuilding and the way the agents have developed their 
capabilities to develop better responses to situations they feel responsible for.  
 
The diagnostic element of the statebuilding frame presupposes that conflict 
sustainable prevention of conflict is best possible through establishing well-
functioning, liberal democratic states. The prognostic element suggests 
developing the capacities of conflict countries in the security, development, 
governance and human rights fields, in order to boost their protection and 
prevention capabilities, with the end goal of making them more responsible 
and sovereign states. From a moral responsibility perspective, these 
diagnostic and prognostic elements point out to a discursive framing, which 
reflect the intentions and promises of the “international community”.  
 
Statebuilding carries the intention to boost the capacities, responsibilities and 
sovereignty of conflict countries in different directions (Ghani and Lockhart: 
2008). The ultimate promise is sustainable peace, security, local ownership 
and sovereignty. Yet, the technical framing of statebuilding can overshadow 
these intentions. The implementation of statebuilding through technical 
guidelines is criticized for transforming conflict resolution into a technocratic 
exercise based on a hierarchy of priorities (Hameiri: 2009). Technocratic 
guidelines transform the ultimate goal of statebuilding into achieving results 
on the technical front. This leads to question marks from a moral 
responsibility perspective. First, moral responsibility is established through 
connecting intentions to responsibilities. From this perspective, presenting 
two different sets of intentions defining the same exercise is confusing; and 
leads to a mismatch between the responsibilities and the actions of external 
agents. For example, defining statebuilding as a comprehensive exercise 
allows intrusive involvement of international actors in a country. Defining the 
same exercise as a technical practice allows defining responsibilities in a 
limited and narrow fashion.  
 
Another point relates to the changing intentions and practices in 
statebuilding. Statebuilding has been an evolving experiment, changing with 
different threat perceptions, new ways of thought and “lessons learned” 
(Paris and Sisk: 2009). For instance, deviating from its original intention, 
statebuilding has sometimes concentrated on immediate priorities such as 
ensuring security and functionality. The international community has often 
taken intrusive roles, sometimes to the detriment of establishing local 
ownership and sovereignty (De Guevara: 2010). These shifts in intention have 
sometimes negatively impacted the promotion of local ownership and 
sovereignty. From a moral responsibility framework, every time there is a 
change in intentions and impact, this should lead to a redefinition of 
responsibilities. Yet, the statebuilding frame attributes responsibility in a 
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static way, without paying attention to how changing dynamics might affect 
the attribution of responsibilities.  
 
One other element, which connects intentions with impact, is presenting 
statebuilding as the best methodology for sustainable conflict resolution. 
According to the moral responsibility framework, the intention of resolving 
conflicts through statebuilding reflects a choice, which establishes 
responsibility. In this line, if the positive impact of statebuilding is unclear, the 
moral responsibility for harmful impact could be established as well. For 
instance, the impact of increased aid dependency or corruption could be 
connected to the responsibilities of external agents, from a moral 
responsibility perspective (De Guevara: 2010, Zartman: 1995, Held: 2009). 
Statebuilding frames international responsibilities in a different way. 
Dominant narratives define statebuilding as a universal best practice rather 
than a subjective judgment. As a result, it becomes difficult to attribute 
responsibility to the international actors for choosing statebuilding as a 
method, as following a universal best practice is not a choice. From this 
perspective, responsibility for harmful impact is attributed in a limited way. 
Statebuilders are not responsible for choosing statebuilding that has led to 
negative results in a conflict country. International responsibility is 
established only when external agents do not implement the frame properly, 
by not cooperating well enough with each other or looking for quick-fixes or 
early exits. In other words, the only responsibility it attributes to international 
actors is to fine-tune statebuilding guidelines, without questioning the 
responsibility for the choice of statebuilding as an appropriate methodology.  
 
The moral responsibility framework uses the way international actors develop 
their capacities as another tool to establish responsibility. In fact, this is one of 
the areas where the dominant narratives of statebuilding and the moral 
responsibility framework come closer to each other. Both support building 
capabilities of international actors to foster better response. From the 
perspective of the statebuilding frame, capacity building is celebrated, as it 
makes international actors implement the statebuilding frame better. Capacity 
building allows adjustments within the dominant statebuilding frame, 
without significantly challenging it. From a moral responsibility perspective, 
fostering capacities allows international actors better fulfill their intentions, 
making them more responsible actors. The difference is the moral 
responsibility framework would also analyze capacity building activities with 
a view to finding out who these activities have favored the most. Are 
international capacities boosted to better fulfill self-interests, or does this 
exercise have the interests of local populations in mind? This can only be 
found out through looking at the direction of responsibilities.  
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3.3.2.3 The direction of responsibilities: 
 
A moral responsibility perspective would also necessitate taking into account 
the directions of responsibilities to establish attributability. As choices, 
intentions and impacts of action can be used to attribute responsibility, the 
answer to the question ‘responsibility towards whom’ could be sought be 
identifying to whom promises have been made and whom the activities have 
impacted the most.  
 
The way statebuilding frames responsibility is much narrower. It identifies 
two directions of responsibilities for external agents: towards the local 
populations and towards international peace and security. The first 
responsibility is based on the normative framework of humanitarianism and 
the protection of the security and welfare of populations. The second one 
related to the protection of international peace and security, which sometimes 
translates as the security of the peacebuilders. This framing is in fact in line 
with the UN Charter and the core principles of the international system; and 
thus helps legitimize interventions from a discursive angle. A moral 
responsibility perspective would suggest additional directions of 
responsibilities: towards local populations, towards the interests of the Self, 
and those related to the identity and image of the Self. The directions of 
responsibilities are not established through international principles or 
discourse, but by looking at intentions, impact and capacity building efforts.  
 
Responsibilities towards the Other: The protection of local populations from 
harm, as well as the promise of sustainable security to them has been 
prioritized by statebuilding as well. However, dominant narratives attribute 
the primary responsibility of protection to nation states, while giving a 
support role to the international community. The moral responsibility 
perspective would first take into regard the intention or the promise to utilize 
statebuilding to foster sustainable peace and security - a wider promise that 
argues establishing functional democratic states by external intervention is 
possible and this practice will lead to sustainable peace. In terms of the impact 
of intervention, the contribution principle would argue that external actors 
would bear responsibility for the negative impact of their involvement such 
as the credibility and democracy deficit experienced in the security sector, aid 
dependency and the flaws in election processes, among others – particularly 
in an environment where sovereignty is problematized and the state capacity 
remains low. Thus, external responsibilities would extend beyond protection 
and enter directly into the sphere of economic development, the 
establishment of the rule of law and the promotion of human rights 
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The interests of the Self: From a moral responsibility angle, statebuilding 
involves many promises in the form of boosted security and economic 
stability. The success of statebuilding also impacts statebuilders. Thus, it is 
expected that statebuilding would establish responsibilities towards the 
security, strength and survival of the Self, so far as it exhibits interests and 
impact in that direction. Statebuilding discourse does not elaborate on this 
aspect; although the emphasis on the protection of international peace and 
security is undoubtedly expected to reflect upon the security and economic 
interests of the Self. Thus, while the statebuilding frame narrowly defines the 
responsibilities towards the Self, the moral responsibility framework would 
widen these responsibilities to look into the full impact of statebuilding on the 
security, economic and social structures of the intervening countries.  
 
Fostering the identity, image and values of the Self: The moral responsibility 
framework adds a third direction to external responsibilities beyond 
protection and prevention, by focusing on the responsibilities to protect and 
promote the identity, image and values of the Self. Affirming the liberal 
democratic state model as a universal best practice as well as promoting its 
own norms and values, in addition to winning hearts and minds and shaping 
the environment it operates can be identified as intentions, which translate 
into responsibilities towards the Self. From an impact perspective, the shift 
from promoting liberal democratic states to supporting strong states, the 
increased emphasis on direct Western security interests, the inability to focus 
on developmental projects to help hearts and minds when faced with limited 
resources, the inability to promote the human rights agenda as a universal 
norm, combined with the mistakes and failures in bringing forward 
democracy through elections implies additional responsibilities for external 
actors engaged in statebuilding could also create responsibility.   
 
A last question is related to capacity building efforts; i.e. whether the efforts 
to boost the response capacities of external actors prioritize the needs of local 
populations, work towards fulfilling self interests or serve to boost the 
identity and image of external actors. The results are mixed. Looking into the 
development of statebuilding, the immediate focus of capacity building 
efforts have shifted between better serving the locals and better protecting 
international (Western) security and economic interests. Especially from a 
European perspective, capacity building has aimed to promote the EU’s 
foreign policy identity and boost its image as well. While responding better to 
the interests of local populations has been prioritized at certain points in 
capacity development, such as after the human tragedies of Srebrenica and 
Rwanda in the mid-90’s, there have been times where the security interests of 
Western actors or the need to boost the image of Western foreign policy actors 
have taken priority as well.   
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3.3.3 The Responsibility Gap:  
 
The framework of attribution of moral responsibility, explained through the 
past sections, helps pointing out the possibility of alternative attributions of 
responsibility to international actors for their engagement in statebuilding. 
The next part will aim to point out concrete areas where a gap between the 
discursive framing of responsibilities and those from a moral responsibility 
perspective could be identified.  This argument will feed into the claim that 
the narrow, temporary, technical and limited definition of responsibilities of 
international actors engaging in statebuilding is not commensurate with those 
that should be associated with the comprehensive and intrusive nature of 
external statebuilding.   
 
The results of the frame analysis undertaken previously had demonstrated an 
official framing of the responsibilities of international actors, as a technical 
assistance function, by implementing universally acceptable best peacebuilding 
practices, in support of national authorities, with the aspiration of full local 
ownership and sovereignty. Challenging this framing would require 
concentrating on its key parts: a) statebuilding as a universal best practice, b) 
statebuilding as a technical exercise, c) statebuilding in support of local 
ownership and sovereignty. In other words, approaching these three points 
from a moral responsibility angle and discovering alternative possibilities to 
attribute responsibility in a broader fashion that the official frame, would help 
highlight three essential gaps in attributing responsibility.  
 
In fact, a literature survey of some academic studies that aspire to attribute 
moral responsibility to international actors for their engagement in 
statebuilding indicates that both academic and policy literature on 
peacebuilding has constantly attempted to attribute moral responsibility to 
agents for both the intended and unintended outcomes of their actions, and 
the inadequacy of international response (Visoka and Doyle: 2014).  
 
For one, Visoka and Doyle (2014) argue that studies connecting peacebuilding 
and moral responsibility mostly focus on the need for a differentiation of 
moral responsibility in proportion to the agents’ intentions, capabilities, 
actions and situation circumstances. From this angle, the definition of 
statebuilding as a universal best practice and the corresponding 
responsibilities of international actors in narrow, static and unchanging terms 
should be challenged, as proper attribution of moral responsibility would 
necessitate different responsibilities for agents for each change or shift in 
intentions, practices and capacities. From a survey of the literature on 
peacebuilding, another common criticism to international actors seems to 
have been the framing of statebuilding and peacebuilding as a technical 
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exercise, while obscuring the political nature of peacebuilding and the 
political intentions, motives and influences of external peacebuilding actors 
(Chandler: 2010, Milovich and Ossewaarde: 2013,	De Guevara: 2010,	Call and 
Cousens 2007, Fukuyama 2004, Fritz and Menocal 2007, Paris: 2002, Samuels: 
2009). Finally, the debates on local ownership seem to connect well with 
discussions on moral responsibility, insofar that statebuilding aspires to gains 
it legitimacy through its discourse on fostering state sovereignty and local 
ownership, while the very practice of statebuilding itself sometimes hampers 
these two areas it promises to foster (Richmond: 2013, Billenbeck: 2015, 
Chandler: 2010).  
 
These three main criticisms on statebuilding discourse seem to correspond to 
the three elements of responsibility that have emerged from the frame 
analysis on statebuilding. As such, they provide us with a good base to move 
forward towards defining the responsibility gap in particular situations and 
for particular agents – the European Union and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
To repeat, the following three points will constitute the basis of future 
discussions on the moral responsibility gap:  
a) The need to define moral responsibilities in accordance with evolving 
intentions, practices and capacities,  
b) The need to accept the political nature of peacebuilding as well as the 
political roles of external agents,  
c) The need for enlightened discussions on local ownership beyond mere 
aspirations.  
 
To start with the first element, the attribution of responsibility while considering 
change is one of the inherent problems of statebuilding. Even if it is possible to 
establish moral responsibility in a thorough manner at the early stages of 
interventions without any significant gaps, as the theory and practice of 
statebuilding evolves, there will be need for a constant redefinition of 
responsibilities in accordance with changing intentions, impact and 
capabilities. Each new change brings forward new responsibilities without 
necessarily cancelling out previous ones. Yet, the effect of the changing 
dynamics as well as how they affect previous responsibilities is often left 
unaddressed. There is little talk on what new responsibilities are, whether the 
previously assumed responsibilities have been fulfilled and who will be held 
responsible in the case of failure. Despite the constantly evolving content, 
scope and practice of statebuilding, the way responsibility is attributed to the 
international community by the dominant narrative has remained quite static 
over the years. In other words, responsibilities are often defined in a 
prospective way, without a proper analysis of the retrospective 
responsibilities from previous phases, creating a ¨responsibility gap¨. 
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The framing of statebuilding as a technical exercise despite its political nature is 
another feature of the responsibility gap. One difference of the moral 
responsibility framework from the statebuilding narratives’ framing of 
responsibility is the possibility to attribute responsibility for normative 
choices. From a moral responsibility angle, liberal/ neoliberal perspectives 
that guide most statebuilding projects indicate that statebuilding is a choice, 
rather than a universally agreed and accepted mode of intervention. This 
choice highlights that the political priorities are not always identified or led 
by local actors, but are also influenced by external actors.  In fact, conflict 
countries often become the playground of competing and inconsistent visions 
on the country’s sovereignty at the local, national and international levels 
(Milovich and Ossewaarde: 2013). However, instead of presenting the 
application of the statebuilding frame as a choice, discursively defining the 
liberal-democratic state as a best practice has allowed the external (Western) 
actors to frame their efforts as a technical or even scientific exercise. Framing 
responsibilities of international actors in such a narrow, limited and technical 
manner leads to the situation where a country does not have the full 
sovereignty to act or decide but is attributed the full political responsibility 
for shortcomings in the statebuilding plan nevertheless. External actors are at 
most attributed technical failures within the statebuilding framework, which 
can be corrected by fine-tuning efforts and increasing the capacities of the 
international community to respond. In short, although statebuilding involves 
political choices and leads to impacts beyond those foreseen by narrow 
technical mandates, there is not much possibility to attribute responsibility to 
external actors. This element deepens the responsibility gap further.  
 
The dilemmas of local ownership and sovereignty are the third element that helps 
indicate a responsibility gap. The statebuilding frame partially derives its 
legitimacy from its purpose to restore full sovereignty to conflict countries. 
Local ownership has always been prioritized both as a principle and as an end 
goal in the post-conflict intervention process. However, the effects of 
statebuilding are different than the one-dimensional results of the intended 
frameworks of international actors (De Guevara: 2010). Any intentional 
deployment only takes effect through a convoluted route involving 
unacknowledged structures and unpredictable outcomes (Ferguson: 2006). In 
short, technocratic statebuilding fails to reflect the dynamism of the 
statebuilding process (Call and Cousens 2007, Fukuyama 2004, Fritz and 
Menocal 2007). The application of technocratic guidelines creates a modus 
vivendi based on external influence, rather than a sustainable arrangement 
reached through inclusion and participation. In this way, statebuilding runs 
contrary to its own discourse and propositions. When crucial decisions 
regarding the future of the country are taken by international project 
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managers, when public and state power are replaced in private/ international 
hands, when the political leadership is expected to support and coordinate 
the structure imposed by internationals rather than represent domestic 
interests, the statebuilding efforts and the “built” state starts losing legitimacy 
in the eyes of its public, hampering efforts to solidify the state-society 
contract, and leading to “local resentment of the presence of the external 
actors” (Etzioni: 2004). In the absence of local ownership, external 
statebuilding becomes a program to externally reform developing countries.  
 
All these three points point out to one key message: Intervenors play a critical 
role in the creation of new rules in post-conflict environments, choosing the 
appropriate mode of intervention, shaping the content of peace agreements, 
providing advice in the implementation of these agreements, defining 
peacebuilding priorities, imposing conditionalities on aid and sometimes 
performing quasi-government functions, particularly in situations where the 
sovereignty and capacities of a conflict country is problematized (Paris: 2002, 
Samuels: 2009, Ghani and Lockhart: 2008). All this is legitimized by the 
aspiration of fostering ownership and sovereignty, as an end goal. However, 
the responsibility frame constructed by official discourse is not structured to 
appropriately attribute responsibility to international actors for the choices 
they make, the impacts of their actions, or their failure in successfully 
fulfilling their aspired vision. Most of the responsibility for this falls on 
conflict countries. This is the essence of the responsibility gap that will be 
explained through further examples in the following paras.  
 
3.4 Introducing Discursive Safeguards: 
 
This part will take the first step towards introducing the third proposition of 
this research; that the dominant international narrative on statebuilding 
includes protective measures to cover up the responsibility gap - dubbed as 
¨discursive safeguards¨ for the sake of simplicity. 
 
The previous parts of this thesis has shown how the ¨problem-solving ethos¨ 
of neoliberalism, combined with the feeling that statebuilding is based on 
universal norms, allows external actors to fall back on the discourse that 
change should come from within, and what the international community does 
is to encourage it (Samuels: 2005, Chandler: 2010). It has exhibited the reliance 
on problem-solving serve to obscure the political goals of international actors 
that are not in line with the declared goals of statebuilding (Heathershaw: 




This phenomenon fits well into the theories of discourse analysis presented in 
the first chapter that aim to show how facts are dependent upon a particular 
discursive framing of the issue in question. Building on this premise, it offers 
an empirical method to operationalize these methods through the prism of 
conflict and interventions (Hansen: 2006, Laclau: 1993, Fairclough: 1995). 
These approaches also help show how dominant narratives seek to construct 
stability and how they deal with challenges (Laclau: 1993, Mouffe: 2006, 
Torfing: 1999, Torfing: 2005, Jorgenson and Phillips: 2002, Fairclough: 1995).  
 
¨Discursive safeguards¨ can be defined as tools that aim to reinforce the 
elements of the frame when met with opposition from alternative discourses 
that do not follow the elements of the statebuilding frame (Hansen: 2006). 
Although the study of discursive safeguards will be conducted in detail in the 
following chapters, when the idea can be connected to a specific agent, this 
chapter will use the elements of research until this point to initially introduce 
the concept of discursive safeguards. 
 
3.4.1 Challenging Technocratic Statebuilding: Competing Discourses: 
 
Discursive safeguards very much relate to how the dominant/official 
discourses deal with criticism. In her work on discourse analysis in conflict 
settings, Hansen (2006) puts forward three ways official discourse deals with 
criticism. One way is to accept and internalize criticism (and change its 
policies). Another is to leave the criticism unaddressed and pass the 
presented facts in silence. The third method is to explain them with the facts 
already in place.  
 
Many critiques to statebuilding do not challenge the essence of its dominant 
narrative. They tend to define the deficiencies of the international community 
from the lens of capacity (Paris: 2002, RAND: 2008). The statebuilding frame 
reacts somewhat positively in its narrative to criticisms that do not directly 
challenge the main parameters of statebuilding, but seek to improve its 
practice. Technocratic guidelines accept that technical errors, miscalculations 
and mistakes have been made in statebuilding (RAND: 2008, OECD-DAC: 
2007). In fact, these guidelines have often been developed as a response to 
overcome these ¨technical¨ problems. The response is usually accepting/ 
adopting changes to the practice without major shifts in underlying concepts 
(RAND: 2008, OECD-DAC: 2007, Ghani and Lockhart: 2008, Annan and 
Mousavizadeh: 2012, Paris: 2007). As a remedy, they suggest adjustments 
within the practice of statebuilding without touching its essence much, such 
as improving coordination among international actors, making statebuilding 
more responsive to local needs or respecting local customs and practices. In 
fact, the foreign policy of the EU – especially related to crisis management – 
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has evolved partially due to self-criticism remaining within the mainstream. 
Capacity development has been one of the areas that the ¨international 
community¨ has put effort into, by developing better means and methods of 
response by learning from failures and concentrating on best practices.  
 
However, these technical solutions do not go deep enough to analyze and 
address the unintended negative impact caused by international action. As 
such, policy guidelines seem to fall short in addressing criticisms directed at 
the essence of statebuilding, some of which are captured previously. What is 
the end goal of SSR; achieving local ownership or combatting threats to 
international peace and security? Who is responsible for countering the 
negative impacts of aid dependency? Is liberal democracy the best way 
forward for every society? If there is a choice, should security or local will and 
ownership be prioritized? These are examples of more difficult questions, 
which challenge the dominant framing of statebuilding as the best model of 
conflict resolution.   
 
As much as addressing criticisms within the statebuilding frame might ensure 
better practices, the challenges to statebuilding are greater than those that can 
be corrected by capacity building. Statebuilding has been criticized to lead to 
the erosion of state sovereignty and local ownership, to reflect the political 
will and interests of external actors, to foster dependency. The impact of 
external involvement goes beyond the initial goal of building state capacity. 
As such, while fine-tuning efforts can be perceived as an appropriate 
response to challenges emanating from within the statebuilding frame, they 
cannot address the deeper challenges, inconsistencies and inherent dilemmas 
in the statebuilding frame.  
 
Narratives that challenge the core principles and concepts of the statebuilding 
frame can be labeled as competing/ alternative discourses (Hansen: 2006). 
Approaching statebuilding and responsibility from a moral responsibility 
angle aims to provide such an alternative narrative. The response of the 
statebuilding frame to competing discourses, defined here as ¨discursive 
safeguards¨, is mostly trying to respond to the criticisms using facts already 
put in place by the statebuilding frame (Hansen: 2006). By using discursive 
safeguards rather than responding directly to challenges arising from 
competing discourse, talkers do not want to provide information to a 
recipient but present dramas to an audience in an act defined as ¨staging¨  - 
predicting one step ahead in speech in order to ensure reduced 
responsibilities for the agents (Goffman: 1986). Using discursive safeguards 
allows the practice of statebuilding as the ¨most successful method¨ to resolve 
conflicts to proceed, without international actors having to bear the burden of 
its seemingly grander and deeper responsibilities.  
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3.4.2 Examples of discursive safeguards: 
 
Following the example of responsibility gaps, three discursive safeguards will 
be identified and operationalized around concepts already used to define the 
responsibility gap: a) Change (how statebuilding discourse adjusts itself to 
changing realities, contexts, new ways of thinking), b) universality (how 
statebuilding is defined as a technical exercise based on universal best 
practices), c) local ownership and sovereignty (how statebuilding gains 
legitimacy through emphasizing the principle of state sovereignty, as well as 
local ownership). Although the arguments on discursive safeguards will need 
a concrete agent and context, and thus will be dealt with in more detail in the 
next chapters, this chapter will mainly aim to put forward this concept in 
relation to the responsibility gap.  
 
3.4.2.1 The element of change:  
 
The contrast between the relatively static definition of external responsibilities 
in the statebuilding frame compared with the ever-changing theory and 
practice of statebuilding is an element leading to a responsibility gap. 
Changes in the parameters and application of statebuilding lead to new 
identity constructions of the Self and the Other, new threat perceptions and 
shifting prioritizations in the way statebuilding is conducted (Hansen: 2008). 
Every new intention put forward in a new phase of statebuilding and every 
impact these practices have on the ground, every change in capacity, policy 
and practice increases the burden of moral responsibility on the shoulders of 
the agents. While changes in statebuilding might add new responsibilities for 
international actors (prospective responsibilities), they do not cancel out 
responsibilities from previous phases (retrospective responsibilities).   
 
The way statebuilding is framed helps avoiding the massive and continuously 
piling responsibilities associated with change. Statebuilding avoids setting 
out external responsibilities in a detailed manner, but rather relies on a 
generic definition for the responsibilities of international agents, emphasizing 
a temporary support role (ICISS: 2001). Thus, even when statebuilding is 
subject to change, there is no pressing need for a redefinition of 
responsibilities commensurate with new roles and practices. Especially when 
an ¨early¨ exit is desperately needed, a fallback on the temporary nature of 
statebuilding and strengthened concentration on the responsibilities of the 
nation-state is emphasized, as is the case in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Concrete 
examples are provided in detail in the case study. 
 
3.4.2.2 The emphasis on statebuilding as a technical and universal exercise:  
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Defining statebuilding as a technical exercise constructed around universal 
best practices lead to a responsibility gap, since the responsibility frame does 
not address the political and normative aspects of statebuilding, the structural 
and historical causes of the conflict, the socio-economic and cultural 
structures and identity issues. Rather, the frame is built around the simple 
idea that failed states should be replaced by responsible states, achieved 
through interventions based on technocratic guidelines. It is difficult to 
attribute the responsibility of failure to an actor mainly implementing 
technical principles. 
 
Once again, the framing of statebuilding also functions as a safeguard for the 
international community to avoid responsibility for more than the ¨correct 
application of statebuilding guidelines¨. Narratives on statebuilding tend to 
avoid or downplay issues of history, culture and identity, in favor of a 
quantitative and technocratic approach based on a liberal democratic 
framework (Berger and Weber: 2006, Berger: 2006, Held: 2009). The choices 
and actions of the international community are defined as ¨technical¨ and 
¨scientific¨ - a depiction that does not define statebuilding as a choice but 
almost a necessity and thus eliminating the responsibility for choosing 
statebuilding as the best course of action for sustainable peace. The 
framework for success is defined in a limited and quantitatively measurable 
way. Diverting responsibility from solving the conflict to successful applying 
technical guidelines helps avoid the responsibilities which arise from impact – 
such as the erosion of state capacity and legitimacy resulting from the 
international community taking over management of institutions and 
provision of basic services (De Guevara: 2010, Zartman: 1995). It becomes 
difficult to attribute the responsibility of failure to an actor, which merely 
follows technical guidelines dubbed as ¨universal¨ and scientific¨. Moreover, 
approaching external responsibilities from a temporariness perspective 
creates the impression that a debate on international responsibilities in the 
long-term is not necessary. Especially in the times of the economic crisis in 
donor countries and intervention fatigue among taxpayers, when ¨early-exits¨ 
are needed, discourse finds it easy to fallback on the temporary nature of 
statebuilding and strengthened concentration on the responsibilities of the 
nation state, through the mutual responsibilities argument which define the 
external actors mainly as donors.  
 
3.4.2.3 Local ownership and state sovereignty: 
 	
The sovereignty-intervention debate defined earlier in this chapter dominates 
debates at the UN and other official fora, raising question marks on issues 
such as responsibility, capacity, coherence, local ownership, legitimacy, 
dependency, accountability and exit strategies (Paris and Sisk: 2009). This 
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sovereignty/ intervention dilemma is sometimes conveniently used to avoid 
deeper discussions on the responsibilities of the international community 
during interventions. The increasing focus on state sovereignty leads to 
emphasizing the primary responsibility of the nation state in many different 
fields of international politics, including intervention and capacity-building. 
In other words, the international narrative which stresses on the primary 
responsibility of the state and the secondary and temporary responsibilities of 
external actors seem to be strengthened by sovereignty debates – even if the 
sovereignty of the state in question has been problematized or there is 
practically no state to talk about. For instance, UN Security Council 
Resolution 2164 (2014) on Mali reaffirms the sovereignty and unity of Mali 
several times. Despite the acknowledgement that terrorist challenges weakens 
the capability of the state of Mali to provide security, it still emphasized that 
¨the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and 
security throughout the territory of Mali (…) and stresses the importance of the 
Malian Defence and Security Forces assuming full responsibility for providing 
security¨.  
 
In terms of local ownership, in many conflict societies such as Mali, Libya, 
Afghanistan and Somalia, the understanding of citizenship as a contract 
between state and society does not even exist. This makes ensuring the 
legitimacy of the statebuilding project in the eyes of local citizens difficult. In 
fact, as sovereignty is associated with capacity rather than political and legal 
rights of equality, local legitimacy is not prioritized (Chandler: 2010). In other 
words, while prioritizing local ownership in discourse, statebuilding 
problematizes sovereignty. In addition, statebuilding is often perceived as 
exogenous and top-down, driven by dynamics, personnel and ideologies that 
originate from outside the local society, especially in its practice (Dodge: 
2006). Neutralizing complicated historical, political and ethnical relations by 
focusing on enhancing state-capacity makes it difficult to produce sustainable 
outcomes (Berger and Weber: 2006). This disconnects people from the 
statebuilding project, in contrast to the end goal of local ownership (Ghani 
and Lockhart: 2008, Chandler: 2010). Yet, just as state sovereignty, local 
ownership is not only presented as an end goal, but is even used to claim that 
the nation state is the primary driver of the statebuilding project. As an 
example, Catherine Ashton, the EU’s foreign policy chief has Catherine 
Ashton, has called on Bosnian politicians to “show leadership” and take steps 
to “resolve not only the economic issues of concern, but also the political 
situation” in February 2014; implying that the Bosnians have full ownership 
of and control over their issues52. 																																																								




In short, the proposition is that the mostly static definition of external 
responsibilities in contrast to the changing nature of statebuilding, the 
definition of statebuilding as a universal and technical exercise and the 
increased emphasis on state sovereignty and local ownership provide the 
basis for employing discursive safeguards to avoid being assigned 
responsibility beyond the narrow definition of the statebuilding frame. 
Looking at the discourse of the European Union as well as looking at cases 



































4. The EU, Statebuilding and Responsibility 
 
The previous chapters have looked into how external statebuilding in conflict/ 
post-conflict states is framed and operationalized, as well as the problems and 
gaps associated with it. These two chapters have demonstrated a 
¨responsibility gap¨ between the way (moral) responsibilities are constructed 
within the statebuilding frame and the way responsibilities would have been 
alternatively constructed from a moral responsibility framework. The concept 
of ¨discursive safeguards¨ has also been introduced, in order to show how the 
statebuilding frame deals with this gap and protects itself from challenges 
emanating from outside the frame. 
 
This chapter will connect the European Union (EU) to the statebuilding frame. 
It will first discover to what extent the EU fits into the statebuilding frame, in 
order to attribute responsibility in a more fair and precise manner - ¨to avoid 
EU-bashing at one extreme and absolving it from any responsibility on the 
other¨ (Manners: 2008, Smith: 2008, Wolff and Whitman: 2011). Secondly, the 
way the EU has reacted and adopted to the developments and changes in 
statebuilding patterns will be analyzed; keeping in mind that the 
development of statebuilding coincides with the period which the EU was 
also building its own external identity, as well as foreign policy tools and 
capacities. The third goal is to look at the responsibility gap and discursive 
safeguards paradigm from the EU perspective, in order to close the agency 
gap presented in the previous chapter. Towards this end, the problems 
associated with EU statebuilding, as well as the Union’s practical and 
discursive reactions to these problems will be analyzed.  
 
In this part, frame analysis will be used once again as the primary 
methodology. Identifying the EU as the agent allows using more specific 
sources; the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) of 1991, the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, the Report on the Implementation of the ESS 
(2008), the Reform Treaty (2007), alongside relevant Council and Commission 
documents, official/media statements and interviews and speeches of leading 
EU officials, as well as academic literature will be used, in order to present the 
reasons, framework and methods of the EU’s involvement in conflict 
resolution and statebuilding .  
 
4.1 Framing the EU as an External Statebuilding Actor: 
 
The EU’s involvement in crisis management, conflict prevention and 
statebuilding is mostly seen as part of a more general framework of values 
and policies, centered around democratic peace approaches that link security 
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to global political stability, economic wealth, human rights and democracy 
(Mayer: 2008, Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). On the other hand, the Union is 
also defined, both in official and academic discourse, as a unique actor. It is 
deeper than an international organization but not a state, with its own 
different tools and capacities especially in conflict prevention and crisis 
management, and its own basket of values such as effective multilateralism, 
human rights conditionality, respect for international law and economic 
solidarity (Manners: 2008, Smith: 2008, Toje: 2011). The goals of this part are 
to understand how much the Union internalizes the statebuilding frame, in 
order to analyze its moral responsibilities from being part of this frame and to 
see whether there is a responsibility gap (Wolff and Whitman: 2012).  
 
4.1.1 The EU and the Statebuilding Frame: 
 
This study claims that the EU can be fitted into the statebuilding frame, as its 
narratives are linked to the dominant discourse of statebuilding and its 
conduct follows the concepts and methodology of this framework. Towards 
this end, some key concepts connecting statebuilding to responsibility from 
previous chapters will be compared with the EU’s approach, to discover 
similarities and divergences.  
 
4.1.1.1 Agency: The Self and the Other: 
 
The portrayal of the ¨Self¨ and the ¨Other¨ in EU discourse is mostly in line 
with that of the statebuilding frame; connecting the functional and democratic 
Self to the incapable Other through capacity-building. The ¨Other¨ is a failing/ 
failed state that cannot fulfill its responsibilities to its own population and 
threatens international peace and security, hence breeding problems such as 
organized crime, human trafficking, poverty, illegal immigration, ethnic 
antagonism, piracy and terrorism (Commission: 2001, ESS: 2003, ESS: 2008). It 
lacks democratic processes, the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
good governance, as well as strong and functional institutional structures 
(Commission: 2001).  
 
The ¨Self¨ as the EU is a more thorough and well-defined entity than the ¨Self¨ 
as the international community – one plus side of adding full agency to the 
statebuilding frame. It is a successful peace project and an ongoing exercise 
and model for peace, prosperity and conflict resolution. The cultural, religious 
and humanist heritage of the Union, as the basis of universal values such as 
human rights, freedom and democracy is emphasized (Lisbon: 2007). In 
addition to this background, the Union has considerable expertise in 
stabilization, democracy support and institution building and is the largest 
global donor, therefore well placed and responsible for making an impact on 
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the international scene (Commission: 2001). Its intentions are framed as 
safeguarding ¨universal¨ values, as well as the interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union, preserving peace, preventing conflicts and 
strengthening international security, fostering sustainable development, 
managing disasters and ensuring the integration of all countries in the world 
economy (Lisbon: 2007). The EU often refers to its international partners in 
this exercise as US, Canada, Russia, Japan, Norway, UN, OSCE, and NGO’s, 
all falling within the statebuilding framework (Commission: 2001). 
 
4.1.1.2 Commitment to humanitarian intervention and R2P: 
 
The emphasis on protection (of civilians) as a way to legitimize statebuilding 
is the second element that connects the EU to the statebuilding frame.  The 
legitimization of (civilian) interventions for protection purposes is a theme 
commonly used by the EU, despite the increased securitization of its external 
endeavors (ESS: 2003, ESS Report: 2008). The moral and political imperative to 
find solutions to human suffering is featured in the Communication from the 
Commission on Conflict Prevention (2001). More recently, the Foreign Affairs 
Council on 18 February 2013 made reference to ¨the humanitarian commitment 
to the populations affected by conflict¨ in Mali and EU High Representative 
Ashton argues that ¨the EU had to help the people of Syria in every way it could¨. 
This humanitarianism is also used to (when necessary and possible) engage in 
statebuilding activities.  
 
In the United Nations, EU member states and the EU often give support to the 
concrete and efficient implementation of the R2P doctrine, with institutional 
capacity building and strengthening states often put forward as the key 
methodology. The Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect’s reports 
indicate that almost all EU countries have taken the floor at the R2P debates at 
the UN in 2013, which in the recent years have been focusing more on 
prevention and capacity-building rather than intervention.53  
 
4.1.1.3 Problematization of Sovereignty and Capacity Building: 
 
In statebuilding, adequate capacity is an important precondition for 
successful transformation. Thus, capacity building is a (temporary) exercise of 
assisting the ¨Other¨ to adopt the methods of the ¨Self¨ to ensure that the gains 
of intervention are sustained.  
 
The dilemma between the comprehensive nature of statebuilding and the 
temporary and limited definition of capacity building is visible in EU 																																																								
53 See http://www.globalr2p.org/publications/.  
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discourse. The European Commission (2001) sets out its goals as influencing 
or shaping sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental 
structures over a longer term (Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). Yet, while 
explaining the content of the efforts, the EU falls back on carving a limited 
support role for itself. The European Security Strategy (2003) declares its 
intention to “step up our work with countries most at risk by strengthening their 
capacity to cope”. Among the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 
missions, EUBAM Libya’s purpose is to “support the Libyan authorities in 
improving and developing the security of the country's borders”; the military 
training mission EUTM Mali’s goal is “to train and advice” the Malian Armed 
Forces under the control of legitimate civilian authorities”54. EULEX in Kosovo 
EULEX is “supporting, mentoring, monitoring and advising the local authorities 
while exercising executive responsibilities in some specific areas of competence” 
while EUPOL COPPS in Palestine “provides support to the Palestinian Authority 
in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangement under Palestinian 
ownership in accordance with the best international standards”55. 
 
In short, the EU follows the neoliberal framing of statebuilding with regard to 
the sovereignty/capacity debates; by defining a comprehensive role for the 
international community in areas of limited sovereignty, while confining its 
responsibility to temporary intervention by emphasizing capacity building, 
institution-building, comprehensiveness, failed states and sustainability  
(Keukelarie and Delreux: 2014, Chandler: 2010). It claims that respect for 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states are not 
negotiable, and sovereign governments must take responsibility for their 
actions (ESS Report: 2008). At the same time, it refers to the need to develop 
long(er) term policies to bring forward structural changes and fight the 
symptoms of the conflict – often defined as state incapacity to protect its 
citizens and threatening international peace and security (Smith: 2008, 
Manners: 2008). This line of thought is also present in enlargement debates; 
which aims to induce governments to voluntarily venture into permanent 
institutional cooperation and to get over national interest driven policies by 
making sovereignty a scarce commodity (Chandler: 2010, Toje: 2011).   
 
4.1.1.4 Conflict prevention as a comprehensive strategy 
 
The EU’s activities in crisis management are based on a notion of 
comprehensive security – that security is possible only if provided across all 																																																								
54 See the EEAS website at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-
agencies/cmpd/index_en.htm. (Accessed on 16 February 2016) 
55See 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090702%20Civilian%20aspects%20of%20crisis%20manag
ement%20-%20version%203_EN.pdf (Accessed on 16 February 2016) 
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dimensions (Wolff and Whitman: 2011). The EU’s current peacebuilding 
framework stresses key notions such as sustainable peace, human security, 
responsibility to protect, effective multilateralism, local ownership, the 
promotion of human rights and democracy and civil society  (Cameron: 2012). 
This approach connecting conflict prevention with the soft power of liberal 
democracy, free markets, good governance rule of law and human rights 
through capacity and institution building, is also featured as a constitutive 
element of the Union in many EU documents  (Smith: 2008, Mayer: 2008). The 
European External Action Service (EEAS) website, for example, defines crisis 
response as a comprehensive exercise; stating that “ensuring a coherent response 
to crises is part of the EU’s wider efforts in its external relations, (…) to turn the 
'comprehensive approach' into comprehensive action, i.e. the effective use and 
sequencing of the entire range of tools and instruments. This applies to the whole 
crisis cycle, including conflict prevention and crisis response, crisis management, 
stabilisation and longer-term recovery, reconciliation, reconstruction as well as 
development, in order to preserve peace and strengthen international security.”56 
 
Thus, the Union’s approach to conflict prevention can easily be fitted into “the 
new orthodoxy that linked democracy, human rights, good governance, development 
and conflict prevention” and statebuilding (Smith: 2008, Paris: 2002). In fact, as 
other members of the international community, including international 
organizations such as the World Bank, IMF and the World Trade 
Organization (and even the UN), the EU is often subject to criticisms that it 
elevates these policies and norms as universal standards, and that 
comprehensive approaches that define neoliberal statebuilding reflect a 
“Western bias” (Chandler: 2010).  
 
4.1.1.5 Effective multilateralism: 
 
Effective multilateralism is a common concept that appears in several key EU 
documents, such as the European Security Strategy (2003), the Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008), the Joint 
Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation (2003) and the Reform Treaty (2007). 
Multilateralism implies cooperation with other neoliberal statebuilding 
actors, such as the United States, Japan, Norway, the UN, NATO, OSCE and 
non-governmental organizations, on the issues of crisis management, 
peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance, all relevant to statebuilding  
(Koops: 2011). By doing so, in a way, the EU becomes one of the members of 
the group of liberal actors that define statebuilding and its key components as 
																																																								
56 See the European External Action Service website, at http://eeas.europa.eu/crisis-
response/index_en.htm. (Accessed on 16 February 2016) 
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a long-term approach to building peace (Cameron: 2012, Commission: 2001, 
ESS: 2003).   
 
4.1.2 The EU as a Unique Actor: 
 
Although the Union fits in many ways in the statebuilding frame, the Union’s 
legacy as a successful exercise in conflict prevention qualifies it to present 
itself as a distinct actor (Manners and Whitman: 2003, Lucarelli, Smith: 2008). 
It claims to possess a unique identity, value system and toolbox of policy 
instruments, and has developed appropriate tools and policies, built-up its 
resources and has conducted operations on the ground (Manners and 
Whitman: 1998, Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014, Smith: 2008). The previous 
Commission President Delors summarized these points by saying “As many 
conflicts are rooted in political, economic and social instabilities, the Union is better 
equipped (…) to address relevant problem”.57 
 
On the other hand, despite its distinct history, identity and structure, the EU’s 
conflict prevention policies and operations are often based on political 
solutions developed outside of the EU, later adopted and integrated with its 
own policies (Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). Statebuilding is a good example 
to this. Disagreements among member states on the Union’s foreign policy 
identity and the means of involvement in conflict prevention has been a 
reason to adopt the concepts and practices associated with the statebuilding 
frame as an easier way out by following international “best-practices” rather 
than making hard choices (Smith: 2008). In addition, most civilian and 
military operations carried out by the EU have been in cooperation with third 
parties, also due to its belief in multilateralism.  
 
Yet, there are areas where the Union stands out (or claims to stand out) as a 
unique actor in statebuilding and conflict prevention; some of which are 
explained below:  
 
4.1.2.1 The EU as a normative/ civilian power: 
 
The EU’s conflict response policies have reflected a (uneasy) compromise 
between civilian and military policies from the outset (Manners: 2008). 
Although the EU has spent much time and resources on developing its 
military (crisis management) capabilities, its military expenditures and 
military involvement in peacekeeping missions has been lower than other 
Western actors and its military role is often dwarfed by the US and NATO. 
Civilian policies constitute the main focus of the EU, and include both short-																																																								
57 Full text available at https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2006/EVS137/um/Smith_145_170.txt. 
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term tools for immediate conflict management, and medium and long-term 
tools designed to promote structural stability (Cameron: 2012). The security 
and defence policy of the EU mostly consists of civilian efforts that can be 
placed within the statebuilding frame; like security sector reform, institutional 
capacity building and strengthening rule of law and human rights (Toje: 
2011). Thus, the civilian role of the EU, which is well connected to the concept 
of statebuilding in practice, is more strongly pronounced than other 
international actors. 
 
The emphasis on the civilian role of the EU in international relations makes it 
a different actor within the statebuilding frame. This civilian emphasis on 
European foreign policy also includes a dimension that emphasizes 
responsibility (towards others). Duchene (1972, 1973) defined the European 
Community as a civilian power that could spread democratic standards of 
governance based on an ethics of responsibility. Manners (2006, 2008) 
suggested that the normative dimension of the EU extends into the 
international relations area as well, since the EU strives to influence the 
economic and social choices of its partners through civilian means. As such, 
the framing of a “normative and civilian EU” portrays the picture of a Union 
that can be a unique actor in statebuilding; in fact, this is even portrayed as a 
moral responsibility. 
 
4.1.2.2 A different value system: 
 
The Union’s discourse and practice emphasizes liberal norms such as human 
rights, democracy, rule of law, and promotion of free markets. The EU 
additionally emphasizes and promotes additional norms based on social 
solidarity in its foreign policy, such as social liberty, the supranational rule of 
law, effective multilateralism, inclusive equality and sustainable development 
(TEU: 1991, ESS: 2003, Manners: 2008). The EU champions international law, 
regional and multilateral cooperation, is opposed to the death penalty, 
supports the rights of the child and climate change. These values allow the 
EU to bring a social justice angle to conflict resolution, contributing to its 
uniqueness (at least in discourse) (Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014).  
 
This unique value basket also has an important identity dimension for the 
Union. The EU claims to be an efficient, universal (almost scientific) model of 
economic and political integration, a stabilizing force derived from European 
history, experience, values and principles that combines democracy, human 
rights, free trade, social justice and good governance (TEU: 1991, ESS. 2003, 
Manners: 2008). This thinking fits into the statebuilding frameworks, 
implying that there are universal best practices to build functional states. The 
difference is that, the EU openly and clearly places its own model at the core 
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of its statebuilding and conflict prevention efforts; in fact, the success of these 
efforts becomes an affirmation of its own identity and model of integration 
(Commission: 2001a, ESS: 2003, Lisbon: 2007). This identity dimension is one 
factor that sets the EU apart from other neoliberal statebuilding actors. 
 
4.1.2.3 A unique toolbox for conflict resolution: 
 	
Although the EU is a relatively new foreign policy actor with its policies and 
tools still in the making, it is also a powerful global player with 28 member 
states, hundreds of millions of inhabitants, a quarter of the world’s gross 
national product and a comprehensive array of economic, legal, diplomatic 
and military instruments at its disposal (ESS: 2003). It is capable of 
comprehensive and functional external action, by combining its different 
policies on trade, anti-terrorism, institution-building, regional cooperation, 
humanitarian aid, development assistance and the promotion of human 
rights, democracy and basic freedoms (Zielonka: 2006). Moreover, the EU has 
acquired a large toolbox that can be used in post-conflict statebuilding, with 
the increasing development of its civilian and military crisis management 
capabilities, its aid efforts and political mediation capabilities (TEU: 1991, 
Commission: 2001, ESS: 2003).  
 
A more detailed analysis on the effectiveness of these policies and tools will 
be conducted later on in this chapter. At this point, it must be noted that the 
EU tries to achieve a structural change at the global scale by using its 
comprehensive array of tools, especially its crisis management capabilities 
(Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014, Smith: 2008). The strongest leverage of the 
Union, enlargement is a unique tool for translating structural discourse into 
action and has been used in the post-conflict setup of the Balkans (Keukelaire 
and Delreux: 2014). 
 
4.2 The EU in Conflict Resolution: Policies, Tools and Capacities 
 
After discussing conceptually how the EU fits into the statebuilding frame, 
the second step is to look into the development and the implementation of the 
EU’s foreign policies and its approach to statebuilding. This exercise will help 
further explain the Union’s place in the neoliberal statebuilding frame. It will 
also provide the elements to construct the EU within the moral responsibility 
framework, by understanding its intentions and its impact on the ground and 
looking into how its capabilities and actorness capacity matches its intentions 
and objectives. These findings will be used to explore the ¨responsibility gap¨.  
 
4.2.1 The development of the EU as a foreign policy actor: 
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The constantly changing nature of statebuilding has previously been 
explained. Most changes that affected the key understandings and practices 
regarding statebuilding took place at a time when the Union was constructing 
its foreign policy identity. From this perspective, the development of 
statebuilding as a response to violent conflict has influenced the EU, 
especially as a civilian crisis management actor. As in the previous part, these 
elements will contribute at later stages to the propositions on the 
responsibility gap and discursive safeguards from a European angle.   
 
4.2.1.1 Naivety and Failure: The Breakup of Yugoslavia: 
 
The first phase of statebuilding was one of both naivety and overconfidence; 
all shattered by the human tragedies in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
The EU’s newly emerging foreign policy was also one of naivety and 
optimism, often exemplified by the former Foreign Minister of Luxembourg 
Juncker’s definition of the Yugoslav crisis as the “Hour of Europe”.58 The eye-
opening experience for the Union is often cited as its failure to bring an end to 
the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Europe’s failure to mediate or force a solution 
to the crisis made it clear that it could not provide sufficient security and 
stability in its immediate neighborhood, lacked sufficient tools for conflict 
prevention and couldn’t move beyond providing funds. It faced difficulties in 
forging common policies, and was guided by the demands and visions of 
external actors (Smith: 2008, Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). These 
shortcomings did not bid well with the Union’s aspirations to develop its own 
voice and stand out as a unique actor (Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014).   
 
The “lowest point in Europe’s post-war history, exposing the gaps between [the] 
pretentions as Europeans and [the] ability to act decisively together” also became 
the “birthplace of European foreign policy” and the most important catalyst for 
the development of the European Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP) (Toje: 2011). This stage exhibits two intentions related to 
statebuilding; one related to advancing immediate European economic and 
security interests in the near neighborhood and the second to enhancing 
Europe, as an entity, a value system and a distinct identity. The development 
of European capabilities was presented as a way forward to achieve these 
goals, in order to bridge the gap between declared foreign policy aspirations 
and actual EU capacities. Thus, as the “capacity gap’ in failed states was 
emerging as one of the underlying elements of statebuilding, the “capacity 
gap” in Europe’s foreign tools and policies became an essential concern of the 
																																																								
58 See http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/29/world/conflict-in-yugoslavia-europeans-send-high-level-
team.html. (Accessed on 16 February 2016) 
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European foreign policy identity. The cure to fixing failed states and the EU’s 
foreign policy merged – building capacity.  
 
4.2.1.2 Identifying Problems, Formulating Policies: Humanitarian Interventions 
and the Birth of ESDP: 
 
The EU’s realization of the need to develop crisis management capabilities 
more or less coincides with the emergence of the concept of statebuilding as a 
comprehensive act. From the Union’s perspective, being able to perform 
credibly and effectively was defined as a goal both for the Self and the Other. 
New capacities were produced, developed and refocused, as reflected in the 
Treaties of Maastricht (1991), Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001), and the 
European Security Strategy (2003). For the Self/the EU, the aim was improved 
coherence as a foreign policy actor, enhanced strategies, tools, policies and 
institutions for preventing conflicts, better decision-making and the elevation 
of European foreign policy from being a declaratory mechanism to an 
operational tool (Gardner and Eizenstat: 2010, Smith: 2008, Toje: 2011, 
Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). The development of the permanent 
institutional structures of CSDP and the appointment of a High 
Representative for CFSP were among the results.  
 
The initial focus was on military capabilities, through the definition of the 
Petersberg Tasks, the formal adoption of the ESDP at the 1999 Cologne 
Summit, the decision to operationalize ESDP’s capacities to fulfill the 
Petersberg Tasks through the Helsinki Headline Goals (HHG), the agreement 
on a ¨European Capabilities Action Plan¨ in 2001 (Smith: 2008, Toje: 2011, 
Wolff and Whitman: 2012, Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014, Simms: 2012). 
Despite grandiose plans of a single army or even a “United States of Europe”, 
the focus remained on “conflict prevention as a civilian and comprehensive 
exercise”; mentioning the need to address root causes of conflict and 
developing long-term structural measures towards that end. As such, the EU 
increasingly fit in the statebuilding frame. As Europe increasingly showed 
that it had little desire to project military power due to institutional 
shortcomings and a lack of political will, the civilian dimension of crisis 
management became more pronounced, with emphasis on development aid, 
technical assistance, institution-building, bolstering civil society and 
democratization (Simms: 2012, RAND: 2008). 
 
The EU discourse on this period includes a stronger “responsibility towards 
others”, just as the statebuilding frame. The need to better protect European 
interests and promote the European identity is also factored in (Commission: 
2001, ESS: 2003, Lisbon: 2007). As the Union developed capabilities and 
started taking action on the ground, the attribution of moral responsibility 
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through the impact of action became possible as well. “Interrelational 
objectives” were also emphasized, as phrases such as “the European model, 
living by example, normative power Europe” were increasingly pronounced 
(Cameron: 2012). At the same time, many member states wanted to ensure 
that the Community institutions did not interfere in their foreign policies – 
hence the intergovernmental nature of CFSP and ESDP. This 
intergovernmentalism combined with new foreign policy tools and structures 
led to overlapping responsibilities and problems in coordination and 
coherence, which are still cited as problems with European conflict 
prevention policies.  
 
4.2.1.3 Securitizing Statebuilding: Operationalization of European Foreign Policy 
 
The securitization of the statebuilding agenda after September 11, and the 
subsequent war on Afghanistan and Iraq coincided with a period when 
Europe’s external action capabilities were being operationalized. This security 
context found its way into European discourse of the time: The Other evolved 
into the “failed state” that exacerbated [new/ unconventional] threats to 
international and European security such as terrorism, migration, criminal 
networks and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Military and 
civilian engagement in places such as Afghanistan became a security 
necessity, rather than a moral obligation (Simms: 2012, ESS Report: 2008, 
Headline Goal 2010: 2004).  
 
However, the EU retained its strong normative/civilian touch, as human 
rights and humanitarian values were directly related to European integration 
and foreign policy identity. As a result, while the concentration of the US 
shifted drastically to its immediate security needs – exemplified in the “light 
footprint approach” of its early days of intervention in Afghanistan, the EU 
continued to emphasize the root causes of conflict and focus on capacity-
building. Feeling more capable to react especially in its near neighborhood 
and emboldened by the success of the statebuilding project in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina until 2006, the Union became a great proponent of hands-on 
statebuilding (Ashdown: 2007, ICG: 2006). The focus on civilian crisis 
management, in line with statebuilding, also presented a chance for the EU to 
fill in a niche in regional and global security (Toje: 2011).  
 
European foreign, security and defense policies were increasingly 
operationalized during this period (Keukelaire and Delraux: 2014, Smith: 
2008, Wolff and Whitman: 2012). Efforts were made to increase civilian and 
military capabilities including at the Headquarters level, combining civilian 
and military assets in crisis management, increasing coordination and 
information-sharing between different pillars, EU institutions and member 
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states, improving budgetary and financial resources (Toje: 2011). Many 
military and civilian crisis management operations were launched, making 
use of both first and second pillar instruments (Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). 
The Civilian Headline Goals 2008 were agreed, to boost civilian crisis 
management capabilities.  The EU Special Representatives (EUSR), an 
instrument aimed to bolster the ability to act and coordinate, improved the 
political voice of EU involvement and became a test case for double hatting 
(Adebahr: 2011). The development of more permanent institutions and 
structures significantly upgraded the Union’s capacity to develop, implement 
and sustain foreign policy initiatives.  
 
The Union documents from this period continue to mention responsibilities of 
the Union in conflict prevention and the protection of civilians (ESS: 2003). 
The European discourse focused on priorities in different directions; 
mentioning local populations in need, the security and economic interests of 
the Union, as well as identity and integration objectives. 
 
4.2.1.4 Stepping back? The Euro Crisis and Intervention Fatigue: 
 
In the midst of the process of operationalization of European civilian and 
military crisis management capacities, the Treaty for the Constitution of 
Europe (2004) was rejected. The Lisbon Treaty (2007) presented a middle 
ground, by aiming to address problems of coordination and increase Europe’s 
weight in global affairs but dropping ambitious references to statehood and 
amending rather than replacing former EU treaties (Gardner and Eizenstat: 
2010). Problems in coordination and coherence remained. “Model” 
statebuilding projects like Bosnia started to falter, exhibiting that key issues 
such as sovereignty and territorial integrity were unresolved after more than 
a decade of intervention (ICG: 2007). Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
raised questions on the stability of borders in the Balkans and showed the 
disunity among EU member states on strategic issues in its near 
neighborhood.  
 
The global economic crisis of 2008 led many European countries into 
recession and highlighted these problems. The Euro debt crisis made 
budgetary constraints an obstacle for further involvement in statebuilding; 
internal problems arose with talks of a potential Greek or British exit from the 
EU (Simms: 2012). The “Arab Spring” and the NATO intervention in Libya 
highlighted differences among EU member states on matters of international 
and European peace and security. Coherent strategies to deal with the 
humanitarian and security challenges in the Middle East are increasingly 
elusive. At the same time, the enormous military, financial and psychological 
burden of fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led to hesitations on 
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whether the cost of intervention outweighed its benefits (Drozdiak: 2010). 
These factors made the future of statebuilding, especially in terms of 
undertaking new interventions in conflict areas, increasingly bleak.  
 
However, statebuilding still remains an important methodology as a response 
to conflict. The latest report of the UN Secretary-General on R2P focuses on 
national capacity building as the best method to combat atrocity crimes.59 The 
Reliefweb and UNDP websites continue to advertise jobs in the framework of 
statebuilding – crisis prevention, recovery and capacity building.60 The EU, 
having developed its foreign policy capabilities around this area, still has 
much to contribute. The economic crisis and internal considerations have 
increased the US’s need for burden sharing (Gardner and Eizenstat: 2010, 
Toje: 2011). Also, the EU has come to a stage where it has acquired necessary 
institutions, experience and personnel in (civilian) crisis management. In the 
Foreign Affairs Council held in Brussels on July 22, 2014;61 elements of 
statebuilding – strong institutions, structural reforms, government control, 
human rights, security sector reform, the rule of law - were emphasized in 
relation to Palestine, Ukraine, Central African Republic (CAR), as well as the 
responsibility of the international community to help these countries survive 
their crises.  On CAR, for example, the EU declared its readiness to “play its 
part in the international community's coordinated and determined support for the 
CAR authorities in this area when the time comes”62. 
 
Although it is difficult to conclude that statebuilding is withering away, the 
increasing gaps in financial and personnel resources, the growing number of 
crises erupting around the globe and the intervention fatigue of major actors 
indicate that there will be the need for more change in the way statebuilding 
is currently conducted. Whether this change, unlike past shifts, will reflect a 
new framing of responsibility for the international community and the EU is 
yet to be seen. 
 
4.2.2 The operationalization of EU Foreign Policy:  
 
The statebuilding frame is based on the formulation of a Self, assisting the 
Other to resolve its conflicts and gain resilience through adopting the 																																																								
59 The reports of the Secretary-General on R2P can be accessed at 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml 
60 See www.reliefweb.org and www.undp.org (Accessed on 16 February 2016) 
61 See the press release on the meeting at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/144098.pdf (Accessed on 
16 February 2016) 
62 See the EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions at Brussels on 22 July 2014, at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/144098.pdf  (Accessed on 
16 February 2016) 
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methods of the Self. EU documents claim that the Union, as a successful 
example of conflict prevention, can serve as an example to other regions in 
encouraging states to reduce political tensions, increase economic 
interdependence and create greater trust (Commission: 2001, EU Programme 
for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts: 2001). The implementation of peace 
agreements have to go hand in hand with structural stability efforts; the goal 
is to achieve long-term stabilization in conflict countries, to treat the root 
causes of conflict by consolidating structural stability through holistic and 
comprehensive approaches combining sustainable development, 
democratization, establishing viable political structures and resilience 
(Commission: 2001, Whitman and Wolff: 2011, Gebhard: 2010).  
 
These lines connect the EU’s narratives to the statebuilding frame. In order to 
facilitate increased understanding on how the EU fits into the statebuilding 
frame and also how its moral responsibilities can be constructed based on this 
engagement, this part will look into how the foreign policy tools and 
capabilities have been operationalized on the ground. 
 
4.2.2.1 Intergovernmental (Second Pillar) Instruments: 
 
The foreign and security policy of the Union is mostly formulated through 
intergovernmental processes (second pillar). The European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP) include a relevant and visible toolbox for (civilian) 
crisis management.  It prioritizes capacity building in conflict prevention, in 
operations that often combine the areas of security, institution building, 
development and aid, human rights and democracy63 (Gardner and Eizenstat: 
2010, RAND: 2007). On the civilian side, EU Special Representatives (EUSR’s) 
have also increased the Union’s visibility. They are the face and voice of 
Europe on the ground and have added a political touch to its conflict 
prevention efforts, by engaging in political guidance, mediation and 
supervision of crisis management operations. They have also acted as bridge-
builders across cross-pillar, national, institutional and political silos and 
served important coordination roles (Adebahr: 2011). On the other hand, 
despite the EU’s conducting of several military missions64 and efforts to step-
up military capabilities, the EU’s higher ambitions in are confined to the 
civilian crisis management area - an important entry point for the Union into 
statebuilding (Gardner and Eizenstat: 2010). 																																																								
63 See the ¨Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP¨ adopted by the European Council (17-18 June 
2004)¨ at 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Action%20Plan%20for%20Civilian%20Aspects%20of%20
ESDP.pdf , (Accessed on 16 February 2016). 
64 In Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Berlin Plus arrangements guaranteeing EU access to 
NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations were used. 
	 156	
 
The Brussels institutions have been reformed to boost the EU’s capacities as 
an international actor, address questions of coherence and coordination and 
increase expertise, information-sharing, civilian – military coordination and 
overall cooperation between Brussels and the field, the Commission and the 
Council and between different EU bodies. The introduction of the High 
Representative and the Vice-President of the Commission by the Lisbon 
Treaty (2007), as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
increased the coherence of European foreign policy and helped ensure better 
coordination between the first and second pillars, as well as between the 
civilian and military aspects of crisis management. Despite these 
developments and improvements, shortfalls in mission capacity including 
planning, financing and personnel deployment problems, as well as 
coordination issues and overlapping of responsibilities between the 
Headquarters, EUSR’s, ESDP missions, the EEAS and the Commission have 
been among the difficulties faced (Commission: 2001a). Many missions seem 
ad hoc and reactive, coherent cross pillar strategies are often lacking. The 
difficulty to reach consensus among member states problematize decision-
making, while the consensus reached is sometimes too weak in content 
(dubbed as the Lowest Common Denominator problem). These elements can 
be cited as corrections proposed within the statebuilding frame.   
 
4.2.2.2 Community (First Pillar Instruments): 
 
According to the Lisbon Treaty (2007), the Commission ensures the Union’s 
external representation, with the exception of CSDP. Foreign policy is in the 
domain of the first pillar. Yet, Community policies, tools and instruments 
such as development cooperation, trade, external assistance and humanitarian 
aid also promote structural change in conflict and post-conflict societies, and 
thus form part of the EU’s efforts in conflict prevention and statebuilding. The 
Commission also states its intention to contribute to security sector reform, 
human rights training, regional integration as well as combatting drugs, small 
arms, human trafficking and environmental degradation (Commission: 2001).    
 
Tools such as the Instrument for Stability (IfS) aim to enable rapid 
disbursement of funds in situations of conflict to reestablish conditions where 
normal instruments can be used again.65 The Instrument includes dimensions 
relevant to statebuilding, such as institution building, democratization, rule of 
law and promotion of human rights. The European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) supports democratization and 																																																								
65 Further information on the IfS is available at http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/index_en.htm.  (Accessed on 16 
February 2016).  
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human rights in third countries at risk, especially through civil society 
initiatives. Bilateral programs undertaken by the Commission, such as 
PHARE, TACIS, EDF, can also be seen in this realm.  These tools provide 
room for direct involvement of the Community in conflict management. 
Trade policy provides instruments such as sanctions, embargoes and financial 
support, and helps promote long-term stabilization, economic growth and 
poverty reduction as well as human rights norms (Commission: 2001, Smith: 
2008, Keukelarie and Delreux: 2014). Development policy and economic 
cooperation programs promote structural change, in scope of the 
development-security nexus (Commission: 2001, ESS: 2003).  
 
Political and economic conditionality, in particular the carrot of EU accession 
in enlargement countries and to a lesser extent trade agreements and aid, are 
presented as a successful way to promote structural change and combat 
instability (Commission: 2001, Zielonka: 2006). The Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP) in the Western Balkans, combining conflict 
prevention and enlargement tools is an example.  
 
The Community, which possesses necessary budgets, procedures, expertise 
and contractual relations with third countries, sometimes, emerges as a more 
efficient and focused foreign policy pillar compared to the second. Yet, there 
have been (technical) criticisms regarding first pillar instruments as well. 
They have limited political and operational flexibility and have difficulties 
adapting to situations of conflict (Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). Community 
instruments often overlap rather than reinforce first pillar instruments, 
leading to problems of coordination. Using first pillar tools to bring forward 
structural change is also criticized for breaking the tradition of neutrality in 
development and humanitarian aid.  
 
4.2.2.3 Traditional diplomatic instruments: 
 
Traditional bilateral instruments are also commonly used in European foreign 
policy, in the form of political dialogue, demarches, dispatches of fact-finding 
missions, economic and other sanctions and mediation (Commission: 2001). 
For instance, the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008) talk about 
mediation, facilitation and dialogue, closely related and complementary tools 
to deal with conflicts and crises. 
 
4.2.3 The EU and Statebuilding Guidelines: 
 
The EU, in its foreign policy, engages in many different sectors such as 
humanitarian aid, security provision, development and institution building. 
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Sometimes, when a statebuilding projects is underway in a country, this 
engagement can serve to guide, support or complement statebuilding efforts, 
as is the case in Afghanistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This part mainly 
aims to explore the EU’s involvement in different areas that form 
statebuilding as a whole, to see if it has the intentions or capacity to engage in 
involvement of this sort as part of a holistic and comprehensive response to 
conflict resolution.  
 
On the security side, the EU supports peacebuilding and conflict management 
activities in discourse and implements them through its civilian and military 
crisis management capabilities (Vines: 2010, Adebahr: 2011). It prioritizes 
capacity building in policing, justice and rule of law (Whitman and Wolff: 
2011). Difficulties in coordination within EU institutions and with other 
donors, limited financial and personnel capacities to fulfill ambitious 
mandates can be cited as technical problems.  The European Parliament, in an 
2013 study on security sector reform (SSR) summarizes the EU’s approach to 
SSR well; stating that “SSR activities are key for stabilizing fragile and post-conflict 
states through their emphasis on training, institutional reform and governance. (….) 
The creation of the EEAS has given the EU the right tools, but a continued emphasis 
on policy coordination is necessary to address old and new, institutional and 
operational challenges so as to attain a comprehensive approach to SSR”66.  From a 
responsibility perspective, most SSR missions are criticized for having short-
term, limited and technical mandates and defining success in narrow terms; 
while the overall security benefits for the local populations and for European 
security is often left unexplored (Vines: 2010). Despite their holistic framing, 
SSR missions, especially after 2001, have been criticizing for prioritizing the 
immediate security side of involvement, with less attention given to the rule 
of law and justice reform components.  
 
On the institutional side, the link between weak or poor governance and 
conflict is acknowledged in several EU documents67. The EU has a “high belief 
in the goodness of institutions” and promotes its own institutional model of 
economic and political integration, as well as European norms of free trade, 
sustainable development, labor standards, human rights and democracy 
(Toje: 2011, Manners: 2008). It emphasizes good governance and institutional 
capacity building to bring long-term durable solutions to address root causes 																																																								
66 See the European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies’ 2013 report on SSR; ¨Assessing 
the EU’s Approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR)¨, at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/433837/EXPO-
SEDE_ET(2013)433837_EN.pdf (Accessed on 16 February 2016).  
67 Numerous examples include the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (2001), the 
European Security Strategy (2003), the European Commission’s Handbook on Promoting Good 
Governance (2004), the Council of the EU’s Conclusions (2012) on ¨Increasing the Impact of EU 
Development Policy: An Agenda for Change¨, and can be further varied.   
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of conflicts. Yet, institution-building and good governance, as SSR, is often 
defined in narrow and technical terms, focusing on issues such as combatting 
corruption and better management of resources, while avoiding more difficult 
debates on democratization and how well the proposed institutions fit local 
contexts and how locals perceive their legitimacy.  
 
On the humanitarian and development side, the EU is an important global actor. 
The Lisbon Treaty (2007) connects the CSDP to humanitarian tasks (Article 
28B). In line with the “development-security nexus”, the EU places 
development policy within the realm of the promotion of world peace, the 
consolidation of democracy, human rights and the constitutional state 
through economic and political conditionality (European Security Strategy: 
2003, Revised Cotonou Agreement: 2010, EU Report on Policy Coherence for 
Development: 2009). Although coordination, complementarity, coherence and 
consistency are cited as the four pillars of the European development policy 
(Maastricht: 1991), it is often criticized for its fragmented nature, lack of 
vision, problems of coordination and coherence, and inability to establish 
clear priorities (EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development: 2009).  
 
On the normative side, the values of human rights, democracy, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law are featured widely in European documents 
(ESS: 2003, Lisbon: 2007, ESS Report: 2008). Their promotion is seen vital for 
its policies, identity, model and unique role in the world (Maastricht: 1991, 
Commission: 2001, Balfour: 2007, Manners: 2008).  As such, these values are 
mainstreamed into European foreign policy and incorporated into the 
Union’s policies and programs, often promoted by the use of conditionality 
(Smith: 2001, Balfour). Criticisms are directed at the EU for applying its 
normative policies in a selective, inconsistent and ineffective fashion, trumped 
by security and economic interests, which undermines the credibility of its 
norm promotion efforts (Balfour: 2007, Smith: 2008, Wolff and Whitman: 
2011).  
 
4.2.4 The EU and the Statebuilding Frame: 
 
This chapter, up until this point, has strived to understand how much the EU 
could be considered as part of the statebuilding frame, given that it chooses to 
engage in statebuilding projects. The main findings are summarized below:  
 
THE EU AND THE STATEBUILDING FRAME 
 Diagnostic Arguments: - Violent conflict endangers local populations and threatens international 
peace and security. 
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- The lack of capacity is a key issue that leads to conflict, organized crime, 
human trafficking, poverty, illegal immigration, ethnic antagonism, piracy 
and terrorism (Commission: 2001, ESS: 2003, ESS: 2008). 
Prognostic Arguments: - Changing strategies:  
Phase 1: The belief that liberal democracy and EU as a foreign/security policy actor 
would take root easily. 
Phase 2: An emphasis on comprehensive, holistic and long-term civilian 
interventions, connected with boosting the response capacities of the EU.  
Phase 3: Increased (civilian) response capacities of the EU, coupled with an 
increasing global focus on security, functionality and capacity. Civilian role of EU 
more emphasized.  
Phase 4: Scaling down; with the Euro crisis, internal issues and intervention fatigue. 
Yet, statebuilding frame still an important (and maybe only) method to sustainably 
deal with conflicts. - Comprehensive and holistic responses needed, that factor in democratic 
processes, the rule of law, respect for human rights, strong institutions and 
good governance (Commission: 2001, EEAS Website).  - Sustainable and sovereign states will emerge as a result of capacity building 
(Chandler: 2010). Influencing or shaping sustainable political, legal, socio-
economic, security and mental structures over a longer term will help bring 
sustainable solutions (Commission: 2001, ESS: 2003). 
Legitimization of Statebuilding: - Protection of civilians is predominant in legitimization efforts (Commission: 
2001, Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions: 2013). The securitization of 
statebuilding led to a concentration on challenges to international peace and 
security too (ESS: 2003, ESS Report: 2003).  - Respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity is not 
negotiable, and sovereign governments must take responsibility for their 
actions (ESS Report: 2008).  - The international community can step in to temporarily boost state capacity.  - The EU defines a limited support role for itself, with technical goals aimed at 
promoting ¨universal best practices¨ (ESS: 2003).  
Normative Arguments: - European values are 
presented as universal 
norms, and democratic and 
functional institutions based 
on these values are the 
guarantee to sustainable 
peace.  - The EU, as a successful 
example of conflict 
prevention, can serve as an 
example to other regions (EU 
Programme for the 
Agency:  - The Self is framed as the functional 
and democratic EU. It is a successful 
peace project, a model for peace, 
prosperity and conflict resolution, has 
internalized universal values, has 
considerable expertise in stabilization, 
crisis management and institution-
building (Lisbon: 2007, Commission: 
2001). - The Other is a failing/ failed state that 
cannot fulfill its responsibilities to its 
own population and international 
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Prevention of Violent 
Conflicts: 2001).  - The unique identity, model 
and tools of the EU make the 
moral imperative for 
engaging in conflict 
resolution higher.  
 
peace and security (Commission: 2001, 
ESS: 2003, ESS Report: 2008).   - The EU often refers to its partners in 
this exercise as US, Canada, Russia, 
Japan, Norway, UN, OSCE, and 




Differences in the EU’s Approach: - A stronger emphasis on multilateralism. - A stronger and more particular definition of the Self, with a unique identity, 
value system and toolbox combining different pillars. Openly placing its own 
model at the core of statebuilding and the transition from the Self to the 
Other. Engagement in statebuilding supports conflict resolution efforts, and 
helps boost the identity and image of the EU.  - An emphasis on the civilian aspects of crisis management, the carving of a 
unique role for the EU in this area. A particular toolbox for civilian crisis 
management. - A deeper emphasis on the normative aspects of statebuilding also due to the 
connection of the EU’s identity goals to statebuilding. Different values 
including social justice and inclusive equality. - A constant effort for self-reform, leading to a constant change in approaches, 
structures and responses.  
 
4.3 EU and Statebuilding – Responsibilities, Problems and Discursive 
Safeguards 
 
In the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of June 24 2013, the EU declared its 
willingness to “remain committed to supporting state-building and long-term 
development in Afghanistan”, implying that the main responsible party for 
statebuilding was the local authorities. Similarly, on Mali, the FAC on 
February 18, 2013 “voiced support [by the EU] to the development of a 
statebuilding contract”, as well as “support to medium and long-term 
stability, development and good governance”. The reference to mutual 
responsibilities can also be seen in the FAC Conclusions in reference to 
Somalia, on January 31, 2013, where the need for a compact between the 
international community and Somalia was mentioned.  
 
This definition of responsibility seems to be in line with the statebuilding 
frame, which stresses that national responsibility is primary to international 
and humanitarian responsibility. Despite this understanding, the EU does not 
believe that “imposing exogenous standards is irrelevant and misleading” (Jackson: 
2000). The narratives imply the possibility of defining a “responsibility gap” 
in the EU’s approach to statebuilding. Approaching the EU’s involvement in 
	 162	
statebuilding from a moral responsibility perspective and comparing it to the 
narratives on responsibility in the statebuilding frame will help point out the 
responsibility gap.  
 
4.3.1 The EU in the moral responsibility framework: 
  
4.3.1.1 Moral responsibility and agency: 
 
In the previous part, it was established that in order to be considered a moral 
agent, every actor needed to meet certain criteria (Szigeti: 2006). These 
included:  - The capacity of deliberation and forming intentions, - The capacity of acting purposefully in line with formed intentions, - Having the possibility to choose from alternative courses of action, - The ability to act independently based on free will.  
 
It was also discussed the way debates on moral agency approached the 
possibility of attributing responsibility to collectives, such as the European 
Union (French: 1979, Runciman: 2003, Harbour: 2003). Attaching 
responsibility to collectives also was possible based on certain criteria, which 
included: - Possessing identities, continuity and organizational memories, - Possessing formal decision making powers, - Having the capacity to act as moral agents,  - The ability to be assigned responsibility in ways not reducible to their 
individual members.  
 
To address these issues one by one, first of all, Article 47 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) explicitly recognizes the legal personality of the 
Union, making it an independent entity in its own right. According to the 
TEU, this means the EU can conclude and negotiate international agreements, 
become a member of international organizations, and join international 
conventions. As such, it can be derived from the TEU that the EU has formal 
decision-making powers, in addition to the capacity of deliberation and 
forming intentions. In fact, EU decision-making is a complex process of 
deliberation; and once a decision is taken, it is difficult for its components to 
challenge it. Beyond these formal decision-making powers, it must be noted 
the intention and ability of the Union to speak with one voice, including 
during negotiations such as United Nations intergovernmental consultations. 
The ability of the Union to engage in complex multilateral negotiations, where 
rapid and decisive choices have to be constantly made, is a clear exhibition of 
its ability to choose between alternative courses of action. All these points 
support Erskine’s (2003) point that a collective with a corporate or legal 
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identity, or an identity greater than the sum of identities of its constitutive 
parts, and a decision-making structure might be considered as a moral agent.  
 
Beyond these abilities, collectives that can be considered as moral agents 
should also possess executive functions that allow it to act on decisions 
(Erskine: 2003). The EU has increasingly gained the capacities, since the 
signature of the TEU, to act purposefully in line with its intentions. One 
exhibition of this is the large toolbox it has acquired in the field of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, with the increasing development of its 
civilian and military crisis management capabilities, its aid efforts and 
political mediation capabilities (TEU: 1991, Commission: 2001, ESS: 2003). 
From this angle, as an external actor, the possibility of establishing the EU’s 
moral agency has increased with each gained capability and instrument, 
consolidating its foreign policy identity ever more. 
 
The EU’s ability to act independently from its members is not absolute. Its 
second pillar instruments, as seen previously, are of an intergovernmental 
nature. However, this does not mean that ability to be assigned responsibility 
in ways not reducible to their individual members. First of all, EU foreign 
policy and statebuilding practices are partially undertaken through the first 
pillar (community) instruments, which are not dependent on the approval of 
all member states. Secondly,	 the existence of a High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, created as the High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the Amsterdam Treaty 
(1997), gives the Union the possibility to act foreign policy matters, once they 
are agreed upon by member states. The European External Action Servise 
(EEAS), created in 2010, allows continuity and organizational memories, and 
the ability to act independently. The EU Special Representatives allow the 
Union to speak on foreign policy matters on the ground with one voice.  
 
In other words, the EU has increasingly gained the ability to act as a single 
unit, under a single European flag, through its Common Security and Defence 
Policy, which is the domain of EU policy covering defence and military 
aspects, and civilian crisis management (Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). In 
fact, the CSDP is the successor of the European Security and Defence Identity 
under NATO, but differs in that it falls under the jurisdiction of the European 
Union itself, including countries with no ties to NATO (Smith: 2008, Wolff 
and Whitman: 2011). The EU is also becoming more and more self-directive, 
also in the sense of having its own material resources. From this angle, the 
agency of the EU is not a given, but something constructed over time, in 
many ways in parallel to the development of statebuilding.  
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Statebuilding is a complex exercise undertaken with the participation of many 
external agents. In order to establish agency and attribute responsibility in a 
fair manner, the way the different agents relate to each other must also be 
accounted (Wolff and Whitman: 2011). One way to approach the EU is as an 
actor that has increasingly became a part of the statebuilding frame, as it 
gained actorness capacity. The Union’s general adherence to the discourse on 
the main concepts related to statebuilding, such as humanitarianism, 
problematization of sovereignty and capacity building, its comprehensive 
approaches to conflict prevention, the way it constructs the Self and the 
Other, the way it places as well as its adherence to multilateralism and 
complementarity places it in the statebuilding frame. From this angle, the EU 
is part of a collective group of actors such as the United Nations, the US, 
major donor states, NATO, the World Bank and the IMF. It cannot be held 
responsible solely for the construction and the responsibility gaps of the 
statebuilding frame; especially keeping in mind that it that developed its 
foreign policy capabilities relatively later in the game.  
 
On the other hand, the EU’s clear intention to become a unique actor in 
foreign policy, the tools and resources it developed towards this end and its 
reasons for engaging in statebuilding allows the attribution of more specific 
responsibilities (ESS: 2003). The unique tools it has developed, particularly on 
the civilian side of ESDP, as well as its emphasis on “civilian power Europe” 
not only makes statebuilding one of the core areas of EU’s foreign policy, but 
also turns this exercise into an affirmation of its own model, values and 
identity. Its “different value system” strengthens its emphasis on protection. 
This different identity and approach affects not only its intentions and the 
impact of its engagement, but also the direction of its responsibilities. 
However, as the Union’s framing of statebuilding mostly fits with the main 
concepts of the statebuilding frame, it is possible to suggest that the 
uniqueness of the EU is more visible in its implementation of statebuilding. 
 
4.3.1.2 Operationalizing Moral Responsibility:  
 
In the earlier chapters, the contrast between framing statebuilding as a 
technocratic exercise and attributing temporary, limited and narrow 
responsibilities to the international community; while operationalizing 
statebuilding as a comprehensive and intrusive act that sometimes aims to 
change the core dynamics of societies was pointed out as a ¨responsibility 
gap¨. Although there were (fine-tuning) efforts from the international 
community to improve statebuilding by improving practices, these efforts did 
not touch problems related to the inherent nature of the practice. The EU faces 
the same criticisms as other international actors, such as lacking local 
legitimacy, imposing external norms, institutions, concepts and practices 
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(Chandler: 2011). It tries to fine-tune its foreign policy to the challenges it 
faces, without challenging the core concepts of the statebuilding frame (Toje: 
2011, Chandler: 2011). It focuses on elite level projects delivered by EU 
institutions in collaboration with selected national elites, despite its claim to 
focus on civil society and local ownership (Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014).   
 
The purpose of this part is to use the attribution framework of moral 
responsibility once more, this time to look at the responsibility discourse of 
the EU from an alternative angle. This exercise will help identify mismatches 
between the statebuilding and moral responsibility frameworks with the EU 
as an agent, as well as the discursive safeguards used to avoid responsibility.  
 
4.3.1.3 Declared/ undeclared intentions in statebuilding:  
 
The development of the EU’s foreign policy identity has run parallel to the 
development of statebuilding itself. It took nearly 10 years after the end of the 
Cold War for the EU to build the necessary capabilities and organizational 
structure that would upgrade it to an external agent status. The Union was 
not one of the main actors that developed the initial theory and practice of 
statebuilding, but rather followed the developments. The way it emphasizes 
capacity building, prioritizes protection, problematizes sovereignty and 
defines responsibility shows the influence of the dominant narrative on the 
identity and policies of the EU. Even if the EU has not been the one 
constructing the frame, investing in statebuilding still constitutes a judgment 
and a promise. The EU’s emphasis on the implementation of statebuilding 
rather than its construction might limit its responsibilities, but the 
responsibility for choosing (the elements of) statebuilding as the best way 
forward for conflict resolution remains. 
 
The intentions of the EU in statebuilding have shifted considerably since the 
early 1990’s, both following the changes in the statebuilding frame and also 
due to the changes it went through. These changes have reflected on the EU’s 
discourse. The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (2001) 
and the European Security Strategy (ESS: 2003) are much more strongly 
worded in terms of assuming the responsibility of Europe in terms of conflict 
resolution. Still, as previously noted, responsibilities have always been 
attributed to the EU as a limited support function. In contexts such as 
Afghanistan, where the EU really is more of a secondary actor throughout the 
intervention following the US lead, the responsibility gap this produces might 
be lower. However, in cases such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EU 
aspires to be the sole external actor, defining its role in limited and narrow 
support terms can deepen the responsibility gap. Moreover, from a moral 
responsibility perspective, the responsibilities of the EU should be redefined 
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based on the changes in the identity and capabilities of the EU in addition to 
the changes in the principles and practice of statebuilding.  This kind of a 
redefinition is not clear in the EU’s discourse. 
 
Local ownership and the primary responsibility of the nation states are 
emphasized in the dominant narrative of the EU as a priority and an end goal. 
Yet, the EU’s discourse also strongly emphasizes long-term comprehensive 
commitments of international actors to statebuilding and the importance of 
capacity building in several directions, in line with the statebuilding frame. 
From a moral responsibility perspective, comprehensive capacity building 
activities are a choice of action rather than a universal best practice. The fact 
that this choice inherently contrasts the ultimate purpose of establishing local 
ownership has previously been defined as a factor leading to a responsibility 
gap. This is also the case for the EU.  
 
4.3.1.4 Responsibility of impact: Do no harm: 
 
The responsibility for impact is based on the contribution principle, where 
responsibility is (also) based on causation and the consequences of action can 
be used to determine responsibility – even if this deterioration is unintended 
and the events are beyond the agent’s control (Mayer and Vogt: 2006, 
Manners: 2008). According to this definition, responsibilities of the external 
agent arise as soon as statebuilding is put into practice on the ground.  
 
Efforts towards bringing structural change in the political, social and 
economic fields can have deep impact on political systems, security and 
stability, even after the international actors are gone. The success of these 
structural changes in promoting sustainable peace and stability also affects 
lives in EU member states, especially in terms of economic and security 
interests. In the case of the EU, statebuilding efforts also affect the image, 
foreign policy identity and weight of the Union in international affairs. 
Moreover, foreign policy actions often have unintended consequences and 
there is an erratic link between intentions and outcomes (Toje: 2011).  
 
From a moral responsibility perspective, this dynamics brings forward 
different responsibilities resulting from the contribution principle. In terms of 
intended results, international actors must keep in mind that the impact of 
action does not end when they exit the country. They must also keep in mind 
the potential unintended impact of their actions; for aid dependency, 
protracted conflicts, increased immigration or the deteriorating image of the 
EU as a foreign policy actor. Yet, neither responsibility seems to be featured in 
the discourse of the Union.   
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It must also be remembered how presenting statebuilding as a technical 
exercise might obscure the essentially political dimensions of the conflict and 
international involvement. This way, although the impact of international 
involvement might go beyond the purely technical realm, responsibilities are 
attributed as if statebuilding is a purely technical exercise that is successful if 
it produces statistically good results. The EU, which needs consensus among 
28 member states to make political decisions, particularly disguises political 
or normative action under a technical guise. The initial goals, ambitions and 
responsibilities of peacebuilding might be obscured through concentrating on 
narrow measures for success – establishing legitimacy, local ownership and 
full sovereignty as well as sustainable peace and security. For instance, on the 
SSR mission EUPOL-COPPS in Palestine; Kristoff 68 argues “any police reform 
program is fundamentally a political matter. In the context of the Palestinian 
police, everything is geared towards the peace process. (…) And yet, an 
official working for EUPOL COPPS stated that the mission is ‘a technical 
office and we try not to answer political problems, we separate the political 
from the technical”.  
 
There are structural, political, economic, social, cultural, regional causes of 
conflict (Whitman and Wolff: 2011). Post-conflict efforts aim addressing these 
causes in various combinations, and it is hard to define exactly which agent, 
at what scale, is responsible and towards whom. As such, moral 
responsibilities are easier identified through focusing on specific cases. At this 
stage, it is sufficient to say that moral responsibilities implied by the 
contribution principle do not seem to match the EU’s responsibilities defined 
in dominant narratives. Even if the impact of international involvement runs 
contrary to the purpose, this is not factored in as the responsibility of the 
external agents.  
 
4.3.1.5 The capacity principle redefined: 
 
The capacity principle has previously been defined, as the responsibility of 
ensuring the capacity to fulfill the intentions and handle the possible negative 
impacts of intervention exists. As such, in order to be a responsible actor, the 
EU must be realistic about its own capacities and what kind of role it can play 
in conflict countries. In other words, if the EU claims that it is “a major actor 
in regional and global peacebuilding”, it should make sure that it is capable of 
being so (Lisbon: 2007). Yet, it is often the case that the great ambitions of the 
Union are not matched with its capacities on the ground. However, the 
willingness to take a leading role is often not matched with the small budget 
and limited personnel and resources (Vines: 2010). The statebuilding frame’s 																																																								
68 http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/ssr_issue_no7.pdf. (Accessed on 18 February 2016).   
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inability to connect the capabilities of external agents to the framing of 
responsibility in this way leads to a responsibility gap  
 
On the other hand, the capacity principle is also the one responsibility gap 
that has been addressed more concretely by the Union. The Union’s focus on 
capacity building, improving coordination and coherence and formulating 
stronger responses to conflict can be perceived as an indicator of the EU’s 
readiness to close the responsibility gap. The EU officially acknowledges the 
challenges and problems it faces in its foreign policy, and has been 
developing capacities in order to overcome them and achieve a smooth 
functioning, efficient and effective involvement (Lisbon: 2007). Even the 
internal processes of the Union have been evolving to address the “capacity 
gap”, in the format of development of institutions and policies and the 
preferences of the member states – perhaps also because its capacities are so 
essentially connected to its image and identity. Yet, in relation to the other 
principles of moral responsibility, if the new capacities and capabilities the 
EU acquires leads to a change in its intentions and impact on the ground, 
responsibilities should be revisited. EU narratives do not address this.  
 
4.3.1.6 The Direction of Responsibilities: 
 
The statebuilding discourse points out to two intentions of interventions: the 
protection and welfare of local populations, and the protection of 
international peace and security through sustainably combatting security 
threats that risk spilling over borders. Through a liberal democratic lens, this 
could be interpreted as a) responsibilities towards the Other, and b) 
responsibilities to protect the security of the Self. However, looking at 
statebuilding discourse from a moral responsibility angle, particularly taking 
into consideration the intentions to promote the identity, image and values of 
the Self allows expanding the ‘responsibilities towards the Self’ to include 
normative responsibilities as well. These three dimensions are visible in the 
EU’s discourse and actions.  
 
Responsibilities towards others: The EU discourse focuses on an ethics of 
“responsibility towards others” as a “moral and political imperative” for 
conflict prevention (Commission: 2001, Smith: 2008, Wolff and Whitman: 
2011). Yet, although it emphasizes the importance of the provision of 
economic prosperity, human rights and democracy, the moral imperative for 
intervention is often used in the realm of the immediate protection of civilians 
(ESS Report: 2008). Concepts such as social justice, equality and poverty 
eradication are featured in EU narratives, but are not directly connected to the 
responsibilities of the EU in discourse.  
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The moral responsibility perspective allows diversifying the EU’s 
“responsibilities towards others”, by looking at its discourse and actions. The 
EU does stress that violent conflicts cause lives, lead to human rights abuses, 
displace people, disrupts livelihood and set back economic development, 
exacerbate state fragility, weaken governance and undermine national, 
regional and international security (ESS: 2003, Council of the European 
Union: 2011, Reform Treaty: 2007). It puts addressing these issues (through 
capacity building) are at the center of response efforts. This implies a certain 
promise to the people suffering under conflict (ESS: 2003, Commission: 2001). 
From this angle, the EU defines its responsibilities to local populations in a 
general and vague manner, without specifications, in its key documents 
regarding conflict resolution (Commission: 2001, ESS Report: 2008). This can 
be pointed out as a responsibility gap. 
 
The protection and promotion of European interests: The Lisbon Treaty (2007) 
claims the EU should offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice; 
contribute to the protection of its citizens, as well as peace, security, 
sustainable development, free and fair trade and the eradication of poverty. 
Conflicts, leading to state fragility and weakened governance, destroy 
infrastructure, encourage criminality, cause migration, disturb energy 
supplies, deter investments and hamper normal economic activity 
(Commission: 2001, ESS: 2003, Reform Treaty: 2007, Council of the European 
Union: 2011, Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). Terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized 
crime are major threats. The ESS (2003) shows the way forward: “Spreading 
good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting 
human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order”. 
The solution is once again, statebuilding. However, when attributing 
responsibility, a similar path to the responsibilities towards local populations 
is followed. The responsibilities are narrowly defined mostly in the conflict 
prevention and the provision of security sphere, as the European Security 
Strategy (2003) suggests “The best protection for our security is a world of 
well-governed, democratic states”. The full impact of statebuilding on the 
security, economic and social structures of European countries is not 
elaborated.  
 
Promotion of European identity, image and values: The moral responsibility 
framework can be used to suggest that the promotion of the identity, image 
and values of the Self could be seen as a third direction of responsibility for 
external actors, as opposed to the statebuilding frame. The statebuilding 
frame that can be derived from the EU’s narratives in fact does feature open 
intentions to foster its foreign policy identity, propagate its regional 
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integration and cooperation model, and strengthen integration (Commission: 
2001, ESS: 2003, Reform Treaty: 2007, ESS Report: 2008). For instance, Romano 
Prodi’s claimed in 2000 “Europe aspires to project its own model of society on 
the whole world”.69 In other words, the EU’s involvement in statebuilding is 
an essential part of its identity formation as well as its norm promotion 
(Lucarelli: 2006, Giddens: 1979, Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014). This projection 
contrasts the EU’s carving itself a solely technical role in essentially political 
peace processes. This is one side of the identity coin.  
 
The EU’s involvement in crisis management particularly through CSDP and 
CSFP is the vanguard of its international presence. When it prioritizes its 
immediate economic and security interests, focuses more on boosting the 
security sector than promoting democracy and human rights or exhibits a lack 
of unity and efficiency in the field, it fails deeply on its responsibilities 
towards itself (Toje: 2011, Wolff and Whitman: 2011). The domination of these 
objectives may elevate the declaratory/ discursive nature of European foreign 
policy over the actual activities undertaken, to a normative and ideal version 
of the peace it promotes (Keukelaire and Delreux: 2014, Cameron: 2012). In 
fact, the reason for sustaining some European missions, even when 
achievements remain modest at best, could be “flag-raising”. This might 
indicate that this third objective in being involved in statebuilding might be 
prevailing over other motives.  
 
4.3.2 The responsibility gap: 
 
Analyzing the Union’s discourse and track record, in terms of its involvement 
in statebuilding, allows identifying a particular framing of responsibility, 
similar to, yet apart from the more general framework discussed in the 
previous part. Three most visible elements of this framing can be identified as 
a) statebuilding as a normative exercise, which supports the promotion of 
universally accepted norms and values, b) statebuilding as a comprehensive, 
holistic, but yet technical exercise, that enables the implementation of 
universal best practices and norms through capacity-building, c) statebuilding 
in support of local ownership and sovereignty, with an emphasis on 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states.	 Approaching 
these three elements from a moral responsibility angle and discovering 
alternative possibilities to attribute responsibility in a broader fashion that the 
official frame, would help highlight three respective gaps in attributing 
responsibility.	 This would also be in line with Visoka and Doyle’s (2014) 
argument on the need for a differentiation of moral responsibility in 																																																								
69 Full text available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-41_en.htm.(Accesses on 18 
February 2016) 
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proportion to the agents’ intentions, capabilities, actions and situation 
circumstances.  
 
4.3.2.1 Responsibility and Change:  
 
While statebuilding is a constantly changing exercise, the responsibilities of 
international actors in the statebuilding frame have mostly remained 
constant. This gap is particularly visible in the case of the EU, since the Union 
itself has constantly changed as statebuilding evolved.  
 
First of all, change in policy brings forward new threat perceptions and new 
intentions and consequences (Hansen: 2006). From a moral responsibility 
perspective, every change in capacity, policy and practice requires a new 
definition of responsibilities (prospective responsibilities), without cancelling 
out the old ones (retrospective responsibilities). Secondly, if an agent’s 
capacities are developing while its identity is being rebuilt and redefined, this 
will also affect the intentions of the agent, as well as its impact on the ground. 
Thus, in the case of the EU, both the changes in statebuilding in general and 
developments regarding the EU’s foreign policy identity and capabilities 
would problematize the static definition of the responsibilities of external 
agents in the statebuilding frame70. 
 
The EU’s discourse reflects that, as statebuilding changed in parallel to 
developments in the Union’s capacities to respond to conflict, it has defined its 
own responsibilities in stronger terms. For instance, the EU Programme for 
the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (2001) and the European Security Strategy 
(ESS: 2003) are more strongly worded than the Maastricht Treaty (1991) in 
defining the responsibilities of the Union. Despite this change, even in cases 
when hands-on statebuilding was applied with an increasing role ascribed to 
the Union, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid 2000s, the EU was 
always careful not to define its responsibilities beyond technical terms. (Bose: 
2002). 
 
As a result, although the EU’s discourse focuses on the increasing 
responsibilities of the Union, there is not much on what these responsibilities 
are, how the changes in the theory and practice of statebuilding affects 
previously assumed responsibilities, when/ how responsibilities end, when is 
a good time for exit and who will be held responsible if there is failure (ESS 																																																								
70 In fact, the static definition of responsibility makes change possible, without engaging in a time 
consuming debate on whether past responsibilities have been fulfilled, what new responsibilities are 
and whether they are realistic. The continuous stream of new initiatives, especially since the CSDP 
became operational in 2003, would not have been possible otherwise (Adebahr: 2011).  
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Report: 2008). Change might help close the “capacity gap”, but constantly 
creates new responsibilities while previous responsibilities are left unfulfilled 
and the incentive to address them disappears.  
 
4.3.2.2 Technocratic statebuilding vs. political statebuilding: 
 
The framing of statebuilding as a technical rather than a political exercise, 
while accepting its essentially political nature at the narrative level is another 
inherent responsibility gap. This is especially visible in the case of the EU, 
whose involvement in statebuilding is an essential part of its identity 
formation and norm promotion (Lucarelli: 2006, Giddens: 1979, Keukelaire 
and Delreux: 2014). In fact, in discourse, the EU accepts conflict prevention as 
a political exercise (Commission: 2001). The importance it attaches to early 
warning analysis, political dialogue, mediation and negotiation, the necessity 
of political, economic and social analysis across pillars, the use of EUSR’s as 
well as traditional political tools such as demarches, statements and especially 
sanctions as mentioned previously indicates an essentially political framing 
by the EU of conflicts. It talks about its goal to promote its own values, norms 
and model (ESS: 2003, ESS Report: 2008). In fact, its choice of statebuilding 
(capacity building) as the best way forward for the sustainable prevention of 
conflicts in countries whose sovereignty is problematized is in itself a 
political/normative choice.  
 
On the other hand, the EU also defines itself as a “neutral, credible and ethical 
actor” that bridges gaps between different sides. Rather than assuming 
responsibility in the success or failure of peace processes or the successful 
implementation of peace agreements, it presents itself as a technical and 
neutral actor with a political touch that can do good. In practice, it mostly 
follows the technocratic guidelines of the statebuilding frame, which 
attributes technocratic, almost scientific responsibilities to the international 
community. The bureaucratic nature of the Union and the difficulties of 
reaching common ground on highly politicized issues among 28 member 
states strengthen the necessity of framing statebuilding as a technical exercise. 
This is the second element of the responsibility gap. 
 
4.3.2.3 The dilemmas of local ownership and sovereignty: 
 
Following the statebuilding frame, the EU derives its legitimacy from its 
purpose to restore full sovereignty to conflict countries and prioritizes local 
ownership as a principle and an end goal. At the same time, the EU discourse 
also emphasizes the importance of long-term comprehensive commitments to 
conflict countries in the form of capacity building. In countries where 
sovereignty is problematized, the international community (the EU) in fact 
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plays a key role in the creation of new political and institutional rules in post-
conflict settings, sometimes even performing quasi –government functions, 
and creates a modus vivendi based on external influence through the 
application of technocratic guidelines (Paris: 2002, Samuels: 2009).  
 
The EU discourse reflects this dilemma well. For instance, the EU Council 
Conclusions on Afghanistan adopted at the Foreign Affairs Council in June 
2014 states that “The EU has made an exceptional commitment to 
Afghanistan over the past 12 years to work with Afghans and the wider 
international community to support the development of a state that could 
better control its territory, reduce the threat posed by terrorism, address the 
needs and fulfill the rights of its people. Real progress has been made. But 
there are still considerable challenges to be overcome to help Afghanistan 
become a stable and functioning democracy able to offer the sort of future to 
its people that they want and deserve”71. This way, the EU defines its 
commitment to supporting reaching full sovereignty and local ownership in 
Afghanistan in the first line, problematizes the sovereignty of the state in the 
second line by making judgment on how much progress has been achieved, 
and points out to the direction Afghanistan should head if it wants to achieve 
full sovereignty in the third. While problematizing Afghan sovereignty, it still 
defines its (and the international community’s role as a support function, but 
still clearly points out to the steps that should be taken by Afghanistan in the 
years ahead, despite its emphasis on local ownership.   
 
4.3.3 Discursive safeguards: 
 
Before moving on to the discursive safeguards employed by the EU to ward 
off challenges to the dominant narratives, we will first look into the responses 
to challenges within the statebuilding frame, dubbed as “fine-tuning efforts”. 
Afterwards, in the spirit of the previous chapter, we will first look at the 
discursive safeguards adopted that respond to “responsibility gaps”, and 
later further elaborate on the concept of entrapment as a risk of applying 
discursive safeguards.  
 
Improving the practices of conflict response and statebuilding is an important 
part of the EU’s foreign policy, as well as its identity. There has been a 
continuous stream of new initiatives attempted to addressing outstanding 
problems building on past experiences and lessons learned. However, the EU 
discourse on reform is mostly centered on institutional reform and technical 
																																																								
71 EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Afghanistan, adopted on 23 June 2014 in Luxembourg. See 
text at http://www.gr2014.eu/sites/default/files/FAC%20Conclusion%206_0.pdf.  
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problems and have not done much to address the numerous responsibility 
gaps outlined above. 
 
The problems related to coordination among different actors in all stages of 
conflict have been cited as a barrier hampering functional and effective crisis 
management. The dominance of intergovernmentalism in the EU’s foreign 
policy – the search for consensus – has paralyzed Europe’s ability to act 
efficiently and rapidly on the international scene; often resulting in foreign 
policy consensus being sought at a “lowest common denominator” around 
which the member states can build their own platforms and programs 
(Gardner and Eizenstat: 2010, Simms: 2012). The Lisbon Treaty (2007) helped 
address the tension between treaty-based requirements for consistency and 
policy-based pragmatism, as well as the difficulties in achieving vertical 
consistency between the EU and its member states as well as horizontal 
consistency between different policy fields, pillars and institutions to a certain 
extent (Wolff and Whitman: 2011). Yet, sometimes these efforts have also 
made European structures more complex. Despite efforts to boost the civilian, 
military and coordination capabilities of the Union, response capacity issues 
prevail (Whitman and Wolff: 2011). In terms of ESDP missions, many states 
are reluctant to send highly qualified personnel, the turnover rate is high, 
financial constraints and inaccurate planning prevails (Pirozzi: 2011). The 
civilian component is largely underresourced and the aspects of 
interoperability; deployability, sustainability and quality are largely neglected 
(Pirozzi: 2011). 
 
Moreover, fine-tuning efforts have mostly prioritized the need to ensure a 
presence and visibility on the ground; while the focus on qualitative methods 
that would boost functionality and effectiveness have been lagged behind. 
This leads to criticisms that the EU’s involvement in conflict prevention aims 
“flag raising” above others - the concentration has been “looking good on the 
ground” rather than effective and responsible implementation of 
statebuilding. 
 
The persistence of technical problems in the EU’s conflict response efforts and 
technical efforts to overcome them is an interesting issue. However, the 
success or failure of the fine-tuning efforts of the EU is not the immediate 
concern of this thesis. The goal is rather to look at the responsibility gaps, 
particularly the ones cited above (irresponsiveness to change, technical 
framing, prioritization of local ownership in discourse while actions suggest 
otherwise); and present the concept of “discursive safeguards” as a response 
to the responsibility gaps. The last part of the thesis will aim to achieve this.  
 
4.3.3.1 The element of change: 
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The “responsibility gap” between the changing nature of statebuilding and 
the way this affects external responsibilities on one hand; and the relatively 
static definition of responsibilities by the statebuilding frame on the other was 
previously explained. Three elements of the dominant statebuilding narrative 
help conceal this gap from challenges emanating from alternative discourses.  
 
First, the statebuilding frame defines responsibilities in a narrow, limited and 
temporary manner. Secondly, the external responsibilities are not set out in a 
detailed manner but are kept general and vague, so they do not have to be 
adapted to the changes in statebuilding. Finally, the responsibility discourse 
concentrates on the intentions for the future (prospective responsibilities), 
rather than the (retrospective) impact of intervention. As a result, even when 
the purposes, methods, goals and results of statebuilding change, a thorough 
analysis on shifting external responsibilities can be avoided.  
  
Simply looking at different mission mandates indicates the emphasis on the 
“temporary support” function of the EU in different contexts. On Bosnia, “it is 
the EU's aim to support and embed a stable and viable Bosnia and 
Herzegovina co-operating peacefully with its neighbours and irreversibly on 
track towards EU membership”. “Helping the Malian authorities consolidate 
peace and security” is presented as the EU’s purpose in Mali. In Afghanistan, 
“the EU supports the transition in Afghanistan through a comprehensive 
approach covering political, security and development support”. The EUPOL 
COPPS mission in Palestine “supports the reform and development of the 
police and judicial institutions”72. The word “support” is one of the most 
emphasized words in the EU’s discourse. Many of these mission descriptions 
do go on to explain different responsibilities of the EU ranging from 
supporting the development of policing and judicial institutions to 
governance and economic development; yet, the general responsibility 
relationship between the EU and the countries in question rests on the generic 
definition of the statebuilding frame with reliance on the primary 
responsibility of the state. Moreover, even in theatres where the modalities of 
international and EU involvement have been subject to great change, like in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, responsibilities are always defined in a forward 
looking manner while the past is mentioned in a vague way that applauds the 																																																								
72 See the mission statement of the Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovia at 
www.europa.ba, the mission description of the EUTM in Mali at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-
and-operations/eutm-mali/mission-description/index_en.htm, the European Union Special 
Representative in Afghanistan and Office of the Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan’s 
statement at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/more_info/eusr/index_en.htm and the 
mission description of EUPOL COPPS at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eupol-
copps-palestinian-territories/mission-description/index_en.htm. (All websites accessed on 19 February 
2016).  
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EU’s past involvement and commitment. For instance, in Bosnia, the 
European integration process lies at the core of the European narratives, even 
though the EU was involved in BiH for many years preceding the granting of 
a EU perspective to the country73.  
 
4.3.3.2 Statebuilding as a universal and technical exercise: 
 
Defining statebuilding as a technical exercise constructed around universal 
best practices leads to a responsibility gap, since the responsibility frame does 
not address the political and normative aspects of statebuilding. Three 
elements can be identified in the EU’s discourse to help conceal the 
responsibility gap.  
 
First, the mission mandates of EU missions that are involved in statebuilding 
functions tend to frame their activities in a technical manner. Their purposes 
are defined as supporting the rule of law, training the security forces, helping 
institution-building, fostering human rights – coinciding with the 
statebuilding guidelines. Narratives on statebuilding continue to avoid or 
downplay issues of history, culture and identity, in favor of a quantitative 
and technocratic approach based on the statebuilding frame (Berger and 
Weber: 2006, Berger: 2006, Held: 2009). The framing of statebuilding as a 
technical exercise, by compartmentalizing it and technicalizing its 
components, allows the framework of success to be defined in a limited way 
and makes it quantitatively measurable. Actors, which fulfill the narrow set of 
requirements they set for themselves through technical guidelines, define 
themselves as responsible. Diverting responsibility from solving the conflict 
to successful applying technical guidelines helps avoid the responsibilities 
which arise from impact; such as the erosion of state capacity and legitimacy 
resulting from the international community taking over management of 
institutions and provision of basic services (De Guevara: 2010, Zartman: 
1995). When the positive impact of implementing individual elements of the 
statebuilding frame on the overall purpose conflict resolution and 
establishing full sovereignty of the state as a whole is unclear, defining 
responsibility in a narrow and technical sense serves as a discursive safeguard 
making engagement in statebuilding more risk-free. 
 
In addition to shaping mandates in technical terms, the narrow and limited 
scope of ESDP missions also serves as a safeguard (Menon: 2009, Cornish and 
Edwards: 2001, Jacobsen: 2006). The track record of the EU in achieving a 																																																								
73 The website of the Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovia and the EU Special 
Representative to BiH indicates a clear European integration focus; featured at 
http://europa.ba/Default.aspx?id=10&lang=EN (Accessed on 19 February 2016). 
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lasting and positive impact on conflicts beyond narrow mandates is unclear 
(Whitman and Wolff: 2011). In fact, less ambitious missions experience fewer 
difficulties in reaching operability and delivering on their mandates. For 
example, the operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic in Congo in 2003 
had such a limited mandate that it was difficult to even assess its success 
(Vines: 2010). Limited mandates are also due to a compromise between 
member states pushing a variety of agendas and logistical limitations (Vines: 
2010). 
 
Finally, framing statebuilding as a “universal best practice” helps dilute the 
responsibility of making a political choice to select and engage in 
statebuilding as a type of conflict resolution activity. For instance, the EU 
document entitled “European security and defence policy: the civilian aspects 
of crisis management”, while explaining the intentions and activities of 
various EU missions around the globe, makes direct reference to international 
best practices on various occasions, like on the EU Police Mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, EUPOL COPPS in Palestine and EUPOL in Kinshasa74.  
 
The case of the EU is particularly interesting in the application of technical 
guidelines. The difficulties in taking the lead in defining policy and the 
dependence on other actors such as the NATO and the US in this sphere 
allows the Union defining its role in conflict prevention as technical. The lack 
of clarity of mandates and future roles beyond technical definitions also helps 
avoiding responsibility of the entire project (Vines: 2010). The inconsistency 
between the strong rhetoric and normative principles of the EU and the 
relative weakness of its policies and practices on the ground are often cited as 
a problem with the EU’s foreign policy (Wolff and Whitman: 2011). Technical 
safeguards help conceal this problem, by legitimizing statebuilding as the 
technical implementation of a normative discourse in practice.  
 
4.3.3.3 Local ownership and state sovereignty:  
 
The emphasis on local ownership and state sovereignty serves as another 
discursive safeguard that helps counter alternative discourses. Three 
safeguards particularly come to the fore; a) the setting of the main intention as 
the restoration of full sovereignty to the country, b) the emphasis placed on 
the primary responsibility of the nation state and c) the framing as the 
intervention “for the sake of the local populations”. These help cover up the 
responsibility gap between emphasizing responsibilities and ownership of the 																																																								
74 See ¨European security and defence policy: the civilian aspects of crisis management¨, August 2009, 
available at 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/090702%20Civilian%20aspects%20of%20crisis%20manag
ement%20-%20version%203_EN.pdf  (Accessed on 19 February 2016). 
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Other when the sovereignty has been problematized and there is not a 
capable state in question, as well as the gap created when intending local 
ownership when intrusive acts on the ground produce the opposite result.   
 
Multiple examples can be provided from the EU’s discourse. The EU 
Council’s Conclusions of the EU’s comprehensive approach from May 2014 
connects the key principle of local ownership in conflict resolution to the EU’s 
comprehensive approach75. The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent 
Conflicts (2001) defines one of the main roles of the EU’s conflict prevention 
strategy as “assistance to local and regional capacity building according to 
principles of local ownership”. Most ESDP mission statements make reference 
to the core intention to the well-being of the local populations76, while the 
emphasis on the primary responsibilities of nation states is common.   
 
4.3.3.4 Difficulty in the attribution of responsibility:   
 
Moral agency is a core element of the moral responsibility framework. Yet, 
finding a specific address to define Europe as a single morally responsible 
entity has traditionally been a problem; the most famous quote in this respect 
being the one attributed to Henry Kissinger in the 70’s on “who he would call 
if he wanted to call Europe”. Indeed, agency in conflict resolution necessitates 
a coordinated, coherent and consistent foreign policy that reconciles 
competing objectives and sets priorities through employing the right tools 
(Toje: 2011). 
 
The EU’s construction as a foreign policy actor brought forward many new 
responsibilities. Reconciling new (first pillar) elements of crisis management 
with the already existing structural instruments of the Community has been a 
major challenge of CSDP, negatively affecting decision-making and 
functionality (Gardner and Eizenstat: 2010, Toje: 2011, Bird: 2007, Cornish and 
Edwards: 2001). CFSP instruments infringe on the Community competencies, 
like democratization, human rights and socio-economic reconstruction 
(Gebhard: 2010). A major problem is overrepresentation. With the Lisbon 
Treaty (2007), the new High Representative has a central role in foreign 
policy, but four other commissioners are responsible for foreign policy issues: 
international trade, enlargement, neighborhood policy, international 
cooperation and humanitarian aid/ crisis response  (Gardner and Eizenstat: 																																																								
75 See the Council Conclusions on the EU’s Comprehensive Approach, adopted at the Foreign Affairs 
Council Meeting at Brussels on 12 May 2014, at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142552.pdf (Accessed on 19 
February 2016). 
76  See the mission statements of various EU missions at http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-
operations/index_en.htm. (Accessed on 19 February 2016).  
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2010, Cameron: 2012). There are a wide range of different EU policies and 
institutions with no single executor – the right and responsibility to 
coordinate is shared between the two constituent actors (TEU). The 
intergovernmental nature of CFSP and principles being agreed at the ¨lowest 
common denominator¨ raises the question how much it makes sense to 
attribute responsibility on substantial issues beyond the member states of the 
Union (Gardner and Eizenstat: 2010).  
 
The issues stated above are often cited as problems of the EU’s foreign policy, 
but they also serve as a safeguard. In discourse, there seems to be assumption 
of responsibility as the European Union (Commission: 2001, ESS: 2003, 
Lisbon: 2007, ESS Report: 2008). However, due to the complex structure of the 
Union, the agent responsible for the delivery of these responsibilities as well 
as the unintended impacts is less clear, despite numerous efforts to “find an 
address to Europe” to determine who is responsible for statebuilding and 
conflict prevention (Maastricht: 1992, Lisbon: 2008). This makes it easier to 
avoid responsibility, especially since success is defined based on more limited 
and technical mandates where responsibility is attributed to specific actors in 
the EU system, such as EU police missions while the overall responsibility for 
taking part in the statebuilding frame is unclear.  
 
4.3.4 Responsibility Gaps and Discursive Safeguards: The EU Example 
 
Below is a chart that aims to summarize the key findings on the responsibility 
gap and discursive safeguards with a focus on the EU, built upon the 
elements put forward previously in this chapter. This chart will be tested in 
the case study with specific examples of discourse, in order to attribute 
responsibility in a more fair fashion, attach specific context to the 
“responsibility gap” and identify discursive safeguards.  
 
 Responsibility Gap: Discursive Safeguard: 
 Change - The static nature of the 
definition of responsibility by the 
statebuilding frame, compared 
with the changing nature of 
statebuilding. 
- Creation of new responsibilities 
while previous responsibilities 
left unfulfilled. 
- Focus remains on efforts to close 
the capacity gap.  
 
 - Responsibilities are defined in a 
narrow, limited and temporary 
manner. 
- External responsibilities are not 
clearly defined, by kept general and 
vague. 
- The narrative concentrates on 
responsibilities for the future 
(prospective responsibilities), rather 
than responsibilities of past impact 




- Framing of statebuilding as a 
technical exercise while accepting 
its political nature in discourse. 
- Mission mandates frame their roles 
and responsibilities in a technical 
manner. 
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-  Presentation of the Union as a 
neutral, credible and ethical actor 
that is committed to do good.  
- The bureaucratic nature of the 
Union, the difficulties of reaching 
common ground on politicized 
issues among 28 member states 
also leads to framing 
statebuilding as a technical 
exercise.  
- Mission mandates are often limited 
in size and narrow in scope.  
- The focus is on following universal 




- While deriving legitimacy from 
restoring full sovereignty to 
conflict countries, the actual 
intentions as well as the impact of 
intervention often produces 
opposite results.  
- Problematizing sovereignty and 
adopting an intrusive role in 
countries lead to increased 
responsibilities for intervenors, 
despite the narrow framing of the 
statebuilding frame.  
 
-  The setting of the main intention as 
the restoration of full sovereignty to 
the country,  
- The emphasis placed on the 
primary responsibility of the nation 
state,  
- The framing as the intervention 




- Despite institutional 
improvements, no single address 
where responsibility can be 
attributed. 
- Agent of responsibility is not 
clear, especially on the ground.  
- Lowest common denominator 
as a decision-making system 
makes attribution of 
responsibility on substantial 
issues difficult.  
- It is not clear whom to attribute 
responsibility, to the Union in 
general, or the more narrow body 
directly responsible for 
implementing specific parts of 
statebuilding guidelines.  
- “Europe” often manages to avoid 
responsibility, whereas the smaller 
missions have narrowly defined 




























































5. STATEBUILDING IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
In January 2014, riots broke out in more than 20 towns and cities across 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia).77 People took to the streets, setting fire to 
government buildings and hurling rocks at the police.78 The reasons for the 
protests had to do with a long-simmering discontent in the society. The 
sluggish economy, political stagnation, bureaucratic mismanagement, 
corruption, unemployment and the lack of future economic and political 
prospects had long been frustrating Bosnians.  
 
In statements during and after the riots, the EU Enlargement Commissioner 
Stefan Füle stated that it was not the EU that had failed, but the Bosnian 
leaders who had failed to listen to their people79. EU High Representative 
Catherine Ashton stated that “the first and biggest responsibility [lay] with 
the political leaders of the country”80. The British Foreign Minister Hague 
tweeted that that Bosnia’s falling out of Europe’s radar had contributed to the 
problems. Meanwhile, Bosnian leaders were blaming other ethnic leaders and 
groups for the rioting, dubbing the crisis as an ethnic power struggle instead 
of a cry for desperation (Meyer: 2014). Some weeks later, with the start of the 
crisis in Ukraine, Bosnia was once again off the global radar.  
 
In the following Security Council meeting on Bosnia in May 2014, High 
Representative Valentin Inzko portrayed a grim picture of the situation, 
listing challenges to territorial integrity, the halt in progress towards Euro-
Atlantic integration, mounting economic and social problems, corruption, and 
interethnic tensions among the gravest of the country’s many problems. He 
argued that “the actions and behavior of some elected officials and political 
leaders suggested they had learned little from the mistakes of the past, and 
(…) progress on Euro-Atlantic integration had ground to a halt despite efforts 
by the EU and NATO, due to the inability of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
political leaders”. European countries and the US called on Bosnian leaders to 
proceed with the reform processes, while the EU Representative argued that 
the country’s “continuing challenges largely stemmed from a lack of political 																																																								
77 Bosnia and Herzegovina will be referred to as Bosnia for convenience. The name of the country, Bosna i 
Hercegovina (BiH), is also sometimes used to make clear that the reference is to the country as a whole. 
78 The protests mostly took place in the Bosniak-Croat entity called the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, although there were smaller scale protests in big cities like Banja Luka in the Serb entity 
Republika Srpska. See The Guardian, ¨Bosnia-Herzegovina hit by wave of violent protests¨, 7 February 
2014. 
79 Füle was mainly referring to the inability of the Bosnian leaders to implement the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights on the Sejdic – Finci case, which will be analyzed in detail further in 
this chapter.  
80 Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and the end of the visit to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brussels, 12 March 2014.  
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will to look beyond narrow ethnic and party interests to seek the 
compromises required to move the country forward.” On the other hand, the 
Bosnian Ambassador claimed that Bosnia was doing its best to advance 
towards sustainability and Euro-Atlantic integration, while Jordan stressed 
that “the international community must look deeper into the reasons behind 
the persisting tensions and determine what could be done to reverse the 
gradual deterioration of the political condition”.81 
 
Even these latest two episodes indicate the lack of consensus on the 
responsibilities of the relevant actors in Bosnia. When such non-definitions or 
inconsistencies exist, this “can lead to attributing (…) responsibilities to some 
institutions beyond their capabilities, while leaving more appropriate actors 
off the hook” (Erskine: 2003). Agents of responsibility can be left to arbitrarily 
constructing their responsibility narratives based on their own interests and 
world visions. To help fill this gap or at least reflect on it, this study aims to 
look into responsibilities and discursive safeguards of the European Union in 
Bosnia, since the signature of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) ending the 3.5-
year war in December 1995. 
 
Bosnia is a good case study on the responsibilities of international and 
European actors for many reasons. The international community has been 
strongly influential in ending the war and establishing the framework of post-
war Bosnia. They have donated massive financial and personnel resources 
towards the implementation of this framework. The comprehensive and 
intrusive manner post-conflict intervention was conducted in Bosnia had 
often led to its dubbing as an experiment for Western statebuilding efforts; 
indeed the post-conflict stage of many later interventions such as Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq did borrow much from the Bosnian model (Meyer: 2014, 
Donais: 2005). Bosnia was also the birthplace of the European Security and 
Defence Policy (ESDP), where different conflict management tools were 
deployed on the ground since the late 1990’s. Bosnia was one of the first 
places where the viability of European integration as a tool for (violent) 
conflict resolution was tested. International efforts have helped stopped the 
war. Bosnia has moved from a conflict country to a troop contributing 
country (TCC) and has served on the Security Council from 2010-2011.   
 
Yet, the international experiment in Bosnia has had its shortcomings. Deep 
divisions in the society about the future organization and direction of Bosnia 
as well as mistrust among different ethnic groups prevail. The path to EU 
membership – seen by many as the only viable way to sustainable peace in 																																																								
81  See the meeting summaries of the UN Security Council, at 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2014/sc11398.doc.htm. (Accessed on 19 February 2016) 
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Bosnia – seems stalled (Belloni: 2007, Bose: 2007, Aybet and Bieber: 2011, 
Tzifakis: 2012, ICG: 2012). And there is no clear recipient for responsibility, 
the blame is placed by different actors in different directions, such as on the 
international community, corrupt politicians, ancient hatreds, 
interventionism, non-interventionism and the EU (Hansen: 2006, Aybet and 
Bieber: 2011). 
 
The purpose is not to find ways to ascribe blame to the international 
community or the EU for the recent events, or even the hardship and 
stagnation faced in Bosnia. It merely aims to use Bosnia as a case study to test 
the arguments of previous chapters, on responsibility gaps and discursive 
safeguards. The initial question will be whether the international community 
and/or EU’s involvement in Bosnia fits into the statebuilding frame, both in 
discourse and in practice, in order “to avoid EU-bashing at one extreme and 
absolving it from any responsibility on the other” (Manners: 2008, Smith: 
2008, Wolff and Whitman: 2012).  This will be done in two ways; first by 
looking into the evolution of statebuilding in Bosnia, and secondly by looking 
into the post-conflict intervention in Bosnia from the perspective of 
statebuilding guidelines – in order to see how the EU fits in the statebuilding 
framework. Both hats of the EU in Bosnia will be scrutinized – a statebuilding 
actor and the driver of European integration. This exercise will provide the 
necessary elements for the next chapter – an in depth analysis on the 
responsibility gaps faced by the EU in BiH and the associated discursive 
safeguards.  
 
5.1 The Evolution of Statebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
 
The changing nature of external statebuilding efforts, together with the 
constant shift in and development of the EU’s foreign policy identity and 
practices makes the analysis on the Union as an external actor in statebuilding 
particularly interesting. This part aims to add the BiH context into the 
equation, to see how this interesting dynamic has played out in practice. The 
core questions to be answered will be a) whether and to what extent the EU’s 
role in BiH fits into the statebuilding frame and b) how can moral 
responsibility be attributed to the EU. Rather than conducting an analysis on 
the entire international intervention in BiH, the goal is limited to looking at it 
simply as a case to shed light into how responsibility gaps and discursive 
safeguards look in practice.  
 
5.1.1 The war in Bosnia: 
 
The brutal war in Bosnia in 1992-1995 left than 100.000 people dead, over 2 
million people displaced internally and externally and devastated the 
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economy, infrastructure and social fabric of the country82. Different responses 
of the Security Council during the conflict, from establishing an international 
tribunal for war criminals, calling for no-fly zones and establishing and 
protecting the safe havens83 did not help stop the war, protect civilians, or 
prevent tragedies such as the Srebrenica genocide 84 . UN peacekeeping 
(UNPROFOR) was reduced to an ineffective fire brigade trying to contain 
eruptions of violence (Bose: 2007). International efforts to mediate peace, 
suggesting the application of different models of power-sharing agreements, 
were not conclusive 85 . The Croat-Bosniak war ended in 1994 with the 
Washington Agreement mediated by the US and signed by the warring 
parties in March 199486. The Bosnian war was concluded with the help of the 
NATO intervention, as well as US military aid to the Croats and Bosniaks87 
(Bose: 2007).  In September 1995, an agreement of basic principles for a peace 
accord was reached between Bosnia, Croatia and Yugoslavia. The Dayton 
Peace Accords (DPA) was signed on 14 December 1995.  
 
The human tragedy in Bosnia and its negative effect on regional/international 
stability shattered the naïve hopes that a smooth and peaceful transition 
towards a functioning international order would take place after the Cold 
War. The unfounded self-confidence of the EU, famously exemplified by the 
																																																								
82  A referendum in Bosnia on sovereignty on 1 March 1992, which was boycotted by the Serb 
population, resulted in %98 of the participants voting in favour. The Bosnian parliament declared 
independence on 3 March 1992 and received recognition by the United States and the European Union 
in the course of 3 days (Bose: 2007). The start of the war is often set to 5 April 1992, the day when Serb 
gunmen fired onto a peace rally in Sarajevo that led to casualties. By the end of 1992, the militarily 
strong Serb forces aided by paramilitary forces from the rump Yugoslavia had seized more than two 
thirds of Bosnia, alongside an ethnic cleansing campaign that killed or expelled thousands of non-Serbs. 
Fighting betweeb Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats broke out in 1993 (Andreatta: 1997, Holbrooke: 1999, 
Bose: 2002). 
83  UN Security Council Resolution 808(1993) and 827(1993) relate to the international tribunal, 
Resolution 816 (1993) is about the no-fly zone. Resolution 824 (1993) declared safe havens around 
Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Bihac; and Resolution 836 (1993) authorized the use of force 
by UNPROFOR in protection of the safe zones and a naval blockade in the Adriatic Sea. 
84 In 2004, in an unanimous ruling on the case ¨Prosecutor vs Krstic¨, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
ruled that the massacre in Srebrenica constituted genocide, confirmed later by the International Court of 
Justice, in the case on the ¨Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro)¨. See www.icj-cij.org and 
www.icty.org for further information (Accessed on 19 February 2016).  
85 The Carrington – Cutilerio Plan (1992) was rejected by the Bosniaks who were against partition on 
ethnic basis, the Vance-Owen Plan (1993) was rejected by the Republika Srpska National Assembly, the  
Owen-Stoltenberg Plan (1993) which proposed ethnic-mini states was rejected once again by the 
Bosniaks. and the Contact Group Plan (1994) was rejected by the Serbs at a referendum in the RS. 
86  The agreement divided the combined territory held by the Croats and the Bosniaks into ten 
autonomous cantons, thereby establishing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). 
87 As large-scale massacres like Markale (which killed 68 people in a single mortar attack in 1994), 
NATO started launching air attacks at the request of the UN. The US unilaterally lifted the arms 
embargo in November 1994. With the help of NATO attacks against Bosnian Serb forces supported by 
UNPROFOR, the Bosnian-Croat alliance gained initiative in the war in 1995.  
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line of Luxembourg’s then Foreign Minister Poos “the hour of Europe”88, 
rapidly faded as the devastation of the 3.5 year war underscored deficiencies 
of military capacity, diplomatic tools, crisis management mechanisms and 
lack of cohesion among member states89 (Andreatta: 1997, Belloni: 2009).  The 
conflict was brought to an end by the US/NATO-led military intervention; 
exposing Europe’s inability to provide security in its own neighborhood 
(Gardner and Eizenstat: 2010).  
 
A thorough soul-searching was conducted later on. The apparent need for 
better international conflict response theories and mechanisms eventually led 
to the emergence of concepts such as humanitarian intervention and 
statebuilding. Europe’s failure to respond catalyzed the development of the 
European foreign and security policy tools (Toje: 2011). The intentions of the 
EU to become a global player that could bring peace, stability and prosperity 
in its neighborhood persisted; yet the development of new tools and 
capabilities would be necessary towards that end.  
 
5.1.2 The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA):  
 
The DPA is a forced compromise, not only between the peoples of Bosnia but 
also among different interests and principles of the international community. 
Throughout the war in Yugoslavia, the partition of BiH by using force was 
seen as an unacceptable moral compromise by international actors.90 Yet, 
growing economic, social and security risks to Europe, humanitarian concerns 
and the increasing loss of credibility of the UN, EU and the international 
community required urgent solutions (Bose: 2002, Belloni: 2007). A 
compromise necessitated factoring in the new political geography and ethno-
territorial divisions of BiH (Belloni: 2007).  Consequently, DPA introduced a 
convoluted system based on strong ethnic protections, a recipe of institutional 
and multiple power-sharing at several layers of executive and legislative 
power, ethnoterritorial autonomy and comprehensive international 
involvement (Lijphart: 2008, Bose: 2007, Belloni: 2007, O’Leary and 
McCrudden: 2013, Tzifakis: 2012). Multiple levels of bureaucracy and 																																																								
88 See New York Times, on June 29, 1991, ¨Conflict in Yugoslavia: Europeans send high-level team¨.  
89 Preceding and during the war, the European Community employed traditional diplomatic tools; 
hosting conferences, establishing bodies to recommend EU policy during the crisis, sending high-level 
mediation teams to Belgrade and warning of sanctions.  
90 Many statements in this direction were made at UN Security Council meetings held between 1992-
1994. On 13 November 1992, for example, the British Representative stated that ¨The international 
community will not accept the partition of BiH into unilaterally declared so-called republics¨. On 29 June 1993, 
the Pakistani representative argued that ¨to subscribe to the so-called plan for the partition of BiH would be a 
mistake of monumental and historic proportions¨. Cyrus Vance, former UN Special Envoy to Bosnia, on 13 
November 1992 emphasized that ¨from the outset of our work, we had rejected partition¨. Meeting records 
are available at the UN Library and online at http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/. (Accessed on 19 
February 2016) 
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government existed under a weak Bosnian state. The two entities under the 
state, both established preceding the DPA, had their own constitutions, 
executive and legislative structures and self-governing powers (the Republika 
Srpska - RS and the Bosniak – Croat Federation of BiH - FBiH), as well as the 
territory of Brcko. Power was further decentralized at the FBiH to its 10 
cantons, and both entities have municipal structures underneath.  
 
The international community was instrumental in the structuring of the DPA 
framework (O’Leary and McCrudden: 2013). US lawyers put together the 
constitution of Bosnia (the 4th Annex of DPA). Its 10th Annex introduced a 
civilian framework aimed at strengthening state institutions and promoting 
reconciliation. This framework ascribed international organizations many 
complex tasks such as humanitarian aid, rehabilitation of infrastructure and 
economic reconstruction, institution building, promotion of human rights, the 
return of displaced persons and refugees and the holding of free and fair 
elections91. The role of the international community was embedded in other 
annexes of DPA as well92. It calls upon the international community to assist 
the process, and designates an international High Representative to monitor 
DPA implementation and mobilize and coordinate organizations involved 
(Sebastian: 2012). DPA framed the international civilian role as supporting 
capacity building in fragile Bosnia as part of a comprehensive strategy of 
conflict prevention.  
 
DPA held negative elements associated with consociationism; the lack of 
integrative elements, insufficient electoral and political incentives for 
cooperation, confirmation of ethno-territorial boundaries, discouraged 
cooperation among ethnic groups, decentralization of political authority, 
empowerment of (the interests of) nationalist elites due to focus on group 
solidarity, slow and often deadlocked decision-making, discrimination 
towards national minorities as well as the disparity between the more 
centralized RS and the more layered FBiH (Bose: 2007, Bieber: 2006, Bose: 
2002, Belloni: 2007). Yet, it brought peace to a protracted conflict (O’Leary and 
McCrudden: 2013). It is “a masterpiece of ambiguity” or a “Pandora’s Box” 
that included delicate compromises, essential to reach peace but not a 
sustainable base of stability and prosperity (Donais: 2005). Each signatory, 
including the international community, held different and often incompatible 
interpretations on DPA meant. It was often dubbed as a framework to 
continue war in peacetime (Tzifakis: 2012). To make this framework function, 																																																								
91 See Annex 10 of the General Framework (Dayton) Agreement, at www.ohr.int/dpa.  
92 Such as the role of NATO/IFOR and IPTF in post-conflict stabilization (Annex 1A, 2 and 11), OSCE in 
confidence-building, human rights and elections (Annex 1A, 3, 6), Council of Europe and UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on human rights (Annex 6), UNHCR, ICRC and UNDP on refugee 
returns (Annex 7). 
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international actors were tasked to assist or oversee the transformation of 
Bosnia, to “lay the foundations of Bosnia” (Bose: 2007, Tzifakis: 2012).  
 
5.1.3 The early Post-Dayton years: Initial optimism (1995 – 1997): 
 
The civilian international intervention in BiH is an important milestone in the 
formation of the theory and practice of statebuilding. DPA was built on the 
understanding that effective institutions functioning based on democratic 
principles is the prerequisite of peace, and international actors can 
temporarily support capacity building efforts until sovereignty and local 
ownership was restored – similar to the way statebuilding frames 
international responsibilities. This dynamic of responsibility has prevailed in 
international discourse since 1995, although the methods of intervention, the 
international background, capacities of external actors and evaluations of the 
domestic situation have constantly changed.  
 
Post-DPA international intervention has been a struggle between the vision 
and interests of different local actors in Bosnia and the efforts of the 
international community to interpret and implement the main pillars of DPA 
according to liberal internationalist principles (Donais: 2005).  Two different 
elements of this vision can be identified in the dominant narrative. Preventing 
further conflict in Bosnia would stop the war that had cost lives and led to 
gross human rights abuses, displaced people, disrupted service delivery, 
hampered economic development and regional trade and threatened 
international peace and stability (Owen: 1995, Ashdown: 2007). It would also 
restore international, Western and European credibility damaged after the 
Yugoslav wars (Holbrooke: 1997).  
 
Although DPA laid the stones for a comprehensive international civilian 
response to Bosnia, the international community was naively optimistic in the 
early postwar years in its assumption that building peace would not be too 
difficult of an exercise (Bose: 2002, Belloni: 2007, Bieber). The early goals were 
diffusing tensions, building viable peace and laying the foundations of a 
country based on the principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law 
and free markets – the conditions that DPA had not yet created (Belloni: 
2007). The hope was that the consociational arrangement would wither away 
as the country moved from war and functioning institutions were established. 
The elections to be held a year after the peace agreement would reflect this 
stability, producing moderate and conciliatory political leadership that would 
assume the leading role in statebuilding, paving the exit of the massive 
international presence. The Declaration by the European Council on Former 
Yugoslavia in the 1996 Florence European Council stated that “Successful 
elections will allow the establishment and development of new political 
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institutions in the country as specified in the Peace Agreement. This is 
essential for the consolidation of a united, democratic State of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”.93 
 
To reach this vision, a passive and short-term approach based on optimistic 
calculations was adopted. A massive NATO-led international peacekeeping 
force, IFOR, was tasked for 12 months to ensure stability by physically 
separating the warring parties and monitoring the inter-entity boundary line 
(IEBL) (Bose: 2007, Bildt: 1998).94  The Office of the High Representative 
(OHR), responsible for the implementation of the civilian aspects of Dayton, 
initially had a limited function of overseeing and coordinating the activities of 
civilian agencies. To address the physical, economic and social devastation, 
the initial efforts focused on physical issues and financial aid95. However, the 
absence of an effective Bosnian state had also forced the international 
community to carry out essential state functions. The EU had not yet acquired 
the confidence and capabilities to overtake ambitious foreign and security 
policy tasks; it subscribed to the international vision for Bosnia and took a 
relatively minor role in peace implementation, with the exception of the 
Mostar mission between 1994-199696 (Toje: 2011, Keukelarie and Delreux: 
2014, Belloni: 2007). For instance, the Declaration by the European Council on 
Former Yugoslavia in 1996 stated that the EU “regards reconstruction as a 
crucial element in fostering reconciliation and promoting a progressive return 
to normal life (…), [the EU] will continue to support the economic recovery 
and rehabilitation of the country” (Toje: 2011). There was a vague 
commitment to BiH’s potential EU membership, lacking a firm promise and a 
road map.    
 
This initial involvement did not provide sustainable stability, foster the 
credibility of the international community or facilitate its exit. By 1997, the 
political institutions remained divided, the issues of state capacity and weak 
institutions persisted and the economy laid prey to parochial and other illegal 																																																								
93  See Presidency Conclusions of the Florence European Council of 1996, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0002.htm (Accessed on 25 
December 2014).  
94 60.000 NATO troops flooded into Bosnia in 1996, together with a civilian army of UN, OSCE, World 
Bank, UNHCR and other international personnel (Bose: 2007).  
95 For instance, after DPA was signed, a ¨Three to Four Year Priority Reconstruction and Recovery 
Program¨ was endorsed by international donors, that aimed to reconstruct war-damaged physical 
assets, jump start economic recovery, promote returns of refugees and displaced, and build a 
framework for sustainable growth (Commission: 1999). 
96  The EU Administration in Mostar was established based on the Geneva Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) signed between Bosniak and Croat politicians in April 1994, empowering the EU 
to administer Mostar until a more permanent solution was found. This mission was much criticized, as 
the EU was found too weak and trusting the good intentions of sides to be able to implement the MoU 
(ICG: 2000). 
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interests (Belloni: 2007). The 1996 elections saw the same parties responsible 
for the war dominating the political scene once again, perhaps due to the 
rushed way the elections were organized and the moderate parties being 
given limited time to organize (Bose: 2002). The massive yet ill-conceived 
nature of the international presence, the limited cooperation and coordination 
between the military and civilian external actors, the inability of the OHR to 
enforce Dayton implementation were cited as criticisms (Belloni: 2007). It was 
now clear that Bosnia would not automatically evolve towards an inclusive 
state based on individual rights. The international community would have to 
step up its efforts towards building a viable Bosnian state. As a result, IFOR, 
instead of leaving the country after a year’s presence, was transformed into a 
NATO Stabilization Force – SFOR. The OHR was reinforced with the 
introduction of the Bonn powers. A new era for Bosnia in particular and 
international intervention in general was launched. 
 
5.1.4 Comprehensive and intrusive statebuilding: 1998 - 2005  
 
5.1.4.1 The Bonn powers and beyond: 1998 – 2002: 
  
The international involvement in Bosnia changed dramatically in the late 90’s, 
coinciding with the change in the statebuilding frame towards hands-on, 
long-term and comprehensive civilian interventions (Ghani and Lockhart: 
2008, Chandler: 2010).97 The carefully crafted consociational balance in the 
Dayton Accords between keeping central state institutions while emphasizing 
the rights of constituent peoples and the jurisdiction of entities was now 
challenged by the international community, setting a new frame of 
involvement beyond the Dayton parameters (O’Leary and McCrudden: 2013).  
 
First, the international ambitions in Bosnia changed from reconstruction and 
stabilization to ensuring structural and institutional reforms (Belloni: 2007, 
Bose: 2002). Efforts that fell more into the statebuilding frame were 
increasingly emphasized within Dayton implementation, such as the 
promotion of democratization and human rights, economic development, 
regional cooperation and good governance (Belloni: 2007, Bieber: 2006). 
Secondly, the means and methods of international involvement shifted. On 
the security side, the PIC in Sintra in 1997 set the stage for a more assertive 
presence, stating that “attention must increasingly focus on long-term 
security arrangements, both within Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the wider 
region”98. On the civilian side, the groundbreaking development was the 
introduction of the Bonn powers in December 1997; a comprehensive and 																																																								
97 See the debates in the third and fourth chapters for further information.  
98 See the PIC Sintra Declaration, at www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5180 
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intrusive set of executive and legislative powers given to the High 
Representative to facilitate the implementation of the civilian aspects of DPA, 
such as imposing laws and sacking obstructive politicians99 (Venneri; 2010, 
Tzifakis: 2012, Belloni: 2007). However, the role of the OHR towards other 
international actors was still a coordinating, rather than executive role 
(Dursun – Oztunca: 2010). The Brussels PIC in 2000 committed to 
concentrating resources to statebuilding. The International Crisis Group 
(2002) defined the new framework of intervention as “an unrepeatable chance 
to push the Dayton Peace Accords to their limits and to permit Bosnia to 
become a functional multinational state”. 
 
The EU involvement in Bosnia was focused on two fronts. On the 
statebuilding side, the Union declared its adherence to the notion of “conflict 
prevention as a civilian and comprehensive exercise”, by emphasizing the 
importance of “focusing on the unfinished items of the institution-building 
and policy reform agenda in order to ensure that the economic recovery 
momentum that began by reconstruction can be maintained”100. Bosnia was 
also increasingly providing a context with optimal conditions for the EU to 
test its operational abilities, its ESDP and enlargement policies, as well as the 
European model as a regional framework for peace (Toje: 2011, Keukeleire 
and Delreux: 2014, Smith: 2008, Simms: 2012). The more substantial 
involvement of the EU began with the promise of the “fullest possible 
integration” of Western Balkans into Europe101 (Bose: 2007, Juncos: 2012). As 
enlargement policies also emphasize the importance of institution building 
and strengthening state institutions to fulfill the requirements of EU 
integration, a parallel between enlargement and statebuilding was inevitably 
drawn. Statebuilding would help Bosnia become a functional and viable state 
that could integrate into the EU, while the pull factor of Europe as well as the 
conditionality tool used for European integration would assist statebuilding 
efforts (Aybet and Bieber: 2011). The EU’s Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP) launched in 1999 for the Western Balkan countries102 captured 
both elements of stabilization and enlargement as indicated by its name; 
which emphasized applying the technical modalities of enlargement boosted 
by crisis management elements.  
 
The period saw many positive developments in Bosnia, with regards to the 
strengthening of central institutions and internal integration. A minimal 																																																								
99 See the PIC Bonn Conclusions, at www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182   
100 European Commission, 1999.  
101 The exact wording is from the Conclusions of the Feira European Council in 2000, although the 
promise was reiterated on a number of occasions by European officials and EU documents since 1999.   
102 See the Conclusions of the 1999 Cologne European Council at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/kol1_en.htm  
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institutional apparatus of the state was established, with bodies such as the 
Central Bank and the multi-ethnic State Border Service reinforced. A common 
currency was introduced in 1998, Bosnians started to cross the IEBL in 
increasing numbers, the security environment improved, and the return 
process accelerated. The removal of uncooperative politicians led to a forced 
moderation103. The ruling of the Constitutional Court in July 2000 ensured 
equitable representation and participation for non-Serbs in the RS and Serbs 
in the FBiH. The rules and regulations of elections were changed, allowing a 
moderate coalition to assume power in 2000 – although nationalist agendas 
and politicians continued to prevail (Bose: 2002, Chandler: 2005). On 
European integration, the European Commission in this period presented 
Bosnia with a roadmap of 18 priority reforms, and decided in 2002 that they 
were fulfilled sufficiently enough to recommend a feasibility study, indicating 
another set of 16 reforms for the start of SAA negotiations. Bosnia started to 
physically resemble a working state.   
 
The international engagement was criticized on a wide array of issues at the 
time. On the technical side, the lack of coordination and coherence between 
international actors, as well as EU institutions, and also duplication of efforts 
and tasks were cited. Criticisms also included the intrusive involvement, the 
contradiction this involvement posed with the defined goal of boosting state 
sovereignty and local ownership, the social-engineering of the state structure 
and institutions through undemocratic means, engagement mainly with the 
political elite (ESI: 2004, Gromes: 2009, Youngs: 2009, Aybet and Bieber: 2011). 
The High Representative, who gained vast control over the country with the 
introduction of the Bonn powers, was neither created nor accountable to the 
Bosnian people (Bose: 2007, Chandler: 2010). All this was in contrast with the 
original goals of statebuilding: local ownership and international exit (Belloni: 
2007, Venneri: 2010).  
 
5.1.4.2 Securitized Statebuilding and a Stronger Europe: 2002 – 2006 
  
The statebuilding agenda became progressively securitized after 2001, 
affecting the modalities of international involvement in Bosnia. As the Other 
became increasingly defined as the failed state that exacerbated threats to 
Western security and military engagement in places like Afghanistan and Iraq 
was prioritized, Bosnia started losing its prime place in the international 
intervention radar (ESS Report: 2008, Simms: 2012). PIC meetings were 
attended at lower levels; Bosnia featured less in international news. Coupled 
with the feeling that things were going well in the country, these 																																																								
103 For example, when the Croats declared self-rule in 2001, the international community responded 
strongly by sacking the Croat leader, Jelavic.  
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developments heightened the need to create conditions for exit. From 2003 
onwards, Mission Implementation Plans (MIP) were released to identify core 
objectives towards the successful completion of missions104. The securitization 
of the agenda, as well as a sense of urgency are visible in the PIC documents, 
with the focus on intelligence, defence and (after 2005) police reforms, as well 
as combatting organized crime and corruption105. 
 
Even if “many positive developments (…) had to be brought about by 
impositions of the High Representative”106, embedding the technical elements 
of statebuilding into the Bosnian system such as rule of law, economic 
liberalization, good governance, democratic state-level institutions would 
inevitably work towards self-sustainability and allow for the closure of the 
OHR, as put forward by the then High Representative Ashdown (Ashdown: 
2008, Sebastian: 2012). Many reforms undertaken between 1998 and 2005 were 
imposed or facilitated by the High Representative, such as the creation of a 
state-level intelligence agency, the unification of three armies, the creation of 
an integrated tax system, a state-level court, a single and state-wide customs 
administration, the abolishment of the rotation system for the Head of the 
Council of Ministers and the establishment of six new state level ministries for 
human rights, treasury, institutions, justice, security and defense107 (Sebastian: 
2012). Despite the intrusive agenda, local responsibilities were still 
emphasized; in a meeting on 14 December 2005 in Paris between the PIC 
Political Directors and Bosnian authorities, it was concluded that “the people 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina – by their own efforts and with practical and 
political help from their partners in the international community” had 
achieved a remarkable recovery since the end of the war.  
 
The role of the EU in Bosnia gradually increased. As the security threats 
elsewhere were moving the attention of the US and other actors away from 
Bosnia, the EU found a fertile ground to put its newly operationalized 
security and defense policy in practice. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) and 
the EUFOR-ALTHEA peacekeeping force took over from IPTF and SFOR. The 																																																								
104 See, for example, the Communique by the PIC Steering Board at its meeting in Sarajevo on 24 
September 2004, focusing on elements of the mission implementation plan emphasizing the completion 
of security sector reforms, the strengthening of the rule of law, economic reforms and facilitating the 
self-governing status of Brcko. See www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_is=33252. (Last accessed on 22 
December 2014).  
105 A relatively detailed analysis on police reform is featured in the Communique by the PIC Steering 
Board at its meeting in Sarajevo on 7 October 2005. A special department on organized crime briefed the 
Steering Board in its Brussels meeting on 3 February 2005.  
106 See the Communique of the PIC Steering Board Political Directors Meeting in Brussels on 28 March 
2003 in Brussels, at www.ohr.int (Accessed on 19 February 2016). 
107 See the Communiques by the PIC Steering Board for the period 2003 – 2006, at the website of the 
Office of the High Representative www.ohr.int/pic/archive.asp?sa=on  (Last accessed on 22 December 
2014). 
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High Representative was double hatted as a European Special Representative 
(EUSR). An EU Monitoring Mission monitored and reported on political and 
security developments from 2000-2007, as the Commission worked towards 
EU integration. More importantly, the Stabilization and Association Process 
(SAP) agenda created an informal marriage between the statebuilding and 
enlargement agendas, as both full sovereignty and Euro-Atlantic integration 
would be achieved through the fulfillment of a similar set of reforms 
(Venneri: 2010). Although the goal of enlargement was never fully embedded 
into the Dayton agenda, the PIC statements from 2002-2006 do stress that “the 
implementation of the reforms underway is essential not least for BiH’s 
aspirations for European integration” and focus on the progress Bosnia has 
made in terms of fulfilling the requirements of the EU feasibility study108. 
Similarly, the defense reform agenda was increasingly connected to NATO 
integration.  
 
The EU’s role was emphasized in two directions. First of all, as the SAP took 
root on the ground boosted by ESDP elements, the tools of soft power and 
conditionality were supposed to produce a chain of self-driven reforms and 
positively influence the domestic political sphere in support of the 
international agenda109 (Ashdown: 2008, Venneri: 2010, Belloni: 2009, Aybet 
and Bieber: 2011). The EU discourse carefully framed the EU’s involvement in 
the Western Balkans as European integration rather than statebuilding; 
resting on a vision of Bosnia taking the responsibility of meeting accession 
requirements rather than the international community being the driver of 
reforms110. However, instead of focusing on activities purely in the sphere of 
enlargement, the EU presented essential reforms for statebuilding as 
conditions for progress towards EU integration, such as the police reform 
(Tzifakis: 2012, Venneri: 2010). It was unclear whether the role of the EU was 
statebuilding or European integration (Venneri: 2010). 
 
The second and more crucial role attributed to the EU was to eventually 
replace the international community in Bosnia. The OHR office would be 
converted into a EUSR office, ESDP missions would continue on the ground 
and the EU would have a stabilization role, in addition to enlargement 
elements drawn from the previous enlargement rounds. The future of the 
Western Balkans was within the European Union; however the speed of 																																																								
108 See the Communique of the PIC Steering Board Political Directors Meeting in Brussels on 28 March 
2003 at www.ohr.int. (Accessed on 19 February 2016). On connections made to the EU Feasibility Study 
and the SAP, see for example, the Communique of the PIC Steering Board Political Directors meetings 
on 11 December 2003, 7 April 2005 and 24 June 2005 on the same website.  
109 This opinion was voiced by several OHR and EUSR officials interviewed in 2008.  
110 This connection is clear in the Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council on 19 
and 20 June 2003,  as well as other European Council documents.  
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movement ahead was in the hands of the countries of the region. Until Bosnia 
was able to become a full-fledged member of the Union, the EU would focus 
on issues such as reforming the judiciary, security sector and public 
administration, combatting organized crime and corruption, cooperation with 
the ICTY111. In fact, Bosnia would not have to be rehabilitated towards full 
sovereignty, but sustainable peace would be possible when Bosnia’s 
sovereignty would be diluted in the EU (Venneri: 2010). From a responsibility 
perspective, the international message was clear: the temporary responsibility of 
the PIC over BiH would end with a transfer of responsibilities to local authorities 
under the oversight of the EU. The PIC Steering Board Political Directors 
Meeting in Sarajevo on 24 June 2005 clearly connected international exit to the 
transfer of international responsibilities to BiH authorities and the EUSR 
office.  
 
Interventions had created the impression that the Bosnian system and the 
international/European strategy was working, despite the persistence of 
physical divisions and ethnic tensions as well as Bosnian leaders focusing on 
their own agendas112 (Belloni: 2007, Ashdown: 2008, Tzifakis: 2012). Since the 
interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond increased the urgency to exit, 
there was heightened need to sell Bosnia as a success story and establish the 
positive atmosphere for international exit. For the EU, as Bosnia was 
becoming a test case both for the future of the ESDP and the success of the 
European model, the same necessity existed. The PIC Political Directors 
meeting on 14 December 2005 in Paris concluded that since 2002, “sweeping 
political, economic and administrative reforms” had taken place that had “helped 
prepare BiH for EU membership”. It was now time to take decisive and visible 
steps towards international exit and European ownership. 
 
5.1.5 Attempts to Exit: 2006 – Present: 
 
5.1.5.1 The big push: 2006 – 2010: 
 
The Steering Board Political Directors met with Bosnian authorities in Paris 
on 14 December 2005, in a special session to mark the 10th anniversary of 
DPA. The meeting was much more than a commemoration; it was supposed 
to mark the transformation from the era of OHR’s comprehensive 
statebuilding efforts – the Dayton era, into a period where local ownership 																																																								
111 These elements are featured continuously in various Presidential and other Conclusions of European 
Council meetings undertaken between 2003 and 2006, and beyond. See the website of the European 
Council for full texts of the meetings, at www.european-
council.europa.eu(council*meetings/conclusions.  
112 Bosnians and Bosnian leaders and elites felt like they had a subordinate role in their countries 
problems and thus focused on the advancement of their own agendas (Tzifakis: 2012). 
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and European integration would move hand in hand – the Brussels era 
(Aybet and Bieber: 2011). The Final Communique of the meeting read; “Ten 
years on, the extent of recovery has been remarkable, (…), BiH is at peace, 
more than a million refugees and displaced people have returned113 (…), the 
economy is growing and the EU launched the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) negotiations with the country”114. As the state structure 
appeared stronger and internal politics seemed more moderate, it was time to 
address the greatest shortcoming of the previous phase – intrusive 
international involvement. The former High Representative Ashdown had 
already started cutting back on imposing legislation as his term in office 
progressed and June 2007 was set for the date of OHR closure115. Christian 
Schwartz-Schilling, a former German Federal Minister with a history of 
mediating in former Yugoslavia and an agenda of non-intervention was to 
replace Ashdown116. The structures already put in place in Bosnia, alongside 
the pull of Europe and conditionality would sustain the state, the reforms and 
the international vision (Venneri: 2010). 
 
The constitutional system of Dayton was imposed by international actors and 
required the continuous involvement of the international community to be 
sustained. Thus, moving towards local ownership and international exit 
would be possible only by creating a proper local agreement on the nature of 
sovereignty that moved away from ethnic guarantees and emphasized 
functionality (Bose: 2007, Venneri: 2010, Tzifakis: 2012). Although the PIC, the 
High Representative, the Council of Europe and many Western capitals had 
been emphasizing the need for structural changes that would emphasize 
democratization and functionality since 2001, the PIC was cautious to launch 
processes that could upset the delicate Dayton balance until the December 
2005 meeting in Paris where the need for constitutional reform was put on the 
agenda (ICG: 2002, Tzifakis: 2012). Schwartz-Schilling’s one-year mandate 
started with the confidence that such reform efforts would succeed.  
 
																																																								
113 According to UNHCR reports from 2005, over one million refugees and internally displaced persons 
had indeed returned to their prewar locations. Yet, these reports do not paint a rosy picture. According 
to UNHCR, displacement continued to be a significant problem in BiH in 2005, with a considerable 
number of people remaining displaced or had decided to settle locally. Moreover, the number of returns 
had declined by %40 in 2005 compared to the previous year. See http://www.unhcr.org/449267580.pdf 
for further reference. (Accessed on 19 February 2016) 
114 See the Communique Issued by the Political Directors of the PIC Steering Board and the BiH 
Authorities Following an Extraordinary PIC Session to Mark the 10th Anniversary of the Dayton-Paris 
Peace Accords, at www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=36256. (Accessed on 22 December 2014).  
115 In June 2005, the PIC had expressed readiness to close down OHR based on a three-step process: a) 
OHR would finish transferring responsibilities, b) the HR would be replaced by the EUSR, c) the UN 
Security Council would endorse the arrangement.  
116 See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Schwartz-Schilling. (Last accessed on 22 December 2014).    
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Despite the positive kick-off, things started going wrong after 2006. The 2006 
elections resulted in large gains for the Serb SNSD and the Bosniak SBiH, both 
with increasingly populist and uncompromising agendas, the former 
pursuing separation from Bosnia and the other seeking the abolition of the RS 
(Belloni: 2007, Touquet and Vermeersch: 2008, Aybet and Bieber: 2011). In 
April 2006, a constitutional amendment package was rejected in the Bosnian 
House of Representatives by a margin of two votes (Sebastian: 2012)117. 
Despite calls from the PIC and other relevant actors to “resume quickly the 
process of constitutional reform, (…) a headline issue [since) a functional state 
was crucial for the country’s future in Europe”118, the rest of Schwatz-
Schilling’s term saw little progress in constitutional reform and a worsening 
of the political atmosphere.  
 
The next High Representative, Miroslav Lajcak prioritized the EU agenda, 
with the endorsement of both the PIC and the EU 119(Aybet and Bieber: 2011). 
The goal was pushing forward the remaining reforms for OHR closure and 
reliance on EU conditionality rather than the Bonn powers, an approach that 
led to the further intertwining of the EU integration and statebuilding 
agendas. The new approach was put to test through police reform, an area 
that was directly defined as an SAP priority as opposed to constitutional 
reform (Venneri: 2010, Aybet and Bieber: 2011, Tzifakis: 2012). In fact, the 
principles set for police reform in BiH by the EU went well beyond the 
requirements of the acquis communautaire and entered into the domain of 
changing the institutional set-up of Bosnia in favor of strengthening the 
state120 (Tsifakis: 2012, Bieber: 2010, Venneri: 2010, Aybet and Bieber: 2011, 																																																								
117 These constitutional amendments were envisaged as the first of a series of reforms that would 
eventually balance the responsibilities of the Bosnian state and the entities towards better functionality 
and democratization. The negotiations leading to the April Package had started in a low-key format in 
early 2005, with the initial participation of different levels of political party membership under the 
guidance of the US Institute for Peace (USIP). The US and the EU became more involved at the end of 
2005; the collapse of talks was prevented with the intervention of the US with EU support. US 
encouraged/ enforced Bosnian leaders to sign a document in Washington in November 2005 committing 
themselves to constitutional amendments in early 2006 (The April package) (Sebastian: 2012). Both the 
EU and the US voiced great disappointment at the rejection of the April package, and continued their 
efforts thorughout the spring of 2006 to bring the bill back to the Parliament – to no avail.  
118  Statement by PIC Steering Board Ambassadors, 4 October 2006, Sarajevo, available at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=38217. (Last accessed on 22 December 2014). 
119 For example, the PIC Steering Board Communique of 27 February emphasizes EU integration and 
OHR transition above constitutional reform, which is available at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=39236. The Council Conclusions on Western Balkans at 
the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting in Luxembourg on 15-16 October 2007 also 
prioritized the SAA 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/96528.pdf). (Last accessed 
on 22 December 2014).	
120 These principles, conditioned by the EU in 2005, were (1) legislative and budgetary competencies for 
police matters to  be vasted at state level, (2) local police areas to be determined according to technical 
criteria, irrespective  of Dayton boundaries, (3) elimination of political interference in operational police 
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Lindvall, Ashdown: 2007). The EU, which at least discursively tried to keep its 
involvement in Bosnia technical and within the domain of the SAA, had 
entered the gray area of facilitation of the Dayton agenda. However, Bosnian 
politicians could not agree on the externally set rules of police reform. 
Moreover, Serb politicians rejected Lajcak’s attempts to resort to Bonn powers 
in 2007 to resolve a deadlock – a showdown that could be solved only after 
weeks of tough negotiations between the OHR and the Serbs121 (Venneri: 
2010). In a time when international exit had gained urgency, the world’s 
attention was focused on other interventions and the EU was preoccupied 
with the independence referendums in Montenegro and Kosovo and the 
making of the Lisbon Treaty (2007), Bosnian leaders were learning that they 
could challenge Bonn powers – a development which started to change the 
entire modus vivendi in Bosnia. To prevent further embarrassment, a 
minimalist consensus was forged to foster appearances that the police reform 
issue was solved for the time being, while wider issues were referred to a 
constitutional reform process to be undertaken in the future (Leroux-Martin: 
2014, Tzifakis: 2008). In 2007, the SAA was initialled, with the EU 
backtracking on its initial conditionality on police reform.  
 
Running the risk of losing control in BiH, the PIC in February 2008 fine-tuned 
the modalities of international engagement once more. The transition from 
OHR to the EUSR would not be automatic; Bosnians would first “create the 
conditions for transition to occur”122. In other words, the Bosnians were 
attributed responsibility for promoting the international vision and 
facilitating international exit. Five objectives and two conditions were 
established towards this end123. This framework was in fact largely symbolic; 
the goal was to indicate that Bosnia would be ready to assume full 
sovereignty when it could agree on difficult issues on the future of the state. 
Two of the five objectives, on state and defense property, remain unresolved 
in 2015.  																																																																																																																																																														
matters (Ashdown: 2007). They were enumerated in the 2005 report of the European Commission (EC: 
2005).  
121 Lajcak had planned on imposing a new voting procedure for the Council of Ministers and a 
simplified voting procedure for the Parliamentary Assembly, to prevent blockages by absenteeism by 
using his Bonn powers. On the request of the RS Prime Minister Dodik, the Head of the Council of 
Ministers Spiric resigned in protest, blocking the work of the Council of Ministers. The crisis was 
overcome in December 2007 with an uneasy compromise reached between the parties (Leroux-Martin: 
2014).  
122 See the Declaration by the Steering Board of the PIC Steering Board Political Directors on 27 February 
2008, at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=41352.  (Last accessed on 22 December 2014). 
123 The objectives were a) acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of the Issue of Apportionment of 
Property between State and other levels of government b) Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of 
Defence Property, c) Completion of the Brcko Final Award, d) Fiscal Sustainability, e) entrenchment of 
the rule of law. The conditions were the signing of the SAA and a positive assessment of the situation in 
BiH by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. Ibid.  
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The political scene remained polarized, with negative rhetoric and unilateral 
requests to change the constitutional structure incrementally on the rise. Yet, 
the EU no longer supported the use of Bonn powers, in an effort to emphasize 
the responsibility of the Bosnians for their own future (Tzifakis: 2012). 
Another constitution reform was attempted in 2009, dubbed the “Butmir 
Process” under the new High Representative Inzko, driven by the US and the 
EU124. Despite strong external arm-twisting, the process was derailed by the 
negative dynamics of the 2010 elections and was never resuscitated.  
 
The EU’s image in Bosnia started to falter, with the failure of the police and 
constitutional reform efforts. The lack of cohesion between the US and the EU, 
the divisions within the EU, the limitation of international engagement to 
domestic elites, artificial time pressures and rushed deadlines were criticized 
(Sebastian: 2012, Tsifakis: 2012, Bieber: 2010, Venneri: 2010). The lack of 
commitment and clear standards regarding EU conditionality was an 
additional reason for failure in police reform (Aybet and Bieber: 2011, 
Lindvall, Leroux-Martin: 2014). In addition, EU conditionality was not seen as 
a credible enough promise to be taken seriously by the local leaders. 125 Both 
reform efforts were a “normative overstretch” that harmed the credibility of 
EU conditionality as well as statebuilding more broadly in Bosnia (Aybet and 
Bieber: 2011, Sasse: 2004).  
 
5.1.5.2 An Undesired Stalemate: 2010 – 2015 
 
The future of Bosnia started occupying even less space on the global and 
European agenda, with the Euro Crisis and the so-called “intervention 
fatigue”. PIC statements and Security Council debates on Bosnia continued to 
stress that the conditions for OHR departure had not yet been met, little 
progress has been achieved in terms of Euro-Atlantic integration, threats to 
territorial integrity and unity prevailed and the economic conditions were 
dire126. Yet, the PIC did not look into providing new and creative solutions for 
the future of Bosnia or take more direct responsibility for its problems, as it 																																																								
124 The Butmir Process started as a US-driven process in summer 2009, and later joined by the EU The 
US and the EU called for a meeting at the NATO Training Center in Butmir on 9 October 2009. 
Negotiations directly included US Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg and Swedish Foreign Minister 
and then Chair of the EU Presidency Bildt. The parties agreed on some principles that looked like the 
April Package. 
125 In fact, many non-EU diplomats from the US, Turkey and Canada, who attended PIC Steering Board 
Ambassadors meetings in this period, recall disagreements among EU Ambassadors on the future 
direction of the EU and BiH’s place within it.   
126 Relevant Security Council documents, including statements and meeting reports and summaries on 
BiH can be found at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/bosnia-herzegovina.  PIC 
statements can be found at http://www.ohr.int/pic/archive.asp?sa=on.  (Last accessed on 22 December 
2014). 
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would have done in the past. It sufficed with emphasizing the responsibility 
of the country to find ways to move forward. The PIC Steering Board’s 
statement on 22 May 2014 states that “it is the collective responsibility of all 
BiH political leaders to (…) address the outstanding urgent and necessary 
reforms, especially those needed for BiH to advance on its European path”, 
stressing the issues of elections, judicial reform, the completion of the ¨5+2¨ 
agenda, full compliance with the Dayton framework and commitment to 
Euro-Atlantic integration127. The EU statements followed similar lines, despite 
taking more responsibility for enlargement, peacekeeping (through EUFOR-
ALTHEA) and facilitation of political processes. The EU Foreign Affairs 
Council Conclusions on BiH on 14 April 2014, while reiterating unequivocal 
commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and its EU 
perspective, placed the responsibility of political and economic stagnation on 
the shoulders of “BiH politicians or the Bosnian leadership”128.  
 
Little progress was achieved on indicators that would allow international exit. 
On the ¨5+2¨ agenda, the Brcko objective was met through minor impositions 
of the High Representative. Promising developments was seen on the defence 
property issue129. However, the state property issue130 and the future of 
immovable defense property remains unsolved, the solution of which 
remains a NATO conditionality to implement the Membership Action Plan131. 
As resolution of state and defense property issues are directly related to OHR 
closure, they become an area for foot dragging by parties who do not want to 
see immediate OHR closure. On the European front, the EU Delegation’s 
website in Bosnia today shows that there have been no major developments 																																																								
127  See the Communiqué of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=48554, made on 22 May 2014. This trend is apparent in 
most PIC Steering Board statements made between 2010 – 2014, that can be found at 
http://www.ohr.int/pic/archive.asp?sa=on. (Last accessed on 22 December 2014). 
128 See the Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on Bosnia and Herzegovina on its 14 April 2014 
meeting in Luxembourg, at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142215.pdf. (Last accessed 
on 22 December 2014). 
129 On the defense property front, related to movable defense property (arms, ammunition, archives, 
records) settled and stocks of obsolete and dangerous munitions destroyed (ICG: 2012).  
130 There are two types of state property: a) Those that Bosnia received through the Agreement of 
Succession Issues, and those that the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoyed rights. 
Initially, a commission was created by the Council of Ministers to draft laws to divide property among 
the state, entities and Brcko. To facilitate the Commission’s work, the High Representative imposed a 
ban on the disposal of state property. This ban was extended indefinitely in 2008. While the ban is in 
place, the commission can issue exemptions for specific sites. In April 2010, Chair and Bosniak member 
of the tripartite Presidential Council, Haris Silajdzic sent the OHR inventory to Federation registries to 
register them as state property, an action stopped by PIC and the OHR. RS passed its own law in 
September 2010, claiming ownership of all property in RS territory, which was again suspended by the 
OHR (ICG: 2012). The issue of state property leads to many (possibly) state-owned property to decay. 
131 In fact, for NATO countries, state ownership of facilities is not required, thus the issue has no real 
urgency.  
	 201	
to report in Bosnia since the signature of the SAA in 2008, except for visa 
liberalization agreement in December 2010. Bosnian parties needed 15 months 
to agree on the formation of a state government after the October 2010 
elections; the fragile coalition broke in May 2012 (ICG: 2012); the approval of 
the 2011 state budget was delayed for an entire year, leaving the country on 
temporary financing, nationalist and provocative rhetoric and acts prevailed 
and the constitutional order was constantly challenged (Tzifakis: 2012). The 
entity structures are in a similar limbo, with the FBiH disintegrating 
economically and stagnating politically; while the RS had one foot in Bosnia 
and one foot in independence (Meyer: 2014). Former High Representative 
Ashdown noted in 2012 that “there is a realistic danger that BiH will become 
a dysfunctional black hole” and the ICG (2011) noted even violence was 
possible.  
 
Constitutional reform remains a goal, but international actors shy away from 
direct involvement since the Butmir Process. The current emphasis remains 
within the realm of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 2009 
decision on the Sejdic-Finci Case132¨, which proposed a rebalancing of the 
Dayton structure so that Bosnian peoples who did not belong to one of the 
three constituent groups (the Others) could be elected to the House of Peoples 
and the Tripartite Presidency (O’Leary and Mc Crudden: 2013). The 
consociational arragements of Dayton had put in place strong constitutional 
protections for preserving the (perceived) identity, rights and interests of the 
constituent peoples of Bosnia; in fact the international community had 
championed consociationism in 1995 as a viable way to end the war and bring 
stability. The ECtHR decision, while explained by the EU in the realm of 
human rights and democratization, became a way to put the responsibility of 
constitutional reform on the shoulders of Bosnians, by asking to replace a 
system that prioritizes group protections rights rather than individual 
liberties and non-discrimination (O’Leary and McCrudden: 2013). In fact, 
consociational power sharing remains an important conflict resolution 
mechanism, having been applied in Europe in Belgium, Switzerland, 
Macedonia and Northern Ireland. Moreover, the EU has no competence over 
language, religion or culture and veto rights and opt-outs are respected in the 
EU system (O’Leary and Mc Crudden: 2013, Lijphart: 2008, ICG: 2012). Yet, 
the ECtHR decision was still used as a way to achieve the international vision 
in Bosnia. As compliance with the decision risked opening “dangerous” 
questions about the constitutional architecture of Bosnia, it is not surprising to 
see that not much progress has been achieved in its implementation.  																																																								
132 A 2009 ruling of  the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), brought forward by two members of 
the Roma and Jewish community, Sejdic and Finci, decided that the Bosnian constitution was 
discriminatory because certain electoral posts could only be held by Serbs, Croats or Bosniaks.  
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In 2009, the Union put two conditions for Bosnia’s candidacy: the closure of 
the OHR and the reform of the constitutional framework. This conditionality 
was lifted in 2010. Later the EU made the implementation of the ECtHR 
ruling a condition to implement the SAA. Yet, the stick-and-carrot approach 
did not lead to a solution and continues to block BiH progress towards the EU 
(The Economist: 2013). The EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on BiH on 
21 October 2013 stated “the current lack of a solution of the Sejdić/Finci issue 
is preventing Bosnia and Herzegovina to further progress towards the EU¨133 
and ¨it is up to the Bosnia and Herzegovina political leaders to make the 
necessary progress”.  
 
The discrepancy between [statebuilding’s] holistic understanding of political, 
social and institutional deficits and the limited solutions became increasingly 
clear, implying that the notion of economic and social stabilization and unity 
through EU integration might have been naïve (Sebastian: 2012). The 
divisions that took Bosnia to war and hamper reform processes still prevail 
over the statebuilding project and the prospect of EU integration (Aybet and 
Bieber: 2011, Sebastian: 2012)134. All sides seem aware that the international 
community is both unable and unwilling to change or fundamentally alter 
Dayton, a structure that seems no longer sustainable. Yet, the EU does not 
want to take responsibility beyond the limited and technical area called 
enlargement, nor is it able to provide fresh solutions. It has become easier for 
Bosnian leaders to challenge the PIC and the EU; for instance, RS Prime 
Minister Dodik, in relation to the appointment of Peter Sorensen as the new 
EUSR in Bosnia, said he had set certain measures and conditions for good 
relations with the EU (Brljavac: 2012). To summarize, the international 
community and the EU do not want to take the risk of leaving Bosnia to its 
own devices, jeopardizing the entire statebuilding project and their own 
image; yet are unwilling and unable to contribute time and energy to a 
conflict that has long lost its urgency. The only definition of Bosnia today can 
be an undesired stalemate, a limbo.   
 
5.2 The Statebuilding Framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
 
In order to complete the analysis on the EU and the statebuilding frame, the 
second step is looking into the EU’s relationship with Bosnia through the 																																																								
133 Athttp://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139070.pdf.   
(Accessed on 19 February 2016).  
134 Many Bosniaks continued to see the RS a an illegitimate and transitional phenomenon, Croats fear 
losing control in the Federation, while many Serbs see the RS as the best guarantee for preservation of 
their interests as the fear of being dominated by the Bosniaks remains, and attribute the Bosnian state 
secondary importance (Aybet and Bieber: 2011, Sebastian: 2012). 
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perspective of technical statebuilding guidelines. Statebuilding in Bosnia 
suggests technical improvements in the fields of security sector reform, 
institution-building, good governance, human rights, democratization and 
development as key to sustainable peace. For example, according to the 
RAND (2007) Corporation, “Bosnia (…) is at peace today because US, NATO, 
or UN peacekeepers came in, imposed order, separated combatants, disarmed 
and demobilized contending factions, organized elections, installed 
representative governments and promoted economic and social 
reconstruction”. As an indicator, the RAND (2007) Corporation emphasizes 
the Bosnian example while proposing guidelines for international post-
conflict intervention. 
 
The EU, despite carefully framing its engagement within the enlargement 
framework, has played an essential role in statebuilding efforts.  First of all, 
the enlargement criteria push similar reforms as the “statebuilding 
guidelines”. It emphasized the importance of “democracy, the rule of law, 
respect for fundamental rights, as well as the importance of a functioning 
market economy” for accession135. Judicial reform, fight against corruption 
and organized crime, public administration reform, human rights, economic 
reforms, improved governance were all in focus 136 . The EU High 
Representative Ashton stated that “the country’s political leaders needed to 
focus on reforming the economy, the social welfare system, promoting trade, 
strengthening the rule of law and protecting human rights”137. As such, many 
elements of the “guidelines” overlap with the EU enlargement agenda; often 
making it difficult to distinguish where Dayton ends and Brussels begins. 
Moreover, we have seen above certain examples, such as the police reform 
efforts up to 2008, where the EU has pushed for strengthening state 
institutions beyond the agenda normally dictated by the acquis communautaire. 
Thus, even if the EU is not directly responsible for the formulation of the 
entire statebuilding project, it has actively contributed to it, through 
enlargement and beyond.  
 
Needless to say, an intervention that has been ongoing for 20 years cannot be 
fully assessed in a couple of pages. This study will concentrate on the efforts 
undertaken by the international community and the Union, as much as they 
help building an argument on a responsibility gap and discursive safeguards.  
 																																																								
135  See European Commission (2013), ¨Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and Council¨, Brussels, 16 October 2013 
136 See European Commission (2013), ¨Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and Council¨, Brussels, 16 October 2013 
137 NEOnline, ¨Ashton tells Bosnia leaders to shape up¨, 12 March 2014, www.neurope.eu/article/ashton-
tells-bosnia-leaders-shape. (Last accessed on 22 December 2014). 
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5.2.1 The Security Dimension: 
 
The provision of security and sustainable stability are often prioritized in 
statebuilding efforts (RAND: 2007, OECD-DAC: 2007). In Bosnia, initial 
international efforts emphasized establishing and maintaining security. The 
NATO-led IFOR was a classical peacekeeping force engaged in stabilizing the 
ceasefire, overseeing the cantonment of troops and handling weapon 
stockpiles138; the international police force IPTF dealt with training and 
monitoring; and the UN Mission to BiH brokered agreements on downsizing 
of police forces. The concern that long-term commitments in the security area 
could draw external actors into dangerous quagmire was a reason why 
international efforts initially focused on maintaining security rather than 
addressing fragmentation139 (Belloni: 2009, Vetschera and Damian: 2006). 
 
As holistic approaches to statebuilding slowly became the norm, international 
involvement extended to the areas of defense, intelligence and police reform. 
Security sector reform (SSR) became a tool to foster efforts to overcome 
divisions at the entity level and establish state level competencies, adding a 
political flavor to them (Muehlmann: 2008). Meanwhile, Bosnia became the 
first theatre for the EU’s crisis management efforts and CSDP. In January 
2003, the EU Police Mission (EUPM) was established (Bloching: 2011). The 
first EUPM’s (2003-2005) aim was to establish a sustainable, professional and 
multi-ethnic police, to “complete unfinished work from the UN period”, 
based on international guidelines and a relatively narrow and technical crisis-
management approach (Ioannides and Celador: 2011, Blocing: 2011). The 
European peacekeeping force EUFOR took over military tasks from SFOR in 
2004 and still raises the EU flag despite troop reductions (Vetschera and 
Damian: 2006, Dursun – Ozkanca: 2010, Wood and Bowley: 2004).  
 
On defense reform, the goal was establishing a state-level Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) and a single armed force. Despite considerable foot-dragging 
especially by the RS, the High Representative used his influence to establish a 
Defense Reform Commission (DRC) in 2003140, consisting of Bosnians as well 
as members from EUSR, NATO, SFOR, OSCE, to work on the role of the state 
on defense issues (Vetschera and Damian: 2006). An effective and credible 
state-level civil command and control structure, including a MoD and army 																																																								
138 Annex 1A of the DPA defines the mandate of IFOR.  
139 Annex 4 of Dayton did not contain any state prerogative to defence and entities maintained their own 
armed forces. The Agreements signed in 1996, namely ¨the Agreement on Confidence and Security-
Building Measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina¨ and the ¨Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control¨  
provided a regulatory framework to control the effects of the mlitary division within the country and 
laid the groundwork for two entities to coexist militarily.  
140 In 2002, the High Representative forced state control over arms exports, following reports on illegal 
arm transfers to  Iraq (Vetschera and Damian: 2006).  
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became the requirement to join Partnership for Peace (PfP); connecting the 
goals of statebuilding and NATO accession. As of 2004, Bosnia possessed a 
state-level defense minister, was moving towards a common general staff, 
uniform and flag, and had downsized (Donais: 2005). Due to relatively clear 
conditionality on the side of NATO and use of powers by the High 
Representative, defence reform was fairly successful (Aybet and Bieber: 2011). 
Civilian intelligence reform followed a similar trajectory. The High 
Representative established an Intelligence Reform Commission (IRC) that 
formulated a draft law passed with the arm-twisting of the OHR (Vetschera 
and Damian: 2006). The state-level intelligence and security agency OSA 
became operational in June 2004. SIPA (State Agency for Information and 
Protection) was established for intelligence duties as well.  
 
Policing was more difficult. The first state-level police force SBS (State Border 
Service) was established with push from the OHR. Following previous 
examples, the High Representative set up a Police Reform Commission (PRC) 
in 2004; that put forward three principles for state-level policing: a) budgetary 
and legislative authorities to be shifted to state level, b) policing operations 
free from political influence, c) policing districts be established on operational 
and technical criteria.  The EU in 2005 conditioned the opening of SAA 
negotiations on the completion of police reform in accordance with the PRC 
principles (Vetschera and Damian: 2006). Yet, police reform did not go as 
smoothly as expected. First, police reform was taken up at a stage when the 
use of Bonn powers was becoming more difficult. In this atmosphere, local 
actors found it easier to oppose police reform as attempts to challenge the 
Dayton status quo. Second, although police reform principles were presented 
as accession criteria, the enlargement conditionality was dubious; as state-
level police structures were usually not required from accession partners 
(Tsifakis: 2012, Bieber: 2010, Aybet and Bieber: 2011). This turned the EU into 
an actor pursuing an interventionist agenda above all (Aybet and Bieber: 
2011). From 2005 to 2008, BiH’s EU integration process was conditioned to 
and delayed by police reform. As the stalemate threatened fusing tensions, 
blocking BiH’s European track and risking international and European 
credibility, a minimalist consensus was forged in 2008 as a face-saving act, to 
create basic coordinating structures at the state level (Tzifakis: 2008, Dzihic 
and Wieser: 2011, Aybet and Bieber: 2011, Muehlmann: 2008, Sasse: 2004). 
 
As immediate security needs were prioritized after 9/11, CSDP missions 
focused on measures that responded more to the security needs of the EU 
rather than local realities or functional imperatives141(ICG: 2013, Ioannides 																																																								
141 After 9/11, the US started pressing Bosnian authorities to arrest or deport individuals with potential 
terrorist links, and the threat of Islamic terrorism started to prevail in discourse (ICG: 2013)  
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and Celador: 2011). After the dissatisfactory police reform episode in 2008, 
EUPM started prioritizing organized crime and corruption, despite retaining 
residual capacities in police reform. Rule of law, an important tenet of SSR, 
never became a priority (Donais: 2013). Good governance, the promotion of 
human rights and democracy were also pushed behind, despite the EU 
documents emphasizing good governance and comprehensive approaches to 
security including transparency, human rights and democratization 142 
(Ioannides and Celador: 2011). Finally, EUPM completed its mandate in 2012. 
The EU conducts its remaining tasks under the EU Delegation, in the scope of 
EIDHR and IPA funds (transitional assistance and cross-border cooperation) 
and EUSR. The focus of the IPA in 2014 combined rule of law efforts with 
combatting corruption and organized crime.  
 
Have international efforts been successful in bringing security and sustainable 
stability to Bosnia? Despite remaining tensions between constituent groups, 
corruption in the security and justice sector and serious capacity problems, it 
is generally accepted that the most successful element of international 
involvement has been the provision of security (ICG: 2013). Today, armed 
conflict does not seem to be a real possibility and the state-level monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force has increased. Bosnia even sends its peacekeepers 
to conflict-ridden countries. However, the divisions and tensions between the 
peoples of Bosnia pose a threat to long-term stability, contrary to the most 
basic goals of statebuilding (ICG: 2012). In other words, while the technical 
and institutional reforms have improved policing practice and contributed to 
a relatively stable security environment, the goal of transforming the socio-
economic or political dynamic hasn’t worked (Donais: 2013).  
 
The content of SSR efforts in Bosnia – the prioritization of immediate 
provision of security, the institutional reform of the defense, police and 
intelligence sectors, as well as the (discursive) focus on the rule of law – 
presents a framework that fits into the statebuilding frame. Despite being 
framed as a technical exercise, efforts to reform the security sector in Bosnia 
directly relate to attempts to build a functional and efficient Bosnian state 
based on a certain world vision (Donais: 2013, Juncos: 2011). The fine-tuning 
of statebuilding to overcome problems such as the lack of coordination and 
personnel and resource gaps, as well as the definition of success in technical 
																																																								
142 The comprehensive concept for CSDP police strengthening missions drafted in 2002 and updated in 
2009 touches upon local ownership, sustainability, transparency, law enforcement, human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law (Council Document on Security Sector Reform).  The 
European Security Strategy (2003) emphasized good governance as the best way to deal with security 
threats.  
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terms and capacity issues also confirm the statebuilding frame143 (Vines: 
2010). In fact, Bosnia is shown as one of the prominent examples in the task of 
constructing effective and accountable security institutions in transitions 
(Donais: 2009).   
 
The EU’s involvement in SSR indicates that the Union fits into the 
statebuilding frame applied in Bosnia, both in its diagnostic and prognostic 
elements. The crisis management capabilities of the EU were first 
operationalized in Bosnia, indicating its willingness to take part in conflict 
resolution efforts beyond enlargement. Although the Union tried to keep its 
involvement in the sphere of conditionality, its (political) choice was often to 
support the agenda set by statebuilding. Thus, while the European crisis 
management tools and its enlargement agenda establishes a unique relation 
between Bosnia and the EU, the main priorities and principles of the 
statebuilding frame are visible in the European engagement.  
 
5.2.2 The Institutional Dimension:  
 
Promotion of democratic institutions through the establishment of functional 
and efficient political, economic and social institutions is another important 
tenets of statebuilding (Paris: 2004, O’Reilly: 2012, Hill: 2010). The early post-
DPA years did not emphasize institution-building, based on the (unfounded) 
expectation that the complex institutional arrangements of DPA automatically 
wither away in peacetime, until it was decided that the complex and 
multilayered system of Dayton made effective governance hostage to 
interethnic intransigence (ESI: 2004, Gromes: 2009, Whitt: 2010).  
 
After the late 90’s, creating an (liberal) institutional structure capable of 
carrying out substantial reforms was prioritized, with a view to resolving the 
conflicting notions of the state (Sebastian: 2009, Youngs: 2009, Dzihic and 
Wieser: 2011, Touquet and Vermeersch: 2009). The “strong interventionism” 
of the time led by the OHR reinforced this dynamic (Paris: 2002, Chandler: 
2005, Jeffrey: 2007, Whitt: 2010). Through its use of the Bonn powers, the 
international administration increased the weight of common state 
institutions, while undermining illegal or parallel structures of governance 
(Gromes: 2009, O’Reilly: 2012). These impositions were framed as “technical”, 
rather than political choices (Chandler: 2005). The EU, throughout the period, 
continued to emphasize good governance and institutional-reform capacity, 
																																																								
143 In order to coordinate the activities of various organizations, a Common Security Policy Working 
Group, followed by the Institution-Building Task Force (IBTF) with a defence component, both later 
merged into Defence and Security Steering Group. 
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both for durable peace and EU integration144. For instance, the European 
Council in 2003 called “on the countries of the region to intensify their reform 
efforts, especially in areas essential for EU integration, in particular public 
administration (…)”145.  
 
After 2007, the ambition became fostering institutional structures that could 
be sustained without intrusive international involvement (Gromes: 2009). 
Institution-building efforts continued in two main directions: the political 
intention of reforming DPA structures and the technical focus on 
functionality through public administration reform efforts. The reform of the 
Dayton structures was addressed directly through constitutional reform 
efforts and indirectly through reforms that would (perceivably) alter the DPA 
balance – such as police reform and the Sejdic-Finci verdict of the ECHR146 
(Sebastian: 2009, Tzifakis: 2012, Aybet and Bieber: 2011). 
 
The first constitutional reform effort – “the April package”, envisaged new 
capacities for the state through measures as more state-level ministries and a 
stronger Council of Ministers. The package fell short of two votes at the 
House of Representatives in 2006  - despite heavy lobbying by the US, 
supported by the EU (Dzihic and Wieser: 2011). The 2009 Butmir process got a 
number of Bosnian party leaders to agree on watered-down principles of 
constitutional reform, but was derailed by the upcoming 2010 elections 
(Dzihic and Wieser: 2011, Tzifakis: 2012). The indirect efforts to reform the 
constitution were guised under functionality, EU integration or human rights 
considerations (O’Leary and McCrudden: 2013). These efforts, materialized 
through police reform or the Sejdic-Finci case, also didn’t bear fruit. 147  
 
Institutional reform efforts in BiH have been somewhat successful in building 
stronger state-level institutions. However, most of the current institutional 
structure has been created in the period of intrusive international 
involvement through Bonn powers, and there has not been much progress 
since then.  Yet, the technical framing of institutional reform has hampered 
the response capability of both the OHR and the EU to respond to direct 																																																								
144 See, for example, the ¨Conclusions on EU Support for Sustainable Change in Transition Societies, 
adopted at the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting on 31 January 2013.  
145 See the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Brussels, 12-13 December 2013 at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/78364.pdf. (Last accessed on 22 
December 2014). 
146  The Venice Commission’s 2005 opinion emphasized the importance of the reduction of the 
interventionist role of external actors as well as boosting institutional capacity for democratization, 
functionality and financial sustainability (Tzifakis: 2012, Sebastian: 2012).  
147 See the Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013 Progress Report of 16 November 2013 prepared by the 
European Commission at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ba_rapport_2013.pdf. (Last 
accessed on 22 December 2014). 
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political challenges to Dayton, once the Bonn powers were off the table 
(Dzihic and Wieser: 2011).  This handicap, combined with the setbacks in 
achieving constitutional reform through direct and indirect means, negatively 
affected the credibility of the international community and put reform efforts 
in BiH on a downward spiral. They also highlighted the political nature of 
statebuilding efforts.  
 
The lack of cohesion among international and European actors, the 
inconsistencies and unclearness of conditionality, time pressures and rushed 
deadlines are cited as technical reasons for failure (Sebastian: 2009, Sebastian: 
2012, Aybet and Bieber: 2011, Tzifakis: 2012). However, the reasons behind 
the failure of constitutional reform are deeper than that. The endpoint of the 
international intervention was foreseen as the establishment of a functional 
and fully sovereign state based on local ownership. Constitutional changes to 
replace the 4th Annex of DPA (constitution) would be an important step in 
that direction. Yet, if constitutional changes were made a requirement for 
OHR closure, this could signal an indefinite presence of the international 
community in Bosnia148. Bosnian people, perhaps as a result of years of 
external intrusive involvement, could not engage in political bargaining and 
compromise towards agreeing on a constitutional system defining the basic 
structure of the state. Thus, constitutional reform has been mostly driven by 
benchmarks and arm-twisting of the US and the EU behind the scenes, but 
could never be owned by them (Tzifakis: 2012). As such, despite the attempts 
to frame it as a technical exercise, constitutional or institutional reform efforts 
in BiH have been highly political, driven by an externally defined vision for 
Bosnia’s future based on international needs and priorities which, strangely, 
has to emphasize local ownership (Sebastian: 2009). The EU tried hard not to 
be directly involved in constitutional reform by presenting it as enlargement 
conditionality. Yet, European officials kept highlighting the need for 
increased institutional capacity and efficiency to meet EU requirements, 
pushing reforms under the guise of technical or administrative necessity 
(Sebastian: 2009, Youngs: 2009). For instance, the 2013 EU Progress Report for 
BiH states that “The country’s constitution (…) established a complex 
institutional architecture that remains inefficient and is subject to different 
interpretations”, [which has] a negative impact on structural reforms and the 
country’s capacity to make progress towards the EU¨149.  
 
																																																								
148 The author was involved in the negotiations leading to the formulation of the five objectives and two 
conditions for OHR closure, as a junior diplomat from a PIC Steering Board member state in Sarajevo.  
149  EU Bosnia Progress Report 2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/ba_rapport_2013.pdf (Accessed on 
19 February 2016). 	
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The EU found it easier to take more direct responsibility for the more 
technical public administration reform (PAR), which aims the development of 
general administrative capacities on policy-making and coordination 
capacities, public finance, human resources, institutional communication, 
information technologies, through the reform of central systems and 
structures of government (Seizovic: 2012, Milowich and Ossewaarde: 2013)150. 
The EU funded good governance and PAR since 2000 to incorporate EU 
governance rules and regulation, made it an accession requirement, and 
drafted a PAR Strategy in 2007 (Dzihic and Wieser: 2011). However, the 
Commission’s Progress Reports indicate little progress towards PAR.  The EU 
is often criticized for prioritizing its own best practices and not taking local 
conditions in account, as well as placing strong focus on building new 
institutions and formal rules while neglecting their implementation 
(Chandler: 2005, Milovich and Ossewaarde: 2013, Dzihic and Wieser: 2011). In 
addition, emphasizing state institutions and the executive increased public 
expenditure; as a result, the government imposed a heavy burden on an 
impoverished society (ESI: 2004). Moreover, the EU is perhaps the most 
important political player in Bosnia, its relationship with BiH is of an 
asymmetrical nature characterized by aid dependency and conditionality, 
leaving little opportunity for domestic players to debate policy alternatives 
(Juncos: 2005, Chandler: 2010). 
 
5.2.3 Human Rights and Democracy: 
 
The consociational system of DPA emphasized group rights based on 
ethnicity in lieu of individual rights (O’Leary and McCrudden: 2013, Dzihic 
and Wieser: 2009). The promotion of human rights, minority rights and 
democracy in Bosnia aimed to soften ethnic and territorial divisions based on 
group rights, by emphasizing individual rights (Donais: 2005).  
 
In the early post-Dayton years, democratization was not in focus. The 1996 
elections were organized mainly to be able to transfer the responsibility of 
Dayton implementation to Bosnians, rather than fostering democracy in the 
country. Yet, nationalist parties taking the lead in the elections, coupled with 
the increased focus on democratization and human rights by the evolving 
parameters of statebuilding, necessitated a renewed focus on these issues 
(Gromes: 2009). The international and European discourse implies that ethnic 
nationalism is an anomaly and Bosnians would move towards European 
integration and Dayton implementation if given the chance (Belloni: 2007, 																																																								
150 PAR was envisaged in three stages by the EU; the initial aim set by the PAR Strategy in 2007 was to 
reach the quality of the European Administrative Space by 2014, to adhere to the common standards of 
EU member states and the implement the acquis (Seizovic: 2012).  
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Jeffrey: 2007).  In other words, democratization would serve the interests of 
the Bosnian people above all; the international community was responsible of 
finding the best electoral structure to capture people’s will. External actors 
exerted increased control over the organization of elections, especially from 
1996 to 2002 (Sebastian: 2012). The international community even became 
engaged in attempts dubbed as “electoral engineering”, with measures that 
aimed to change the electoral system to give more representation to 
moderates, foster pluralism and multi-ethnicity, uphold the rights of refugees, 
by the systems of alternative vote and integrationism, while preserving 
consociationism, such as the adoption of the Permanent Election Law151 (ICG: 
1998, Bose: 2002, Belloni: 2007). Open-lists and multi-member constituencies 
were introduced152. Frequent elections were organized from 1996 to 2002, 
hoping that each election would strengthen moderates (Gromes: 2009, Dzihic 
and Wieser: 2009). Especially after 1997, the international community openly 
supported moderate parties such as SDP; the PIC appealed for support to pro-
Dayton and multi-ethnic parties in 1998.  
 
On returns, only a quarter of more than 2 million refugees and IDP’s had 
returned by 1999. The rate of minority returns was even lower due to 
widespread ethnically motivated violence (Hanson: 2000). With the removal 
of officials that obstructed the processes, the pension reform, the Property 
Reform Implementation Plan, as well as the constitutional changes of 2000 
that emphasized minority rights, a significant increase was noted after 2000. 
However, returns focused on quantity rather than quality. Sufficient attention 
was not paid to the livelihoods of returnees. Most returnees were older 
persons; many claimed their properties to sell it and went back to live with 
their own groups, contributing to ethnic divisions (Juncos: 2012, Donais: 
2005). According to Human Rights Watch (2013), no progress was noted in 
reform strategies for refugees and IDP’s in 2013.  
 
Minority rights followed a similar pattern. As these rights relate to ensuring 
equitable representation and participation both for non-constituent people in 
Bosnia, and for non-Serbs in the RS and Serbs in FBiH; their focus on 
individuals rather than groups have a strong constitutional and institutional 
reform dimension (O’Leary and McCrudden: 2013). The Venice Commission 
in 2005 directly connected constitutional reform with the reform of 
discriminatory practices. The inability to carry out constitutional changes to 
deal with ethnic and minority discrimination is still framed as one of the 																																																								
151 In fact, PIC set requirements for the drafting of the Permanent Election Law (Bieber: 2006).  
152 Consociationalists prefer proportional representation with closed lists, which allows party leaders 
greater control and sustains conditions favorable to elite cooperation. All political offices are allocated 
on the basis of ethnic criteria; citizens who don’t define themselves as one of the three ethnic groups are 
barred for standing for state and RS Presidencies (Belloni: 2007).  
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biggest human rights concerns in Bosnia (HRW: 2013, Dzihic and Wieser: 
2009). The Sejdic-Finci case stresses the need to end discriminatory 
restrictions on non-constituent minorities holding political office. The EU has 
even announced that it would not be able to accept the results of 2014 
elections unless the constitution was amended153.  
 
The international community presented the promotion of human rights, 
democracy and fundamental freedoms as a priority area of statebuilding in 
Bosnia (Manners: 2008).  After the Thessaloniki Summit, the EU became the 
main actor of external human rights and democracy promotion; drawing 
connections with its own identity and model (Dzihic and Wieser: 2011, ESS: 
2003, ESS Report: 2008, Commission: 2001). Important developments were 
recorded. Ballots replaced bullets and ethnic competition was carried to the 
political ground (Belloni: 2007). Democratic institutions were established, 
enabling mostly free and fair elections. Bosnia became party to all major 
human rights instruments; returns did take place (OSCE). Yet, nationalist 
parties continue to thrive in Bosnia compared to moderate and integrationist 
ones (Hanson: 2000). Human rights problems prevail on the ground, 
including issues regarding minority rights, discrimination and intolerance 
(HRW: 2013). Electoral engineering by the international community including 
the use of Bonn powers and conditionality, as well as the use of democracy 
and human rights approaches to change the consociational structures 
politicized the normative agenda (Hanson: 2000).  
 
5.2.4 Economy and Development: 
 
To address the economic and social devastation, criminality and corruption, 
as well as the impediments to a single economic space following the war in 
Bosnia, initial post-war efforts focused on basic reconstruction of the 
infrastructure, restoration of public services and the establishment of a viable 
macroeconomic framework (PIC: 1998, Tzifakis and Tsardanidis: 2006). The 
Washington Consensus agenda influenced longer-term solutions, by linking 
growth and disruption of the power of warlords to economic reform 
connected to macro-economic stabilization, liberalization, and privatization 
(Donais: 2005).  
 
The initial assumption was that, once the physical effects of the war were 
overcome, the Bosnian economy would make a quick transition to market 
conditions (World Bank: 2002, ESI: 2004). However, by 2000, there was no 
economic activity to speak of in Bosnia, privatization processes were slow, 
unemployment was high, illegitimate economic activities and corruption 																																																								
153 See Human Rights Watch web site, http://www.hrw.org/europecentral-asia/bosnia-and-herzegovina.      
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remained widespread (Hanson: 2000, Donais: 2005). International financial 
institutions (IFI’s) in charge of economic transformation were criticized for 
not factoring in the multiple transitions the Bosnian economy was going 
through, including the destabilizing effect of market reforms154. The economic 
strategy towards Bosnia started shifting after 1999. As a result of the 
“development-security nexus”, the statebuilding framework was expanded to 
include economic transformation (Donais: 2005, Belloni: 2007, Juncos: 2012). 
The minimal state model of the 90’s was reversed; strengthening governance 
and the rule of law, conducting fiscal, monetary, tax and judicial reforms was 
added to the economic reform agenda. In the meantime, privatization and 
deregulation of the economy continued to be prioritized (Tzifakis and 
Tsardanidis: 2006, Donais: 2005, Ashdown: 2007). 
 
The EU’s initial involvement in Bosnia was through aid delivery. SAP had 
already prioritized the development of a functioning market economy 
through institution building, liberalization and legal harmonization (Bojicic-
Dzelilovic and Kostovicova: 2013). Having emphasized economic interests 
within its security strategy, the EU provided substantial economic assistance 
to Bosnia in the framework of SAP (ESS: 2003). For reconstruction, 
strengthening democratic institutions, rule of law, economic development, 
institution-building, cross-border cooperation and promoting respect for 
human rights, minority rights, gender equality and civil society, 503 million 
Euros were granted under CARDS between 2001-2006, 660 million Euros 
under IPA between 2007 – 2013, (Tzifakis: 2012). European assistance also was 
available in support to ESDP missions and the EUSR 155. 
 
Despite important achievements such as the common currency, economic 
revival, development and growth remain among the least successful of 
statebuilding elements. Public and private interests are mixed with identity 
politics, privatization has almost stopped, market competition is distorted, 
unemployment is high, public expenditure remains bloated and investments 
are below the declining foreign aid (ESI: 2004, Bojicic-Dzelilovic and 
Kostovicova: 2013, Tzifakis and Tsardanidis: 2006). The February 2014 riots in 
Bosnia reflected the frustration with grim economic outlook for the future. 
The country is still highly dependent on the conditional financial assistance 																																																								
154 For example, Donais (2005) states that, the fact that the Bosnian economy suffered the negative effects 
of multiple transitions, being a post-socialist and post-war country that was transitioning into becoming 
a state were not factored in by IFI’s operating in Bosnia after Dayton was signed.  
155  Since 2007, Bosnia has received EU financial assistence under the IPA. IPA funds have two 
components; a) transition assistance and institution-building, b) cross-border cooperation. IPA’s EU 
integration dimension is about adaptation to more than 120.000 pages of rules and regulations. Projects 
are implemented via contracts, %39 of which have been with local contractors. For further information, 
see the website of the European Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina for further information, at 
http://europa.ba.   
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provided by international agencies, and a decline in donor assistance always 
coincides with decreased economic growth156 (De Guevara: 2008, Tzifakis and 
Tsardanidis: 2006). The global economic crisis has increased the need for 
external assistance; and the EU had to create an IPA crisis package of 200 
million Euros in 2009. 
 
There have been technical errors on the side of the international community 
in implementing the economic program. The failure to restructure companies 
before privatization processes negatively affected revenues, the microcredit 
system ended up prioritizing the private goals of senior manages and skilled 
people ended up being employed by the international community (ESI: 2004, 
Bateman, Sinkovic and Skare: 2012, Tzifakis and Tsardanidis: 2006). However, 
many experts also connect the problems of the Bosnian economy with the 
prioritization of privatization, liberalization and institution-building as an 
economic model, instead of developing the social sector, poverty reduction 
and effective industrial policies (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis: 2006). External 
actors retained influence on the setting up and implementation of fiscal and 
economic strategies and policies, both because of the aid dependency of the 
country and the conditionality requirements to receive aid (De Guevara: 2008, 
Donais: 2005, Tzifakis and Tsardanidis: 2006).  
 
5.3 The EU and the Statebuilding Frame in Bosnia: 
 
In the previous chapter, it was acknowledged that the EU’s contribution to 
statebuilding could be fitted into the statebuilding frame, despite some 
elements that set it apart from different international actors. The elements of 
external statebuilding analyzed in this chapter similarly fits the EU in the 
statebuilding frame in Bosnia, albeit with certain differences and 
particularities. In short, the EU can be considered as an external actor within 
the statebuilding frame, but its engagement goes deeper beyond that frame 
through the policies of EU integration. 
 
The capability of the EU to be a moral agent was already established in the 
previous chapter. Looking at the EU’s discourse and its construction of the 
Other, the depiction of Bosnia as a fragile state whose sovereignty must be 
problematized until a functional and capable state is built is obvious. Yet, 
alongside the capacity of the state, the international community also 
problematized the ethnic divisions built in the Dayton Accords in Bosnia. In 
																																																								
156 The Guardian noted in 2014 that the ¨extreme inefficiency and failure to create the economic growth that 
Bosnia needed would in a normal country have soon led to both fiscal and political bankruptcy, but the subsidies, 
mainly from the European Union, just kept rolling in¨156. 
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fact, the construction of “Bosnia” in the EU’s narratives emphasizes the 
fragmentation of the country more than its lack of capacity.  
 
The Self has also been framed in a particular way in the case of the EU. The 
EU has presented its own model on conflict resolution as an inspiration for 
Bosnia from the outset, especially in the gray area where enlargement met 
statebuilding. Thus, it has aspired to help the evolution of the Other into the 
Self through capacity and institution building, in line with the statebuilding 
frame. Yet, its actorness capacity did not come automatically. On the contrary, 
the EU has not only problematized the capacity of Bosnia in its discourse, but 
also its own. It has put conditions on itself to build its crisis response 
capabilities before becoming a capable actor in global affairs. In addition, by 
aspiring to change the consociational system of Dayton, the international 
community problematized its own “moral compromise” of allowing ethnic 
divisions and group identities to be factored in the peace accords. In Bosnia, 
perhaps more than in any other conflict theatre, the intervention was about 
correcting the misdeeds, building the capacity and fostering the image of the 
Self.  
 
The diagnosis and the prognosis of EU throughout the intervention, linking 
the problem to the lack of capacity and democratic institutions and the 
construction of the solution around capacity building has paralleled the 
statebuilding frame. The international community and the EU have at first 
favored quick fixes through short-term engagement to achieve this; later 
comprehensive and holistic engagement has been preferred with a focus on 
security after 2001. In Bosnia, since the construction of the Other is based on 
ethnic divisions and fragmentation, the prognosis also exceeds building state 
capacities and institutions in order to combat state fragility. Most of the 
international and European response efforts in Bosnia have, in fact, been 
about deconstructing the Dayton structure; an “anomaly” that reflected a 
wartime attitude that would be corrected through capacity building. The way 
statebuilding is legitimized through the emphasis on sustainable protection 
and prevention, the temporary and technical responsibilities envisaged for the 
EU in statebuilding narratives and the focus on the primary responsibility of 
the state are also recurring topics in the EU’s discourse.  
 
Especially until the mid 2000’s, the EU has followed international efforts 
mostly led by the US in statebuilding, rather than driving them. Its modalities 
of response have developed similar to the evolution of statebuilding, from 
quick-fix solutions to comprehensive statebuilding efforts and scaling down. 
At the same time, the EU’s emphasis on multilateralism, the placement of its 
own model, values and capacity at the core of statebuilding, the normative 
push and the constant efforts for self-reform set the EU aside as a unique 
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actor. In the specific case of Bosnia, its unique tools, its enlargement vision 
and the (uneasy) connection of this vision to statebuilding sets the EU apart. 
After the 2000’s, the EU already started to support the statebuilding project as 
a unique actor, with the unique tools of ESDP. The enlargement perspective 
was first presented as the final guarantee of peace and stability, and used to 
directly promote and finalize statebuilding efforts through SAP tools. Later, 
as statebuilding efforts in Bosnia rapidly started to falter, the EU discourse 
started signaling a break with the statebuilding frame. Narratives inched 
towards supporting the future stability of Bosnia merely through the SAA 
process, with increasing calls from the EU to end the mandate of the OHR and 
employ solely an enlargement perspective in Bosnia. Yet, the main diagnostic 
and prognostic elements of the statebuilding frame, the problematization of 
capacity as well as the problematization of the Dayton Accords were still 
dominant in the EU’s discourse and actions in Bosnia, signaling that a clear 
break from the statebuilding frame would not be easy.  
 
Finally, in terms of the construction of responsibilities, both the statebuilding 
frame and the enlargement discourse have emphasized the primary 
responsibility of Bosnians or Bosnian leaders throughout the different phases 
of intervention. The role of the international community has always been 
supporting the Bosnians towards sustainable peace and stability. Ethnic 
nationalism and group identities were defined as anomalies while reform 
efforts have been presented as technical and administrative necessities; while 
the main responsibility of the international community was finding the best 
structure to capture the people’s will. In other words, although the political 
and normative nature of statebuilding in Bosnia has been quite apparent, the 
responsibilities of international actors were always framed in the realm of 
technical support. Yet, in the period when comprehensive and holistic 
statebuilding efforts were championed, international discourse did put less 
emphasis on the responsibilities of local actors, despite making it clear that 














6.  EUROPE’S RESPONSIBILITIES IN BOSNIA: AN 
ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
Throughout this thesis, a framework to make sense of the confused discourse 
regarding the EU’s responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina was slowly 
constructed. This chapter will be the final step in efforts towards 
understanding the EU’s discourse on responsibility and statebuilding.  
 
The chapter will first focus on establishing the moral responsibilities of the 
Union. Later, it will move on to explain the responsibility gaps and discursive 
safeguards, comparing the moral responsibility framework to the 
statebuilding frame defined just before. To locate official (mainstream) 
discourse, European Council, Peace Implementation Council and Security 
Council meeting records and conclusions, Progress Reports, official 
statements and interviews by high-level EU and Office of the High 
Representative (OHR) officials, alongside other relevant EU and UN 
documentation will be used as research material157. Alternative discourse will 
be based on the moral responsibility framework. 
 
To reiterate once again, this thesis does not claim to establish all the moral 
responsibilities that can be attributed to the EU in statebuilding. Moral 
responsibility is a complex issue and statebuilding efforts are comprehensive 
exercises that intrude into many aspects of human life. Thus, a full attribution 
might not even be practically possible. The goal is rather identifying a limited 
set of responsibilities that can be attributed to the Union, which goes beyond 
those assigned by the mainstream narratives of the statebuilding frame.  
 
6.1 The EU and the Moral Responsibility Framework: 
 
6.1.1 Establishing agency: 
 	
6.1.1.1 The EU’s role in BiH: Enlargement or Statebuilding? 
 
It has previously been argued that it is possible to establish the agency of the 
EU in statebuilding, in virtue of its separate identity, continuity, (formal) 
decision making powers, internal unity and self command, as well as its 
capacity to act independently and change – although this actorness capacity 
might be less than a nation state on some instances. 
 																																																								
157 As in the previous chapters, two types of discourse will be used: a) the mainstream discourse that 
tries to find solutions to the issues in BiH within the main concepts and theories of the neoliberal 
statebuilding framework, and b) to a lesser extent, the discourse that problematizes the theory of 
neoliberal statebuilding as well as the way it was carried out (Hansen: 2006).  
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The EU assumes two sets of roles in statebuilding: a) one of the actors of the 
(neoliberal) statebuilding frame and b) a unique foreign policy actor with 
distinct conflict resolution tools, particularly enlargement. In fact, the Union 
has openly declared its responsibilities regarding Bosnia on several occasions. 
EU engagement, including integration perspectives, is “almost universally” 
recognized as the key strategy for achieving peace and prosperity in the 
Balkans and as the end-point of statebuilding (Belloni: 2009). However, 
despite these open declarations of responsibility, it is still difficult to frame 
the nature of the EU’s engagement in BiH. Is its responsibility mainly in the 
framework of European integration, or is the Union responsible for the choice 
and implementation of statebuilding in Bosnia as well? The answer lies 
somewhere in between, and requires a careful analysis of the European 
discourse and practice explained previously.   
 
The EU framed its responsibilities towards BiH in the late 1990’s and early 
2000’s as achieving and maintaining peace and stability. It first assumed its 
responsibilities by supporting the statebuilding project. This support 
increased as the EU’s crisis management capabilities developed. The 
European Security Strategy (2003) talks about “the role of the EU in restoring 
good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy, and enabling the 
authorities to tackle organized crime”. It claims, “the European perspective 
offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform”.  
 
Enlargement was also (initially) presented as a method to achieve viable 
peace in the Balkans. The 2003 ‘Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: 
Moving Towars European Integration’ referred to the goals of the 
Stabilization and Association Process as moving towards European 
integration and supporting the Balkan countries’ reform efforts158. Although 
the EU has traditionally been careful not to discursively frame its 
responsibilities outside the enlargement framework, European tools were 
clearly used to foster the statebuilding agenda in processes such as police and 
constitutional reform159. Javier Solana, in a 2005 speech160, argued that the 
“European membership perspective is the only way we will have real 
leverage over local leaders so that they take the tough decisions that they 
need”. Stabilization through EU integration emerged as an effective and long-
term strategy with an end goal, contrasted to the limits of earlier ad-hoc and 
uncoordinated approaches of the EU in the Balkans. The European 
Commission’s 2005 Progress Report for Bosnia and Herzegovina noted that 																																																								
158 Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, 16 June 2003. 
159  The Union got involved in constitutional reform processes, and attached police reform to 
conditionality – although none of which were EU accession requirements by technical standards (ICG: 
2012). 
160 Ibid.  
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the country “has been an increasing focus of EU political interest, especially in 
relation to CFSP and ESDP measures. (…) The mandate of the EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) to the country, whose role is to “offer the EU’s advice 
and facilitation in the political process and to promote overall political 
coordination”, has been extended until the end of February 2006. There are 
ongoing discussions within EU bodies for a new police mission which should 
replace the current one (EUPM) as from 1 January 2006. The EU Monitoring 
Mission continued to operate on the basis of its Joint Action. Its current 
mandate expires at the end of 2005.”161	Especially in terms of the diagnosis 
and prognosis of the problem, the EU’s responsibilities were defined within 
the statebuilding frame, but it had the unique tools of CSDP, soft power and 
conditionality to assist Dayton implementation (Juncos: 2012). Until 2006, in 
the period when the OHR was ¨the boss¨, it is possible to define EU’s 
responsibility more as an increasingly influential actor. 
 
With the stalling of constitutional and police reform efforts, the increasing 
loss of international control over the statebuilding framework and the lack of 
progress in OHR transition, the opportunity cost of the EU’s direct 
involvement in stabilization and statebuilding efforts started to increase. 
Later, the Euro crisis and the enlargement fatigue strengthened the debates on 
the absorption capacity of the Union (Belloni: 2009). As Bosnia was seen as a 
test case for both the ESDP and the promotion of integration through soft 
power, emphasizing the technical realm of enlargement started to seem like 
the safest option for the EU, to avoid the perception of another failure – even 
if Bosnian accession appeared a remote possibility. EU Enlargement 
Commissioner Stefan Füle stated in a speech in 2010 “the EU has played a 
leading role in promoting stability, security, democracy and fundamental 
freedoms in the Western Balkans. The region is now firmly anchored in the 
EU enlargement process. (…) Political leaders bear a huge responsibility (…) 
to overcome differences and steer their countries and the region towards 
better governance and away from the risk of destabilization”162. Although 
there were issues such as the implementation of the Sejdic-Finci decision163, 
constitutional reform or the way police reform was implemented, which 
could not be seen entirely in the realm of enlargement, EU action was 																																																								
161 Full text is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2005/package/sec_1422_final_progress_r
eport_ba_en.pdf (Accessed on 19 February 2016).  
162 Remarks by Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy, in his 
address to the EU-Western Balkans Conference, Sarajevo, 2 June 2010, europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-10-289_en.htm?locale=en    
163 The EU Statement at the UN Security Council debate on Bosnia in 2013 argues ¨the implementation of 
the ruling, and the subsequent entry into force of the SAA, would allow the EU to consider as credible a possible 
application by Bosnia and Herzegovina for EU membership¨. EU Statement at the UN Security Council 
Debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina on 12 November 2013, New York.  
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increasingly centered on enlargement164. A EU Statement at the Security 
Council debate reads, “While Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to enjoy a 
clear European perspective (…), the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
have so far failed to achieve the necessary progress in meeting key EU 
requirements. (…) Indeed, the domestic political stalemate is a reason for 
disappointment to all who wish to see Bosnia and Herzegovina succeed165”. 
Success in Bosnia was connected to enlargement and the statebuilding 
dimension of European involvement was more and more cut off from 
narratives.  
 
In short, the EU has assumed three different sets of roles in relation to BiH: a) 
an external actor supporting Dayton implementation and statebuilding, b) a 
unique statebuilding actor with distinct tools such as soft power, 
conditionality and CSDP, c) the roles and responsibilities attributed by the 
enlargement process. Its engagement has increasingly been defined through 
the lens of conditionality and enlargement; as the statebuilding project started 
to falter.  
 
6.1.1.2 The Self and the Other:  
   
In the general frame of statebuilding, the “duty” of neoliberal peace is 
correcting failed states through projecting on the Other the image of the Self. 
The EU, around these lines, frames itself as a neutral, credible, ethical actor in 
Bosnia that is capable of bridging gaps between sides, as well as a model of 
good governance and successful regional cooperation. The EU has defined its 
responsibilities in Bosnia as facilitating sustainable peace; by increasing 
participatory democracy and human rights, helping create self-sustaining, 
effective and representative democratic institutions, giving the Western 
Balkans a European integration perspective (Dursun – Ozkanca: 2010).  
 
Of course, the international community and the EU have never been neutral 
and impartial actors as they claim through discourse. Moreover, while their 
efforts have been undertaken under the guise of helping Bosnians, their 
involvement has been affected by strategic considerations, threat perceptions 
and economic factors beyond the needs of BiH. They have undertaken 
political and intrusive roles on many occasions beyond the limited framing of 
“technical support to statebuilding”, some examples of which have been 
presented in the previous chapter. Both the PIC and EU have similar ideas on 
																																																								
164 EU Enlargement Commissioner Füle announced three initiatives towards Bosnia in 2014:  improved 
economic governance, a joint working group to accelerate IPA-funded projects and judicial reform, all 
in the context of enlargement (Weber and Bassuener: 2014). 
165 Ibid. 
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what peace and stability should mean, not always in connection to the visions 
of local populations (Venneri: 2010).  
 
As the Other, the Balkans have been articulated as a phenomenon different 
from Europe, but also something that Europe could define itself 
comparatively - a dichotomy between the rational and enlightened West and 
the passionate and irrational Orient (Hansen: 2006, Belloni: 2009). Definitions 
on “the Balkans” have been varied, influenced not only by developments in 
the region, but also the shifts in what ‘Europe’ means. The Bosnian war, 
where European efforts did not lead to any meaningful solution, was 
constructed as “Balkan”, defined by ancient passions, hatreds and tribal 
instincts (Hansen: 2006). The EC mediator of the time Owen (1995) defined 
the region as “a climate of dishonor, propaganda and dissembling¨, with ¨no 
innocents among the political and military leaders”. Bose (2007) refers to the 
much-quoted depiction of Maria Todorova on the Balkans, as “a repository of 
negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory 
image of Europe and the West had been constructed”. The Balkan mentality 
was a combination of socialism and war, employing characteristics of extreme 
ethno-nationalism, open hostilities between populations, political instability, 
lack of pluralism, narrow minded and uncooperative local actors and 
dysfunctional governance systems (Belloni: 2007, Bose: 2007). However, side 
by side with this depiction existed confusion on how people who shared such 
deep ethnic hatreds managed to live together for extended time periods 
(Sudetic: 1999). Romantic visions of the Balkans spoke about unpolluted 
nations that lived together in peaceful co-existence, portrayed through a lens 
of “Yugonostalgia” (Bose: 2002, Hansen: 2006).  
 
As Europe gained self-confidence on its role, capacity and influence in the 
Western Balkans, the capability of BiH to change was stressed while the war 
was defined as an anomaly (Bose: 2002, Belloni: 2007). This very much relates 
to the construction of the Self (EU) in Bosnia as an actor capable or building 
its own capacities to respond better to crises. CSDP has constructed a 
“European Self”, capable of learning, progressing and solving conflicts 
through reason and calculation. These characteristics, especially with 
enlargement, also became expectations from the Other. In other words, the 
introduction of capacity-building capabilities in the definition of the Self, 
peculiarly led to the expectation that Bosnia (like the EU) would develop its 
capacities and solve its problems. Swedish Foreign Minister and the first High 
Representative to Bosnia Bildt stated in 2014 that ¨They need to help themselves. 
At the end, Bosnia is the responsibility of elected politicians¨. EU High 
	 222	
Representative Ashton urged Bosnians to show leadership to solve their own 
crises166.  
 
In times when the statebuilding and European integration projects were going 
according to plan, Bosnia was constructed as an actor that had the potential to 
become an image of Europe through capacity building. It was also 
constructed towards the nostalgic image of its own in these times, where 
ethnic divisions did not prevail over unity (Bose: 2002). The replacement of 
the terminology “Balkans” with “Southeastern Europe” in discourse reflects 
this change in ¨the Other¨167.  
 
However, when the international community and the EU felt that they lacked 
the capacity, vision or drive to deal with the Bosnian conflict, such as the 
wartime era or the period after 2008, the deeper root causes of the problem 
was increasingly stressed. An almost mystical, irrational Bosnia that cannot 
follow its own interests towards better governance and European integration 
was constructed. The EU Foreign Policy chief Ashton, for example, in a visit 
to Bosnia in 2012, stressed the importance of looking “beyond the domestic 
divisions, the political rivalries and the vested interests” 168 . Instead of 
analyzing how correct the choice of intrusive institution-building and 
Europeanization has been for post-conflict Bosnia, as well as the impact these 
strategies have had on the country, the irrationality of the Bosnian denial of 
the international strategy was criticized, where most of the blame is placed on 
the shoulders of the incapable leaders of Bosnia. These changes are 
summarized in the chart below: 
																																																								
166 Bildt’s statement was made in connection to the February 2014 riots in BiH and the text is available at 
http://euobserver.com/news/123089. Ashton’s words are available at http://www.spiked-
online.com/newsite/article/bosnia-the-limits-to-eu-rule/14719#.U1q5jRY2_6c. Although this framework 
of discursively assuming a support role in statebuilding has been quite constant; different international 
actors in different time periods have assumed responsibility in different ways. Both within the PIC and 
the EU, there have been voices throughout the intervention calling for stronger EU or PIC leadership to 
solve Bosnia’s problems. In the PIC Steering Board, the US, Turkey and the UK often call for a more 
robust role for the OHR until the Bosnian state becomes more sustainable (Bassuener: 2012). In the EU, 
for instance, the British Foreign Minister Hague recently argued that the EU needed to make more effort 
to encourage BiH to apply for EU membership. (Both documents accessed on 19 February 2016). 
167 In fact, ¨Europe’s civilizing mission¨ is not a new thing. In the 19th century, the Balkans was 
constructed as uncivilized but with the capacity to transform into the image of the West. Their 
inferiority and backwardness was because they were cut off from Europe too long. Romantic visions of 
the Balkans were also present in the same period, which claimed that the unpolluted Balkan nations 
should not be spoiled by Western civilization (Hansen: 2006).  
168 See 
http://www.voanews.com/content/clinton_ashton_say_bosnia_must_make_reforms_to_join_nato_eu/15
36265.html Accessed on 19 February 2016.  
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6.1.2 Operationalizing moral responsibility of the EU in Bosnia: 
 
According to the moral responsibility framework, the “consent principle” 
helps attributing moral responsibility through exhibited choices, promises 
and intentions of agents (Mayer: 2008). Intentions and consent can be 
deducted from discourse, as well as analyzing behavior and practice. The 
moral responsibility framework also factors in the impact of international 
engagement in building states. This is based on the “contribution principle”, 
claiming the moral responsibility of an agent if its actions have led to the 
deterioration of the interests of those who its responsible to – even if the harm 
is unintended and beyond the agent’s control (Mayer and Vogt: 2006, 
Manners: 2008). The increasing capacities of the international community and 
the EU in the realm of statebuilding can also be analyzed; as assuming 
responsibility without having the necessary capacities is defined as 
irresponsible behavior and improving capacities could be considered as an 
intention to engage and assume more responsibility in a certain context.  
 
In order to achieve consistency and exhibit change, the discourse from PIC 
Declarations, UN Security Council (UNSC) statements and EU Council 
Conclusions will be primarily used, in addition to the analysis in the previous 
chapter on the was the statebuilding project in Bosnia was presented and 
conducted.   
 
The purpose is not to attribute full responsibility of success or failure to any 
actor. Bosnian politicians and strongmen, regional actors, profiteers and 
foreign warriors, in addition to the history, culture and social dynamics of 
Bosnia have all impacted the current state of affairs and all hold specific 
responsibility. The goal here is simply to present some moral responsibilities 
of external agents beyond those defined in the statebuilding frame, in order to 
later point out to a responsibility gap.  
 
6.1.2.1 Declared intentions and emerging capacities: 
 
From the perspective of the consent principle, the Dayton Peace Accords 
(DPA) reflect the choice of the international community to balance the need to 
end human suffering by immediately stopping the war and the desire to reject 
unconfident Self, 
¨Other¨ defined 





an ¨Other¨ which is 
nearly constructed in 
the image of ¨Self¨ and 
ready to assume full 
sovereignty (towards 
end).  
due to external and 
internal factors, 
¨Other¨ again defined 
as irrational and 




gaining territory through the means of war and violence. The DPA as well as 
initial post-war statements by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and 
the UN Security Council (UNSC) stressed the need to achieve a durable 
settlement, new constitutional arrangements, the protection and promotion of 
human rights, the return of refugees and a free market economy in Bosnia, 
through building institutions169. Yet, the “moral compromise” made in order 
to prevent more human suffering and spillover effects into the EU set the tone 
of the first phase of intervention: an emphasis on humanitarianism and 
relatively limited involvement by the international community, with a desire 
to exit Bosnia as early as possible. These factors, coupled with the naïve belief 
that peace would come relatively easy after the war, led to the narrow 
definition of international civilian and military mandates. Efforts 
concentrated on humanitarian aid, traditional peacekeeping and 
reconstruction. The intention was not to change the Other towards the Self, 
but immediately respond to a crisis. PIC Conclusions and several UNSC 
Security Council statements stressed upon the understanding that the prime 
responsibility of Dayton implementation lay with the different authorities of 
BiH; and an open parallel was drawn between “the availability of 
international financial assistance and the degree to which all authorities of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina fully implement the peace agreement”170. The EU 
had not yet acquired response capabilities for ambitious foreign and security 
policy tasks. Its self-confidence was low. Thus, it emphasized its contribution 
in terms of financial aid and reconstruction efforts in support of the 
international vision for Bosnia. The commitment to BiH’s potential place in 
Europe lacked a firm promise and a road map171.  
 
In the second phase of statebuilding, protection was still the declared goal; 
UNSC meetings continued to emphasize the human tragedies of the war such 
as sexual violence, extreme poverty and torture. Yet, the general global trend 
of pursuing comprehensive and holistic responses to conflicts was apparent. 
The Bonn powers in 1997 provided the ability to deliver on these intentions. 
These changes led to an alteration of the responsibility dynamic between the 
international community and the Bosnians, as well as the definition of the Self 																																																								
169 See the PIC London Conclusions in 1995 at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5168, the 
PIC Paris Conclusions in 1996 at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5173. The meeting 
records of the Security Council meetings on BiH on 4 April 1996 and 12 December 1996 can be found at  
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.3723 and 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.3647.   (Accessed on 22 December 2014).  
170 Ibid. This parallel between international responsibility and Bosnian compliance with Dayton was not 
fully shared by the Bosnians; the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Permanent Representative to the UN, 
Ambassador Sacirbey stressed in the same Security Council meeting in 1996 that ¨failure by some 
authorities within BiH cannot excuse the international community from neglecting its promises to all of BiH¨. 
171 See the Declaration on Former Yugoslavia made at the Florence European Council on 22 June 1996 at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/fir1_en.htm.  (Accessed on 19 February 2016).		
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and the Other. There was a stronger and more confident Self, capable of 
delivering positive change to Bosnia. The Other, -referred to as Southeastern 
Europe since 1998172, was increasingly framed as capable of positive change, 
opposed to the more irrational and emotional past depictions of the Bosnian 
identity 173 . This redefinition of the Self and the Other affected the 
responsibility dynamic. Although the primary responsibility of Bosnians was 
still emphasized, it was accepted that the influence and responsibilities of the 
international community had grown exponentially towards (technically) 
promoting the Dayton (statebuilding) agenda; where tasks such as returns, 
the rule of law, security sector reform, economic development and human 
rights were emphasized instead of mere humanitarian relief and 
peacebuilding. Longer-term engagement was promised. Holistic 
statebuilding, which would inevitably help overcome divisions in Bosnian 
society while fostering functionality, was also seen as a way to reverse the 
past moral compromise of Western countries in Dayton. The Bonn PIC 
Conclusions argued “an even more persistent approach on the part of the IC 
is required. (…) ¨The important role of the HR in ensuring the creation of 
conditions for a self-sustaining peace (…) and his responsibility for [civilian] 
coordination [is necessary]”. The Brussels PIC in 2000 committed to 
concentrating resources to statebuilding. UNSC and PIC meetings turned into 
platforms where Bosnian leaders reported to the international community on 
their progress in Dayton implementation (Belloni: 2007). However, until the 
Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, the European responsibilities were still mostly 
defined as supporting the international vision.  
 
After 2001, the international community still assumed responsibility for a 
wide array of (technical) tasks in the statebuilding framework that would 
bring Bosnia towards lasting peace and stability. However, combatting 
threats to international and European interests became openly emphasized 
with statements focusing on issues such as combatting cross-border threats 
and terrorism, human trafficking, illegal immigration, organized crime and 
corruption (ESS: 2003)174. Statebuilding was important not only for protecting 
the Bosnians, but also to prevent state failure. The shift in global attention to 																																																								
172  http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00300-R1.EN8.htm.  
(Accessed on 19 February 2016).  
173 Even the Bosnian Permanent Representative to the UN followed suit in helping challenge stereotypes 
of a Bosnia that was incapable of addressing its ancient tribal hatreds in his criticisms of the 
international community’s previous attitudes in a speech in 1998. He stated that ¨it may be more 
understandable for stereotypes to be perpetuated in the clichés of popular culture, but not in the highest decision-
making institutions representing the international community¨. The British Ambassador responded by 
expressing his genuine hope that Bosnia’s divided past would be replaced by a shared future and the 
international community could not stay in Bosnia forever. 
174  See the Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council, at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.pdf (Accessed on 22 
December 2014).   
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bigger security threats such as Iraq and Afghanistan left more room for EU 
involvement and responsibility in Bosnia. The EU found a fertile ground to 
support the international statebuilding project with its unique ESDP tools, its 
soft power and its conditionality. Its promise in 2003 at the Thessaloniki 
Summit to launch the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for 
Southeastern Europe aimed fostering the international vision for Bosnia. With 
this promise, the end point of statebuilding and the restoration of full 
sovereignty for Bosnia were expected to coincide with its accession process to 
the EU; in a similar fashion to the Central and Eastern European countries. 
The High Representative of the time, Paddy Ashdown argued in November 
2005 that: “The signing of the SAA should (…) herald the end of heavyweight 
international intervention in Bosnia”. The growing self-confidence of the 
Union allowed it to assume responsibilities more boldly; the Italian 
Permanent Representative to the UN declared in 2003 that the EU was fully 
involved in the reform of Bosnia while the EU statement at the Council in 
2004 read that EU activities in the political, economic, security and 
development fields reinforced each other. 
 
If things had gone according to the plan and both OHR transition and the 
signature of the SAA had happened in 2007, perhaps there would have been 
no need to contemplate the direct responsibility of the EU in statebuilding. 
However, the protracted limbo situation of Bosnia between the temporary 
responsibility of the international community and full sovereignty has 
complicated the role and responsibilities of the Union. Two elements blurred 
the distinction the EU discourse wanted to make between enlargement and 
statebuilding. First, both the statebuilding and SAP agendas worked towards 
the same vision: Ending the temporary responsibility of the PIC through the 
implementation of the necessary technical reforms towards a viable and 
sustainable Bosnia, and full assumption of the EU of the responsibility of 
engagement with a fully sovereign Bosnia within the SAP. Secondly, the EU’s 
engagement in BiH has sometimes surpassed supporting statebuilding and 
driving the SAP into directly promoting statebuilding elements, exemplified by 
the police reform process (Tzifakis: 2012, Venneri: 2010).  
 
The period also saw a redefinition of the Self and the Other. The 
overconfidence of the Self in its own vision for the future of Bosnia started to 
wane. The understanding that the time was not yet ripe for the closure of 
OHR and the restoration of the full sovereignty of Bosnia was still relevant. 
However, the PIC was slowly deprived of its tools to fulfill its responsibilities 
from engaging in this temporary responsibility, namely the Bonn powers. The 
PIC discursively responded by placing the responsibility for failure on the 
Bosnian leaders and refraining from accepting additional responsibilities. The 
EU defined its intentions increasingly in the enlargement/SAA framework, in 
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an attempt to obscure its responsibility from statebuilding. The economic 
crisis in Europe and the increased intervention fatigue strengthened this 
dynamic. The Other once again started to be defined from the perspective of 
ancient ethnic hatreds and irrationality; responsibilities of local politicians 
were emphasized. The EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on BiH on 21 
October 2013 provides a good summary of the new dynamic: “It is up to the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina political leaders to make the necessary progress¨ and 
¨the current lack of a solution of the Sejdić/Finci issue is preventing Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to further progress towards the EU”175. 
 
After the failure of constitutional reform efforts, the international community 
did not look into providing creative solutions for the future of Bosnia or 
taking more direct responsibility for its problems, as it would have done in 
the past. As a result, in the last years, the discrepancy between 
[statebuilding’s] holistic understanding of the political, social and 
institutional deficits and the limited solutions available became more clear, 
implying that the liberal notion of economic and social stabilization and unity 
through EU integration might have been too naïve (Sebastian: 2012). The fact 
that the international community had to prioritize certain aspects of 
statebuilding such as SSR over others after 2001, due to other pressing global 
necessities in Iraq and Afghanistan is an indicator that external actors did not 
have the capacity to implement comprehensive statebuilding in its entirety.  
 
Almost 20 years after the Dayton Accords, High Representative Inzko was 
still telling the Security Council in May 2012 and November 2013 that “a 
lasting and sustainable political settlement that would ensure a durable 
prospect of peace” was not yet attained, thus the international community 
needed to remain engaged so that all the previous gains were not lost and the 
entire region was not destabilized176. Preserving gains in Bosnia as well as 
combatting threats to stability undoubtedly displays a political/normative 
intention, one that has not been fulfilled. 
 
Statebuilding had three intentions in Bosnia: a) setting the political and 
normative vision for the intervention through Dayton and the subsequent 
efforts to alter its consociational balance; b) remaining temporarily engaged 
on a technical level until Bosnia gained institutional and political maturity; c) 
solidifying the stability of Bosnia through European integration (Bose: 2002, 
Ghani and Lockhart: 2008, Chandler: 2010). Yet, the responsibility framework 
of statebuilding only responds to the first intention, leaving the general 																																																								
175 At http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139070.pdf  
176  These statements can also be seen in the line of institutional emtrapment, which will be explored 
later on in this chapter.  
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political responsibility to the Bosnians. This is the general dynamic of the 
moral responsibility gap according to the legitimate expectations principle. 
 
6.1.2.2 The impact of involvement in Bosnia 	
The Dayton Accords were signed as a forced compromise in order to bring 
immediate stability to Bosnia. Dayton’s consociational nature has been 
criticized for bringing forward a lack of integrative elements, insufficient 
electoral and political incentives for cooperation, territorial divisions, 
discrimination towards national minorities, complex and multilayered 
governance structure, empowerment of (the interests of) nationalist elites due 
to focus on group solidarity. All these factors led to the further deepening of 
ethnic divides within the country (ESI: 2004, Donais: 2005, Gromes: 2009, 
Whitt: 2010, Bose: 2009, Bieber: 2006, Bose: 2002, Belloni: 2007). International 
response in Bosnia has partially hoped to respond to criticisms regarding the 
nature of the Dayton Agreement. Thus, post-Dayton international 
involvement, especially after the Bonn powers were introduced, has been 
about actively seeking to alter the negative effects of Dayton – in action if not 
in discourse. It must be noted here that the EU, as a foreign policy actor, has 
not been a lead actor in putting together the Dayton system- it was mostly 
crafted by US lawyers (O’Leary and McCrudden: 2013).  
 
The international impact was enormous in the first years of Dayton, but this 
was mostly the immediate positive effect due to the influx of humanitarian 
support, IFOR troops and foreign aid into the country. However, the lack of 
capacities to implement the Dayton vision combined with a rushed peace 
process led to delays in the consolidation of peace and sometimes even served 
to further heighten wartime divisions. A more holistic and long-term 
involvement of the international community was declared as the solution for 
sustainable peace. The more assertive international civilian and military 
presence that followed, especially with the introduction of the Bonn powers, 
fostered the ability of the PIC, OHR and NATO to impact developments and 
outcomes in the country (Chandler: 2010). The increased challenging of the 
consociational balance in Dayton by the international community set a new 
frame of involvement beyond the Dayton parameters, making external actors 
a stakeholder in the conflict rather than a neutral party based on its own 
political-normative vision (Belloni: 2007, Venneri: 2010). From a moral 
responsibility perspective, the power and the responsibility to impact the 
situation in Bosnia increased. Increased international involvement also meant 
more financial resources and personnel on the ground from donor countries, 
establishing higher moral responsibility in that direction. 
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From a moral responsibility point of view, the application of technocratic 
statebuilding did result in positive change for Bosnians, such as more 
functional state-level institutions, freedom of internal movement and better 
minority representation, the replacement of bullets with ballots, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation, (limited) success in returns, freedom of 
movement, a single market and the establishment of democratic institutions 
(Belloni: 2007, ICG: 2013). These positive changes were achieved mainly based 
on an international vision, and supported by financial and personnel 
involvement in Bosnia. The EU deserves extra credit for providing Bosnia 
with a longer-term vision, as an equal member of the EU and employing 
resources towards that end. In fact, many discursive examples provided 
previously indicate that the EU is well aware of its positive impact of its 
engagement on Bosnians, Europeans and the EU, and is glad to take credit for 
this.  
 
There were also negative impacts of engagement, such as aid dependency and 
the destabilizing effect of market reforms. The comprehensive nature of 
external statebuilding, as well as the practice of prioritizing engagement with 
the political elite, divorced the local populations from ownership in the affairs 
of their own country, creating a contradiction with the declared goal of 
boosting state sovereignty and local ownership177(ESI: 2004, Gromes: 2009, 
Youngs: 2009, Aybet and Bieber: 2011). With the increasing securitization of 
statebuilding and the diminished attention to Bosnia, statebuilding efforts 
prioritized shorter-term security needs of donor countries rather than local 
realities or functional imperatives (ICG: 2013, Ioannides and Celador: 2011). 
This led to an increased focus on improving security services and 
empowering the executive, to the detriment of rule of law, democratization 
and human rights efforts. The High Representative, who gained vast control 
over the country and its elected politicians through the Bonn powers, was 
neither created nor accountable to the Bosnian people (Bose: 2009, Chandler: 
2010). Also, as previously noted, the statebuilding frame in general found it 
difficult to attribute responsibility for harmful impact.  
 
Before 2006, the continued strong interventions created the impression that 
the Bosnian system was able to stand on its own feet and the 
international/European statebuilding strategy had worked (Belloni: 2007, 
Ashdown: 2008, Tzifakis: 2012). The need to sell Bosnia as a success story for 
other interventions like Iraq and Afghanistan led to a narrative emphasis on 
the positive aspects of international involvement, instead of a more balanced 
analysis on problems and lessons learned. The December 2005 PIC Steering 																																																								
177 Bosnians and Bosnian leaders and elites felt like they had a subordinate role in their countries 
problems and thus focused on the advancement of their own agendas (Tzifakis: 2012). 
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Board meeting in Paris, for example, stated that “the extent of recovery has 
been remarkable, (…), BiH is at peace, more than a million refugees and 
displaced people have returned (…), the economy is growing and the EU 
launched the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations 
with the country”178. Indeed, with the launch of the SAP agenda and the 
Thessaloniki Summit, the role and the impact of the EU increased 
considerably. It became an actor that not only contributed to peace and 
stability in Bosnia, but also was instrumental in the framing of its future.  
 
The selling of statebuilding through Bosnia as a success story proved 
immature. The international vision, suggesting that replacing Bonn powers 
with EU conditionality would suffice to alter the consociational nature of 
Dayton, negatively affected the image of the Union. With the withering away 
of the Bonn powers, Bosnian leaders were increasingly able to challenge 
Dayton, as well as the statebuilding efforts following it. The political stability 
on the surface gave way to negative rhetoric and increased tensions. The 
politicization of conditionality beyond the acquis communautaire, the perceived 
absence of a credible European perspective and disagreements on how to deal 
with non-compliance have taught Bosnians that enlargement could not be 
taken too seriously and conditionality could be disregarded (Sedelmeier: 
2006, Bieber: 2010 Aybet and Bieber: 2011, Tzifakis: 2012). The EU’s choice to 
enter into bargaining processes with the political leaders instead of 
encouraging citizen participation resulted in an unwilling empowerment of 
the political elite - who the EU put the responsibility of failure on in its public 
statements (Dzihic and Wieser: 2011). The EU became an actor unwillingly 
pursuing an interventionist agenda but lacked the means of the OHR – 
making it responsible for statebuilding beyond its intentions and means.  
 
The divisions and tensions among the peoples of Bosnia continue to pose the 
biggest threat to national and international stability (ICG: 2012). The Dayton 
Accords and the subsequent statebuilding program, whose ultimate goal was 
to eliminate these conflicts and achieve sustainable peace by institution 
building has sometimes even fostered ethno-territorial divisions and 
empowered nationalist politicians (Tzifakis: 2012). The situation in Bosnia 
today, despite all positive developments in the past, has not created 
guaranteed regional stability. In addition, the effectiveness of EU 
conditionality, ESDP tools and the soft power of Europe have been challenged 
by the developments in Bosnia, negatively affecting the EU’s image as a 
successful foreign policy actor. Both the EU and the Bosnians seem to be in a 																																																								
178 See the Communique Issued by the Political Directors of the PIC Steering Board and the BiH 
Authorities Following an Extraordinary PIC Session to Mark the 10th Anniversary of the Dayton-Paris 
Peace Accords, at www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=36256 (Accessed on 22 December 2014).  
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protracted limbo, created mostly by the political-normative premises of the 
international and European vision on Bosnia as well as the way statebuilding 
was implemented. Yet, in discourse, the technical framing of statebuilding 
obscured the impact of its political and normative dimensions. The 
international/European discourse within and beyond Dayton is carefully 
crafted to attribute statebuilding actors the responsibility of assisting Dayton 
implementation. Setbacks are often blamed on the irrationality and 
intransigence of Bosnian leaders. The political instability brought by pushing 
to reverse the consociational structure of Bosnian governance is an example: 
the responsibility of this instability is pushed on the shoulders of local 
politicians (O’Leary and McCrudden: 2013).  
 
6.1.3 The direction of the EU’s responsibilities: 
 
The EU’s responsibilities in statebuilding have previously been approached 
from three angles: a) protecting local populations, b) preserving international 
stability and advancing its own economic and security interests, c) advancing 
its foreign policy identity, actorness capacity and global image. All these 
angles can be deducted through the EU’s engagement in Bosnia: alleviating 
the human tragedies of the Bosnian war and serving the best interests of local 
populations, combatting threats to international and European political, 
economic and security interests and correcting the negative international 
image caused by the war.  
 
Looking at the intentions and impact of intervention, the promise to provide 
and develop the framework for sustainable peace and security is visible in 
international and EU narratives. This framework entails promises and action 
towards the provision of viable security and stability, a free and functioning 
market economy that will lead towards economic growth, human rights and 
democracy and a functioning political system. It also includes a vision to 
reverse the root causes of war and foster reconciliation. The final promise is 
full sovereignty and local ownership, embedded in a European future.  
 
In terms of the core interests of the EU, the prevention of Bosnia from 
becoming a failed state as well as a potential spillover of violence or 
instability to Europe and beyond, combatting organized crime, corruption, 
human trafficking, illegal immigration, and fostering free markets, investment 
and trade are highlighted both in discourse and European action. Finally, 
statebuilding in Bosnia aimed correcting the negative international/European 
image from the Bosnian war, fostering the credibility of the EU as a foreign 
policy actor, promoting the EU as a model of regional integration and stability 
and advancing its own norms and values.  
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Looking at statebuilding in Bosnia as a whole process, it can be seen that 
different directions of responsibilities were prioritized in different phases of 
the intervention. There have been shifts in how these responsibilities were 
discursively formulated and implemented. The changing theories and 
understandings on the conflict in Bosnia and international statebuilding in 
general, the merging capabilities of the external actors – in particular the EU, 
the global and regional developments have all led to redefinitions of the Self 
and the Other and the nature of the intervention. As such, although the 
primary responsibility of the local populations (leaders) and the limited 
support function of the interveners remained essential elements of the 
dominant discourse, the degree to which they were emphasized did shift. For 
instance, as the European perspective of Bosnia became a possibility and 
ESDP tools subsequently became more developed, one of the most 
emphasized responsibilities became confirming the EU as a model and driver 
of sustainable peace and stability, sometimes taking precedence over the 
responsibilities to local populations of Bosnia and those to the immediate 
economic and security interests of Europe (Juncos: 2012). None of these shifts 
have altered the general trend of defining international responsibilities in a 
limited and narrow manner, while ascribing primary responsibility to local 
actors. Both dynamics are captured in the following diagram.  
 
6.2 Responsibility Gaps and Discursive Safeguards: 
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The previous parts on Bosnia have indicated several possibilities to identify 
responsibility gaps between the responsibilities that the EU’s narratives were 
ready to assume and the moral responsibilities its involvement in Bosnia 
could entail. Many examples of discursive safeguards – the narrative tools 
through which discourse manage to construct its responsibilities in a limited 
and narrow manner in comprehensive interventions – have also been implied. 
This final part aims to clearly set out the existence of responsibility gaps and 
discursive safeguards in Bosnia; thus connecting all the keywords of this 
thesis: statebuilding, responsibility, the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
6.2.1 Responsibility gaps in Bosnia:  
 
The previous parts of this chapter have indicated the possibility to attribute 
more responsibility to the EU beyond determined by its own narratives. The 
following moral responsibilities are examples: 
 - Choosing constructing a consociational system, as a best practice to 
stop human suffering and spillover into Europe and beyond, - Choosing to promote a normative/ political vision of conflict response, 
based on its own world vision and political/administrative model, - Pursuing comprehensive and holistic external responses to conflict, in 
the form of statebuilding, - Promising Bosnia a European future with conditionality attached, 
connecting this promise with the full sovereignty and local ownership 
goal of statebuilding,  - Responsibility for unintended harmful impact, such as the effect of aid 
dependency and the destabilizing effect of market reforms on the 
Bosnian economy, or the harmful impact of prematurely replacing 
Bonn powers with EU conditionality in practice on the image of the 
EU, - Engaging in wartime response and statebuilding without having the 
necessary capabilities, pursuing statebuilding goals through 
insufficient SAP tools, losing important capacity to pursue 
statebuilding goals with the withering away of the Bonn powers, - The capacity gap in implementing the comprehensive version of 
statebuilding, and having to focus on more security related issues, - Responsibilities for leaving Bosnia in a limbo between limited and full 
sovereignty, at the doorstep of the EU; responsibilities for the inability 
to show a viable path towards full sovereignty and EU membership. 
 
As previously argued, it is possible to point out to responsibility gaps in a 
coherent and structured way, by addressing these gaps in three categories: a) 
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Factoring in change while attributing responsibility, b) The political nature of 
international statebuilding activities as opposed to their technical framing, c) 
The dilemmas on the discourse on local ownership.  
 
6.2.1.1 The changing nature of statebuilding: 
 
In Bosnia, the international intervention has gone through many stages. In 
fact, the international engagement in the country can be seen as a trial-error 
experiment, where the theory and practice of statebuilding, constructions of 
the Self and Other, the actors involved, the external capabilities and the 
responsibility frameworks have constantly changed and evolved (Adebahr: 
2011). Yet, the general attribution of responsibility to the international 
community has not shifted in parallel to these changes.  
 
The first example that comes to mind is the way statebuilding in Bosnia was 
configured with the Dayton Accords. The consociational system in Bosnia 
was a conscious choice of the international community. The initial 
international involvement in Bosnia after 1995 was limited in scope and did 
not intent to challenge the consociational balance established by Dayton. The 
modalities of intervention changed massively in 1997, with the introduction 
of the Bonn powers. For the next 9 years, Bosnia became a comprehensive and 
intrusive international project. Yet, there was not much of a shift in the way 
external responsibilities towards Bosnia was defined. The new responsibilities 
the new format of involvement might have had brought to international 
actors was not thoroughly explored.   
 
Another example is the international community’s increased focus on ending 
the statebuilding project in Bosnia, necessitated by the “more urgent” 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bosnia was sold as a success story 
since the end of 2005 with the hope of establishing the right mood for 
international exit, starting a new phase of intervention in Bosnia. As global 
dynamics had led to the shift in the practice of statebuilding in Bosnia, a soul 
searching on to what extent international responsibilities towards Bosnia was 
fulfilled was not made. Christian Schwartz-Schilling, with his agenda of non-
intervention, was made the new High Representative in Bosnia in 2006 with 
the blessing of the PIC; when his agenda did not succeed in facilitating exit, it 
became the failure of him and Bosnian politicians. The fact that the 
international community had decided to unsuccessfully change its approach 
towards Bosnia was not factored in.  
 
A more visible change came with the next High Representative Lajcak, and 
his decision to prioritize EU integration over statebuilding projects. 
Statebuilding accepts the temporary responsibilities of the international 
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community in situations when the sovereignty of a state has been 
problematized. The EU, on the other hand, expects to engage with fully 
sovereign states through enlargement. The EU has applied both conflict 
management and enlargement policies in Bosnia. As the end goals of the 
statebuilding project in Bosnia became increasingly difficult to implement, it 
stressed the responsibilities of Bosnia as a sovereign state more and more. Yet, 
this shift in discourse did not correspond with the reality. From a 
statebuilding point of view, the international community’s temporary 
responsibility in Bosnia had not ended and the Bonn powers, however weak, 
still existed. The EU, despite carefully framing its engagement within the 
enlargement framework, has played an essential role in statebuilding efforts. 
In other words, the EU shifted its narrative and involvement from a 
statebuilding perspective to an enlargement perspective in Bosnia, without 
properly analyzing what its moral responsibilities on the two fronts were.  
 
Statebuilding has constantly changed from its inception. Every change has 
brought with it new modalities, new means of engagements, new promises 
and new definitions of the Self and the Other. From a moral responsibility 
perspective, every such shift would necessitate the redefinition of the 
responsibilities of the involved actors. This has not happened. The narratives 
defining the responsibilities of the international community in Bosnia have 
not shifted in general, even when a comprehensive, intrusive and holistic 
statebuilding was being implemented between 1997 and 2006. Moreover, in 
each phase responsibilities have been defined in a prospective way, without a 
proper analysis of the retrospective responsibilities from previous phases. 
Instead of factoring in responsibilities from previous eras retrospectively, they 
have been obscured by the dynamics of new modalities. There has been a lack 
of debate on what new responsibilities might be, whether the previously 
assumed responsibilities have been fulfilled and who will be the responsible 
party in the case of failure. This has been apparent especially in the case of the 
EU, when the dynamics of EU enlargement have dramatically shifted the 
balance of responsibilities of international and local actors. The EU was able 
to emphasize the responsibilities of Bosnian politicians more and more, 
although the problematization of the sovereignty of Bosnia never seized to 
exist.  
 
In short, although the shifts and changes in the statebuilding framework and 
the defined roles of international actors have shifted throughout the 
intervention in Bosnia, the narratives on the responsibilities of international 
actors never exceeded supporting Bosnia through technocratic guidelines. 
When it is considered that most change was due to shifting threat perceptions 
of international actors or new global realities, the responsibility gap becomes 
even more apparent.  
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6.2.1.2 Statebuilding as a normative and political exercise: 
 
Statebuilding in Bosnia has often taken the form of a political and normative 
exercise. The EU has supported the agendas set by the PIC on different issues 
such as SSR, institution-building, economic policies and normative value 
promotion. Despite reluctance to intertwine its enlargement agenda with the 
statebuilding frame, it has used its political tools as well as conditionality to 
support statebuilding goals. It has supported moderate political parties, 
engaged in arm-twisting with regard to police, constitutional and other 
reforms and has used traditional tools such as statements and demarches to 
support its goals. Its intentions have been political. The EU Special 
Representative (EUSR) in Bosnia 179  supports the SAP, but also the 
implementation of the Dayton Accords. The EUSR is tasked with political 
activities, such as facilitating the local political process, monitoring and 
advising the executive and legislative authorities in Bosnia as well as political 
parties and engaging in public diplomacy and outreach. As such, the EU’s 
role as a political actor is embedded in the Union’s discourse and its 
intentions are defined in this realm. Moreover, the EU’s relationship with 
Bosnia is of an asymmetrical nature characterized by aid dependency and 
conditionality, leaving little opportunity for domestic players to debate policy 
alternatives. This increases the political tone of European involvement.  
 
Yet, the EU discourse is able to present itself as a neutral and technical actor, 
with the sole aim of doing good. The EU frames its intentions in Bosnia as 
building a functional country that could integrate with the EU, operating 
through a set of technical and economic instruments falling within the SAP, 
ESDP field missions and EUSR offices (Venneri: 2010). EU officials 
systematically claim that they do not directly deal with sovereignty or Dayton 
implementation issues; a claim which is inconsistent with the Union’s massive 
field presence, its support to statebuilding and its use of enlargement tools to 
foster Dayton implementation. This leads to a responsibility gap, between the 
political role played by the EU in Bosnia and its narratives confining its 
responsibilities to the technical area.  
 
Examples are abundant. Transforming the economic and political dynamics in 
Bosnia has been the main goal of statebuilding and SAP, a goal that has not 
completely materialized. Pushing forward such a transformation would 
imply moral responsibility. The international choice to increase the weight of 
common state institutions and alter the consociational nature of Dayton is 
clearly in the political sphere, yet another unassigned responsibility (Gromes: 																																																								
179 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:188:0030:0033:en:PDF 
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2009, O’Reilly: 2012, Chandler: 2005). The technical framing of statebuilding 
has hampered the response capacity of both the EU and the OHR to respond 
to direct political challenges to Dayton or the SAP, negatively impacting on 
the image and global actorness capacity of the EU (Dzihic and Wieser: 2011). 
Even the responsibility of this negative impact is attributed to local leaders.  
 
In fact, the EU, a big bureaucracy that must reach consensus among 28 
member states on difficult issues, has a higher tendency to frame political 
problems as technical. This affects it’s framing of enlargement and the SAP as 
well, beyond statebuilding. The EU has often been criticized for neglecting its 
responsibilities arising from the stabilization dimension of the SAP, perhaps 
because it enters the political zone a bit too much. In post-conflict countries 
such as Bosnia and Kosovo, the EU has mostly fine-tuned the technical model 
it had applied in the Central and Eastern European Countries, with the 
addition of elements such as ICTY conditionality, regional cooperation and 
ESDP elements (Chandler: 2006, Aybet and Bieber: 2011). Enlargement, and 
the responsibilities it entails, has comfortably been confined to the 
“technical”.  
 
6.2.1.3 Dilemmas of Local Ownership: 
 
The way statebuilding deals with the concepts of full sovereignty and local 
ownership is another element leading to a responsibility gap. The 
comprehensive and intrusive nature of statebuilding in countries whose 
sovereignty has been problematized, the ambition to set out the future vision 
for countries, and the negative unintended impacts on local ownership imply 
more responsibilities for international actors than the narrow and limited 
support role self-attributed by discourse.  
 
Although the restoration of full sovereignty and local ownership has been the 
primary declared goal of statebuilding in Bosnia, the current administrative 
structure is hardly a product of local will. The Dayton Accords, to which the 
Bosnian Constitution is an annex, is based on external arm-twisting rather 
than the result of dialogue between the peoples of Bosnia. Similarly, the 
decision to alter the consociational elements of Dayton based on the vision 
that ethnic nationalism should be overcome is a product of the international 
community (Belloni: 2007). The key elements of Bosnian statehood; such as 
the state flag, the common currency and border services are products of 
international decrees (Donais: 2005). Especially in 1998 – 2006, domestic 
sovereign prerogatives continued to be compromised with a view to fostering 
the institutional reorganization of BiH towards establishing full sovereignty. 
External actors have retained influence on the setting up and implementation 
of fiscal and economic strategies, government structures and the security 
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sector. Bosnians have cast votes several times since 1996, but none of these 
elections provided answers to the lingering questions of statehood and local 
ownership (Donais: 2005). Each new High Representative has changed the 
modalities of statebuilding in Bosnia, with the endorsement of the PIC but 
without the approval of the Bosnians.  
 
International ownership also prevailed over reform efforts. Both the US and 
the EU have made clear that the constitutional reform efforts, envisaged to 
grant Bosnians ownership over their constitution and state, would have to 
result in a state structure more or less modeled after a neoliberal state. 
Ironically, both internationally led constitutional reform efforts engaged 
primarily with the nationalist elites in Bosnia, resulting in their empowerment 
over local interests (Juncos: 2012).  A similar dynamic became prevalent in 
enlargement. As European integration processes also prefer bargaining with 
(democratically elected) national elites and limits the engagement of civil 
society and political parties, EU-conditionality helped boost anti-state forces 
that it tried to weaken and problematized transforming nationalist identities 
into genuine local interests (Juncos: 2012). Moreover, the application of 
integration frameworks previously applied in Central and Eastern Europe 
made Bosnia the recipient of strategies developed elsewhere (Belloni: 2007). In 
addition, by suggesting that the only solution for Bosnia was Europe, a future 
direction was dictated to the people of Bosnia instead of being their choice.  
 
In short, both Dayton implementation and enlargement have conditioned 
local ownership on prior acceptance of externally defined (imposed) sets of 
norms, principles and institutional frameworks (Donais: 2005). Yet, the 
primary responsibility of statebuilding and Dayton implementation falls on 
the local populations and their leaders, creating a “responsibility gap” in 
terms of ownership of the vision for Bosnia. This dilemma has led to the local 
population adopting a passive attitude towards democratic processes, the 
statebuilding project and European integration (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis: 
2006). It also allows Bosnian leaders to avoid the responsibility of difficult 
political decisions; when external actors frequently impose decisions, local 
politicians can afford an intransigent attitude on the domestic front and avoid 
inter-ethnic cooperation (Belloni: 2009). This dynamic works against the basic 
principles of statebuilding defined above: establishing a fully sovereign 
Bosnian state which can take responsibility, does not pose a threat to 
international peace and stability, and allows for the external actors to leave 
the country confident that there will be no return to conflict.  
 
As long as the sovereignty of Bosnia is problematized and its constitution is 
based on international impositions rather than the will of the Bosnian people, 
the prospective moral responsibilities of the international community will 
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persist for the malfunctioning of the system. Until then, it is difficult to talk 
about full sovereignty and ownership of Bosnians, in a system that is still 
sustained through the involvement of the international community. This is 
not only a responsibility gap, but also an underlying reason behind the 
urgency of pushing for constitutional reform in Bosnia.  
 
6.2.2 Responding to criticisms to the statebuilding frame: Discursive 
safeguards 
 
While the global and regional dynamics kept changing as the statebuilding 
project in Bosnia progresses, alongside evolving international and European 
capabilities, the core elements legitimizing the international presence 
remained mostly static:  
o The understanding that effective statebuilding, embraced by national 
authorities and succeeded by European integration, would result in 
sustainable peace and stability,  
o The problematization of the full sovereignty of Bosnia until a 
functional and viable state was built,  
o The attribution of the primary responsibility of “making Bosnia work” 
to the Bosnian population and leaders.  
 
6.2.2.1 Responses to criticisms within the statebuilding frame: 
 
In the previous chapters, we have seen that one way dominant narratives 
respond to criticism is by offering practical solutions within the statebuilding 
frame, suggesting fine-tuning and technical improvement.  One such example 
is the streamlining of the coordinating structures of the international 
community in 2002 to eliminate duplication of tasks, in response to criticisms 
regarding the difficulties in cooperation and coordination and the 
overlapping of tasks (Sebastian: 2012). A “Board of Principals” was 
established as the main coordinating body, chaired by the EU Special 
Representative and meeting weekly in Sarajevo, to coordinate the efforts of 
NATI, OSCE, EU and UN agencies, the IMF and the World Bank (Chandler: 
2006). As the statebuilding project progressed, international actors tried to 
avoid the trap of rushed and unrealistic timelines, although time pressures 
have also been a consistent feature throughout the years. Criticisms 
concerning the consociationalism of Dayton and the intrusiveness of 
international action have also been dealt with in a technical manner and 
within the statebuilding framework, through stressing that effective and 
successful statebuilding coupled with a European perspective would 
eventually help manage and eradicate these problems.  
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The lack of international and/or European capabilities to materialize the 
comprehensive vision set out for Bosnia in the Dayton Agreement and 
afterwards has been another criticism consistently raised, especially in the 
first years of international intervention. The introduction of the Bonn Powers 
as well as EU conditionality, together with the bolstered European civilian 
crisis management capabilities, was important to help narrow this capability 
gap, although the inconsistencies and unclearness in EU conditionality 
sometimes invalidated this tool (Aybet and Bieber: 2011, Tzifakis: 2012). On 
the EU side, the dominance of intergovernmentalism and the phenomenon of 
the “lowest common denominator” have also been criticized for paralyzing 
the Union’s ability to act efficiently and rapidly in Bosnia, often leading to 
technical responses instead of more debated political ones (Simms: 2012). The 
problems of horizontal and vertical consistency have been partially improved, 
including in Bosnia, with the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) (Wolff 
and Whitman: 2011).  
 
From a moral responsibility perspective, one can claim that efforts to improve 
statebuilding and foster the capabilities of relevant actors have been morally 
responsible acts, which have aimed to match the international vision with 
adequate capabilities. For instance, in the late 1990s, the international 
community has constantly assumed new tasks in Bosnia, to keep up with the 
vision of statebuilding as a comprehensive act that leads to sustainable peace 
and security. The EU’s increasingly assertive role, fostered by its enhanced 
civilian management capabilities and its use of enlargement conditionality 
has not only provided Bosnians with a future direction, but also helped 
improve the image of the EU shattered by its early ineffective response to the 
war in Yugoslavia. The European perspective has also helped respond to 
criticisms on the intrusive nature of international involvement. In short, the 
international community and the EU have consistently sought to identify and 
address the problems within the statebuilding frame, especially through 
fostering their own capabilities to better serve their responsibilities set out by 
declared intentions and impact of action. However, these solutions have not 
challenged the core elements of the statebuilding frame, which suggests that 
statebuilding is a guarantee for lasting peace and stability, and the primary 
responsibility in bringing this forward belongs to the Bosnians. 
 
6.2.2.2 Responses to challenges to the statebuilding frame: Discursive 
safeguards 
 
One problem in statebuilding is strikingly clear. Statebuilding in Bosnia has 
succeeded in bringing security, establishing state institutions, conducting free 
elections, making Bosnia subscribe to core human rights treaties and 
addressing the gravest sufferings of people. However, the ultimate goal has 
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not been reached: Achieving full sovereignty and national ownership, based 
on the consent of people, in a peaceful and functioning Bosnia integrated into 
Europe. The core intention of statebuilding in Bosnia remains unfulfilled. IN 
addition, despite continuous efforts to improve and fine-tune international 
practices, the continuous stream of new initiatives have not managed to find 
solutions to the core problems associated with external statebuilding – 
establishing full ownership, inclusivity, and self-reliance. 
 
As the previous parts have demonstrated, the international community has 
continuously set out the normative and political vision for Bosnia. It has 
regularly changed the parameters of involvement, without much consultation 
with the Bosnian people. It has assumed executive positions where the 
sovereignty of Bosnia has been problematized. The EU has been part of this 
international vision, including by assuming a leading role in the later stages 
of statebuilding. With the introduction of the SAP framework, the EU has 
aspired to be the main actor in Bosnia; many EU countries still push for the 
OHR to be finally closed. Yet, neither international nor European narratives 
have assumed much moral responsibility that all these choices, intentions and 
actions imply.  The scope of international and European responsibilities has 
consistently been defined as limited and technical; similarly, responses to 
criticisms have been limited and technical as well. A deeper soul-searching 
has not yet taken place, to address the “responsibility gaps” inherent in the 
statebuilding frame. Instead, international narratives have chosen to avoid 
them, by employing a number of “discursive safeguards”. Some of these 
safeguards are exemplified below: 
 
The emphasis on statebuilding as a universal and technical exercise: 
 
The consistent framing of international actors of their involvement as narrow, 
limited, technical and temporary, despite their political and normative role in 
Bosnia, is the first discursive safeguard. In other words, the framing of 
statebuilding in Bosnia as a technical support function, as opposed to a 
political and liberal exercise, has allowed the international community to 
avoid any responsibility beyond the technical sphere. To give a recent 
example, on the website of the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
responsibilities of the EU Delegation are defined purely in the technical realm 
– “presenting, explaining and implementing EU policy, analyzing and 
reporting on the policies and developments in the country, and conducting 
negotiations in line with its mandate”. Furthermore, the EU Special 
Representative, which was once double-hatted with the High Representative 
of OHR and has a more political scope of action, also defines its 
responsibilities as reinforcing “the EU’s political support for its policy 
objectives” in Bosnia , offering “advice and facilitation support in the political 
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process to all institutions (…), and ensuring greater consistency and 
coherence of all political, economic and European priorities”. Its connection to 
statebuilding, as well as the political role it (previously) played, is obscured.  
 
Confining international action purely to the technical realm allows the 
attribution of political and normative responsibility – the responsibility for 
choice – to domestic actors. This technical framing has been apparent in the 
EU’s discourse, even when dealing with more political issues such as 
constitutional reform, political facilitation and minority rights. The European 
Commission’s 2014 Progress Report for Bosnia defines the EU’s role in 
constitutional reform as “facilitation”. Furthermore, without mentioning that 
the Bosnian constitution is the Fourth Annex of the Dayton Agreement, it 
stresses that “the complicated decision-making process, lack of shared vision, 
and weak cooperation between the various levels of government have 
delayed structural reforms and hampered the country’s progress towards the 
EU”. Statebuilding in Bosnia has been a liberal internationalist choice, 
justifying comprehensive and intrusive efforts aiming to bring forward free 
markets, individual rights, and democratic institutions, as the universal 
prerequisite of sustainable peace and development (Baum: 2008). Framing the 
role of international actors, including the EU, as purely technical, obscures 
these political and normative choices made by international actors since the 
signature of Dayton. This framing allows define international responsibilities 
purely as implementation, although the overarching vision of liberal 
internationalism is never challenged. It has technicalised the engagement of 
the international community, by defining the neoliberal state as a norm and 
statebuilding as the way to get there. 
 
The frustration of the PIC and the EU with Bosnian leaders who openly 
challenged internationally imposed reforms, for example, has much to do 
with the universal/technical framing of statebuilding. By challenging these 
reforms, many Bosnians were implicitly arguing against their universal 
nature. Arguing against the universal frame of statebuilding would mean that 
international involvement in Bosnia was a choice – which involves 
responsibility. 
 
The presentation of statebuilding and EU integration as the only viable and 
rational alternative to conflict in the country has also been a discursive 
safeguard constantly employed by the EU. For instance, the French 
Representative’s statement to the United Nations Security Council in 2014 
stresses that “the prospect of European integration offers the only viable way 
forward for Bosnia and Herzegovina” . Defining European integration as the 
“only choice” gives it a universal tone, obscuring the choice to use integration 
as a statebuilding tool for many years. The careful framing of several EU 
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Presidency Conclusions of the EU’s involvement in Bosnia in the framework 
of EU integration rather than statebuilding is also telling. International actors 
can be inevitably held more responsible for political choices in the context of 
statebuilding, which problematizes sovereignty. The enlargement frame 
brings no such responsibility to the EU: the choice to enter an enlargement 
relationship with the EU rests with the accession country, after that choice has 
been made; it is easier to frame the relationship as technical. In the examples 
of police and constitutional reform, the EU has often left it to the US to 
undertake the more risky and complex responsibilities in the political sphere, 
while trying to technicalize its own involvement by connecting it to the SAP 
(Venneri: 2010).  
 
This is not to say that there was a conscious effort to avoid the “political” in 
Bosnia. Both the EU and NATO recognized that engagement meant getting 
involved in the creation of the state normative and institutional framework 
(Aybet and Bieber: 2011). However, especially as the risks of becoming 
entangled in the complex Bosnian dilemma – partially created by 
international involvement – increased, discourse been used as a safeguard to 
avoid the responsibility that might arise beyond the manageable technical 
sphere. Defining responsibility in technical terms has also allowed the EU to 
identify quantitatively measurable narrow definitions of success and avoid 
difficult political choices (Vines: 2010). As dealing with the political sphere 
became increasingly risky since 2006, the European discourse has more and 
more focused on its technical responsibilities in the scope of enlargement – 
the safest area for EU engagement. 
 
The static formulation of responsibilities, despite evolving dynamics: 
 
We have previously seen how dominant narratives frame of international 
responsibilities in statebuilding in a static manner, failing to adapt them to 
changing realities on the ground as well as shifting modalities of response. 
The democratic state based on neoliberal values has been consistently framed 
as a best practice, and statebuilding as a technical exercise to get there. This 
has been despite the fact that the international community has been the 
driving force behind change, influenced by external interests and threat 
perceptions.   
 
The static definition of responsibilities has safeguarded against the attribution 
of retrospective responsibilities with each change in the parameters or 
modalities of statebuilding. Examples are numerous. UN Security Council 
resolutions on Bosnia since 1995 have constantly underscored that “the 
primary responsibility for the further successful implementation of the peace 
process lies with the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, while often 
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conditioning international assistance to compliance of national authorities 
with Dayton. The responsibilities of international and European actors have 
been defined as “support”, even in 1998-2006 when statebuilding evolved into 
an intrusive and comprehensive exercise with the Bonn powers. This focus on 
the primary responsibilities of the nation state and the definition of external 
responsibilities as limited and temporary has helped avoiding the 
responsibility from being the driver of the process of change.  The EU’s 
narratives, after the introduction of the Stabilization and Association Process, 
provide another good example.  
 
Framing responsibilities in prospective terms as such has allowed avoiding 
the retrospective responsibilities that have arisen from its involvement in 
statebuilding. Although the EU has clearly been a statebuilding actor, and its 
ESDP tools have been utilized towards fulfilling statebuilding goals, it has 
increasingly defined its responsibilities solely in the scope of enlargement. In 
fact, it has not always been clear where statebuilding ended and enlargement 
began, as the expected outcomes and the methods carry similarities and the 
tools of each project is used to reinforce the other. The aforementioned 
examples on police reform in Bosnia provide a good example.   
 
Although the statebuilding frame continues to attribute the primary 
responsibility of statebuilding to the national authorities, the international 
community has been the most instrumental actor in determining the future 
direction of Bosnia. Accepting a consociational structure for Bosnia in order to 
successfully stop the conflict embedding an international role in the Dayton 
system, employing statebuilding as the key methodology for sustainable 
peace and security and pointing out Europe as the future direction of Bosnia 
have all been international choices and intentions which have impacted the 
current situation on the ground (Bose: 2009). However, every new phase in 
Bosnia has obscured this relationship of the international community and the 
EU with Bosnia. Retrospective responsibilities have particularly been 
obscured.  
 
Emphasizing local ownership while problematizing sovereignty: 
 
The imperative of full local ownership is the most emphasized element in 
international narratives, not least because the legitimacy of international 
peacebuilding efforts are based on the emphasis on sovereignty and 
ownership. Yet, while emphasizing full ownership as an end goal, the 
sovereignty of conflict countries is often problematized in peacebuilding 
contexts. Ghani and Lockhart (2008) use the term ‘sovereignty gap’, to define 
countries that enjoy de jure sovereignty, yet are characterized by a de facto 
inability and incapacity to protect their populations. In other words, 
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peacebuilding is often conducted in a sovereignty and capacity vacuum, 
where conflict-affected countries are unable to exercise full ownership over 
peace processes. This vacuum provides international actors with an entry 
point to engage in broad and comprehensive activities, cross-cutting through 
development, human rights and peace and security sectors and a possibility 
to determine the future direction of the country (AGE: 2015). However, 
narratives still tend to stress the ‘primary responsibility of the nation state’. 
This has been the dynamic for Bosnia, throughout the statebuilding project. 
For instance, while one of the most comprehensive and intrusive 
statebuilding projects was implemented in Bosnia from 1997 - 2005, often 
criticized as a form of ‘social engineering of the state and society’, 
international narratives pointed out to how ‘the people of Bosnia’ had 
achieved a remarkable recovery with international support (Aybet and 
Bieber: 2011, Chandler: 2010, Belloni: 2009). 
 
The constitutional system of Dayton has been imposed by international actors 
and has required the continuous involvement of the international community 
to be sustained. The international community has also called for change in 
Dayton parameters: a PIC Steering Board Political Directors Meeting in 
Sarajevo on 24 June 2005 clearly connected international exit to the transfer of 
international responsibilities to Bosnian authorities and the EUSR office. This 
has also drawn the framework of sovereignty in Bosnia: until the OHR office 
is shut down, the full sovereignty of Bosnia will remain problematized. The 
PIC in February 2008 fine-tuned the modalities of international engagement 
once more. The transition from OHR to the EUSR would not be automatic; 
Bosnians would first “create the conditions for transition to occur.   
 
Especially with the increasing stagnation of the statebuilding project, the 
Europeans have strived to frame their involvement in Bosnia in the scope of 
enlargement. This has made it easier for them to emphasize the primary 
responsibility of the Bosnian leaders, since enlargement does not deal with 
contexts where sovereignty has been problematized. Yet, since the 
statebuilding project in Bosnia will technically end only with the closure of 
the OHR, the international community continues to hold discretion over what 
the future Bosnian state should look like: a functional state adhering to 
neoliberal principles. Thus, the responsibility of the Bosnians is, in fact, not 
taking the responsibility for their own future, but rather adhering to the 
“universal model of the neoliberal state”. Indeed, when different Bosnian 
leaders started to challenge Dayton or statebuilding reforms after 2006, the 
international community and the EU criticized them for being 
“irresponsible”. Defining full ownership as full adherence to the liberal 
internationalist framework has been a discursive safeguard applied in Bosnia. 
The framing of statebuilding as a technical and universal best practice has 
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strengthened this safeguard, implying that this vision of a democratic and 
functional Bosnia on its way to Europe is not developed by external actors but 
is a universal norm.  
 
Additionally, the EU’s narratives, exemplified previously, have articulated a 
distinction between the will and interests of the Bosnian people and the 
narrow self-interested goals of the Bosnian leaders. While the will of the 
Bosnian population, regardless of their community, is equated to the goals of 
statebuilding, the local politicians are blamed for being the ones pursuing 
narrow nationalist goals. From this angle, international engagement, no 
matter how intrusive it is, aims to further the will of the people; in fact, they 
intrude in Bosnian affairs to counter local politicians threatening the interests 
of local populations (Chandler: 2009).  The international and European 
discourse implies that ethnic nationalism is an anomaly and Bosnians would 
move towards European integration and Dayton implementation if given the 
chance (Belloni: 2007, Jeffrey: 2007).  Thus, in a way, international discourse 
claims to foster local ownership, by empowering the well being of local 
populations over the narrow self-interests of their leaders.  For instance, the 
2013 EU Progress Report for Bosnia states that “The country’s constitution 
(…) established a complex institutional architecture that remains inefficient 
and is subject to different interpretations¨, [which has] a negative impact on 
structural reforms and the country’s capacity to make progress towards the 
EU”. Different interpretations, clearly, have not been welcomed.  
 
Difficulties in the Attribution of Responsibility:  
 
The moral responsibility framework emphasizes the importance of 
identifying the moral agent in the attribution of responsibility. The 
statebuilding frame in Bosnia has always involved multiple international 
actors working together, making it more difficult to attribute responsibility to 
them separately (Dursun – Ozkanca: 2010). This has been less of a dilemma in 
the years between 1998-2006, when the OHR and the High Representative 
was to a great extent the main source of authority and PIC was the key 
decision-maker. Although the PIC/OHR did not have any powers over the 
other members of the international community, being the sole provider of 
Bosnia’s future vision and enforcing steps towards this end placed them in 
the drivers’ seat of external responsibility. The International Crisis Group 
(2011) reported that the OHR staff believes that they are needed to handle 
issues that other organizations do not or cannot. Yet, this dynamic obviously 
did not prejudice the discourse that the local actors had the primary 
responsibility in Bosnia.  
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Once the EU entered the equation, it became unclear to what extent the EU 
was responsible for Dayton implementation and to what extent for 
statebuilding. Both statebuilding and enlargement perspectives stress the 
“primary responsibility of the local authorities” in peace processes. However, 
statebuilding might ascribe temporary (executive) responsibilities to 
international actors in the sphere of the “sovereignty gap”, implying stronger 
international responsibilities in success and failure . Enlargement highlights 
the applicant state’s responsibility for shaping their policies, structure and 
identity through asymmetrical processes and fulfilling political and economic 
criteria (Tzifakis: 2012, Friis and Murphy: 1999). The EU enterprise is highly 
asymmetrical and unaccountable, but not imposed OHR style (Belloni: 2009). 
Thus, as long as the EU confines its involvement to the technical territory of 
enlargement in the form of political and economic criteria and harmonization 
with the acquis, it can more comfortably claim that its responsibilities lies in 
the technical realm (Dzihic and Wieser: 2011, Aybet and Bieber: 2011, Juncos: 
2012). While statebuilding aims closing a sovereignty gap, enlargement wants 
to construct Bosnia as a state that can join the Union, without necessarily 
concentrating on the full restoration of its sovereign prerogatives (Ghani and 
Lockhart: 2008). Indeed, conditionality is about the local leaders weighing the 
benefits of accession against the costs of transformation, and offering financial 
and technical assistance and institutional ties (Tzifakis: 2012). In fact, as seen 
above, this change is evident in the EU’s discourse after 2006, where 
enlargement perspectives are highlighted more than security and stability 
ones.  
 
The majority of EU states feel uncomfortable of the OHR presence in the 
country; this presence serves as a reminder that BiH is a country that does not 
enjoy full sovereignty, thus inevitably stressing their role as being directly 
engaged in the peace process (Vogel: 2011). The Council of the EU remarked 
that the PIC should consider the possible relocation of the OHR outside of the 
country in March 2011, has continuously asked for cuts in the OHR budget 
and has been criticized for undermining the High Representative’s work in 
Bosnia . The OHR and EUSR have stopped the practice of double hatting, and 
the reinforced EUSR has moved from the OHR office to the EU Delegation’s 
office in Sarajevo in 2011 . Yet, it is not possible to see the efforts of the EU in 
Bosnia solely in the realm of enlargement. Many EU countries are PIC 
members. The EU endorsed and actively supported Dayton implementation, 
sometimes through its unique ESDP tools. It has directly associated itself with 
the use of the Bonn powers on many occasions. The police and constitutional 
reform processes are among the best indicators on how the Union has used 
EU conditionality and its soft power to help foster Dayton implementation. 
This difference between the concentration of the EU discourse on its 
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the ground constitutes a ‘responsibility gap’, problematizing the attribution of 
responsibility to a statebuilding actor despite its deep involvement. The 
abundance of the different EU institutions working on Bosnia complicates the 
attribution of responsibility to the EU as a whole even further, with the EUSR, 
European Commission (Delegation) and the European Parliament defining 
their responsibilities to Bosnia in different ways (Venneri: 2010).  
 
6.2.2 Responsibility Gaps and Discursive Safeguards: The EU in Bosnia: 
 
This chapter has analyzed the EU’s role and responsibilities in Bosnia, in 
order to support the propositions on ¨responsibility gaps¨ and ¨discursive 
safeguards¨.  
 
One of the main findings has been showing that international responsibilities, 
from a moral responsibility perspective, go much beyond those defined under 
the dominant statebuilding narratives - defined as a “responsibility gap”. 
Statebuilding, from the viewpoint of international narratives, has been 
defined as a technical, narrow, limited support function, conducted in 
support of national priorities and under national ownership. Yet, the 
international community has given political and normative guidance to post-
conflict countries, has been engaged in comprehensive and intrusive efforts to 
materialize this guidance, and has caused certain unforeseen negative impacts 
arising from the implementation of statebuilding. In Bosnia, international 
efforts have been technically successful in bringing security, relative 
prosperity, and human rights and democratic standards. Yet, the core vision 
of establishing a self-sustained, resilient, inclusive, fully sovereign state has 
not yet been fulfilled. The image and foreign policy identity of the EU have 
also been negatively affected. The riots in February 2014 show the 
disillusionment of the Bosnian people, the remaining risks to viable stability 
and economic well-being. The international responsibility for this situation is 
left mostly unassigned. This lies at the heart of the “responsibility gap” in 
Bosnia.  
 
The final purpose of this thesis was presenting the idea of “discursive 
safeguards”, as the response of the international community/EU to challenges 
and criticisms regarding statebuilding, as explained above. For the sake of 
simplicity and manageability, four responsibility gaps and discursive 
safeguards were prioritized among others: the contrast between the static 
nature of moral responsibility and the changing nature of international 
involvement, the presentation of statebuilding as a technical exercise despite 
its political nature, the dilemmas regarding local ownership as well as the 











- The introduction of new, prospective 
responsibilities does not cancel out existing 
retrospective responsibilities, from a moral 
philosophy perspective. 
- International responsibilities remained 
constant, despite changes in global context, 
conflict dynamics, the intentions and threat 
perceptions of international actors, and their 
evolving capacities (primary responsibility of 
Bosnians, support role of PIC/EU).   
- The shift in the EU’s engagement in Bosnia 
from statebuilding to enlargement has not 
been analyzed adequately from an 
attributability perspective.   
- As international engagement moves from 
one phase to the next, there is no analysis on 
how this might change the responsibilities of 
external agents.  
- Definition of international 
responsibilities in a static fashion, such 
as supporting local actors even when 
comprehensive and intrusive 
statebuilding is ongoing.   
- Each new phase further obscures the 
fact that the international community 
has drawn and implemented the vision 
for Bosnia.  
- In each phase, narratives concentrate 
on prospective responsibilities, without 
clear analysis on retrospective 
responsibilities from previous phases. 
- Lack of debates on what new 
responsibilities might be, with changing 






as a Technical 
Exercise 
- Statebuilding in Bosnia has been a normative 
and political exercise.  
- Yet, the statebuilding frame defines EU as a 
neutral and technical actor that aims to ¨do 
good¨.  
- Both involvement in statebuilding and 
enlargement has been framed as technical 
exercises, obscuring the responsibilities for 
choosing and implementing a certain model of 
conflict resolution as a solution for BiH. 
- The EU’s internal dynamics foster the 
narrative choice to frame statebuilding as a 
technical exercise.  
 
- Presentation of statebuilding and 
subsequent EU integration as a universal 
best practice and the only viable and 
rational alternative to conflict, allowing 
the technical framing of steps taken in 
that direction. 
- Allowing attribution of primary 
responsibility to local populations by 
defining the neoliberal state as the norm 
and statebuilding as the way to get there. 
- Creating an image of success by 
framing success as narrow and 
quantitatively measurable. 
- Lack of clarity of mandates beyond 








- Statebuilding is a comprehensive and 
intrusive exercise. The will of international 
actors is emphasized where sovereignty is 
problematized.   Enlargement frameworks 
made Bosnia the recipient of strategies 
developed elsewhere for other countries. 
- Yet, international responsibilities are 
presented as a limited and narrow support 
function, while the primary responsibilities of 
the conflict country are emphasized.  
- The consociationism of the Dayton system as 
well as the enlargement process resulted in the 
empowering of nationalist elites over local 
interests. Yet, the end goal of intervention is 
local ownership.  
 -  Although the emphasis throughout 
the intervention period is on the 
responsibility of the Bosnians, this 
translates as the responsibility of the 
Bosnian leaders to adhere to the 
internationally defined/imposed vision 
and framework – especially with regards 
to European integration.  
- The framing of statebuilding as a 
technical and universal best practice 
implies that the vision for BiH is not 
developed by external actors but is a 
universal norm. 
- The EU and the PIC claim to foster the 
interests of Bosnian people over those of 




Identifying a concrete agent of responsibility – the EU – and connecting it 
with a specific context – Bosnia and Herzegovina – has helped the 
propositions of this research with direct examples from the ground. Looking 
into the application of statebuilding guidelines in Bosnia, it can be concluded 
that there has been success on the technical, measurable, quantitative 
elements such as bringing stability, establishing state-level institutions, 
delivering basic services and taking steps towards integration into the EU. 
The problematic aspects have always been questions related to identity, 
territorial divisions, ethnicity, constitutional structures and conflicting visions 
related to the future set-up of Bosnia. The understanding of statebuilding 
suggests that the technical implementation of statebuilding guidelines will 
lead to the withering away of these questions. In Bosnia, the reverse has 
happened; the political questions left unaddressed have taken over the 
statebuilding agenda and threaten to overturn the technical gains achieved. 
This dynamic that envisages the separation of the technical and political 
spheres and attributes the responsibility of the ¨political¨ to the Bosnians is 
one of the biggest ‘responsibility gaps¨’ of neoliberal statebuilding. In fact, 
when one looks at the list of European responsibilities cited above, this 
negative dynamic risks the fulfillment of many responsibilities, from 
providing sustainable peace and security, ensuring better service delivery and 
promoting a European future to the local populations, to protecting the 
economic and security interests of the EU and fostering the image of Europe.  


















- The multitude of international actors makes 
it hard to establish moral responsibility for 
specific moral agents. 
- It is unclear to what extent the EU is a 
statebuilding actor and to what extent it is 
responsible for enlargement. 
- It is difficult to understand which EU 
institution or actor is responsible for which 
action, beyond technical responsibilities 
arising from narrowly defined mandates.  
- The complications in defining the 
moral agents has led to appropriate 
actors being off the hook on some 
occasions.   
- The shift from the statebuilding to the 
enlargement framework has led the EU 
to increasingly frame its involvement in 
BiH from the enlargement perspective, 
allowing it to avoid its responsibilities 




This thesis has not aimed to point fingers at the ‘irresponsible’ members of the 
international community by highlighting their failures and mistakes. Nor did 
it intend to portray external actors in statebuilding in an entirely negative 
light – as unhelpful actors that interfere in conflict situations, prioritize their 
own interests under the guise of statebuilding and exit at times when they are 
most needed. Such claims would deny the value and benefits of having a 
multitude of international, regional and national efforts to produce 
sustainable solutions to conflict, the genuine intentions of many international 
actors to promote peace, and the good will of the individuals who risk their 
lives to go to the field to operationalize these efforts. 
 
The purpose has been much simpler. It was to answer this question: How 
could the international community, having set out the rules for Bosnia from 
the outset and having retained influence over its management as well as its 
future direction in the years to follow, claim so little responsibility for its 
actions there? Similar situations in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq showed a 
dynamic common with BiH, in terms of the construction of responsibilities. 
External actors assumed responsibility in ‘building countries’ in a manner 
that was limited, compared to their vast power and influence over the present 
and future of those countries. Such examples relate to a key entry point to this 
research: the apparent mismatch between the comprehensive and often 
intrusive role of international actors in statebuilding and the narrow and 
limited definitions of their responsibilities.  
 
These initial thoughts led to three concrete propositions. First of all, 
statebuilding clearly presaged an influential role for international actors in post-
conflict countries. It would be logical to expect that such an influential role 
would come with comprehensive responsibilities. This thesis tested this 
proposition, via a detailed look into the theory, practice and progression of 
statebuilding, as well as into the manner in which the EU partook in this 
exercise in general and in BiH. 
 
In Bosnia, the international community (and particularly the US) was 
instrumental in creating the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) – an accord that 
was never ratified by any referendum (O’Leary and Mc Crudden: 2012). In a 
country whose full sovereignty would be compromised until certain criteria 
(set by international actors) were fulfilled, external actors assumed key 
executive and judiciary positions after the DPA was signed (Chandler: 2006, 
Belloni: 2007). The Bonn Powers gave the High Representative an additional 
executive and legislative role, designed to facilitate the implementation of the 
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civilian aspects of the Dayton Accords, that included the ability to impose 
laws and to sack obstructive politicians180  (Venneri; 2010, Tzifakis: 2012, 
Belloni: 2007).  Moreover, and maybe more crucially, international actors (and 
increasingly the EU), dictated the way forward for BiH. The full 
implementation of an emerging and comprehensive statebuilding frame, 
based on such neoliberal parameters such as individual rights, good 
governance, democracy, elections and a free market economy, preferably via 
constitutional reform, would put BiH on the way to full sovereignty. The EU, 
would not only help this transition through its Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP), but would be Bosnia’s final destination.   
 
In theatres such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine, international actors have 
been involved in statebuilding in many different ways, and have acted with 
varying levels of comprehensiveness and intrusiveness. In general, they were 
responsible for pushing for and supporting peace deals, sometimes dictating 
the full terms of the agreement. Throughout the implementation stage, they 
would then frequently change the parameters of how the state should be 
structured on numerous occasions. They dictated guidelines under the guise 
of following universal and technical principles, even though these guidelines 
indicated a choice by the international community to try to achieve a certain 
type of state – a choice that should have entailed responsibility. In general, 
local choices and ownership were respected mainly if they fell within those 
preexisting guidelines. In the meantime, the actors often defined the direction 
of the statebuilding project according to factors that did not necessarily 
originate with the conflict itself, such as new developments in the theory and 
practice of statebuilding; emerging global or regional threat perceptions; and 
changing foreign-policy aspirations. All of these examples served to reaffirm 
the first proposition of the thesis, that statebuilding is a comprehensive and 
intrusive exercise.  
 
The second proposition of the research was that the responsibilities of external 
actors in statebuilding contexts have not been framed comprehensively. Numerous 
examples cited in this thesis illustrate how the international, and specifically 
the European, discourse defined responsibilities in a limited and narrow 
manner. In order to test this proposition, two methods have been employed: 
(a) discovering whether it is possible to talk about a general frame through 
which external responsibilities are constructed, and, (b) looking into 
alternative ways to attribute responsibilities to external agents.   
 
The frame analysis conducted in the thesis identified a narrative that could be 
used to understand how statebuilding activities and responsibility were 																																																								
180 See the PIC Bonn Conclusions, at www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182   
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constructed (while still acknowledging deviations from the frame and 
context-specific behavior). The frame problematizes the sovereignty of states 
that cannot protect their populations or that pose a threat for international 
peace and security. It also defines statebuilding as a technical process aiming 
to establish well functioning liberal-democratic states based on ¨universal¨ 
best practices of state administration. States that cannot fulfill their protection 
or prevention responsibilities due to a lack of capacity are the subject of 
statebuilding efforts.  
 
The frame also holds that statebuilding does not directly challenge state 
sovereignty, and it implies the consent and primary responsibility of the state 
being “built.” The international community’s role is thereby defined as a 
support function, simply helping fragile states to achieve sustainable stability 
through capacity-building in several areas, ranging from development and 
democratization to security provision, good governance and human rights. 
When external actors have to assume more direct executive functions, these 
efforts are mainly defined as technical. The frame ultimately holds that 
statebuilding not only allows conflict-ridden states to better respond to 
challenges, it also boosts their sovereignty and fosters local ownership. 
 
Following the frame analysis, the thesis sought to establish an alternative 
framework to attribute moral responsibility, using relevant philosophy and 
international relations literature.  The comparison of the way external 
responsibilities are constructed under the statebuilding frame to the 
alternative narrative of moral responsibility indicated that the statebuilding 
frame attributes responsibilities to external actors in a rather limited and 
narrow manner. A deeper analysis of declared intentions, as well as of the 
impact caused by external (European) actors, concluded that external 
responsibilities can go beyond the protection of local populations and the 
sustainable prevention of conflict through capacity building. Indeed, civilian 
international interventions can lead to the assumption of more direct 
responsibilities by external actors in such areas as the promotion of 
democracy; the construction of long(er)-term stability and economic 
prosperity; the establishment of functional systems of justice that contribute 
to reconciliation; the construction of viable structures that combat state 
fragility by addressing the root causes of conflict; the integration of “failed 
and failing” states into the international system; the encouragement of 
sustainable development and prosperity (in the EU); the promotion of free 
and fair trade; the mitigation of threats posed by migration, criminality, 
organized crime, terrorism, regional conflicts; and the disruption of normal 
economic activity. In addition, the EU formulated responsibilities and 
definitions toward relating to itself as an entity, for example building and 
solidifying its identity; boosting its capacity as an international actor; 
	 254	
propagating and affirming its own model; and promoting European, 
internationalist values and norms.  
 
In comparing the moral responsibility framework with the statebuilding 
frame, the thesis identifying three dilemmas: 
 - Change: The static definition of external responsibilities in the 
statebuilding frame stood in contrast with the ever-changing nature of 
statebuilding. From a moral responsibility perspective, every change in 
capacity, policy and practice requires a new definition of 
responsibilities (prospective responsibilities), without cancelling out 
the old ones (retrospective responsibilities). 
 - Statebuilding as a technical exercise: In discourse, the political nature 
of statebuilding is accepted, while in the statebuilding frame, external 
responsibilities are labeled a technical exercise and the role of external 
actors is regarded as “neutral, credible and ethical – almost scientific”.  
From a moral responsibility angle, statebuilding is a choice by external 
actors to create a certain type of government rather than a universal 
best practice. Moreover, external actors openly declare (political) 
intentions to protect their interests and promote their identity and 
model by engaging in statebuilding.  
 - The dilemmas of local ownership and sovereignty: In the statebuilding 
frame, external actors derive their legitimacy from the purpose of 
restoring full sovereignty to conflict countries and prioritizing local 
ownership as a principle and an end goal.  Yet, the international 
community plays a key role in the creation of new political and 
institutional rules in post-conflict settings, sometimes even performing 
quasi-governmental functions, and creating a modus vivendi based on 
external influence through the application of technocratic guidelines. 
Moreover, external actors, instead of fostering sovereignty, often 
attached conditions to it – ones that might contradict the idea of local 
ownership and state sovereignty.  
 
In short, the frame analysis and the construction of a moral-responsibility 
framework made it possible to test and affirm the hypothesized mismatch 
between the narrow and limited way external responsibilities are constructed 
in the statebuilding frame and the broader construction of responsibilities 
under a moral-responsibility perspective. This mismatch was dubbed the 
“responsibility gap.”  
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The third and final proposition of the thesis concerned the relationship 
between the international community and its responsibility gaps. 
International efforts to reform statebuilding practices were not deep enough 
to bridge the responsibility gaps identified in the statebuilding frame; instead, 
those efforts were seen to be focused on fine-tuning statebuilding to new 
realities. Where responsibility gaps existed, they were protected by 
“discursive safeguards”; defined as narratives ensuring that external actors 
attributed responsibilities to themselves in narrow and limited ways. 
 
In looking at this third proposition in BiH and other theatres, technical, 
measurable, quantitative successes achieved by the EU were visible, for 
example in bringing about stability, establishing state-level institutions, and 
delivering basic services. In the case of Bosnia, this also included taking steps 
toward integration into the EU. Actors in these theatres tended to address 
gaps and shortcomings in their implementation of the statebuilding frame in 
practical and limited terms; reports prepared by such institutions as RAND, 
OSCE, DFID and OECD-DAC offered advice on how to improve the practice 
of statebuilding within the boundaries of the existing frame.  
 
Where these actors fall short is in address questions related to identity, 
territorial divisions, ethnicity, constitutional structures and the future shape 
of conflict countries. The statebuilding frame suggests that the 
implementation of guidelines will be sufficient to address these issues. In BiH, 
though, the reverse has happened; political questions that were insufficiently 
addressed have taken over the statebuilding agenda and threaten to overturn 
the technical gains achieved, while the responsibility for reversing this 
situation has been placed on local leaders, under the guise of local ownership 
or via the issuing of technical guidelines. This dynamic, which envisages the 
separation of the technical and political spheres and attributes the 
responsibility of the “political” to the Bosnians, lies at the very core of the 
responsibility gap. Response to these problems has often taken the form of 
“discursive safeguards,” some of which have been identified below: 
 - Change:   The statebuilding frame defines responsibilities in a narrow, 
limited and temporary manner. These responsibilities are not set out in 
a detailed manner, but are kept general and vague. As such, changes in 
the practice and implementation of statebuilding do not require a 
recalibration of international responsibilities. Discourse on 
responsibility ultimately concentrates on intentions for the future 
(prospective responsibilities), rather than the (retrospective) impacts of 
intervention. As a result of this framing, even when the purposes, 
methods, goals and results of statebuilding change, a thorough 
analysis of shifting external responsibilities becomes unnecessary. 
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 - Statebuilding as a technical exercise: A number of factors have made it 
possible for external actors to define their responsibilities in a limited 
and narrow way. These include the framing of mission mandates in a 
purely technical manner; the connection of responsibilities to these 
narrow mandates rather than to the general impact of statebuilding on 
the country, its people and the interests and values of the actors 
involved; the avoidance of issues of history, culture and identity in 
favor of a quantitative and technocratic approach; and the definition of 
success in a limited and quantitatively measurable way.  Frames that 
attribute actors’ activities to “following international best practices” 
put the intervention in a universal frame and help to dilute the 
responsibility of making a political choice to select and engage in 
statebuilding as a particular type of conflict-resolution activity.  
 - Local ownership and sovereignty: The external actors have established 
their main intention as the restoration of full sovereignty to the country 
where the intervention is taking place and the provision of assistance 
to local populations, as well as by emphasizing the primary 
responsibility of the nation-state being helped. In creating this frame, 
the external actors have covered up a responsibility gap between their 
emphasis on the assumption of responsibilities and ownership by local 
actors in the sites of intervention and their problematization of those 
countries’ sovereignty and capacities, as well as the gap created when 
their intrusive acts on the ground have tended to disempower local 
actors.   
 
Taken together, the three propositions outlined above have helped to test the 
hypothesis of this research—that the international community uses discursive 
safeguards to cover up the gap between the comprehensive and intrusive 
nature of statebuilding and the narrow and limited definition, in international 
relations, of the external responsibilities of external actors in statebuilding.  
 
This thesis has been focused on Bosnia, in order to maintain a manageable 
scope. Yet, throughout, narrative examples have been provided from conflict 
situations and statebuilding efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Central 
African Republic, Mali and Kosovo.  
 
Up until this point, the thesis has analyzed discursive safeguards as a 
rhetorical escape hatch for the international community—as tools that are 
embedded in the statebuilding frame, and that allow international actors to 
avoid responsibility when faced with situations they cannot address.  Yet, 
there is another way to look at these safeguards. First of all, the extent to 
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which they genuinely absolve the international community from 
responsibility is questionable. Secondly, they do not, in and of themselves, 
provide sustainable solutions for conflicts or to problems that arise during the 
implementation of statebuilding. They simply serve as band-aids, covering up 
the underlying root causes of conflicts and the international community’s 
inability to find lasting solutions for them. In the short run, discursive 
safeguards might alleviate the burden of responsibility on international 
actors, as well as the inherent shortcomings of the frame itself, but in the long 
run, they lead international actors to become mired in intractable situations.  
 
By defining its role and identity within the statebuilding frame, the European 
Union managed to carve out a foreign-policy role and identity for itself. It also 
minimized the political risks of engagement by focusing on the technical 
nature of statebuilding and the support function of the Union. When an early 
exit became imminent, for instance in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the 
temporary role of external actors and the primary responsibility of the nation 
state was more emphasized. The discursive safeguards employed with 
respect to these theatres have not necessarily fostered the well being of local 
populations in a sustainable manner, nor eradicated terror threats and socio-
economic risks to the EU or fostered its image as a credible foreign-policy 
actor. Instead, by choosing not to define these areas as being among its 
responsibilities, but instead constructing a narrative, under the statebuilding 
frame, around the narrow and limited definition of responsibilities, the Union 
has effectively trapped itself in that frame. It has robbed itself of the 
possibility of credibly questioning the statebuilding frame or defining its role 
and responsibilities in a way that would allow it to take more creative and 
robust action to address the issues lying at the core of the conflicts in which it 
has intervened. 
 
This is precisely the situation in Bosnia today, which can best be defined as in 
limbo. Despite years of fluctuating in the level of international engagement, 
the situation has evolved to a point where neither statebuilding nor 
enlargement perspectives suggest a viable future for the country. The EU and 
the international community appear to be unable to develop and implement 
creative solutions that can steer the country toward self-sufficiency, full 
sovereignty and local ownership. Nor are they willing or able to contribute 
the extra time and energy that might lend renewed urgency to the 
reconstruction project. Instead, the international community, and the EU in 
particular, remain engaged in Bosnia, out a sense of their economic and 
security interests and their image, but, worried about the risks of potential 
turmoil and the harm a more robust engagement might cause to the Bosnian 
people, they have lost control of the political situation. The Union remains 
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trapped in its own narrative, falling back on elements of a frame that has, in 
many ways, lost touch with global realities, and the realities on the ground. 
 
Other theatres provide similar examples. At various stages of the conflicts in 
Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya and Palestine and elsewhere, statebuilding 
has been presented as a method of sustainable conflict response. The framing 
of international intervention and of the roles and responsibilities of external 
actors has all converged to a certain extent with the statebuilding frame 
previously discussed. This frame has provided external actors with discursive 
safeguards that present their roles as broadly positive, ideologically neutral 
and supportive of local actors. Yet, it has not necessarily led to sustainable 
solutions. Local communities in all of these theatres continue, to varying 
degrees, to live with the threat of instability and war. Refugee flows to 
Western countries, disruption of normal economic activity and terror threats 
remain viable risks.  
 
Nor have discursive safeguards helped to bolster the images of external actors 
in the international community, or to prevent them from being blamed for 
failures in the countries where they have intervened. A quick Google search 
for the keywords “Bosnia” and “the European Union” still talks about 
“Bosnia presenting a terrifying picture of Europe's future,” “Bosnia, and 
vanishing European leadership,” “Bosnia and the European Union - A Balkan 
dysfunction” and “Bosnia: Europe’s Time to Act”181. External actors, too, 
remain in a kind of limbo between whole-hearted intervention and full exit—
one in which they cannot fulfill their moral responsibilities to local 
populations, to their own people, or to the identities and self-images they 
wish to promote. They cannot move forward. They are simply entrapped.  
 
This process of “entrapment” (Schimmelfennig: 2001, Hansen: 2006, Loizides: 
2015) occurs as the identities and interests of agents become entrenched in 
frames—ones that make it increasingly difficult for agents to adapt to new 
conclusions or to accept challenges to the dominant narrative. Even if 
community members apply standards of legitimacy opportunistically, to 
advance their self-interests, they can become entrapped by their arguments 
and obliged to act if they have taken those arguments seriously 
(Schimmelfennig: 2001). Schimmelfennig’s exploration of entrapment argues 
that the use of rhetorical action in order to avoid assuming responsibility, as 
well as the confirmation of self-set moral standards, can lead to a loss of 																																																								




to-act.aspx (Accessed on 22 December 2014).  
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credibility and a decline in the reputation of actors. In other words, failing to 
assume responsibility while core issues and root causes of problems remain 
unaddressed can erode the legitimacy of post-conflict interventions, while 
harming both the interests and the image of external actors.  
 
From this perspective, in the long run, discursive safeguards do not help 
international actors to avoid their responsibilities, but prevent these actors 
from fulfilling them. Discursive safeguards divorce external actors from their 
initial promises to enhance their political and economic interests, to boost 
their own images and to advance the conditions of local populations. The use 
of discursive safeguards as “bandaids” also hampers the ability of 
international actors to find new and creative solutions to conflicts that are in 
line with changing global contexts, threat perceptions and economic realities, 
as well as with evolving situations on the ground. This is the final conclusion 
of this thesis, which could provide an avenue for future exploration and 
research.   
 
The theory, practice and methods of conflict prevention have been subject to 
constant evolution and change. Even the best responses to today’s conflicts 
will not provide answers that will last forever; they must be fine-tuned, 
shifted or even dramatically altered in order to respond to the needs and 
demands of a turbulent world, as well as to the constantly shifting nature of 
conflicts.  
 
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has announced a comprehensive review 
on peace operations, to be conducted in 2015, which will look into various 
possibilities to reform the peacekeeping and peacebuilding architecture of the 
UN. The need to revisit the way we think about conflict has been voiced in 
other regional and international fora, as well. In order to come up with new, 
creative and satisfactory solutions, and to convince the international 
community to invest in these solutions, it will be necessary to think creatively. 
Rethinking and reformulating the ways in which external actors frame their 
responsibilities might help foster creative, results-oriented approaches to 
statebuilding and conflict response, and to help overcome the phenomenon of 
entrapment. Looking at international statebuilding from the perspective of 
moral responsibility, for example, might allow the international community 
to define its responsibilities both to the country intervened and to itself in a 
more comprehensive and active way.  
 
From a moral-responsibility perspective, rethinking peace operations as 
efforts to close responsibility gaps would require significant brainstorming 
about core ideas of statebuilding. It would require a clear definition of the 
agent (the Self), the subject (the Other), as well as the clarification of 
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intentions in a more concrete and static manner, the identification of 
statebuilding as way to sustainably prevent conflict and the clear 
identification of responsibilities. It would require that actions on the ground 
remain consistent with these intentions and constant assessments to 
understand whether this has been the case. It would require a different type 
of political will, since improved procedures and institutions can only 
supplement political will in making the Union more responsible in conflict 
resolution. But more importantly, it would require seeing statebuilding as the 
active choice of external actors—a choice that entails certain responsibilities. 
Only then would it be possible to close or narrow the responsibility gap, to 
the benefit of local populations, of the economic and security interests of 
statebuilders themselves, and of their image and identity. The increasing use 
of discursive safeguards in Bosnia by the EU shows that this kind of soul-
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